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Abstract
This study argues that the nexus of business, politics and the state which has been central 
to the capitalist upsurge in Southeast Asia (McVey, 1992:9) has also been central to the 
rise of Malay capitalism and the transformation of Chinese business in Malaysia. That 
nexus is intimate in Malaysia where the government through the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) has sought to create a Malay commercial and industrial community, in short Malay 
capitalists. In the process of creating Malay entrepreneurs the study shows how just as 
the boundaries between business, politics and the state became blurred in the Malaysian 
context there, as indeed elswhere in Southeast Asia, it is no longer easy in many cases to 
distinguish between “rent-seeking” and true “productive” capitalism, between pariahs and 
entrepreneurs or between patrons and clients. But from this amalgam what sort of 
capitalism and capitalists have emerged in Malaysia? To throw light on the character and 
strength of Malaysian capitalism answers are sought to two questions. First:
Has government manipulation created new sources of entrepreneurship or 
only fostered rentiers?
The study identifies the complex interaction between the state, party [UMNO] and 
business as the source of dynamism or defeat in the development of Malay capitalists. It 
argues that significant changes are taking place in those relationships, while at the same 
time more Malay groups are developing a greater independence of patronage - changes 
that suggest it is imperative we keep our view of the nature of Malay capitalism open to 
revision. But, just as the growth of Malay capitalism is more variegated than generally 
supposed, so this survey of Malaysian capitalism also seeks to illuminate the change and 
transformation occurring among Chinese business groups. So the second question 
addressed is:
Have Malaysia's political circumstances trapped Chinese businessmen in 
dependency relationships similar in kind if not degree to Riggs' pariah 
entrepreneurs?
After a survey of Chinese business groups the study finds that analyses in the 1980s 
which have described the relationship between the state and Chinese [as well as foreign] 
capital as discrete entities and in antipathetical terms, no longer seem appropriate to the 
more complex and complementary character of those categories in the 1990s. At a general 
level this survey also challenges a common view that Chinese capital is completely 
different to Malay capital. There are differences, but increasingly there are important 
points of similarity in the manner of their growth, their relations with the state and the 
UMNO leadership, and their credentials as capitalists.
Overall the study argues against drawing sharp contrasts between dependency and 
self-reliance, between state and capital, and between rent-seekers and true productive 
capitalists. For it is from that amalgam of categories and groups that this study shows a 
form of capitalism emerging in Malaysia which is nonetheless remarkably dynamic, 
vibrant and resilient despite its ‘unorthodox’ origins, and already well integrated into the 
increasingly complex product cycles and investment patterns of the rapidly growing 
Asian region.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The nexus between the state and business is intimate in Malaysia where the government 
through its New Economic Policy (NEP) has sought to create a Malay commercial and 
industrial community, in short Malay capitalists1. The pursuit of that goal by the 
Malaysian Government raises questions that go to the heart of the debate about the 
character of capitalism in Southeast Asia.
This thesis argues that 'the nexus of business, politics and the state which has been 
central to the capitalist upsurge in Southeast Asia' (McVey, 1992:9) has also been 
central to the rise of Malay capitalism and the transformation of Chinese business in 
Malaysia. And just as the boundaries between business, politics and the state have 
become increasingly blurred in the process of creating Malay entrepreneurs, so the 
distinction between other important categories of analysis have also become less clear. 
In the Malaysian context, as indeed elsewhere in Southeast Asia, it is no longer easy in 
many cases to distinguish between "rent-seeking" and true "productive" capitalism, 
between pariahs and entrepreneurs or between patrons and clients. Yet from this 
amalgam the thesis will argue that a form of capitalism nevertheless appears to be 
emerging in Malaysia which is nonetheless remarkably dynamic, vibrant and resilient, 
despite its 'unorthodox' origins, and already well integrated into the increasingly 
complex product cycles and investment patterns of the rapidly growing Asian region.
Southeast Asian Capitalism : 'real' or not or what?
The towering skyscrapers of concrete and glass that now dominate the skylines of 
Jakarta, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok reflect the dramatic capitalist upsurge 
that has taken place in Southeast Asia as an increasingly significant share of the regions 
growth and wealth is derived from manufactures and services rather than commodities. 
Yet while the images of plantations and paddy fields give way to modem metropolises
1 The New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched in association with the Second Malaysian Plan for 
1971-75. The NEP contained two prongs, namely to eradicate poverty 'irrespective of race' and 
restructure Malaysian society to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with 
economic function' (4MP:31).
2and urban sprawl, some analysts have questioned whether the growth underpinning 
such change is real capitalism or a chimera, some Southeast Asian derivative of 
capitalism that ultimately will not be sustainable.
A number of arguments are put forward to support this point of view. Some assert 
that Southeast Asian growth remains overly dependent and vulnerable to external 
factors. With regard to trade it is argued that the trading environment and export 
markets that provided opportunities for the first wave of NIC's no longer exist and that 
the Southeast Asian economies are structurally locked into a dependency relationship 
with Japan.2 Critics also point to widening income disparities between urban rich and 
rural poor, rising levels of debt, environmental degradation and other negative aspects 
of Southeast Asian growth.
A colourful journalistic account of Southeast Asian capitalism in these terms is 
provided by James Clad (1989) who argues that the region's remarkable economic 
growth and the emergence of its new corporate captains mask the reality that these 
economies are corrupt, speculative and fragile and unlikely to be resilient in the longer 
term. In short, "despite the glitter, Southeast Asia's prosperity rests on shaky 
foundations and depends on external forces beyond its control. The regions growth, in 
its essence, results primarily from outsiders' capital, outsiders' technology, outsiders' 
management and outsiders' markets" (Clad, 1989:ix). According to Clad the role of the 
state is largely a negative one. Rather, the nexus between business and politics has 
promoted insidious networks of cronies who scramble for profits through short-term 
speculative activity in trade, finance and property. Moreover, dominating those 
networks, and indeed much of the domestic side of economic activity in the region, is 
the commercial talent of the Chinese immigrant minority (Clad, 1989:1-25).
A more considered formulation of this view of Southeast Asian capitalism has been 
developed by Yoshihara (1988). Many scholars have found Yoshihara's analysis rather 
exaggerated, though there is certainly more than a grain of truth in it, so a summation of 
his argument and those advanced against it will serve as a useful starting point to 
consider the debate regarding the 'reality' of Southeast Asian and Malaysian capitalism.
According to Yoshihara (1988:3) 'unfortunately what has occurred in Southeast 
Asia is the emergence of ersatz capitalism.' (The word 'ersatz' literally means
2 See Bello and Rosenfeld, 1990:8-11. For critiques of Bello and Rosenfeld see Halveri; Beresford; 
and Purcal, 1992: 546-551.
3'substitute' but with an implication of 'not the real thing'.) Ersatz capitalism therefore is 
one which is inferior, imitative and artificial when compared to real capitalism. 
Capitalism in Southeast Asia is ersatz because it has been largely confined to the 
tertiary sector. Yoshihara concedes that the problem is not domination by foreign 
capital, 'since that has declined in importance and foreign ownership in the 
manufacturing sector has become less significant in the region,' but argues that 
Southeast Asian industrial capital cannot act as a vanguard of economic development 
'because it does not have an export capability' (Yoshihara, 1988:3).
Yoshihara cites three main reasons why Southeast Asian capitalism possesses 
neither the dynamism nor independent technological base associated with capitalist 
industrialisation in Europe, North America and Japan. The first concerns the 
technological backwardness of Southeast Asian societies and their low levels of 
investment in science and technology by government and the private sector. A second 
reason concerns the low quality of government intervention in the economy which has 
led to the domination of Southeast Asian capitalism by non-indigenous Chinese, rent- 
seekers, and cronies and the development of a form of industrialisation built on 
expensive government subsidies, concessions and tariff barriers. Finally Yoshihara 
argues that Southeast Asian capitalism is erstaz because a strong domestic capitalist 
class has not emerged and the region remains dependent on foreign capital for the 
development of technologically sophisticated industry (Yoshihara, 1988:3-4 & 122- 
131).
Yoshihara's view of what constitutes 'true' capitalism in Southeast Asia or elsewhere 
for that matter is hard to sustain in the face of the consistently high growth rates of all 
the ASEAN countries (except the Philippines); moreover it echoes as Mackie (1989) 
has observed, some kind of latter day physiocratic fallacy.3 Instead of the eighteenth 
century view of some French economists that agriculture was the only source of real 
wealth Yoshihara posits a contemporary version, whereby only industrial production for 
export plus rising productivity and technological independence constitutes 'real'
3 See Mackie, 1989:104 Book review, "Ersatz Capitalism." The Physiocrats were a group of 
eighteenth-century French economists led by Quesnay who believed in the existence of a natural 
order and regarded the state's role as simply that o f preserving property and upholding the natural 
order. They held that agriculture was the only source of wealth. The central point o f their analysis 
was the search for the produit net which was not a surplus of social wealth in the abstract (exchange- 
value), but of concrete material wealth of useful goods. It was this technological approach which led 
the physiocrats to single out one particular branch of production (agriculture) as the one really 
productive one. See Roll, 1953:128-137.
4capitalism. Not only is this perspective old fashioned, but as Robison and Hewison have 
separately pointed out, it suggests a view of capitalism that would qualify perhaps no 
more than a dozen countries as capitalist.4 It may for instance no longer apply to the 
United States, or at least significant regions of it, where recent data shows that the net 
capital stock in services has outstripped manufacturing.5 More immediately it would 
exclude Singapore which is primarily dependent upon foreign investment in industry 
and whose dynamic domestic economic element is confined to the services sector 
which, in Yoshihara's view, cannot constitute the driving force of capitalism. In 
Yoshihara's view, technological innovation is crucial to capitalist development but, as 
various critics have pointed out, there is no inherent reason why all industrial capitalist 
economies need to produce their own technologies. When the latest technology can be 
bought or borrowed or stolen from abroad and combined with effective systems of 
management to produce internationally competitive products, that surely is not only 
well-established capitalist practice but also a more profitable and efficient use of 
resources.6
Parallel with his view of capitalism, Yoshihara tends to dismiss the claims of 
rentiers, crony capitalists, speculators and the like to be recognised as true capitalists. 
But in fact his 'strange breeds of (Southeast Asian) capitalists' are by no means unique 
to the region and are found in many economies generally acknowledged to be capitalist. 
Moreover, their presence has not prevented capitalist development - although their 
activities may have been inimical to efficiency and brought about slower development 
than would otherwise have been the case. Thus, although development in some 
economies may be sluggish, introverted and even chaotic in contrast to the experience 
of those with flourishing manufacturing exports, there do not seem to be grounds for 
considering one type of economy as capitalist and the other as non-capitalist.
Finally, Yoshihara's conception of Southeast Asian capitalism as ersatz suffers from 
a static quality in that he believes that industrialisation in Southeast Asia is driven by 
foreign technology and therefore is having no impact on the domestic business class. 
Yoshihara seems to deny the possibility that business people 'nurtured within networks 
of patronage, or within the service or protected import substitution sector, are showing 
signs of moving beyond those origins' (Robison, 1989:122).
4 See Book reviews, Ersatz Capitalism' by Robison, 1989:119-124 and by Hewison, 1991:540-543.
5 See Hewison, Ersatz Capitalism' 1991:542
6 See Book reviews 'Ersatz Capitalism' Mackie, 1989 and Robison, 1989.
5In contrast to Yoshihara's approach, this thesis will adopt a broader conception of 
capitalism. Following McVey, capitalism will be understood 'as a system in which the 
means of production, are in private hands, are employed to create a profit, some of 
which is reinvested to increase profit-generating capacity. Thus the groups and 
individuals studied deal with agribusiness, banking and other services, construction, 
trade, mining, and other non-manufacturing activities, provided they are carried on in a 
capitalist manner and involve domestic capital’ (McVey, 1992:8). Beginning with this 
broader definition, we are guided to the examination of the economies of the region not 
as deviants from, but as variants of, capitalism. Reflecting various cultural, social and 
historical experiences it is hardly surprising that the paths taken by the countries of 
Southeast Asia toward industrialisation differ from those of West Europe, North 
America and Japan.7 In this thesis, the origins of a domestic capitalist class will be 
sought among the rentiers, cronies and clients whom Yoshihara dismisses as no more 
than ersatz capitalists.
Capitalism and the state in Southeast Asia
In the debate about the character of capitalism, or more accurately capitalisms, of 
Southeast Asia the role of the state looms large.8 In considering the role of the state, it 
is necessary to distinguish between the state and the government. As Stepan has argued, 
'the state must be considered as more than the government. It is the continuous 
administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not only to 
structure relationships between civil society and public authority in a polity but also to 
structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well' (Stepan, 1978:xii).
Many analysts of East Asia's economic success have identified the presence of a 
strong state as an essential ingredient of successful industrialization. The strong state
7 As critics of Yoshihara's approach have all pointed out in one way or another, Yoshihara is implicitly 
comparing the Southeast Asian experience of industrialization with Japan's as if there were no other 
growth trajectory and not surprisingly he finds them all wanting (See Mackie, 1989:105). As Robison 
notes, Yoshihara is essentially concerned to chart an ideal path of industrial development, not 
capitalism per se. Rather than focussing on capitalism as a type of activity, Yoshihara's analysis 
would have been on firmer ground had he defined capitalism more in terms of, 'the systems of social 
and economic relationships which are created by particular systems of production and not the degree 
to which an industrial economy can establish its own technology and sustain growth over a long 
period’ (Robison, 1989:121).
8 Some of the principal work done so far to place Southeast Asia's capitalist development in a 
theoretical framework includes: Crouch 1985; Doner 1991(a) and Hewison, Robison, Rodan, eds., 
1993. See also an earlier discussion in Higgot and Robison, eds., 1985 and McVey 1992. For more 
general theoretical discussions concerning the state see Skocpal 1985; Stepan 1978; Eisenstadt 1969; 
Mann 1989 and Weber 1968.
6argument, reflecting the concern to 'bring the state back in' as a central concept of 
analysis,9 was not of course confined to East Asia, but sprang from the need to explain 
the failure of democratic and populist regimes in the third world more generally. Rather 
than emphasizing liberal assumptions concerning participatory democracy, a new 
emphasis was given by modernisation theorists in the late sixties such as Black and 
Rostow on the need for strong developmental states.10 That approach was best 
articulated by Samuel Huntington in his celebrated work, Political Order in Changing 
Societies who argued the need for a 'centralization of power in the bureaucratic polity 
(to) enhance ... the capability of the state to bring about modernizing reforms in society' 
(Huntingon, 1968:167).
The focus on the role of states in development gathered further momentum in the 
seventies because at that time 'the state was seen as the key to the conundrum posed by 
dependency theorists, whose argument that there was no way for third-world countries 
to industrialize save by revolutionary withdrawal from the capitalist system was being 
challenged in Latin America by the emergence of what became known as 
"developmental authoritarian" regimes' (McVey, 1992:12-13).* 11 As a consequence, 
'categories such as "dependent", "peripheral" and "comprador" were thrown into 
question which resulted in a less deterministic approach to political change and the 
position of the state, and a move away from the dependency cul-de-sac' (Hewison, 
Robison, Rodan, eds., 1993:19).
According to Deyo (1987(a):230) the key feature of the strong developmental state 
was its relative autonomy from social classes and specific private economic interests, a 
capacity that enabled it to pursue a coherent operational program for development. The 
state as the explanatory key to the East Asian 'economic miracle' gave rise to a number 
of illuminating case studies of the most prominent newly industrializing countries of the 
region - South Korea and Taiwan as well as Japan. While noting critical differences 
between these states, a common theme threading through such principal works as Evans 
(1987:211) Gold (1986) Haggard and Tun-jen Cheng (1987:106 & 111) and Johnson 
(1987:156-158), was the insulation or "imperviousness" of such states from political 
demands that would undermine economic growth and their dominant role in
9 See Skocpal, 1985.
10 See Black, 1966:13-14 and Rostow, 1971:25-26.
11 For further discussion of the challenges posed to dependency theory by the Latin American and East 
Asian NIC's see Deyo's Introduction in Deyo ed., 1987(a) and in the same volume Evans, 1987. 
Another pertinent work is that of Collier, 1979.
7development. As studies of East Asia's industrialization gathered momentum the work 
of scholars, including those noted earlier, also focussed more on the important and 
complex relationships between state actors and the business sector.12 Increasingly the 
notion of the autonomous state as the decisive explanatory category of East Asia's 
dynamism gave way to a focus on the interaction between the state and business with 
each other and with foreign capital. It was the interaction of those elements rather than 
the state per se that provided 'the source of dynamism and coherence, or of defeat’ 
(McVey, 1992:14).
In Southeast Asia, political economy studies have taken a somewhat different route 
from those of East Asia. In the Southeast Asian context the so called 'autonomous state' 
was hardly examined or applied to studies of capitalism in the region. Why was this so? 
Principally because Southeast Asian states, compared to their East Asian counterparts, 
appeared 'soft' in the 1960's and 70's, suggesting interpretations in terms of 
patrimonialism and the bureaucratic polity, which seemed likely to mire them in a bog 
of semi-modernization rather than fit them as candidates for dynamic economic 
growth.13 What then are the main features associated with 'patrimonialism’ and the 
'beaucratic polity’ that were considered so inimical to Southeast Asian dynamism?
The patrimonial model was first suggested by the German sociologist Max Weber 
(1947) as part of his analysis of traditional authority but was developed and applied to 
modem states by Roth (1968) and Eisenstadt (1973). As used by modem writers this 
model emphasizes the flow of political resources. The essence of the patrimonial model 
is the notion of a head of state preserving his position by dispensing rewards to 
members of the elite which itself is divided into rival cliques that compete for the 
patronage of the ruler. Other important features of the patrimonial model include its
12 Some pertinent works in this genre include: Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1979 and 1985; Haggard, 1990; 
Mackie, 1988 and Wade, 1988.
Studies which draw attention to significant differences between the East and Southeast Asian 
experiences and warn against the applicability of the former to the latter include: Cumings, Haggard 
and Tun-jen Chang; and Evans; all in Deyo, ed., 1987.
13 In his analysis as to why some third-world countries failed to develop Gunnar Myrdal used the terms 
"hard states" and "soft states". He used the term "soft state" 'to comprise all the various types of 
social indiscipline which manifest themselves by: deficiencies in legislation and enforcement, a 
widespread disobedience by public officials on various levels to rules and directives handed down to 
them and the presence of widespread corruption. According to Mydral 'the laxity and arbitrariness of 
soft states are exploited for personal gain by people who have economic, social and political power, .. 
but even aside from those personal interests, there will in a soft state be a much wider spread, in all 
strata o f a general inclination of people to resist public controls and their implementation’ (Myrdal, 
1970:211-212).
8pyramid-like network of patron-client relationships and the notion that politics is 
characterised not by conflict over issues of policy but competition for material rewards.
A
Patrimonial features are also found in the concept of the bureaucratic polity which 
was developed by Fred Riggs (1964 & 1966) to describe Thailand in the 1950's and 
1960's. The essence of his argument was that power in Thailand was located in the 
bureaucratic polity - the armed forces, police and civil administration - rather than in 
political parties or in society. The bureaucratic polity was primarily concerned to 
promote its own interests, being unconstrained by societal interests in the determination 
of policy. Members of the bureaucratic polity were certainly not motivated by any 
commitment that would free business from bureaucratic control. An inherent element of 
the bureaucratic polity was the presence of 'pariah entrepreneurs', a term Riggs used to 
describe businessmen in societies where business lacked political legitimacy. Pertinent 
in that regard was the position of the Chinese in Thailand who remained social and 
political outsiders, but as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, dominated the country’s 
domestic business community. Rather than acting as a bourgeoisie in defence of class 
interests, as in the classic Western model of capitalist development, pariah 
entrepreneurs were forced to make mutually rewarding deals with individual 
bureaucrats with the purpose of influencing the political leadership through patron- 
client links.14
The characteristics associated with the bureaucratic polity and patrimonialism, 
however, encouraged a misleadingly static view of both the state and indigenous 
capitalists in Southeast Asia. Doner (1991(a): 822) argues that 'vertical, patron-client 
links obscured the processes of capital accumulation, class formation and private 
influence over economic policies ... and the result was a general neglect of dynamic 
interactions within the private sector and between public and private interests.' Yet, in 
retrospect, as McVey (1992:22) observed, the bureaucratic polity had 'less the aspect of 
a developmental bog than a container for fundamental transformation, a chrysalis in 
whose apparently confused interior the change from one sort of economic order to 
another was taking place ... an increasing intimacy and equality between business and 
political leadership.'
Clearly important transformations were taking place between state and capital in 
much of the region. The literature and experience of East Asia again provides useful
14 See Riggs, 1964 :116, 163, 173, 188-193.
9insights, though this is not to suggest that the paths of capitalism in Southeast and East 
Asia will mirror one another. Proponents of an ersatz view of Southeast Asian 
capitalism criticise the role of the state not because it has intervened, but because of the 
quality of its intervention. Implicit in such a criticism is a view of the state in Southeast 
Asia, as ipso facto unable to address the national interest in any long-term and 
systematic way because it is captive of its own officials and operates in their interests to 
produce a rent-seeking form of intervention. On the other hand, scholars of East Asia's 
transformation have shown how, as continued capitalist expansion required the 
development of an export manufacturing sector to complement existing import- 
substitution structures, relations between state and capital built largely on networks of 
patronage (characteristics of "soft" states), gave way to the development of an 
autonomous and more effective state apparatus (characteristics of "hard" states).15
In the eighties, movements in the international economy, the collapse of commodity 
prices (oil prices in particular) and changes in domestic class structures led Malaysia 
and Indonesia to introduce economic reforms that surprised most observers and 
demonstrated a strength and imperviousness on the part of those states hitherto thought 
unlikely. In Malaysia Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin's resolution in promoting far- 
reaching (and successful) structural adjustments in the mid-eighties showed a capacity 
to override the interests of the politically important Malay middle class and the growing 
Malay business community. Among Daim's measures were the implementation of 
savage cutbacks in public expenditure, the liberalization of equity guidelines in the 
Industrial Coordination Act (thereby reducing opportunities for Malays); the restriction 
of bank credit and refusal to bow to the special pleadings of prominent Bumiputra16 
businessmen for a moratorium on the repayment of loans. In Indonesia Robison has 
shown how the oil price collapse and 'Pakem' regulations of 1986 set in train a process 
of liberalization of trade and credit which constricted the options available to politically 
powerful rent-seekers (although they have not yet touched the most powerful families). 
Nevertheless the pace and determination by which such reforms were pressed surprised, 
says Robison (1992:77-78) 'even the most cynical observers.’
15 See Cumings, 1987:69-79 and Johnson, 1987:230.
16 Bumiputra, is a Malay word which means literally 'son o f the soil', indigenous. In Peninsular 
Malaysia it serves to distinguish the Malays from the Chinese and Indian communities of 'recent' 
immigrant origin and in the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak it is also applied to other indigenous 
groups such as the Ibans, Bidayuh, Kadazans and others. In this thesis the terms Bumiputra and 
Malay will be used interchangeably.
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All this is not to suggest that states such as Malaysia and Indonesia were becoming 
hard states by any East Asian standard. Such regularization of the state apparatus 
continued to coexist with highly patrimonialist relations between the state and business. 
Nevertheless such reforms showed that important transformations were taking place in 
the state side of the state-business relationship in Southeast Asia.17 Deregulation, that 
is exposure to market forces and competition, became more a feature of business in the 
region (although the rates varied considerably from country to country) in systems 
where markets had previously been subordinated to the patrimonial allocation of 
resources on personalistic or political grounds (although again there was considerable 
variation from state to state).
Just as static views of the state and its relationship with business have required 
revision, so have those regarding the character of capitalism in that relationship. A 
number of scholars pointed to important transformations taking place in Southeast 
Asian capitalism as business groups attained a greater independence from networks of 
patronage or the protected import-manufacturing sector and became more competitive 
on world markets.
In his analysis of recent developments of business groups in Thailand Suehiro draws 
attention to the process of adjustment and change occurring in Thai capitalism. Suehiro 
points out that since the 1973 revolution political patronage has become less significant 
for the growth of commercial banking while among the industrial groups, 'the rise of the 
Saha Union and the Siam Cement group (was) due mainly to their adoption of more 
rational methods; a well organised management, leadership by young innovative 
entrepreneurs, and the capability to import foreign technology and adapt to local 
conditions' (Suehiro, 1992:63). He adds that the development of such new capitalist 
groups, with their greater independence of patronage and ability to compete on the 
world market, appears to be gradually changing the mode of Thai capital accumulation, 
and this in 'turn makes it imperative that we keep our view of the nature of Thai 
capitalism open to revision' (Suehiro, 1992:62-63). In retrospect, he argues that 'the 
politically patronized, externally dependent, and commercially oriented capitalist 
groups which have dominated the economy thus far should be understood as a historical 
product of Thai capitalism at a certain stage of its development' (Suehiro, 1992:61)18
17 Factors contributing to reform and regularization of the state apparatus, and some of the implications 
of that for the relationship between the state and business are further explored by Hewison, Robison 
and Rodan, eds, 1993:28. See also Harris, 1988:237-249.
18 Suehiro also argues that 'under historical circumstances where the existence of both strong domestic
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Hewison’s (1989) work on Thailand also challenges the view that capitalism is 
dependent in Southeast Asia and highlights the changing, and more equal, balance in 
state-business relations.19 Central to Hewison's analysis of the development of Thai 
capitalism is the nexus between the state and capital, a dynamic relationship in which he 
shows considerable movement between the sphere of business and the state. Hewison 
notes that, 'on the one hand, state officials .. have been able to accumulate both the 
capital and expertise necessary for the establishment of their own business groups 
(examples are Prapass Charusathiarana and the Soi Rajkhru group) while on the other 
hand business people have become influential in political and economic policy 
(examples are Prasit Narongdej, Boonchu Rojanastien and Amnuay Viravan') 
(Hewison, 1989:211-212).
Similarly Robison's approach to relations between state and capital in Indonesia has 
reflected important transformations taking place in the relationship there, particularly 
the evolution of bureaucrats and business groups from rent-seeking activity 'to a more 
normal (and independent) path of accumulation through the generation of profits by 
capital investments' (Robison, 1985:316).20 In his earlier work Robison's view of the 
Indonesian polity emphasized the 'neopatrimonial nature of the bureaucratic state' 
(1978:18). The major domestic capitalists in that polity, the 'bureaucratic capitalists, ' 
were little more than 'rentiers'. However in his later (1986) comprehensive study of
political power and integration into the world capitalist system set limits on Thai capitalists, the most 
practical - and perhaps the only possible - way to achieve growth has been the "dependent" mode of 
accumulating capital funds', but points out that 'such characteristics are not unique to Thailand and 
can be observed more widely in the initial development of domestic or indigenous business classes in 
late-starting capitalist societies such as Japan, India, Korea and major Latin American countries. 
Insofar as domestic capitalist groups are conditioned by historical factors, changes in such 
environments as political power structure, international economic relations, and industrial progress 
will inevitably have a great effect on their mode of capital accumulation ... (which) in turn makes it 
imperative that we keep our view of the nature of Thai capitalism open to revision' (Suehiro, 
1992:62-63). There has been a significant shift in Suehiro's earlier (1985) Phd study of Thai 
capitalism which saw it in dependent terms, and his more recent (1992) work which points to 
important changes in Thai business groups that indicate a more independent, dynamic and resilient 
form of capitalism.
19 Toward the end of his study Hewison sums up his position regarding Thai 'dependency' thus: 
'Thailand does exhibit certain characteristics of dependency, but as Barone has argued for South 
Korea, immersion in a world capitalist system can bestow certain capitalist advantages which can 
enhance capitalist development. Elements of the international division of labour and inflows of 
foreign capital, for example, can be turned to a country's advantage. Thailand, like South Korea, has 
reaped some of those advantages' (Hewison, 1989: 213-214).
20 Though in line with key features associated with the Malaysian polity noted earlier in this 
introduction, Robison adds that, 'This is not to deny that the major business groups still enjoy 
politically secured and privileged access to state-controlled contracts and concessions' (Robison, 
1985:316).
12
Indonesian business groups Robison's position shifted in line with his identification of 
an emerging domestic bourgeoise. In that regard his focus was particularly directed at 
the leading members of a domestic capitalist class who had developed their own capital 
bases and were coming to stand independently of the state.21
In a more recent work Robison (1992:81) notes, 'the weakening of the state's 
capacity to maintain networks of patronage and policies of industrial deepening 
facilitated by monopolies and protection has created opportunities for elements of the 
domestic class located in the downstream sector to secure more precisely their interests 
via political organization and action.' Drawing on Andrew MacIntyre's (1991) study of 
the political activities of industry associations, particularly those involved with the 
textile industry, to illustrate this process Robison (1992:83) concludes that, 'the prospect 
of increasing manufacturing competitiveness (in the textile industry) outweighed the 
political loyalties of patronage networks, and this reflected a move from relations 
binding officials of the state to particular business groups towards more generalized 
and abstracted relationships between "state” and "capital” (my emphasis). Shin 
(1989:427) reaches a similar conclusion, arguing that the increasing competitiveness of 
the new Indonesian capitalists 'was accelerated by the increasing importance of state 
policies and institutions, which have steadily replaced personal, exclusive, and informal 
patronages as the major means to create and consolidate the private sector.'
These studies of Southeast Asian capitalism caution us against static notions of the 
bureaucratic polity (and such key ingredients in it as the relationship between state and 
capital), or the use of such categories without recognising their indeterminacy, fluidity 
and dynamic character. They also caution us against drawing too sharp a contrast 
between dependency and self-reliance.22 As Doner (1991(a):823-24) suggests, 'most 
less developed countries (LDC's) are best understood not as one or the other, but as 
somewhere on a continuum between the two'. He also warns against creating 'sharp 
dichotomies between rent-seekers or commercial capitalists on the one hand and 
industrialists on the other' and points out that 'throughout Asia strong industrial firms
21 Robison concludes that, 'Nor can we say that the domestic capitalist class is simply a pariah class, 
dependent upon and limited by arbitrary political intervention in the commercial sphere by officials 
of the patrimonial state. It is true that the development of the major business groups was predicated 
upon state intervention, but the leading capitalist clients have now developed independent bases' 
(Robison, 1986:395).
22 Cumings (1987) for example notes that South Korea and Taiwan expanded their autonomy in the 
world at large while deepening their reliance on Japan.
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have emerged from commercial capitalists, speculators and rent-seekers'.23 In similar 
vein Robison (1990:36) points out that, 'a core of productive investment is emerging 
within the cocoon of "primitive accumulation" or "rent-taking".
Since the concept of rent-seeking is so central to the debate about the character of 
Southeast Asian capitalism and, for our purposes, that of Malaysian capitalism in 
particular, it is appropriate here to elucidate the way in which the concept is employed 
in this study. Economic rent is an analytical concept which may be said to refer to 
additional or extraordinary profits or surplus due to exclusive proprietary claims to 
particular economic (especially natural) resources not eliminated by competitive 
processes. Rents generally arise through state intervention in the economy, 
interventions which allegedly distort market processes and create opportunities for 
rents. It is argued that the existence of such rents encourages corrupt or unproductive 
profit-seeking behaviour (to capture such rents) and that rents in turn usually lead to 
monopoly situations. However as Jomo has pointed out rents exist in almost all 
situations since the conditions for perfect market competition rarely obtain.24
This broader notion of rents has led some to argue that the prospect of capturing rents is 
a very important motivation for investment by most capitalists. For example, 
Schumpeter (1946:102) argued that the true entrepreneurs were defined primarily by 
their ability to continuously make technological progress, thus capturing ‘technological
23 As Doner notes, pertinent also in that regard is research on the South Korean economy which has 
shown that a number of the large industrial firms known as chaebol emerged from those 
entrepreneurs known as "political capitalists, plutocrats or compradors". He illustrates the fact that 
origins do not determine ends by a comparison of Philippine businessman Ricardo Sil verio and South 
Korean businessman Pyong-chol Yi. Both expanded from commercial origins to create major 
industrial groups with support from powerful political patrons. Silverio, however, became a notorious 
Marcos "crony" who was forced to flee the country when his mismanaged conglomerate fell apart in 
the early 1980's. Yi, on the other hand, founded Samsung, South Korea's largest chaebol based on 
steady expansion from production of consumer goods to basic industries' (Doner, 1991 (a):824).
Interestingly, Yoshihara who coined the term ersatz for capitalism in Southeast Asia himself admits 
that, 'in Meiji Japan, rent-seeking activities became so widespread that the term "seisho" was coined 
for conspicuous rent-seekers. The Mitsubishi and Mitsui zaibatsu were the largest and best known 
seisho of pre-war Japan.' To the argument that the Southeast Asian situation is a repetition of what 
happened in Japan and the West and will resolve itself automatically in the process of capitalist 
development, Yoshihara replies only that, 'rent-seeking is more pervasive in Southeast Asia' and he 
cannot conceive of circumstances imposing a 'rationality on ..(Southeast Asian) governments that 
would greatly reduce the scope for rent-seeking' (Yoshihara: 1988:88).
24 I am especially grateful to Jomo K S., and Rick Doner for their comments on an earlier draft and 
suggestions that I expand my discussion concerning rents and rent-seekers. At various points material 
in this and the following paragraph is derived from material contained in ‘Rents Rent Seeking and 
Rent Deployment in Malaysia’ by Jomo K.S., and Gomez T. G., (Unpublished Manuscript).
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rents’ based on exclusive intellectual property rights in the process. Hence, R & D 
investment is a form of rent-seeking by this definition and the Microsoft 
mogul/entrepreneur Bill Gates would, by these criteria, be a rentier. However for the 
purposes of this study the concept of rent-seeking is deliberately used in a more limited 
way to refer to rents obtained through direct political influence. That is it focusses on 
the relationship of individuals who seek special business favours (such as licences, 
contracts, concessions and the privatization of state assets) from the power holders. This 
more limited use of the concept is nevertheless that which is more generally employed 
in the literature and used by scholars such as Yoshihara who are engaged in the debate 
about the character of Southeast Asian capitalism. But while this study employs the 
concept of rent-seeking in this more narrow/’popular’ fashion it does not, at the same 
time, take the view that in contrasting rent-seekers from ‘real capitalists’ one can posit 
an ideal type of one or the other, since in reality the line between the two (whether in 
Asia or the West) is blurred, or that all rents or rent-seekers are ipso facto bad. Thus 
while state intervention can result in rent appropriating opportunities and corrupt and 
wasteful activities, state intervention can also support the emergence of desirable new 
industries, increase opportunities for learning new skills or promote disadvantaged 
socio-economic or ethnic groups. Moreover it does not follow that those successful in 
seeking rents may not be competent, or become competent, entrepreneurs and capable 
of generating economic growth.
This survey leads to the conclusion that it is an attachment to such direct contrasts 
between dependency and self reliance, and between rent-seeking and true 'productive 
capitalism,' as well as to such discrete categories as state and capital which obscures for 
critics of Southeast Asian capitalism its distinctive and evolutionary character and leads 
them instead to dismissive notions of Southeast Asian capitalism as ersatz. These 
issues, which are of central importance to the debate concerning the 'reality' of 
Southeast Asian capitalism, will be bom in mind in this thesis which focuses on the rise 
of Malay capitalism and the response of Chinese business in Malaysia.
Malaysian Capitalism : Real, Rentier or Pariah?
The debate concerning the character of capitalism in Southeast Asia has a particular 
resonance in Malaysia where socio-economic circumstances associated with a plural 
society gave rise to the NEP, through which a more intimate relationship was forged 
between the state and business. During the seventies and at least until the mid-eighties, 
the Malaysian polity became more intrusive in imposing political and social goals 
associated with the NEP on business generally, though of course those goals were
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resented by foreign and Chinese business but generally welcomed by Malays.
Secondly compared to Thailand and Indonesia, where there was considerable 
continuity in the composition of the major business groups from the 1970's to the 
1980's, the composition of many of Malaysia's big business groups underwent 
considerable change during that period. In Malaysia, that period, which covered the first 
two decades of the NEP, saw not only the emergence of many powerful Malay business 
groups, but also the rise of new Chinese business groups whose manner of growth and 
relationship with the state was very different to that of Chinese groups which had arisen 
before the NEP.
Finally, important shifts occurred both in the composition of the Malay elite and in 
the power of its main elements. The Malay political elite of the 1960's and early 1970's 
was closely identified with upper class civil servants and aristocrats, and since the 
backgrounds of both frequently merged such individuals were appropriately tagged as 
'administocrats'.25 It was members of this group that implemented the NEP to safeguard 
and promote the political and economic power of the Malay community. But in the 
1970's and early 1980's the rapid expansion of Malaysia's economy, together with the 
socio-economic changes wrought by the NEP, spawned a growing number of Malay 
businessmen. By the early eighties this social group had become more numerous and 
constituted an increasingly important element of the Malay political elite as the old 
aristocratic and bureaucratic element was gradually displaced. In other words the locus 
of power shifted within the Malay elite from the 'administocrats' to a combination of 
politicians and businessmen (Leigh, 1992:119-120) a shift in power that was also 
accompanied by changes in the occupational background and outlook of the elite and 
was symbolized by the assumption of the Prime Ministership by Dr Mahathir in July 
1981.26 Some of the implications of that shift within the elite will be explored in greater 
depth later in the study, but at this point they serve to place in a wider context the 
debate about the development of capitalism in Malaysia to which we now turn.
Due in large part to Puthucheary's pioneering work, Ownership and Control in the 
Malayan Economy, written in the 1950's, there is a greater historical depth to studies of
25 See Chandrasekaran Pillay (1974). The term 'administocrats' is used to refer to the Malay 
administrative stratum recruited initially from the ranks of the pre-colonial Malay 'aristocratic' class 
by the British colonial regime.
26 Whereas previous Malaysian Prime Ministers had been drawn from or were closely associated with 
the former Malay administocratic elite’ Mahathir, a commoner and self-employed professional (a 
medical practitioner) had never been part of that elite and felt little empathy with it
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Malaysian political economy than elsewhere in the region.27
27 For the 1960's see Puthucheary, J. 1960, Ownership and Control in the Malayan Economy. 
Singapore, Eastern Universities Press; Silcock, T. H. & Fisk, E. K. 1963 The Political Economy of 
Independent Malaya. Canberra, ANU Press; Wheelwright, E.L. 1965 Industrialization in Malaysia. 
Melbourne, Melbourne University Press; Yip Yat Hoong, 1969, The Development of the Tin Mining 
Industry of Malava. Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press; Golay, Frank H. 1969 "Malaya", in 
Frank Golay et al Eds; Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia. Ithaca. 
Cornell University Press. In the 1970's and 1980's there were studies by Popenoe, Oliver 1970 
"Malay Entrepreneurs: An Analysis of the Social Backgrounds, Careers and Attitiudes of the Leading 
Malay Businessmen in Western Malaysia", P.hD. dissertation, London School of Economics; 
Hirschman, Charles 1971 "Ownership and Control in the Manufacturing Sector of West Malaysia" 
reprinted with discussion in Further Readings on Malaysian Economic Development. Ed David Lim, 
Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1983; See also Hirschman 1989, "Development and 
Inequality in Malaysia: From Puthucheary to Mehmet" in Pacific Affairs. Vol. 62, Nol; Lim, David 
1973 Economic Growth and Development in West Malaysia. 1947-1970. Kuala Lumpur, University 
of Malaya Press; Lindenberg, Marc 1973 "Foreign and Domestic Investment in the Pioneer Industry" 
P.hD. dissertation, University of Southern California; Snodgrass, Donald 1980 Inequality and 
Economic Development in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press; Gale, Bruce 1981 
Politics and Public Enterprises in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur, Eastern Universities Press; See also Gale 
1985 Politics and Business: A Study of Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd. Kuala Lumpur, Eastern 
Universities Press; Lim, Mah Hui 1981(a) Ownership and Control of the One Hundred Largest 
Corporations in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur Oxgford University Press; See also Lim (b) and Canak, 
William 1981(b) "The Political Economy of State Policies in Malaysia", Journal of Contemporary 
Asia. 11 (2) and Lim, 1985 "Contradictions in the Development of Malay Capital: State 
Accumulation and Legitimation" Journal of Contemporary Asia. 15 (1); Fisk, E. K. & H. Osman 
Rani, Eds 1982 The Political Economy of Malaysia Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press; Sieh- 
Lee, Mei Ling 1982 Ownership and Control of Malaysian Manufacturing Corporations Kuala 
Lumpur, UMBC Publications; Sieh-Lee, Mei Ling 1992 "The Transformation of Malaysian Business 
Groups" in Me Vey (ed) Southeast Asian Capitalists : Tan, Tat Wai 1982 Income Determination and 
Distribution in West Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press; Toh, Kin Woon 1982 "The 
State in Economic Development" Phd. dissertation, University of Malaya; Hua, Wu Yin 1985 Class 
and Communalism in Malaysia. London, Zed Books; Crouch, Harold 1985 Economic Change Social 
Structure and the Political System in Southeast Asia. Singapore. ISEAS; Gill, Ranjit 1985 The 
Making of Malaysia Inc. Singapore, Pelanduk; Jomo Kwame Sundaram 1986 A Question of 
Class:Capital. The State and Uneven Development in Malava. Singapore. Oxford Univesty Press; See 
also Jomo 1990 ‘Wither Malaysia’s New Economic Policy’ Pacific Affairs 63 (4); Milne, R.S. 1986 
"Malaysia-Beyond the New Economic Policy", Asian Sui^ev. Vol. 27, No. 12 December; Ho, Khai 
Leong 1988 "Indigenizing the State: The New Economic Policy and the Bumiputra State in 
Peninsular Malaysia" P.hD dissertation, Ohio State University; Mehmet, Ozay 1988 Development in 
Malaysia: Poverty. Wealth and Trusteeship Kuala Lumpur, Insan. Finally in the 1990's these works 
have been added to by Jesudason, James 1990 Ethnicity and the Economy: The State . Chinese 
Business and Multinationals in Malaysia. Singapore, Oxford University Press; Gomez, Terrance 
1990 Politics in Business: UMNO's Corporate Investments. Kuala Lumpur, Forum; also Gomez 1991 
Money Politics Kuala Lumpur, Forum; Bowie, Alisdair 1991 Crossing the Industrial Divide: State. 
Society and Politics of Economic Transformation in Malaysia. New York. Columbia University 
Press; Means, Gordon 1991 Malaysian Politics:The Second Generation. Singapore, Oxford 
University Press; Hara, Fujio 1991 ‘Malaysia's New Economic Policy and the Chinese Business 
Community’ The Developing Economies. Vol 31 (4); Leigh, Michael 1992 ‘Politics, Bureaucracy, 
and Business in Malaysia: Realigning the Eternal Triangle’ in Andrew MacIntyre & Kanishka 
Jayasuriya (eds) The Dynamics of Economic Policy Reform in South-east Asia and the South-west 
Pacific Singapore. Oxford University Press; Khoo, Kay Jin 1992 ‘The Grand Vision: Mahathir and 
Modernization’ Joel Kahn & Francis Loh Kok Wah. (eds) Fragmented Vision. Sydney Allen &
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In what follows we shall set down two key questions and then draw upon the 
responses of scholars, Malaysian and foreign alike, that go to the heart of the debate as 
to whether Malaysian capitalism is real, rentier or pariah. By such means we may better 
and more succinctly elucidate the parameters of that debate.
Has Government manipulation actually created new sources of entrepreneurship 
or has it only fostered rentiers?
On one side of this question stands, of course, the Malaysian Government which is not 
only committed as a matter of policy to the creation of a Malay commercial and 
industrial community (Malay capitalists), but believes that through state intervention 
such an objective can be achieved. Although this objective is most clearly and 
comprehensively set out in the NEP, its antecedents go back to the proclamation of 
Independence in 1957 when the policy of creating a Malay capitalist class through 
'special rights' was given constitutional recognition. However during the first decade of 
Independence the state's relatively restrained role in the economy produced few changes 
and Malays remained poorly represented in most sectors of the modem economy. Later 
the government was to conclude that it was the relative economic deprivation of the 
Malays compared to the non-Malays that was the main cause of the May 13 race riots 
which erupted in Kuala Lumpur after the May 1969 general elections.28
In the aftermath of the May 1969 election and riots, the inclusion of more 
component parties in the ruling coalition resulted in its political base being broadened 
considerably, a change that greatly enhanced the dominant status of the UMNO within 
the coalition. Not only was there a change in the balance of political forces within the 
ruling coalition but, as Jomo (1986:256) notes, there was also a change in UMNO itself 
as 'the position of those who stood for a more active promotion of Malay capitalism was 
strengthened'. The most important consequence of that change was the formulation of 
the New Economic Policy (NEP), first launched in association with the Second 
Malaysia Plan for 1971-75. The NEP contained two prongs, namely to eradicate 
poverty 'irrespective of race', and to 'restructure Malaysian society to reduce and 
eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function' (4MP:31). The
Unwin; Mackie, Jamie 1992 ‘Changing Patterns of Chinese Big Business in Southeast Asia,’ in 
McVey (ed); Heng, Pek Koon 1992 The Chinese Business Elite of Malaysia' in McVey (ed); 
Crouch, Harold ‘Malaysian Government: Authoritarian Repression and Democratic Responsiveness’ 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press (forthcoming).
28 See Means, 1972: 55, 59. The literature on the causes and consequnces of the riots is quite extensive. 
Some principal works include: Gagliano 1970; Reid 1969; Slimming 1969; Von Vorys 1975; 
National Operations Council 1969; Tunku Abdul Rahman 1969; and Vasil 1972.
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most important element of the second prong of the NEP was the objective of correcting 
the inter-ethnic imbalance in the ownership and control of wealth in the country. The 
government's proclaimed target was that by 1990 or two decades after the 
implementation of the NEP:
... 'at least 30 per cent of the total commercial and industrial activities in all 
categories and scales of operation should have participation by Malays and 
other indigenous people in terms of ownership and management. The objective 
is to create over a period of time, a viable and thriving Malay industrial and 
commercial community which will operate on a par and in effective 
partnership with non-Malays in the modern sector' (2MP:158).
Since the publication in 1971 of the Second Malaysia Plan the government's 
commitment to this strategy for the creation of a Malay capitalist community has been 
elaborated and reaffirmed by subsequent government pronouncements in the subsequent 
four- five year plans and the various mid-term reviews. While there was a general 
consensus concerning the second aim of the NEP, 'the restructuring of Malaysian 
society so as to eliminate the identification of race with economic function', 
considerable controversy and debate surrounded that element of restructuring which 
involved the creation of Malay capitalists. In varying degrees and from various 
standpoints scholars expressed scepticism as to whether government action could create 
new sources of entrepreneurship.
In his study Politics and Public Enterprise in Malaysia, based on data from the 
1970's, Bruce Gale (1981:37) argued that the entwining of various complex political 
and bureaucratic processes resulting from the implementation of the NEP strengthened 
the patrimonial features of the Malaysian polity at that time. For Gale the implications 
of that development were that the performance of public enterprises would necessarily 
be affected by, and reflect, the patrimonial and patron-client characteristics of the 
Malaysian polity. Gale concluded that the vulnerability of public enterprises to patron- 
client influences led to a dependency on government by Malay businessmen and at the 
same time limited the capacity of some public enterprises (particularly those obliged to 
provide loans and other forms of assistance to Malay businessmen such as MARA and 
UDA) to create 'a genuine class of Bumiputra traders' (Gale, 1981:202-203).
K.S. Jomo, a professor of economics at the University of Malaya, has approached 
the question from a class perspective. He has argued that 'with the NEP the state no 
longer merely played a supportive role for private capital; it moved to centre stage to 
become a medium for capital accumulation serving the particular interests of the
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governing class.' He adds that 'in this important sense then, it can be suggested that the 
statist bourgeoisie crystallized with the announcement and implementation of the NEP' 
(Jomo, 1986:266). Later in his analysis Jomo emphasizes that unlike the rest of the 
bourgeoisie, what he terms "statist capitalists" are not involved in capital accumulation 
solely based on their own private property but also use the state apparatus to 
accumulate. So 'statist capitalists' includes those social groups who control capital 
accumulation by virtue of their access to state power such as Malay politicians, 
bureaucrats and businessmen (Jomo, 1986:268). What are the implications for 
entrepreneurship emerging from such origins? According to Jomo the potential for 
statist capitalist development is constrained by its social base. The increased 
government intervention in the economy which has promoted statist capitalists has also 
promoted rentier activity and has led to an increased incidence of corruption and 
economic waste (Jomo, 1985:268-269).29
The increasing role of the bureaucracy and the state in Malaysian capitalism is also 
a feature of Lim Mah Hui's approach. Writing in the mid 1980's Lim (1985:52) argued 
that two features distinguished the new Malay bourgeoise which began to emerge in the 
late 1970's. The first was that most members were either politicians or aristocrats or had 
close connections with such people; and secondly, all made the dramatic leap into the 
corporate world through political connections and state patronage. At this point, 
however, Lim disagrees with Jomo's view 'that state participation in the economy and 
state assistance in the development of a Malay bourgeoisie has resulted in a new class 
faction called "the bureaucratic bourgeoisie." Rather Lim argues that 'there is no sign 
that state capitalism is on the rise or that it has spawned a new class or class faction 
with different interests ... the clearest evidence is the frequent interloping of bureaucrats 
into the private sector' (Lim M.H., 1985:54-55, 61).
In his study of Malaysia's business class Crouch is primarily concerned to ask 
whether the social structures associated with the development of that new business 
class, Chinese and Malay, are supportive of democratization. In the course of that study, 
Crouch answers the question, 'Malay Business: Entrepreneur of Rentier'? by arguing 
that while the NEP succeeded in bringing Malays into business it failed to stimulate the 
development of an independent Malay entrepreneurial class. Malay businessmen were 
essentially individual clients ... preoccupied with maintaining individual links with 
political patrons. While such characteristics of the nascent Malay bourgeoisie limited (at
29 See also Jomo, 1990:492.
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least in the short run) its capacity to act as a significant check on government power, 
Crouch nevertheless points to new complexities and tensions in the relationship 
between politics and business. He suggests for instance that the rise of entrepreneurs 
such as Daim Zainuddin owed more to a merging of state, party and private interests 
than merely 'political' links alone and that while Malay businessmen did not yet 
constitute a 'class' by the 1980's they nevertheless did have a significant impact on the 
political process. This was graphically illustrated during the recession of the mid-80's 
when many Malay businessmen faced bankruptcy as sources of patronage shrank. 
Crouch30 concludes that 'it was the life-and-death struggle between threatened and 
failed businessmen that fuelled the UMNO split in the late 1980's.'
Both Mehmet and Gomez use the concept of trusteeship31 in their analysis of the 
NEP's role in creating Malay capitalists. The highly negative view they have regarding 
the nature of Malaysian 'trusteeship' has led both to damn Malay capitalism as 'rentier' 
and skewed in favour of the elite few. The central argument of Mehmet's study is that 
members of Malaysia's ruling elite (consisting of political decision-makers and officials 
and public service staff), in assuming the role of trustees, have emerged as a cartel 
(Mehmet, 1988:i). His primary conclusion is that cartel-like domination of the NEP by 
interlocking networks of elites has had a marginal net impact on poverty eradication (up 
to 1983) while concentrating income and wealth among trustees and associates 
(Mehmet, 1988:ii). In short the trusteeship system is subject to manipulation by the rich 
and powerful seeking quasi-rents and other forms of unearned rewards (Mehmet, 
1988:135).32
Gomez's (1990) study also utilizes the concept of trusteeship, though his focus is on 
UMNO's role as a vehicle for enlarging the Malay stake in the corporate economy. 
Gomez's main conclusion is that UMNO's involvement in business has not really
30 See Crouch 'Malaysian Government: Authoritarian Repression and Democratic Responsiveness' 
(unpublished manuscript) Ch. 11.
31 The concept of 'trusteeship,' its origins and advantages in the Malaysian context has been succinctly 
described by Mehmet. 'Originally a small group of top political/bureaucratic leaders, inspired by Tun 
Razak, simply assumed the role of political trustees (i.e. guardians) of the Malay community. To 
accomplish the objective of 30 per cent equity restructuring, this leadership conceived of the 
institution of Bumiputra Trust Agencies, as special-purpose public enterprises, acquiring equity on 
behalf o f the rakyat. Compared to the alternatives of nationlisation or confiscation, equity 
restructuring by trusteeship offered a piecemeal yet pragmatic solution to the traditional Malay state 
of capitalist underdevelopment’ (Mehmet, 1988:102).
32 For thoughtful critiques o f Mehmet's approach see Hirschman (1989:72-81) and Snodgrass 
(1987:110-113).
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contributed to the development of productive businesses under its control. Rather, the 
party has been primarily involved in capturing 'paper wealth' and transferring such 
wealth from one company to another (invariably in the interests of the politically well- 
connected few) to obtain quick profits (Gomez, 1990:178). In short the investments of 
UMNO in business have served the interests of a select group, entrenched patronage 
and money politics and contributed to other undesirable consequences such as 
corruption and sapping the confidence of "genuine" investors. Implicit in the web of 
detail provided by Gomez is that business people spawned from such a chrysalis as 
UMNO's vast corporate empire can never move beyond their patronage networks and 
rentier activity.
Finally, in his study of the State, Chinese Business and Multinationals in Malaysia, 
Jesudason also examines the relationship between the state and private Malay 
capitalists. After a short biographical account of four such capitalists he concludes that, 
'very few of them started their own enterprises and it remains to be seen whether a self- 
confident Malay bourgeoisie, contributing productively to the nation will emerge. Thus 
far, its development has been rather parasitic. Strong links to political power and 
Malaysia's moderately high growth rates were the essential props for this new class' 
(Jesudason, 1990:108&105).
A striking feature of this survey is a 'consensus' of sorts amongst scholars that 
government manipulation cannot, or at least to date has not, created new sources of 
entrepreneurship. Instead state support has fostered rentier activity which is inimical to 
the development of an independent Malay entrepreneurial class. Yet the static nature 
and rather deterministic quality of such analysis stands in marked contrast to the 
conclusions drawn from our earlier survey of capitalism in Southeast Asia. There we 
concluded that the evolutionary character of Southeast Asian capitalism was obscured 
by an attachment to such direct contrasts between dependency and self reliance, 
between rent-seeking and true 'productive capitalism', and the assumption that ipso 
facto, entrepreneurs could not emerge from speculative or rentier origins. This thesis 
will argue that that argument is no less applicable to the evolution of Malay capitalism. 
As the body of this thesis will show, Malay capitalism is a complex amalgam of state, 
party and private capital but a core of productive investment and entrepreneurial activity 
is emerging from within the cocoon of state/UMNO supported patronage networks and 
rent-seeking activity.
The debate concerning the character of Malay capitalism is of course juxtaposed 
with that of Chinese capitalism and its relationship with the state and Malay business.
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Contemporary views by Malaysianists in this regard can be thrown into sharp relief by 
responses to the following question posed by Mackie.
Have Malaysia's political circumstances trapped Chinese businessmen into 
dependency relationships similar in kind if not degree to Rigg’s pariah 
entrepreneurs? 33
Most studies that have attempted to assess the character of contemporary Chinese 
business in Malaysia after 1970 and its relationship with the state make the necessary 
analytical distinctions firstly between small to medium and big business, and secondly 
between individual responses and the so-called communal or group response to the NEP 
by Multi-Purpose Holdings (MPH) (an investment arm of the MCA). A number of these 
distinctions will be explored later but here we will confine ourselves to the debate 
concerning the perceived character of big business and its relationship with the state. 
While there appears to be some consensus regarding the character of the newly 
emergent Malay capitalism (as rentier rather than entrepreneur) this is less the case 
where Chinese capitalism is concerned. As McVey asked, should Chinese capitalists be 
seen as 'pariahs' rather than 'paragons'?34
Mackie's study of Changing Patterns o f Chinese Big Business in Southeast Asia 
stresses how, in the Malaysian case, Chinese groups have demonstrated a greater 
capacity for change and adaptability than elsewhere in the region.35 Besides indicating
33 Mackie (1992 (a): 173). The full context from which this question is drawn reads, 'Malaysia’s political 
circumstances have forced Chinese businessmen into dependency relationships akin in kind if not 
degree to Rigg's "pariah entrepreneurship." Will this trap Malaysian capitalists into a subordination to 
bureaucrats and politicians which they have hitherto been spared?'
34 McVey has used the conepts of 'pariah' and 'paragon' to stress the changes that have taken place in 
the character of Chinese business since colonial times. In common with Riggs notion, Chinese 
businessmen in the past could be considered as pariah because they were politically dependent and 
could not rely on the state to protect their interests. A consequence of that was the transformation of 
Chinese-dominated sectors of the economy into closed shops which indigenous entrepreneurs could 
not penetrate. However the characteristics required for major business success in the present age run 
counter to many older Chinese entrepreneurial practices and values. Paragons therefore are those who 
have adapted to modem requirements for capital, political connections, and broad international 
operations by an opening-out in terms of their finance, business organization, and social style 
(McVey, 1992:20-21).
35 See Mackie (1992 (a): 161-190). For a comprehensive and thought provoking study of the reasons and 
theories advanced for the 'dynamism' of Chinese entrepreneurship and suggestions further 
investigations might take see Mackie (1992 (b):41-64). Further valuable insights regarding Chinese 
business in Southeast Asia are also provided by other comparative studies by the same author, see 
most notably: Mackie (1988);(1990 (a) and (b)).
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some of the unique features of Chinese business in Malaysia, 36 Mackie shows how, 
despite the particularly pressing socio-economic circumstances of the NEP, big Chinese 
firms have adjusted towards modem-style managerial techniques and structures.37 In 
terms of ownership he notes how the development of the stockmarket in Malaysia and 
Singapore, relative to that elsewhere in the region, made it easier for large Chinese 
companies to advance beyond the single family firm toward more complex patterns of 
interlocking share ownership and control (Mackie, 1992(a): 171). In addition he points 
to the leverage such elements of Chinese capital have on the political leadership as 
international Chinese investment becomes increasingly important in Southeast Asian 
economies, Malaysia's in particular (Mackie, 1992(a): 174). While such factors make 
notions of 'dependency' and 'pariah' less applicable,38 other points he has raised 
regarding the nature of Chinese business in Malaysia, and more generally in Southeast 
Asia, also suggest the need for caution regarding such terms. Pertinent in that regard is 
Mackie's concept of 'growth coalitions' to describe the variety and complexity of the 
political and economic factors and relationships that lie behind state power and the 
Southeast Asian capitalist upsurge (Mackie, 1992(a): 162-163). In other words, he 
places Chinese capital within a more complex set of relationships and circumstances 
that increasingly belie easy categorization.39 Also relevant is the evidence he detects of 
a gradual change within Chinese groups (Malaysian in particular), from personal
36 In particular Mackie points to the greater degree of continuity from old wealth to new among the 
leading Chinese firms in Malaysia-Singapore compared to Thailand and Indonesia, although he notes 
'new men' have been coming to the fore and most of the old-established firms seem to be declining. 
In this respect he points out that we can posit a tendency toward convergence in the pattem of 
Chinese big business in all these countries (1992 (a): 168). Mackie defines "old wealth" as that which 
was established before World War 11 and "new money" as that which has emerged in the last twenty 
or thirty years, leaving an intermediate group ie, those that emerged in the 1950’s the most prominent 
of which in Malaysia include the Kuok and Hong Leong groups (Mackie, 1992 (a): 167).
37 For a succinct but comprehensive account of the important structural changes that have occurred in 
Malaysian Chinese business see (Mackie, 1992 (a): 168-174).
38 Mackie (1992 (a): 177) argues 'that the term pariah entrepreneur has become generally inappropriate 
to describe Chinese businessmen in Thailand but it is not yet entirely so in Indonesia.' After taking 
into account Malaysia's political circumstances, Mackie essentially leaves the question open as to 
whether Chinese business in Malaysia will be trapped into dependency relationships akin in kind if 
not degree to Rigg's "pariah entrepreneurship"; however his analysis suggests that this is unlikely and 
in that regard Malaysia's Chinese are on a spectrum somewhere between their counterparts in 
Indonesia and Thailand.
39 Mackie (1992 (b):57). Nathaniel Leff, who has written on entrepreneurship in other developing 
countries (Latin America), hints at the importance of the complex factors and relationships between 
business groups, governments and state policies (though mainly in terms of growth), but as Mackie 
points out, with some notable exceptions mentioned earlier, much work remains to be done 
systematically exploring the theoretical implications of these relationships in Southeast Asia.
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relationships towards what he calls corporatization and reliance on more impersonal 
management practices and market mechanisms (Mackie, 1992(b):58).
In his examination of Chinese business Crouch juxtaposes the concepts of 
bourgeoisie and pariah in order to assess to what extent one important ingredient of 
Malaysia's bourgeoisie, Chinese business, is capable of countervailing the power of the 
government. Crouch argues that the size and variegated nature of Chinese capital 
means that the answer is necessarily mixed. Although the Chinese community 
dominated the domestic private sector, it could not precisely because it was Chinese, 
convert its economic strength into political power. Its leverage was further reduced 
during the 1970's and 1980's with the expansion of the state sector and the inflow of 
foreign investment. Nevertheless the sheer size of the Chinese bourgeoise meant that its 
interests could not be simply ignored by the government.40
After describing the variegated nature of the Chinese bourgeoise and how that in 
turn has determined a variety of responses in its relationship with government, Crouch 
focuses on big business 'whose representatives were strong enough to approach 
government directly' and asks whether such businessmen conformed to Rigg's concept 
of pariah entrepreneurs. In that regard he makes an important distinction between those 
who were already well established before the expansion of the state sector in the 1970’s 
(and whose business success was not derived primarily from government patronage), 
and those who rose in the 1980's and whose fortunes were usually linked to a powerful 
Malay patron. Crouch argues that while those in the former category could not be 
dismissed as mere 'pariah entrepreneurs,' those in the latter category conformed more 
closely to the pariah image.41
The studies by Sieh (1992) and Jesudason (1990) both suggest that while Malaysia's 
political circumstances have not trapped businessmen in dependency relationships of 
the pariah type, they have nevertheless been responsible for distorting investment in 
ersatz-type ways and encouraging capital flight. Both argue, albeit from different
40 See Crouch, 'Malaysian Government: Authoritarian Repression and Democratic Responsiveness' 
(forthcoming).
41 He qualifies this distinction somewhat by noting how one prominent representative of new wealth, 
Khoo Kay Peng developed from pariah-like origins to become a businessman who could stand on his 
own feet even after his patron's fall from power. Such a distinction highlights the superficiality of 
Yoshihara's analysis which does not distinguish between the very different modes of capital 
accumulation by Chinese business before the NEP (by such individuals as Robert Kuok and Lim Goh 
Tong) and after by those such as Tan Koon Swan and Khoo Kay Peng, all of whom Yoshihara simply 
lumps together as "rent-seekers" (Yoshihara, 1988:91).
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perspectives, that under the NEP the manner, expansion and type of investment 
undertaken by such groups has changed in such a way that 'the bases of new business 
ventures in Malaysia have tended to be political and speculative rather than 
economically rational and productive' (Sieh, 1992:125). Jesudason and Sieh, however, 
have different views on the relationship between Chinese and Malay capital. Jesudason 
(1990:160) claims that 'the Malay state elite and Chinese business have viewed each 
other in zero-sum terms and have gone on divergent paths in their economic activities' 
but Sieh's (1992:110) study shows, although in a rather formalistic manner, how the 
joining of political-bureaucratic (Malay) and entrepreneurial (Chinese) interests has 
been greatly facilitated by the organizational characteristics of capitalism. This 
argument concerning the erosion of Chinese exclusivity as both economic interests and 
cultural forces bring together Chinese and indigenous elites in pursuit of common goals 
(profit) has been most forcefully put by Linda Lim. In her examination of the 
implications of the relationship between Chinese business, multinationals and the state, 
Lim (1983:246 &270) argues that 'capital loses not only its face, but also its colour. ... 
Pre-capitalist modes of production which may have an ethnic character give way to 
strictly capitalist forms of business organization and operation in which ethnicity 
becomes irrelevant.'
Heng Pek Koon's (1992) analysis of the relationship between the state and Chinese 
business, however, places inter-ethnic commercial co-operation in a more negative 
light. She is inclined to the view that sees Malaysia's political circumstances as likely to 
trap Chinese business in dependent relationships of the pariah sort. While noting that it 
is those Chinese groups which have formed alliances with powerful Malay patrons who 
have prospered the most, Heng argues that such dependency relationships, and the 
fortunes they build, are inherently fragile and vulnerable to changes within the Malay 
power structure. That situation Heng believes is the driving force behind the 
employment of the 'exit option' by Chinese businesses - that is the relocation of 
substantial portions of their capital overseas to avoid being totally trapped by Malaysia's 
political circumstances. Heng (1992:127-128) concludes that even the "success stories" 
she describes, that is those groups who have formed close and profitable alliances with 
powerful Malay patrons, may merely reflect a transitional phase, or (from the 
perspective of the Malay power structure) a temporary "alliance of convenience" which 
serves as a necessary half-way station enroute to complete Malay and foreign 
dominance of the major economic institutions of the country.
Clearly scholars differ in their assessments about the character of Chinese 
capitalism and the extent to which Malaysia's political circumstances have trapped
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Chinese businessmen into dependency relationships similar to Riggs pariah 
entrepreneurs. In retrospect it would seem that some of the more pessimistic 
assessments made in the mid-eighties about the outlook for Chinese business in 
Malaysia were probably coloured by the particular circumstances of the time, when 
inter-ethnic tensions were rising as a result of a severe economic recession and a crisis 
in UMNO. Nevertheless we have seen how analyses of the relationship between the 
state and Chinese (as well as foreign) capital in Malaysia tended to view these 
categories in discrete and antipathetical terms. At the same time a strong theme persists 
in the literature that determinedly attempts to classify Chinese capitalists in either/or 
terms, that is as either pariahs or paragons, patrons or clients. By an examination of a 
cross-section of Chinese business groups this thesis will show that such attempts to 
classify or characterise Chinese capital are no longer adequate to describe the 
complexity and dynamism found in the responses of Chinese capitalists to the NEP and 
their relationships with the state and Malay business groups.
Change and Transformation
This thesis will be concerned with change and the transformation of Malaysian 
capitalists. It will focus on big business because it is that level rather than that of small 
and medium business, as McVey (1992:9) notes, that 'we find most clearly displayed 
the nexus between business, politics and the state.' Furthermore it is at that level that 
the government-sponsored NEP has had most impact in fuelling and defining the 
character of Malaysian capitalism over the last twenty years. This is not to deny the 
importance of changes that have also occurred in medium and small business during the 
same period. However as Shamsul's illuminating study of local politics shows, such 
changes would not have occurred, or taken the form they did, had it not been for the 
new political-economic linkages forged at the national level after 1970.42
In concert with a focus on big business much of the thesis will also examine 
changes occurring in Malaysian capitalism from the perspective of business groups, 
both Malay and Chinese, because they dominate much of the private and domestically 
owned advanced sector in Malaysia.43 Before moving to an examination of changes in
42 See Shamsul (1986). While on the other side of the ethnic divide Tan and Jesudason have provided 
glimpses of some of the key characteristics and changes occurring at the levels of small and medium 
Chinese business, clearly the dynamics at those levels to date are less well known and understood 
than they are at the level of big business. See Tan (1982: Ch 8) & Jesudason (1989: Ch 5).
43 For some valuable insights regarding the role and importance of Business Groups in LDC's see 
Doner 1991:833; Leff 1979:46-64 and Mackie 1992 (b):56.
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major business groups during the last twenty years, it is useful to look briefly at two 
seminal works based on data in the 1970's. They are Lim Mah Hui (1981) Ownership 
and Control of the One Hundred Corporations in Malaysia and Tan Tat Wai's (1982) 
Income Distribution and Determination in West Malaysia. The most striking impression 
for a reader of these books in the 1990's relates to the extraordinary changes in the 
Malaysian business world during the past two decades.
Lim's study focusses on changes in ownership patterns in the mid-1970's. Principal 
characteristics of the corporate sector at that time highlighted by Lim were that: it was 
foreign dominated in terms of ownership; that it was dominated by a few large 
corporations (Lim's 100 largest corporations); that there was a high degree of 
concentration of both ownership and control within the largest corporations; and that 
through interlocking directors and share ownership 8 major cliques could be identified. 
Besides ownership, Lim provides a valuable socio-economic profile of directors in the 
corporate sector in the mid seventies. His principal findings included that, of the 579 
directors of the 100 corporations studied, two-thirds were non-Malaysians. Of the 33 
per cent who were Malaysian, twenty-one per cent were non-Malays and 12 per cent 
were Malays. Three occupational categories predominated among the directors - 
businessmen, professionals and politician-civil servants. Comparing the Malaysian 
directors, 6 per cent of the non-Malay directors had political or civil service 
backgrounds while 50 per cent of the Malay directors had such a background (Lim, 
1981:69-70).
Lim (1981:66-67) also identified three types of directors. First, executive 
professional directors who were basically high ranking employees engaged to run the 
company. An overwhelming majority of executive-professional directors were 
foreigners and of the Malaysians more than two-thirds were Chinese and the rest were 
Malays. Secondly, there were owner-directors who, as their title implies, did not simply 
manage companies but owned them as well. According to Lim (1981:67) a majority of 
owner-directors were Malaysian and Singaporean Chinese. (In another study, Sieh 
found that Malays occupied 30 per cent of the ordinary Malaysian directorships but 
accounted for only 4.6 per cent of the capital owned by Malaysian directors.44 Finally a 
third type of director identified by Lim were what he termed functional directors. 
Functional directors were mainly former civil servants who were hired for their
44 In her sample of 538 Malaysian ordinary directors Sieh-Lee found that the Chinese accounted for 50 
per cent of the directorships but almost 95 per cent of the capital owned by Malaysian directors. See 
Sieh-Lee Mei Ling (1982).
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experience and connections and who performed advisory and brokerage functions for 
companies. An overwhelming majority of functional directors were Malays (Lim, 
1981:69).
Tan's research also confirmed the concentration of wealth and its control as well as 
the strong position of foreign ownership in the economy. At the same time he pointed to 
changes (circa the mid-1970's) 'as the government gained dominating control of the 
financial and tin mining sectors and appeared to be making important inroads into the 
plantation and property sectors' (Tan, 1982:328). In his examination of the origins, 
nature and outlook of Malaysian businessmen Tan noted that the role of the non-Malay 
(almost all Chinese) businessmen had expanded in almost every field, although they 
tended to occupy the medium to large enterprises and in only a few cases had they been 
able to penetrate the tight control of the large foreign-owned corporations (Tan, 
1982:190). Some of the big Chinese businessmen had already established partnerships 
with Malays but such partnerships invariably involved close ties with the government or 
a leading Malay politician or bureaucrat as few Malay tycoons had yet emerged.
As for the Malays, Tan found that, although significant headway had been made 
regarding their ownership of the corporate sector since 1970, most of that had been 
made by the government on their behalf and was particularly apparent in the finance, 
mining and petroleum sectors though important inroads had also been made in the 
plantation, property development, manufacturing, trading and services sectors (Tan, 
1982:191). Finally from the perspective of the mid-1970's Tan saw the prospects of 
more economic nationalism as likely to increase as the young Malay professionals- 
politicians-civil servants sought to establish an independent economic base in 
juxtaposition to the foreign and big local (Chinese) businessmen (Tan, 1982:306).
The studies by Lim and Tan elucidate well the principal characteristics of 
Malaysia's corporate sector in the mid-seventies. However some fifteen years later some 
of their major findings regarding structures and relationships in the corporate sector no 
longer apply or require considerable qualification, a fact that indicates the quite 
extraordinary degree of socio-economic change that has taken place in Malaysia 
between then and now. For instance, of Lim's 8 major business cliques (Overseas 
Chinese Banking Corporation-Sime Darby; London Tin-Charter Consolidated; Malayan 
Banking; Kuok Brothers; Pan Malaysia Cement; Harrisons and Crosfield; Lee Loy Seng 
and the Sung Chi Fang) only three - Malayan Banking, Kuok Brothers and Lee Loy
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Seng - have retained their earlier character and prominence.45 Besides significant shifts 
in ownership patterns there have also been important changes regarding the typology of 
Lim's directors, particularly Malay directors. With the emergence in the eighties of 
Malay business groups, the background of Malay directors and the nature of their 
partnerships with Chinese (as described by Tan), have also undergone fundamental 
change. The emergence of Malay business groups has also transformed the relationship 
between the Malay politico-bureaucratic elite and Chinese as well as foreign business. 
Another major change between the 1970's and the 1980's has been the extensive use of 
the stockmarket to raise capital by business groups, whether Malay or Chinese in the 
course of their development into conglomerates.
It is in regard to such change and transformation that this study takes its point of 
departure from earlier work. It will, however, be less concerned than the earlier studies 
with the formal structures of ownership and control, and the formal linkages between 
business, politics and the state than with providing a sense of the dynamics between 
them in the growth of business groups and the development of Malaysian capitalism.46
To this end the thesis will examine a cross-section of business groups, Malay and
45 For developments in the Kuok Brothers and Lee Loy Seng groups since the 1970’s see chapter 9. 
Malayan Banking, although still a major group, no longer has the earlier links ascribed to it by Lim. 
Since Lim's study the two components of the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBO and 
Sime Darby clique have gone their separate ways. According to Lim, at the end of 1976, OCBC had 
the largest block of shares in Sime however in the eighties OCBC was replaced by the Malaysian 
Government and trust agencies as the dominant shareholders in the company. As of end 1990 
government corporations and trust agencies held 28 per cent of Sime's shares. See (Lim:1981:84) and 
KLSE Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XV I1, 1991: 435. London Tin-Charter Consolidated 
Between 1976-77 state-owned Pemas through New Trade winds became a major partner in Charter 
Consolidated. New Tradewinds later changed its name to Malaysian Mining Corporation (MMC). 
During the 1980's some of the principal companies previously under Charter Consolidated such as 
Aokam Tin and Ayer Hitam Tin Dredging that had passed to MMC were spun off to the UMNO- 
controlled Halimtan network of companies. See chapter 4. The Pan Malaysia Cement Clique In 
March 1980 this clique broke up when a key component, Pan Malaysia Cement (PMC), became a 
member of Khoo Kay Peng's MUI group. See chapter 8. The Harrisons and Crosfield Clique This 
foreign (British) dominated clique passed to Malaysian Government control in July 1982 when PNB 
the national equity corporation became the dominant shareholder. See KLSE, Annual Companies 
Handbook, Vol XI 1:1263. The Sung Chi Fang Clique Taiping Textiles, one of the key companies in 
the trio that made up this clique passed to the control of Malay entrepreneur, Azman Hashim in 1982. 
Taiping Textiles was later renamed Arab Malaysia Development Bhd. Ownership of the two 
remaining companies in the clique - Selangor Dredging and Malayan Flour remains largely 
unchanged. See chapter 6 and KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XV: 651, 855, 307.
46 In a review of Lim Mah Hui’s book Khoo Kay Jin (1983) persuasively argues how over emphasis on 
formal linkages can miss the dynamics both within business groups as well as in their relations with 
each other and the state. He notes how too economistic an approach can ignore informal links of 
great importance and which are often a more accurate guide as to the real locus of power.
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Chinese, and the changes occurring in each from the 1970's to the 1990's. It will show 
that the nexus between politics and business has blurred the distinctions commonly 
made between 'real' capitalists or entrepreneurs on the one hand and such categories as 
rent-seekers, pariah entrepreneurs, client capitalists and speculators, on the other. It will 
argue that we need to consider Malaysian capitalists, both Malay and Chinese, as 
occupying positions along a spectrum rather than placing them in either/or categories. 
At the same time Malaysian capitalism itself has to be viewed as being in a continuing 
process of change and evolution.
PART 1
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: 
STATE AND CAPITAL TO 1990
Chapter 2
MALAYSIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY: AN OVERVIEW
Introduction
The character of Malay capitalism and the transformation of Chinese business in 
Malaysia in the 1990’s arises from one of the most colourful and controversial histories 
of political economy in Southeast Asia. This chapter provides the historical, socio­
economic and political context which has shaped the contemporary relationship 
between business, politics and the state in Malaysia.
The Political Setting
Malaysia is a plural society with a total population of 17.756 million in 1990. Of this 
total, 14.617 million resided in Peninsular Malaysia, 58.20 per cent being Malay, 31.35 
per cent Chinese, 9.82 per cent Indian, and 0.63 per cent from other ethnic groups. 
Developments in the peninsular under British colonial rule resulted in the segregation 
of these various ethnic groups by geographical location, economic occupation and 
political role. Historically the political economy of Malaysia may be divided into five 
phases:
(a) the pre-colonial phase (before 1874);
(b) the phase of the colonial economy (1874-1957);
(c) the post colonial economy (1957-1969) when the government adopted a 
largely laissez-faire approach.
(d) the period of state intervention (1970-1985);
(e) the period of economic liberalization (since 1985).
Contemporary notions of nationalism or of the political state did not exist in pre­
colonial Malaya.1 The view of the Malay peasant did not extend much beyond his
1 See Gullick 1958 and Jomo 1986:ch 1.
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village community. At the same time conflicts within the ruling class and between 
rulers of different states also contributed to the fragmentation of authority on the 
peninsula which enabled the British to secure control with minimum resistance. The era 
of British rule in Malaya (1874-1957) and the political and socio-economic legacies of 
that rule have been well documented. For our purposes therefore it will suffice to 
highlight some of the principal features of that period and their implications for the 
relationship between politics, ethnicity and ownership of the economy in the post 
Independence 1957-1969 period.
British intervention had a number of important implications for Malaysia's future 
politics, society and economy. First the formal hierarchy of political power in Malay 
society with the Ruler at its apex was strengthened. In return for surrendering most of 
their real power and authority the Rulers were provided with generous monetary 
allowances, enjoyed the trappings of office and were freed from the uncertainties of 
challenges by rebellious subjects (Sidhu, 1980:188). As a result the prestige of the 
Sultans as symbols of the Malay community was gradually enhanced, a development 
which significantly strengthened conservative forces in the Malay community.2
Secondly, British intervention created a dual economy whereby large plantations 
and mines, essentially modem corporations based on venture capital, existed side by 
side with peasant smallholdings (Chan, 1986:10). The dominance of foreign investment 
coincided with another feature of the colonial economy - its dependence on two 
commodities, rubber and tin.3 Foreign, principally British, interests dominated nearly 
every facet of the colonial economy, including plantations, mining, banking, 
manufacturing, shipping and public utilities. Puthucheary (1960:xiv and 85-86) showed 
that in the mid-fifties European-owned firms still controlled 65-75 per cent of the 
export trade, 60-70 per cent of the import trade and owned 83 per cent of the rubber 
estate land. Besides European investment, Chinese business capital was also significant, 
though much was concentrated in tin mining. It was estimated that 64 per cent of tin 
mines were owned by Chinese in 1920 compared to 36 per cent that were European- 
owned. However, with the introduction of the dredge mining technique Chinese
2 See Snodgrass, 1980:29. For more detailed accounts of the colonial period and its implications for 
the powers and position of the Sultans see Emerson 1964; Parkinson 1960:324; Lim, T. G., 1977:7; 
Sadka 1968:379-80 andTarling 1969.
3 In the 1930's Malayan rubber production accounted for more than 50 per cent of total world output 
and Malayan mines about one third of total world production Lim, C. Y., (1967: 60 and 94).
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ownership declined and in 1954 European mines produced 62 per cent of total Malayan 
output compared to 38 per cent by Chinese-owned mines.4
A third legacy of the colonial era was the dramatic demographic change that took 
place in the Peninsular and the emergence of a plural society in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. Foreign capital, with the compliance of the colonial 
government, organised and permitted a massive inflow of low-cost immigrant labour, 
first from China and later from India, to meet the high production schedules in the 
plantation and mining sectors. In 1911 Malays constituted 59 per cent of the population 
of what is now Peninsular Malaysia and non-Malays 40 per cent. By 1931 there was a 
50:50 even balance between the indigenous Malay and the migrant populations, a 
situation that continued until about 1957 after which the non-Malay rate of natural 
increase declined and that of the Malays moved decisively ahead. See Appendix 2.1.
Colonial rule and changing demographic patterns also wrought important changes 
in the political and socio-economic structure of the society. At the top was the colonial 
government and British merchant capital. The Malay aristocracy and royalty formed an 
adjunct to that apex of British political and commercial power. In the middle were the 
Chinese compradors, the mercantile class and the emerging government bureaucrats, 
later dominated by Malays. Forming the base of society were the Malay peasantry and 
migrant wage labour.
An important feature of Malaya's emerging plural society was the extent to which 
the division between Malays and non-Malays also reflected differences of occupation 
and location. The colonial government's focus on facilitating conditions for the 
flourishing of a cash and export-oriented economy, in part through an open-door 
immigration policy, was largely responsible for imposing the ethnic division of labour. 
Ethnic and socio-economic cleavages were reinforced by the outlook and policies of 
colonial administrators. Notable in that regard was the rural orientation of Malay 
education which aimed 'to make the son of a fisherman or a peasant a more intelligent 
fisherman or peasant than his father had been, and a man whose education will enable 
him to understand how his own lot fits in with the scheme of life around him'.5 Such a 
view limited Malay access to many important forms of employment in the modem 
sector - professional, administrative and clerical - that were largely a function of
4 See Purcell, 1956 and Puthucheary, 1960.
5 This oft-quoted statement was made by George Maxwell, a colonial administrator in 1927. See 
Snodgrass, 1980:238.
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education. For Malays, English-medium education was limited to the sons of the 
nobility who attended the elite Malay College at Kuala Kangsar where they were 
trained for positions in the Malayan Administrative Service (MAS) as civil servants 
under the British.6 In the commercial sphere efforts by the colonial authorities to keep 
the Malays in rice production and the severe constraints placed on peasant rubber 
production further limited Malay economic opportunities.
Table 2.1:Malaya: Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Major Industries, 1947
Total
Industries (Thousand)
Malays
(%)
Chinese
(%)
Indians
(%)
Agriculture 889.3 57 30 12
Peasant
(incl. padi) 508.3 70 27 1
Padi 333.2 88 10 *
Plantation 381.0 39 33 27
Mining 39.4 14 71 13
Manufacturing,
construction,
utilities 124.8 19 70 6
Tertiary 407.2 27 48 23
Government 104.9 54 11 30
Total 1,461.7 44 40 15
Note: ^negligible
Source: Federation of Malaya, Population Census, Kuala Lumpur:
Government Printer, 1957, vol. 14, p.31. As cited by Ho, 1988:95
The relationship between ethnicity and occupation is apparent from Table 2.1 which 
shows that in the colonial economy the majority of Malays (57 per cent) remained 
confined to the agricultural sector while the tin mining and manufacturing sectors were 
clearly the preserves of the Chinese (71 per cent and 70 per cent respectively). The 
relationship between race and economic activity was also emphasised by Puthucheary 
(1960:xvii) who observed that, 'very few Malays were engaged in trade and probably 
none in mining and manufacture'. Colonial policy aside, employment as estate labour 
was probably not attractive for Malays either on economic or cultural grounds. As 
Snodgrass (1980:30) observed, ‘the plantations required disciplined low wage labour 
while the kampung economy, with its favourable land-man ratio, probably offered a 
comparable living standard within a more familiar and comfortable social framework’.
6 See Khasnor, 1984 and Stevenson, 1975.
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The reasons as to why the Malays remained outside the sectors that boomed after 
British intervention are complex and beyond the scope of our present concerns. It will 
suffice here to indicate that besides the effects of colonial policy noted earlier, such an 
account would also need to address the role of cultural attitudes toward capital 
accumulation as well as the institutions Malay society lacked (vis-a-vis those of the 
Europeans and the Chinese) that could effectively mobilize and utilize capital.
The agricultural/commercial divide between Malays and Chinese continued to 
widen as large numbers of Chinese moved from employment as mining and agricultural 
labourers to commercial occupations.7 Members of the same dialect group tended to 
follow the same occupation which suggested the importance of those ties in providing 
mutual help and finance for business. It was the closed nature of Chinese business, and 
its ubiquitous presence in the retail trades in particular, that seemed to make Chinese 
activity appear more threatening and exploitative to the Malays than that of the 
Europeans, even though it was the Europeans who dominated the colonial economy. 
Another factor contributing to the ethnic/occupational cleavage was the exclusion of 
Chinese from holding senior administrative posts in the Malay States while very few 
were permitted employment in the army or police (though few sought such occupations 
as by Chinese tradition they carried little status).
While colonial rule created a climate that was of course favourable to European 
commerce, it also provided an environment which allowed Chinese business to flourish. 
Indeed it was in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the foundations of 
a number of the Chinese business groups still operating in the 1990's were established, 
most from humble beginnings as traders in rice, rubber and tin.
The State, The Economy and The Malays 1957-1969
The political and socio-economic structures already apparent in the colonial period had 
implications both for the background of the elites which were to govern Malaya and the 
policies of the post-colonial state. The most striking feature of the 1957-69 period was 
that 'a governing group dominated the state without an economic base of its own, a 
situation that while not altogether unusual in new states, was necessarily fragile and 
untenable in the long run' (Jomo, 1986:247).
7 See Snodgrass, 1980:38:Table 2.4.
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When the Federation of Malaya gained its independence on 31 August 1957, the 
Alliance - a coalition of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the 
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) - 
formed the government of the new nation. The dominant party in the Alliance was 
UNMO. UMNO's initial success as a mass-based Malay party was due to its ability to 
mobilize Malay opinion after World War 2 against the British-imposed Malayan Union 
scheme, the main proposals of which (a common citizenship and equal political rights 
for all locally bom residents), removed even the semblance of Malay sovereignty.8 The 
opposition movement culminated in the formation of UMNO led by English-educated 
Malays, many of them civil servants of aristocratic background, the so-called 
'administocrats' who represented the moderate face of Malay nationalism. Alarmed at 
the strength of UMNO's opposition to plans for a Malayan Union, the British 
abandoned it and a new scheme - the Federation of Malaya Agreement - came into 
force in 1948. The Federation of Malaya Agreement was far more favourable to Malay 
interests and was a significant victory for UMNO; it upheld the sovereignty of the 
Rulers, entrenched the 'special position' of the Malays and was more restrictive of non- 
Malay citizenship. The rapid rise of UMNO and its success in forcing the abandonment 
of the Malayan Union, left it as the dominant Malay force and leading Malayan 
organization in government affairs (Mauzy* 1983:8).
Shortly after the Federation was promulgated, the security situation deteriorated 
seriously as a result of an insurgency mounted by the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP), an organization whose membership was overwhelmingly Chinese. It was in that 
context that the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was formed in 1949 in a bid to 
encourage the development of an anti-communist alternative to the MCP (Heng, 
1983:294). MCA leaders included some of the most successful Chinese capitalists of 
the time; they also tended to be English-speaking and strongly pro-British such as Tan 
Cheng Lock, his son Tan Siew Sin and H. S. Lee. As Jomo (1986:246) observed 'in 
marked contrast therefore to the class composition of the Malay community and the 
character of the UMNO leadership (the "administocrats") the MCA was primarily a 
party of businessmen from the outset.' It was also the MCA's identification with the 
interests of big Chinese businessmen, at least in the 1950's and 1960's, which limited its 
appeal among other classes in the Chinese community.
8 Malay sovereignty was further eroded by another key proposal in the Malayan Union scheme, that is 
the surrender by the Malay rulers of all power and jurisdiction in their states to the British crown. For 
a comprehensive account of this period see Noordin, 1974.
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The Malayan (later Malaysian) Indian Congress (MIC) was also formed in the later 
1940's, and after an earlier 'radical' period, emerged in the mid-1950's as a moderate 
party led primarily by English-educated Indian professionals and businessmen who had 
virtually no links with the Indian laboring class or trade unions.9 In 1952 UMNO and 
the MCA formed an electoral coalition to contest the Kuala Lumpur municipal 
elections. The success of that pact led to the formation of the Alliance Party, a coalition 
between UMNO, the MCA and the MIC, each claiming to represent the three major 
communities in Malaysia. The overwhelming victory scored by the Alliance in the first 
federal election in 1955, when it won fifty-one of the fifty-two contested seats, 
demonstrated a persistent feature of Malaysian politics: 'that an alliance of ethnic elites, 
each with its own communal organization, was more appealing to voters than non- 
communal organizations' (Jesudason, 1990:44).
The Alliance's electoral success proved the potency of its prescription for ethnic co­
operation (albeit at an elite level) and paved the way for independence in 1957. Before 
independence a series of important compromises were negotiated between the moderate 
elites of the UMNO and the MCA that were later reflected in the constitution. Generally 
referred to as 'the bargain', its essence was that in return for liberalized citizenship 
regulations and a tacit understanding that Chinese economic interests would not be 
disadvantaged, the non-Malays agreed to Malay political paramountcy and the 
paramountcy of Malay symbols in the definition of the state. This would be achieved by 
UMNO controlling the highest offices of government, Islam as the state religion, Malay 
as the national language and the preservation of the Malay sultans within the framework 
of a constitutional democracy (Milne and Mauzy, 1980:38-90). Malay anxieties 
regarding their economic backwardness were reflected in Article 153 of the 
Constitution which contained provisions for the 'special position' of the Malays in terms 
of official preference in education, the bureaucracy and business.
The Political Economy of the Alliance
The policies of the Alliance government were constrained by its social base on the one 
hand and by the nature of the inter-elite co-operation that characterized its operation on 
the other. These constraints were particularly pertinent where attitudes to foreign 
ownership and the role of the state in expanding Malay ownership in the economy were 
concerned.
9 See Mauzy, 1983:11 and Stenson, 1980.
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Although after independence efforts were made to industrialize and diversify the 
economy, its basic character changed little from the pre-independence period. Rubber 
and tin, which accounted for 83 per cent of exports in 1950, continued to comprise 75 
per cent of exports in 1969 (Ho, 1990:104). Foreign capital and investment also retained 
its dominant role in the economy. In 1970 foreigners continued to control almost three 
quarters of the corporate capital in modern agriculture (the plantation sector) and 
mining (75.4 per cent and 72.5 per cent respectively). Foreigner's also continued to 
dominate the export trade (70 per cent).10 A strong presence was also retained by 
foreign capital in the financial and manufacturing sectors. Only in two sectors, transport 
and construction did local ownership exceed that of foreign ownership.* 11
The consistently positive and tolerant attitude of the newly independent Malaysian 
government to a large foreign stake in the economy was due to a combination of 
factors. Jesudason points to Malaysia's heavy dependence on Britain for military 
defence in the 1960's (with a lingering communist insurgency and Indonesia's active 
'Confrontation' of Malaysia) as well as perceptions of economic vulnerability as the 
government sought to diversify the economy and provide more employment 
opportunities for a rapidly growing population. In its concern to attract foreign 
investment the government apparently did not even broach the notion of whether 
changing the terms of participation in one sector would actually lead to declining 
investments in other sectors (Jesudason, 1990:53).
The benign attitude of the Alliance government to foreign dominance of the 
economy has also been accounted for in terms of Malay insecurity about Chinese 
economic power. In that regard some scholars have argued that as the Malays were not 
yet ready to manage large modem businesses, a large degree of foreign domination was 
preferable to, and more manageable than, heavier reliance on Chinese enterprise.12 
Other scholars have sought to explain tolerance of the large foreign stake in the 
economy in class terms arguing that the governing group, the Malay 'administocrats' 
(represented by UMNO) who partly derived their dominance in the post colonial order 
from compromises acceptable to the British on the one hand, and Chinese commercial
10 See Hoffman, Lutz and Tan (1980:215) and Appendix 2.2. where foreign domination of the export 
trade is apparent from the figure for 'Wholesale Trade’.
11 Foreign, principally British, traders also suffered a relative decline in the import of manufactured 
goods as competitors from East Asia and the United States increasingly chose Malaysians as agents 
for their products (Junid Saham, 1980:121).
12 See Golay, 1969:387 and Snodgrass, 1980:210.
41
interests (represented by the MCA) on the other, had a stake in preserving the 'capitalist 
status quo' (Jomo, 1986:247).
Another significant feature of the 1957-70 period was that not only did income 
inequality increase for the population as a whole and especially among the Malays 
(Jomo, 1986:249), but ethnic disparities in inter-ethnic income distribution also 
remained largely unchanged.
Table 2.2: Mean Income and Shares in Income Growth, by Ethnic Group, 1957/8-1970
(Malays, Chinese, and Indians Only)
Income
Mean income growth, Total personal income
per household 1957/8-70 ($ million/year Percent
Ethnic
group
($/month) 
1957/8 1970
In
$/month
In
per cent
In
1957/8
In
1970 Increase
share of 
increase
Malays 139 177 39 28 1,008 1,954 946 41
Chinese 300 399 100 33 1,299 2,426 1,127 49
Indians 237 310 74 31 358 673 315 14
Total 203 262 59 29 2, 665 5,053 2, 388 100
Source: Snodgrass: 1980:83.
The study by Snodgrass of household income as an indicator of income inequality 
showed that in 1957 the Malays had the lowest mean income $139, compared to 
Chinese $300 and Indians $237. By 1970 Malay households still had the lowest mean 
income ($177) while Chinese mean income ($399) was almost twice that of the Malays 
(Snodgrass, 1980:83). Yet despite these continuing disparities, the role of the state in 
expanding Malay ownership in the first decade of independence has been generally 
characterised as restrained or laissez-faire in its approach. Why was this the case? As 
suggested earlier it was in large part due to the social bases of the Alliance elites and 
their modus operandi in government.
The nature of inter-elite co-operation that characterized the operation of the 
Alliance was dependent on continuing respect by Alliance leaders for the terms of the 
Independence 'bargain' thrashed out between them. The quid pro quo of the bargain 
often represented by the formula: 'Malay political hegemony in return for unhindered 
Chinese (and Indian) economic activity' also established the political rules of the game. 
The bargain therefore constrained the UMNO leadership from even contemplating 
radical state action to expand Malay ownership as any such action that upset the 
economic status quo would undermine the very basis of Alliance co-operation and rule.
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While the multi-ethnic compromises made between the Alliance elites shaped the 
laissez-faire policies of the government and posed structural constraints to Malay 
ethnic particularism, such outcomes were also sustained by the power and personality 
of the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman and the nature and style of Alliance rule. 
An aristocrat from the royal house of Kedah, the Tunku had little empathy with the 
aspirations of urban Malays increasingly conscious of their ethnicity and position as an 
economic outgroup vis-a-vis the Chinese. Nevertheless criticism of his leadership from 
Malay nationalists was muted for much of the 1960's as the Tunku continued to enjoy 
the considerable prestige attached to his persona as the father of Independence (Bapak 
Merdeka). The Tunku's dominance both of UMNO and the Alliance, and his preference 
for a style of government which emphasized compromise, ambiguity and gradualism at 
the elite level, also facilitated a degree of MCA influence that was not matched by the 
number of seats it held in government compared to that held by UMNO.
The MCA's influence in the Alliance was also due to its widely recognized role as 
the party that provided most of the funds for the Alliance party's organization (Milne 
and Ratnam, 1965:196). In addition, the limited extent of MCA participation in the 
cabinet was largely compensated for by the fact that it held the key economic portfolios, 
that is the ministries of Finance and of Commerce and Industry. A fiscal conservative, 
MCA leader Tan Siew Sin's tenure as Finance Minister during the 1960's was 
characterized by a concern to limit domestic borrowing levels and contain the foreign 
debt, an approach that while maintaining the Malaysia's reputation for responsible 
economic management, also necessarily limited the amount of funds that could go to 
special Malay programs (Jesudason, 1990:54). In that regard Heng (1988:258) has 
observed that 'Tan Siew Sin probably understood better than any other non-Malay 
politician of the period, the full economic implications a wide-ranging implementation 
of Malay special rights could have upon Chinese business interests (and) appears to 
have successfully influenced the Tunku to pursue a low-key policy in regards to Malay 
special rights throughout the 1960's.'
While structural constraints (the bargain), and the modus operandi of Alliance rule 
were important factors shaping the benevolent attitude of the government to foreign and 
Chinese commercial interests, it is pertinent nevertheless to recall that most Alliance 
leaders, Malay and non-Malay, shared the Tunku's pro-British attitudes and were 
generally sympathetic towards those supporting the virtues of a free enterprise 
economy. As (Funston, 1980:13) has pointed out, this was no coincidence, but a 
reflection of the similar background of this group which was largely drawn from the 
privileged classes (aristocratic-bureaucratic for Malays, commercial and English-
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educated for non-Malays). Finally, the laissez-faire policies of the Alliance leadership 
were also reinforced by the advice Malay political leaders received from the 
bureaucracy, the senior echelons of which were occupied by people who shared the 
same privileged background and outlook as themselves, that is the so-called 
'administocrats'.
In summary therefore, a key feature of the pre-1969 period was a state that did not 
explicitly or aggressively promote Malay advances into the capitalist sector (Jomo, 
1986:254). This is not to deny that the Malay leadership wished to see greater progress 
in Malay entrepreneurship and ownership of the economy but its approach to securing 
those goals was long term and ad hoc. We next examine the development of Malay and 
Chinese business during the 1960's, both as a backdrop to the breakdown of the laissez- 
faire framework of Alliance rule and to the development of those groups after 1970.
Capital and Ethnicity before 1969
From 1956 to 1970 there were three five-year economic development plans that broadly 
signalled the government's attempt to "Malayanise" the economy. However those plans 
did little to alter the pattern of ownership and control inherited at the time of 
independence and Malay ownership, particularly in the corporate sector of the 
economy, remained negligible. By the mid-1960's the number of urban Malays had 
begun to swell as a result of special economic and educational privileges (notably 
preference in public sector employment, the allocation of scholarships and licences for 
businesses). Frustrated in their attempts to make significant headway in the corporate 
sector, aspiring Malay businessmen began to lobby the government for assistance. In 
spite of the weakness of its organization, Malay business opinion was able to exercise 
substantial influence with government officials because many of them were, or had 
been, high UMNO officials or top civil servants (Popenoe, 1970:221).
The response by the government to this pressure marked 1965 as a turning point in 
the development of Malay capitalism. In that year the first Bumiputra Economic 
Congress was held. A second followed in 1968. The main thrust of the resolutions that 
emerged from both congresses was to urge a more active role by the state in support of 
Malay commerce. In response the government formed the first Malay commercial bank, 
Bank Bumiputra, in 1965 to provide Malay individuals and companies with easier
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access to credit facilities (ST, 8:6:1965). Twelve months later the government set up 
Majlis Amanah Rakyat, or MARA (Council of Trust for the People) to replace RIDA.13
Despite these measures, and a special allocation of $124 million for the promotion 
of Malay economic development in the First Malaysia Plan (1966-70), which amounted 
after all to a mere 3.8 per cent of the Plan's expenditure (Jesudason, 1990:52), progress 
in the promotion of a Malay capitalist class remained slight.14 The compromise or 
'bargain' under the Alliance arrangement continued to restrain the state from making 
significant inroads against foreign and Chinese capital. As to the latter, Chinese 
business generally prospered in the 1960's. It benefitted from sustained growth in the 
economy (GNP growth averaged about 6 per cent for the decade), the loss of the 
foreigner's favoured position in some sectors, and increased government expenditure on 
infrastructure. Furthermore, the considerable influence wielded by the MCA in the 
Alliance government enabled Chinese businesses, big or small, to carry on their 
activities with a minimum of bureaucratic interference.
A number of Chinese businesses which emerged in the 1960's grew into large and 
diversified conglomerates.15 Tan (1982:294) constructed a hypothetical scenario for 
the development of Chinese big business in the following manner:'... the initial activity 
was usually retailing evolving into wholesaling, importing or exporting. With larger 
surpluses accumulated and the development of broader experience and outlook, the 
traders could then move into resource-based activities related to their trading and/or 
manufacturing.' Tan's hypothesis, as Jesudason (1990:61) has pointed out, encapsulates 
Chinese business expansion from the colonial era to independence, but in the 1960's
13 RIDA or the Rural Industrial Development Authority had been established in 1953 with 
responsibility for promoting Malay development in commerce and industry but due to poor 
management and lack of funding it had achieved little.
14 Lindenburg (1973:258 and 252-328) found that in a sample he took of Pioneer Firms in 1968 Malays 
held less than one per cent of the shares and that Malay directors comprised about 10 per cent of the 
total directors of such firms. Thirty-five per cent of the Malay directorship positions were held by 
individuals who held more than one directorship. Of the 52 positions for Malay directors in the 
sample, 19 were held by individuals who filled more than one position. Lindenburg also observed 
the small number of Malays who entered the private sector were either prominent politicians of 
bureaucrats. Such a background, combined with the holding of multiple directorships, suggests that 
even those small numbers of Malays who had entered the private sector played a largely symbolic or 
figurehead role and were generally not actively involved in the day to day affairs of companies.
15 The characteristics and growth of most of the big Chinese conglomerates to emerge in the 1960's are 
examined in some detail in chapters 9 and 10.
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that outline became less clear, and in addition, diversifying into property became almost 
de rigueur for most of the leading representatives of big Chinese business.16
Besides property, banking was another sector where Chinese business made 
substantial gains during the 1960’s. Before independence, the banking system was 
dominated by a few foreign banks, the largest being the Chartered Bank, the Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and United Malayan Banking Corporation 
(Chin, 1984:196). After independence the Central Bank's support for the development 
of local banks led to the flourishing of domestic banking activities. The spread of 
Chinese investment in the banking sector has been well documented by Tan (1982:159) 
who noted that, 'most of the twelve new local banks established since 1957 were 
incorporated in the sixties by (Chinese) businessmen who made their money in the 
rubber and tin sectors and were then diversifying into the financial sector for security, 
fame (as a banker), and to facilitate future industrial and property development 
activities.'17
Increased government expenditure on infrastructure, including rural development 
programs aimed primarily at the Malay population, also provided Chinese contractors 
and other businesses with opportunities for growth and profit. Chinese even benefitted 
disproportionately from the government-sponsored Pioneer Industry Program where 
Lindenburg (1973:310-312) found that, 'while pioneer firms made a contribution to 
growth they also reflected and sometimes magnified racial, regional, and domestic- 
foreign imbalances in ownership, directorships and employment.' He also noted that 
several large Chinese groups exerted a great deal of control in pioneer firms. Prominent 
in that regard were the Kouk-family group which, in alliance with both government and 
Japanese interests, controlled major pioneer industries, and another group of Chinese 
businessmen centred around Chang Ming Thien's United Malayan Banking 
Corporation.
The spread of Chinese business, particularly the small and middle-level sized firms, 
seldom involved Malays. Although the larger Chinese firms did employ Malays as
16 In the 1960's prominent Chinese tycoons who diversified into property included Robert Kuok, Lim 
Goh Tong, Teo Soo Cheng, Teh Hong Piow and Low Yat.
17 Some of the original founders of the major domestic banks included: Khoo Teck Puat and Loke Wan 
Tho, the heir of the tin miner Loke Yew (Malayan Banking), Chang Min Thien and Chew Choo 
Keng, the latter of the Kong Guan biscuit group (United Malayan Banking Corporation), Teh Hong 
Piow (Public Bank) and Sir Henry H.SLee, wealthy tin miner, co-founder of the MCA and former 
Minister o f Finance (Development and Commercial Bank). For further details o f founders and 
original shareholders of the major domestic banks see Tan (1982:196fh 62).
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'Functional Directors' (Lim, M. H., 1981 (a) :69) to assist in their dealings with the 
government, such directors wielded little influence in the day-to-day affairs of such 
companies. In other words the relationship between Malay and Chinese directors in the 
larger Chinese firms conformed to the 'Ali-Baba' stereotype.18 In short Malays were 
generally marginalized from the development of Chinese business in the sixties and 
viewed its advance as inimical to their own aspirations for economic advancement.
The marginalization felt by aspiring Malay capitalists was also shared by much of 
the rest of the Malay population for whom economic conditions had also deteriorated 
during the 1960's. As noted earlier, over the period 1957 to 1970, intra-group inequality 
rose for each group, but most for the Malays and least for the Chinese (Snodgrass, 
1980:83). In 1957 the top 20 per cent of Malay households accounted for 42.5 per cent 
of total Malay household income but this had risen to 51.3 per cent by 1970. During the 
same period the percentage of household income received by the bottom 40 per cent of 
Malay households dropped from 19.6 per cent to 13.0 per cent (Jomo, 1986:249) and 
Appendix 2.3.
Growing inequality within the Malay community corresponded with the observation 
that Chinese movement into modem, well-paid activities was more rapid and broadly- 
based than that of the Malays (or Indians) (Snodgrass, 1980:83). By contrast the great 
majority of Malays remained in poorly paid occupations such as rice cultivation, rubber 
smallholding and fishing. Malay movement into high-income occupations was 
invariably associated with public sector employment rather than corporate sector 
employment.
Table 2:3: Employment by Sector and Race Peninsular Malaysia, 1957 and 1970
Agricultural (per cent) Mining, manufacturing, construction, Services and public
utilies and transport (per cent) and public administration
Year Malays V
1o
Others Total Malays Chinese Others Total Malays Chinese Others Total
1957 61 25 14 100 25 56 18 100 32 44 24 100
1970 68 21 11 100 31 59 10 100 38 48 14 100
Source: K. Young, K., W. Bussink W., and P. Hasan, 1980: 118.
18 'Ali' represents the Malays who, under the special privileges guaranteed by the Constitution, can 
easily obtain permits, licences and contracts that are reserved for them. However 'Ali' normally does 
not have the capital, so he often 'sells' the right of operating these businesses or benefits gained from 
government contracts to well-to-do Chinese - referred to as 'Baba' - either for an outright or monthly 
payment. See S. Husin Ali, 1975:35.
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Employment by Sector and Race 1957 and 1970
The extent to which Malays were under-represented in most sectors of the modem 
economy whether as executives or urban workers is also apparent from Table 2.4. It 
was only in the lower categories of professional and technical jobs, again mainly in the 
public sector in occupations such as nursing and teaching that Malays were over­
represented.
Table 2.4:
Employment by Occupation and Ethnic Group, 1970 
(percentage of ethnic representation in occupation)
Sector Malay Chinese Indian
Professional and technical 47.2 37.7 12.1
Administrative & managerial 22.4 65.7 7.5
Clerical workers 33.4 51.0 14.3
Sales 23.9 64.7 11.0
Production workers 31.3 59.9 8.6
Service workers 42.9 42.5 13.4
Agricultural workers 68.7 20.8 9.6
Total 51.4 37.0 10.7
Source: TMP, 1976: 82, Table 4-15.
The distribution of corporate wealth in Malaysia also highlighted the 
marginalization of the Malays from the modem sector of the economy and the fact that 
after more than a decade of independence a firm foundation for the development of 
Malay capitalism had yet to be established. In 1970 Malays and 'Malay interests' (the 
latter comprising government trust agencies and institutions which held shares 'on 
behalf of Malays) owned only 2.4 per cent of all share capital of limited companies in 
Peninsular Malaysia, while 'other Malaysians' owned 34.3 per cent. Foreign ownership 
of corporate equity remained high and in 1970 amounted to 63.3 per cent (3MP:86).
The ethnic disparities in employment and ownership were particularly apparent to 
the growing number of urban Malays who through government support had obtained 
tertiary education and aspired to the high-level executive jobs, status and rewards 
conferred by the corporate sector. The frustration this group experienced in making 
inroads into the modem sector of the economy was soon directed primarily at the 
Chinese. Although the Chinese did not actually dominate the economy, the Chinese 
were most often the capitalists who dealt directly with urban (and rural) Malays in 
commerce and credit and so were perceived as representing the main barrier to Malay
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economic advancement (Jomo, 1986:253). Malay frustration was not only directed 
against Chinese capitalists but also the UMNO-led Alliance government which, in 
Malay eyes, had failed to sufficiently mobilize the resources of the state to facilitate 
Malay entry to the private sector.
On the other side of the racial divide, a younger generation of Chinese became 
increasingly resentful at what they perceived was as an increasingly pro-Malay 
government, which through 'special privileges, ' was more concerned to promote the 
interests of Malays than those of other races. Besides economic grievances, a volatile 
mix of contentious language and cultural issues had also come to the fore,19 and by 
1969 the Alliance elites, Malay and Chinese, were being successfully outbid by more 
radical elements on their respective ethnic flanks.
Table 2.5: Parliamentary Election Results, Peninsular Malaysia, 1959-1969
Parties
1959 1964 1969
Won Contested Won Contested Won Contested
Alliance 74 104 89 104 66 103
UMNO 52 70 59 68 51 67
MCA 19 31 27 33 13 33
MIC 3 3 3 3 2 3
Opposition
PAS 13 58 9 52 12 59
DAP - - ii u i 13 23
Gerakan - - - - 8 14
Others 17 5 4
Total 104 104 1032
Source: Vasil, 1972: 85 
Notes: ^Contested by PAP.
^Election in one constituency postponed. As cited by Jesudason 1990:69.
19 Pertinent in that regard were the compromises made by UMNO over the National Language Bill of 
1967 (which angered many Malays because it permitted the continued use of English for official 
purposes), and an increasing propensity amongst Chinese to challenge Malay political supremacy 
and special rights.
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Table 2.6: State Election Results, Peninsular Malaysia, 1959-1969
Seats Won Votes P o lled  (Percentage o f  Total)
Parties 1959 1964 1969 1959 1964 1969
Alliance 206 241 162 55.5 57.6 47.9
UMNO 140 164 133 37.0 37.7 33.5
MCA 59 67 26 16.3 17.4 12.7
MIC 7 10 3 2.3 2.5 1.7
Opposition
PAS 43 25 40 20.8 15.3 22.8
DAP - - 31 - 0.9 11.8
Gerakan - - 26 - - 8.8
Others 33 16 18 23.7 26.2 8.7
Total 282 282 277 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Vasil, 1972: 73
In terms of votes the 1969 election results were not a major departure from previous 
voting patterns but, largely due to an electoral pact between the predominantly non- 
Malay opposition parties, the Alliance lost a large number of seats and, before the 
suspension of voting in East Malaysia, was in danger of losing its two-thirds majority in 
parliament.20
The major erosion of electoral support for the Alliance bode ill for a system which 
depended on the ability of leaders to resolve communal issues privately and through 
compromises while at the same time enjoying the support of their respective 
communities. The apparent inroads made by the non-Malay opposition parties shocked 
many Malays and prompted exuberant and provocative celebrations by Chinese in the 
capital, Kuala Lumpur. Counter demonstrations by Malays led to the 13 May racial 
riots in the city, the suspension of parliamentary rule and the setting up of a National 
Operations Council (NOC) under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime
20 In the predominantly non-Malay urban areas, oppostion parties made considerable inroads, largely at 
the expense of MCA candidates. In 1969 the MCA was able to win only 13 of the 23 parliamentary 
seats which it contested while non-Malay candidates from the opposition parties won 24. In the 
predominantly Malay rural areas, electoral support for the Alliance also fell enabling the Malay 
opposition party PAS (Parti Islam Malaysia) to win back much of the support it had lost in the 1964 
election. Wheras 67 per cent of Malays voted for the Alliance in 1964 only 54 per cent did so in 1969 
(Ramam and Milne, 1967:374-376).
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Minister. In September 1970 Tun Razak, who had personally been identified with 
various government programs meant to uplift the Malays, replaced the Tunku as Prime 
Minister. For many Malays the Tunku's Prime Ministership had become synonymous 
with too many concessions to non-Malays which had contributed to continuing Malay 
backwardness. The so called 'Young Turks' in UMNO, most notably Dr Mahathir and 
Musa Hitam, who had been the most vocal critics of the Tunku's laissez-faire approach, 
and had earlier been dismissed by him, were soon rehabilitated by Tun Razak and 
brought back into the mainstream of government.21
From Alliance to Barisan Nasional
'1969 marked the end of a period in Malaysian politics dominated by certain ethnic 
arrangements and the beginning of another era reflecting the growing strength of new 
social groups and classes' (Chandra, 1984:356-57). Economic and social disparities 
between Malays and non-Malays were identified as the root cause of the 13 May riots. 
The strengthened position of those elements within UMNO that supported a more 
active role by the state in the promotion of Malay capitalism led to fundamental 
changes on both the political and economic fronts.
On the economic front the most important indicator of change was the formulation 
of the New Economic Policy (NEP). As indicated earlier, the NEP contained two 
prongs, notably the eradication of poverty 'irrespective of race', and the restructuring of 
Malaysian society to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with 
economic function' (MTR2MP, 1973:1). A central concern of the plan, it will be 
recalled, was the restructuring of wealth ownership. In that regard a specific target of 30 
per cent ownership and control of the corporate sector by Malays and Malay interests22 
was set for 1990 with other Malaysians taking up 40 per cent leaving 30 per cent 
remaining in foreign hands. Thus, the rise in the Malay share was to be achieved in the 
context of a rapidly growing economy and an expansion of the national share in the 
ownership of the modem sector through a relative decline in that of the foreign share. 
Since a Malay business class had yet to emerge, state enterprises were of necessity the 
vehicle through which assets would be acquired so that targets for Malay ownership 
might be met. State enterprises were thus to play a crucial role not only in holding
21 Dr Mahathir was dismissed from the party on 10 July 1969 while Musa Hitam was fired from his 
government postion as an Assistant Minister on 28 July 1969. See Von Vorys 1975:377-380.
22 'Malay interests' include government trust agencies and state enterprises.
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assets in trusteeship for the Malay community as a whole, but also in the government's 
efforts to produce Malay capitalists.
Candour about economic policies corresponded to similar candour in the political 
sphere. The ambiguities of Alliance rule were removed, especially uncertainties about 
Malay political hegemony (Mauzy, 1983:4). When parliament reconvened in 1971 
amendments to the constitution proscribed most of the more sensitive ethnic political 
issues from public debate. Thereafter it became seditious to question Malay 'special 
rights' or the goals of the NEP which in effect became sacrosanct. While Malay 
hegemony was entrenched, the system also took a more authoritarian turn as the 
government moved to exercise stronger indirect control over the media23 and later 
amended the Universities and Colleges Act to prevent students taking part in political 
activity.
Besides redefining the political agenda, Tun Razak strengthened his hold over 
UMNO. At the 1971 UMNO General Assembly Razak persuaded delegates to approve 
a proposal that the party's ruling body, the Supreme Council, be elected for three years 
instead of one (Gale, 1981:32). At the same time he also strengthened UMNO's 
dominance of the political system by broadening the base of the former Alliance 
structure by drawing more component parties into a wider coalition called the Barisan 
Nasional or National Front. The opposition parties had to weigh the advantages of 
joining the ruling party against remaining in opposition in which case their activities 
were significantly circumscribed. By joining the Barisan, former opposition parties 
acquired some influence and access to patronage, but the quid pro quo, acceptance of 
cabinet solidarity, meant the abandonment of their former position as independent 
critics of government policy. The co-option of UMNO's main Malay rival, Parti Islam 
Sa-Malaysia (PAS) into the Barisan strengthened UMNO's position in the Malay 
constituency, while the broadening of representation of Chinese parties through the co­
option of the Gerakan, diluted the power of the MCA, the former Chinese pillar of the 
old Alliance structure.24
23 In 1972 control of the major English-language newspaper group, the Straits Times was bought by the 
new state trading company, Pemas. The chairman of Pemas was Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah who was 
appointed as one o f UMNO’s vice-presidents in 1974. The chairman of the main Malay-language 
newspaper group, Utusan Melayu, was Abdul Ghafar Baba who had been an UMNO vice-president 
since 1962 (Crouch, 1980:6-10).
24 As Jomo (1986:255) has pointed out the bargaining position of the MCA in the Barisan had also been 
considerably weakened by its especially poor performance in the 1969 election and its decision to opt 
out of the government after the election. Furthermore, all the new coalition partners from the
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As power became increasingly concentrated in the UMNO leadership on the one 
hand and UMNO strengthened its dominant position in the National Front on the other, 
the party also sought greater control of the economic agenda by consolidating its hold 
over the key economic and technocratic agencies of government. This was most 
apparent in UMNO's determination to wrest control of the Ministries of Trade and 
Industry and of Finance from the MCA. The Trade and Industry portfolio passed from 
traditional MCA control to UMNO in 1971 and, while Tun Tan Siew Sin remained 
Minister of Finance until 1974, decisions concerning expenditure shifted to the 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU) which was located in the Prime Minister's Department. 
The changing power balance between those economic agencies and UMNO's control of 
economic policy became more apparent still 'when the EPU was considerably 
strengthened while the Treasury in the Finance Ministry suffered a secular decline in 
influence' (Jesudason, 1990:78).
New policies and regulatory authorities were also instituted to enable the 
government to increase its control over the private sector with a view to achieving 30 
per cent Malay ownership and control by 1990. A major new policy instrument in that 
regard was the Industrial Co-ordination Act (ICA) of 1975. The intention of the Act 
was to control the growth of the manufacturing sector to ensure advancement of Malay 
capitalist interests in that sector (Jomo, 1986:270). The ICA stipulated that all 
manufacturers must obtain a licence except those with capital of less than $100,000 and 
less than 25 full-time paid employees. An important feature of the Act were the wide 
powers given to the minister to grant or refuse a licence in the 'national interest'. 
Conditions contained in the Act left no doubt that the national interest required 
manufacturers to ensure that they fulfilled the NEP's requirement of 30 per cent Malay 
employment and ownership participation.25
peninsula had been brought in primarily on the initiative of UMNO leaders, whereas the MCA effort 
to negotiate with the DAP was unsuccessful. UMNO's political dominance vis-a-vis the Chinese 
components of the Barisan was further enhanced by frequent in-fighting amongst the component 
parties, especially between the MCA and the Gerakan, over seat allocations prior to elections as well 
as cross-overs by party cadres from one party to another (Lee, 1980:186-93).
25 In the case of foreign enterprises, the Act required Malaysian equity amount to 70 per cent, except in 
the case of export-oriented industries. Other important conditions of the Act included an obligation 
by manufacturers to seek Malay distributors so that at least 30 per cent of distribution would be in 
Malay hands and to recruit and train Malay workers so that their work force up to managerial level 
reflected the composition of Malaysia's multi-racial society (Jesudason, 1989:137).
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The ICA was vigorously opposed by both Chinese and foreign business who were 
loathe to transfer 30 per cent equity to Malays.26 Small and medium Chinese 
businesses were particularly hard hit by the legislation as many such businesses were 
run as family firms and as such were less able to absorb or minimize the effects of the 
regulations than were larger Chinese companies or big business. Subsequently, 
although the Act was amended to exempt the smaller firms from its provisions and the 
discretionary powers of the minister were curtailed somewhat, the Act nevertheless 
retained its character as an instrument for promoting social restructuring, particularly 
where large and medium-sized Chinese enterprises were concerned.27
The restructuring goals of the NEP also brought about a growing concentration of 
power in a number of key regulatory authorities. Most prominent in that regard were the 
Foreign Investment Committee or FIC, the Capital Issues Committee or CIC and the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry.
The FIC was established in 1974 with the main objective of monitoring and 
controlling "foreign" take-overs of Malaysian companies or assets to ensure that they 
conformed with NEP objectives. However, included in the FIC's guidelines was a 
provision covering 'any proposed acquisitions of assets or interests exceeding in value 
$1 million whether by Malaysian or foreign interests, ' which in effect extended the 
FIC's influence over domestic investments as well. The $1 million ceiling was later 
increased to $5 million (Chooi, 1987:14). Membership of the FIC included high ranking 
officials from the Ministries of Finance, Trade and Industry, the EPU and the Registrar 
of Companies. With its high-powered bureaucratic membership, the FIC was one of the 
sharper instruments for enforcing the NEP's requirements, particularly in terms of
26 See Jesudason 1989:135-42 and Ho 1990:229-239.
27 On 30 April 1977 the ICA was amended in several minor ways. Although the discretionary powers 
of the minister were reduced the objective of enforcing the NEP through bureaucratic controls 
remained intact. The amendments directed at the complaints of small business included the raising of 
the exemption limit to $250, 000 in shareholders' funds and exempting firms with less than $500, 000 
in fixed assets from the equity provisions (Jesudason, 1989:141). In June 1979 a further amendment 
established an Industrial Advisory Council to advise the Minister on all matters pertaining to the Act 
but as bureaucratic representation remained dominant that amendment also failed to meet the main 
concerns of the Chinese business community (Jesudason, 1989:142). In the wake of the severe 
recession of the mid 1980's the Malaysian Government again amended the ICA. In 1986 the 
exemption limit from the Act was again raised so that only companies whose assets amounted to 
more than $1 million were required to restructure. Other concessions included: for export-oriented 
industries, no prior approval being required for plant expansion or diversification and government 
agreement to provide a "clearance letter" to companies which had difficulties in getting suitable 
Malay partners (Chan, 1986:47-48).
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getting large public and non-public companies to restructure their equity. While firms 
which ignored the FIC risked bureaucratic obstruction, it also became apparent that the 
ease and speed with which applications were approved or rejected depended both on the 
merits of the project and/or the right people "connections" behind an application 
(Chooi, 1987:15).
The Capital Issues Committee (CIC) is also a powerful instrument in the regulation 
and restructuring of the corporate sector. All public companies have to comply with the 
CIC's requirement of 30 per cent equity for Malays if they want approval for changes in 
their equity structure or wish to apply for a public listing. In setting the price of shares 
issued to Malay interests (including government enterprises) by private Chinese and 
foreign companies, the CIC has usually set such prices below the market price 
(Jesudason, 1990:79). While the official justification was that stock market prices could 
easily be manipulated and did not really reflect the 'true' value of a company, CIC 
intervention in the market has often been blamed for encouraging the very practices it 
was meant to contain, that is company growth and windfall profits through swapping 
undervalued shares. As timing of approvals for listing a company can be crucial to 
profits, 'connections' with the CIC are also important.
Under the NEP both the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) and the central bank, 
Bank Negara, have also become important regulators of corporate sector activity. If, 
after the FIC has given its approval for a take-over or restructuring of a company, and 
the issue or transfer of shares involves bumiputras, the business of the company is 
subject to licensing by the MTI. Bank Negara also becomes pertinent to corporate 
concerns if a company needs to import foreign funds or a foreign investor proposes to 
participate in a Malaysian project. In either case the company or investor would need 
the approval of the Controller of Foreign Exchange for the import and subsequent 
repatriation of funds (Chooi, 1987:15-16).
This survey has shown that the transition from Alliance to Barisan rule was 
accompanied by fundamental change on a number of fronts political, economic and 
bureaucratic. First the ambiguities of Alliance rule were removed. Malay political 
hegemony and the dominance of UMNO in the Barisan were firmly established. 
Candour on the political front was accompanied by candour regarding the social and 
economic goals of the NEP. In that regard the laissez-faire Alliance state was replaced 
by one that was more interventionist and avowedly pro-Malay in its orientation, 
particularly where increasing Malay ownership of the economy and the fostering of 
Malay capitalism were concerned. In concert with these developments, decision
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making, particularly with regard to national economic management, became 
increasingly centralized and concentrated in a few key bureaucratic and technocratic 
state agencies. UMNO's firm control of those agencies meant that political dominance 
allowed it to dominate economic policy and its application in the corporate sector. We 
now turn to examine some of the implications of these changes for Malaysian political 
economy in the 1980's and 1990's.
The 1980's: New Alignments between Politics, the Bureaucracy and Business
At one level the assumption of power by Dr Mahathir as Prime Minister in July 1981 
reflected significant shifts within the Malaysian polity and society; at another it also 
provided the catalyst for a shift which gave the Malaysian political system an 
increasingly patrimonialist cast for reasons that were not only structural but political 
and personal as well.
As indicated previously, by the early 1980's the growing number of Malay 
businessmen fostered by the NEP had become an increasingly important element in the 
Malay political elite, the composition of which gradually changed from politicians and 
administocrats to a combination of politicians and businessmen. The changing 
occupational background and disposition of UMNO leaders mirrored similar changes at 
the grassroots or branch level of the party as those who could be categorized as "middle 
class" (increasing numbers of whom were businessmen) steadily displaced the village 
headman and schoolteachers who had earlier formed the mainstay of the party's rural 
base. The growth of the Malay middle class was dramatic. Between 1970 and 1990 the 
proportion of the Malay workforce working in middle class occupations28 more than 
doubled from 12.9 per cent to 27.0 per cent (Crouch, 1993:142).
UMNO's changing social base had important implications where the relationship 
between politics and business was concerned. Whereas in the 1960's it was often 
difficult to persuade UMNO members to hold posts in the party, after 1970 NEP- 
produced business opportunities inevitably increased the stakes in the struggle for 
power in UMNO (Crouch, 1992:32). Success in party elections and the chance to be 
member of a state assembly or a member of parliament also opened the way to
28 As Crouch points out the categories used in the International Standard Classification of Occupations 
do not provide an exact measure of the 'middle class', nevertheless they do provide a useful, though 
rough indication of the growth of the middle class. The four occupational categories used to measure 
the 'middle class' are: 'professional and technical', 'administrative and managerial', which comprise 
the upper middle class and the 'clerical' and 'sales' categories which comprise the lower middle class. 
See Crouch, 1993:142 & 156.
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commercial opportunities. As a result large sums of money were spent on elections at 
all levels in the party. In 1980 Datuk Musa Hitam as UMNO vice-president and Deputy 
Prime Minister complained that UMNO was becoming a "get-rich-quick" club and said, 
'there were some members who bragged they had spent $50,000 during an election 
campaign to become a "wakil rakyat" (assemblymen). Once they become a "wakil 
rakyat, " they would set out to recover what they had already spent or even double it' 
(ST, 1:12:1980). The problem of 'money politics' was also emphasized by the party 
president and Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, who revealed that he knew of a case where 
someone had spent $600,000 in his bid to become a divisional chairman in 1985 (NST, 
20:5:1985).
During the 1970's the social change taking place in UMNO and the implications of 
that for the relationship between politics and business were masked, partly by the rapid 
expansion of the economy for most of the period, and partly by the administocratic 
background and more consensual political styles associated with the then Prime 
Ministers, Tun Razak and Tun Hussein Onn. The growing nexus between politics and 
business became both more apparent and firmly established however with the elevation 
of Dr Mahathir to the Prime Ministership.
The assumption of power by Dr Mahathir coincided with two important 
developments: the emergence of an increasingly influential core of bumiputra 
businessmen on the one hand, and the concentration of power in a few key regulatory 
agencies of the state on the other. The link to fuse these two elements was provided by 
the outlook and personality of Mahathir. Dr Mahathir was driven by an ambition to 
transform Malaysia into a modem industrialized society. The impetus for Malaysia's 
move to heavy industrialization in the early 1980's with the setting up of the Heavy 
Industry Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) (whose most celebrated project was the 
national car) came from Dr Mahathir. The 'Look East Policy', 'Malaysia Incorporated' 
and 'Vision 2020' were all Mahathir inspired policies directed to the simultaneous 
achievement of an industrialized society of which the 'modern Malay' with the 
necessary entrepreneurial and technocratic skills was an integral part.
The engine to achieve this vision was business. Whereas Dr Mahathir's predecessor, 
Tun Hussein Onn, had kept businessmen at arms length, Dr Mahathir embraced them. 
His antipathy to the bureaucratic establishment and the conventional channels of policy 
implementation were both personal and political. By background and temperament 
Mahathir differed from Malaysia's former Prime Ministers, all of whom had been 
drawn from, or were closely associated with, the former Malay 'administocratic' elite.
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Mahathir, the commoner and professional, had never been part of that elite and felt little 
empathy with it. He was instead excited by, and identified with, the values and ethos of 
business. His close circle of advisers were businessmen, particularly the new Malay 
entrepreneurs, one of the most prominent of whom, Daim Zainuddin, he appointed as 
Minister of Finance in July 1984. A number of these new Malay entrepreneurs had 
found elements of the bureaucracy conservative and obstructionist, particularly where 
their own rather freewheeling business activities were concerned. Such attitudes found 
a resonance in Mahathir's antipathy for bureaucrats who sought to regulate and 
intervene unnecessarily in business and whose enthusiasm for implementing his bold 
plans for Malaysia's industrialization were often suspect.
It was against this background that the shift in relationships between politics, the 
bureaucracy and business took place. As Leigh (1992:120) observed, 'bureaucrats' 
power in contemporary Malaysia is derived from their political masters, and is not 
characterized by the autonomy they were previously believed to have enjoyed. ... The 
argument that they played a central role was validly made for the 1970's but that 
contention (in the 1980's and 90's) is no longer viable.' As this shift of power in the 
Malay elite from politicians and administocrats, to a combination of politicians and 
businessmen occurred, so the political system also assumed a more patrimonialist caste. 
Persons who were politically loyal and committed to the leadership's world view were 
given authoritative positions, rather than those who were merely technically competent 
(Jesudason, 1990:78).
The imposition of political criteria in appointments extended from the foremost 
planning agency, the EPU, to the central bank (Bank Negara), as well as to the banking 
system more generally. During Tun Ismail's long tenure as Governor of Bank Negara 
(from 1962 to 1990), that institution enjoyed considerable independence and influence 
both in the formulation of economic policy and where senior appointments elsewhere in 
the banking system were concerned. However in the 1980's, the independence and 
influence of Bank Negara in economic policy was considerably diminished, while 
appointees to senior posts in the major banks were invariably regarded as close to the 
political leadership or were strongly identified with its views.
The erosion of Bank Negara's powers in the 1980's was highlighted when, following 
pressure from the Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin, the Governor of the bank, Tan Sri 
Aziz Taha, was forced to quit his post. Aziz, who headed the bank from 1980 to 1985, 
won a reputation for his integrity in trying to resist political pressures in making 
decisions that would affect banking policies and security transactions. Aziz favoured
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conservative monetary policies and sought tighter supervision and regulation of the 
banks and of Kuala Lumpur's rather freewheeling securities market. He was particularly 
concerned about the extent to which growth was being stimulated through share and 
property speculation rather than through investment in infrastructure and manufacturing 
(Interview, Aziz Taha, 22:1:1992). Such a view clashed with Daim's expansionary 
fiscal policies and desire for more bank credit for share acquisition.
Through his chairmanship of the Capital Issues Committee (CIC), Aziz also 
exercised wide authority over all transactions by companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE). By blocking or altering the terms of proposed acquisitions, 
takeovers or new share issues, CIC rulings put Aziz at odds with many prominent 
members of the newly emerging Malay business elite including Datuk Azman Hashim 
(Arab-Malaysia Merchant Bank chairman), Tan Sri Ibrahim Mohamad (Promet Bhd 
chairman) and Daim himself who complained about his decisions to Dr Mahathir 
(FEER, 21:3:1985). After Daim became Minister of Finance in July 1984, he and Aziz 
clashed over the central banks' policy of limiting lending for purchases of shares on the 
KLSE29. Ultimately Aziz's opposition to the policy was overruled after Daim obtained 
Prime Minister Mahathir's support on the matter (AWSJ, 4:3:1985). The waning of 
Bank Negara's influence and particularly the power of its Governor became most 
apparent in April 1985 when Daim stripped Aziz of his position as chairman of the CIC 
in a move which brought the powerful securities supervisory agency directly under 
Daim's authority. The chairmanship of the CIC passed to a senior bureaucrat located in 
Daim's ministry (Tan Sri Thong Yaw Hong, then secretary-general of the Treasury), a 
move which significantly increased Daim's power in business circles and at the same 
time signalled Aziz's departure as governor of the bank.
There were other examples elsewhere in the banking system where political loyalty 
rather than mere technical competence appeared to be the prime criterion for 
appointment. For instance Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, who had been closely identified 
with Daim's business interests and those of UMNO in the early 1980's, was appointed
29 During the stockmarket boom of the early 1980's many Malaysian businessmen, and particularly the 
new Malay entrepreneurs who had little in the way of capital or assets, used large bank loans to buy 
shares. Those loans were secured by the value, generally inflated, of the shares purchased. Such 
shares were in turn 'swapped' to obtain control of publicly-listed companies by undervalueing the 
shares of the latter. Purchases by share swapping required proxies or the use o f interlocking 
directorships and interlocking stock ownership. Aziz wished to contain lending for share or property 
purchases because the collateral (overvalued property or shares) increased bank debts and soaked up 
loan money in speculative investment rather than investment for capital works and infrastucture.
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as president and chief executive of Malayan Banking in March 1985. Other examples 
included Zain Azahari and Mohamed Razali who were appointed chairman and 
managing director respectively of Malaysia's third largest bank, United Malayan 
Banking Corporation (UMBC) in 1985. Neither had any previous experience as bank 
executives but Zain was for a time trustee of Daim's substantial private investments 
(which had been placed in a "blind trust" after Daim became Finance Minister in July 
1984). Razali had also been closely involved with most of Daim's family companies 
and was general manager of the government-owned Peremba, the property concern 
previously headed by Daim.
Political criteria were also apparent in the appointment of Tan Sri Basir Ismail to a 
number of powerful corporate and regulatory bodies. Basir, a close associate of the 
Prime Minister Dr Mahathir, 30 was appointed chairman of Bank Bumiputra in January 
1985, not long after Petronas had bailed the bank out of a $2.5 billion loan scandal 
involving its Hong Kong subsidiary, Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Finance. (The 
government dragooned Petronas into buying 86.2 per cent of Bank Bumiputra's equity 
and injecting $300 million into the bank. The windfall from oil revenues meant 
Petronas was the only state enterprise that could afford to bail out the bank.) In 
February 1988 Basir was also appointed chairman of Petronas which was later (October 
1989) again called upon to bail out Bank Bumiputra with a $982 million injection of 
funds after the bank suffered a further loss of $1.06 billion.31 The loss stemmed in large 
part from UMNO's failure to repay loans to Finance its headquarters building at the 
Putra World Trade Centre in Kuala Lumpur. Political criteria and the changing role of 
the 'regulators' was most apparent however in the appointment of Basir in August 1990 
as chairman of the powerful Capital Issues Committee (CIC). Whereas Aziz Taha, the 
former CIC chairman was criticized for being 'too much a civil servant and not enough 
a business oriented person' (AWSJ, 4:3:1985) Basir, who had extensive interests in the 
corporate sector and was at the same time chairman of the CIC, epitomized the blurring 
between the regulators and the market.
30 Journalists often cite Dr Mahathir's appointment of Basir to succeed him as chairman of Kumpulan 
Fima, a government-owned corporation as an indication of Mahathir's high regard for Basir. After Dr 
Mahathir was brought back into UMNO in 1972 one of his earliest appointments was as a director 
and later chairman of Kumpulan Fima, a position he held until he became Prime Minister in July 
1981. Mahathir is also reputed to respect Basir's entrepreneurial skills because of the latters success 
in managing the Johore State Economic Development Corporation (JSEDC), one o f the few 
profitable SEDC's in the 1980's. See The Star, 13:7:1981.
31 See FEER, 31:1:1991. In January 1991 Petronas sold Bank Bumiputra back to the government or 
more specifically to the Ministry of Finance’s investment arm (AWSJ, 17:1:1991).
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As Malaysia's political system assumed a more patrimonialist caste in the 1980's 
and decision-making became more concentrated in the executive, so the scope for abuse 
increased enormously. Several institutions under the central government made huge 
losses. In one case the Malaysian government was involved an abortive attempt to 
comer the world tin market and push up the price after the failure of the tin producing 
countries to negotiate a higher price under the International Tin Agreement. The failure 
of the scheme cost the government $660 million.32
The idea in the early 1980's of using Malaysia's position as the biggest tin producer 
to prop up prices through a secret tin buying operation on the London Metal Exchange 
(LME) appealed to Dr Mahathir who believed that Malaysia, like other commodity­
exporting countries, always lost out in international trading in markets controlled by the 
rich north (Jomo, 1990:73). 'Inspiration' for the scheme seems to have originated with 
David Zaidner, a metals trader with a tainted financial past, who cultivated senior 
contacts in the government-owned Malaysia Mining Corporation (MMC), most notably 
MMC's then group chief executive, Abdul Rahim Aki. Rahim Aki, who was a personal 
appointee of then Finance Minister Tengku Razaleigh, became the 'driving force' 
behind a company called Maminco Sdn Bhd which was set up by the Malaysian 
government in June 1981 as a subsidiary of MMC.33 Shortly thereafter a 'mystery 
buyer' began to make large purchases on the world tin market causing a rise in price 
which threatened to cause massive losses for brokers in futures on the London Metal 
Exchange. During this period Bank Bumiputra and Malayan Banking were 'persuaded' 
to extend huge loans to Maminco to finance purchases and interest payments which, at 
their peak, were estimated to reach US$571 million (Jomo, 1990:74). The scheme 
failed however because in February 1982 the London Metal Exchange countered the 
attempt to comer the market when it allowed traders to pay a fine instead of defaulting 
on their contracts, a move which combined with releases from the US tin stockpile led 
to the collapse of tin prices (AWSJ, 29:9:1986). The 'mystery buyer' was left with large 
stocks of expensively acquired tin and huge debts to Bank Bumiputra. After strong 
denials by the Malaysian government of any link to the 'mystery buyer, ' the Prime
32 The figure of $660 million was given by the Minister of Primary Industries. He claimed however that 
the actual loss was only $209 million because of what he named, 'identifiable benefits' amounting to 
$451.5 million. Statement in parliament on 10 November 1986 (cited in NST, 10:12:1986).
33 Source: Interview with senior official of MMC, 8 January 1992. Rahim Aki had been a close friend 
of Razaleigh since their student days in Britain. The board o f Maminco, when the company was 
started, consisted entirely of directors of MMC including Rahim Aki and MMC commercial 
manager, Noordin Ismail. Noordin Ismail, who was known to be on good terms with David Zaidner, 
was the general manager of Maminco (FEER, 7:8:1986).
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Minister, Dr Mahathir finally admitted in September 1986 that the mystery buyer was, 
through Maminco, the Malaysian government but defended the scheme as 'in the 
national interest' and claimed that it only failed because of the 'massive cheating in the 
London Metal Exchange' (AWSJ, 22:9:1986).
In an attempt to cover up Maminco's losses the government secretly formed a 
company Makuwasa Securities Sdn Bhd in mid 1984. Makuwasa, a $2 company was 
given some of the privileges of bumiputra trust agencies, most importantly allotments 
of public share issues at preferential prices. In order to maintain the cover up, 
allotments of such shares which should have gone to the government-managed 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF) were instead channelled to Makuwasa.34 Apparently 
the idea was that Makuwasa could then sell the shares at the market rate on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange and make windfall profits to cover the tin losses. Eventually 
the government admitted Makuwasa had been formed in an attempt to recover the 
losses from the tin scheme (AWSJ, 22:9:1986). However it appeared that Makuwasa, 
rather than recovering money, lost more on its share transactions in the wake of the Pan 
El stock market collapse in late 1985 (Jomo, 1990:75).
The most sensational scandal was the loss suffered by Bank Bumiputra's Hong 
Kong subsidiary, Bumiputra Malaysia Finance (BMF). BMF lost about $2.5 billion in 
bad loans, mainly to the Carrian Group, a Hong Kong property company headed by a 
Malaysian Chinese called George Tan. The full details of the scandal have never been 
revealed and probably never will. The Government was initially very evasive about 
BMF but under pressure revealed that senior officials in Bank Bumiputra and its 
subsidiary in Hong Kong gave massive loans to Carrian in exchange for special 
consultancy fees, gifts, loans and other forms of graft. When the Hong Kong property 
market collapsed in 1983-84 Carrian was bankrupted and Bank Bumiputra was unable 
to recover even a fraction of the huge sums that had been lent.
While many details surrounding the BMF affair remain obscure, findings by a 
Committee of Inquiry indicated that there was more to the links between BMF officials,
34 For a period covered by the Makuwasa deals (June 1984 to March 1985) Tan Sri Thong Yaw Hong, 
a then senior official in the Finance Ministry who was believed to have headed Makuwasa, was also 
head of the CIC and for a time chairman of the EPF as well (FEER, 24:7:1986). It will be recalled 
that the chairmanship of the CIC had been shifted earlier from the rather 'independently minded' Aziz 
Taha to a senior official in Daim's Finance Ministry, notably the ministry's former secretary-general 
Thong Yaw Hong. According to Tan Sri Zain Azraai, also a chairman of the EPF for part of the 
relevant period, the share allotments to Makuwasa were secured 'through the favourable influence 
enjoyed be the CIC' (FEER, 24:7:1986).
62
George Tan, and top UMNO leaders including Dr Mahathir, Tengku Razaleigh and 
Musa Hitam, than was previously thought. Perhaps significantly, the government 
refused to appoint a Royal Commission but, only after considerable clamouring by 
various interest groups, conceded to a Committee of Inquiry.35 It did emerge however 
that although the Prime Minister Dr Mahathir had been briefed by the then Governor of 
Bank Negara, Aziz Taha in November 1982 and again in April 1983 about the 
magnitude of the losses, it was not until October 1983 that the BMF officials were 
asked to resign. Stranger still, on 29 October BMF continued to make further loans 
totalling US$70 million to the Carrian Group (Lim K. S., BMF: 1986:6).
Tengku Razaleigh and Musa Hitam were implicated in other ways. Tengku 
Razaleigh had close ties with Lorrain Osman (the chairman of BMF) and Hashim 
Shamsuddin (a member of the BMF board and an executive director of Bank 
Bumiputra). Hashim was also then treasurer of the UMNO headquarters building 
committee, of which Tengku Razaleigh was chairman. Razaleigh was alleged to have 
been involved in a deal to purchase a property (Gammon House) in Hong Kong which 
was subsequently to be sold to the Malaysian Government. If the deal had materialized 
it would have given George Tan a quick US$50 million profit (Insan, 1986:11).36 The 
BMF Report also found that approval had been given by BMF for a US$ 5 million loan 
to Asiavest Ltd and a HK$5 million to Sherridon Holdings Ltd, companies in which 
Tengku Razaleigh had a significant interest (BMF, Final Report Voll, 1986, 435-445). 
Datuk Musa Hitam was implicated in the BMF scandal through the proposed 
acquisition of a shipping line, Grand Marine Holdings37 and financing for a commercial 
development project in Johore.38 Where the former was concerned, apparently the plan
35 Unlike a Royal Commission of Inquiry, a Committee of Inquiry could not obtain evidence under 
force of law and its members were personally liable for possible defamation writs.
36 Tengku Razaleigh also received US$15, 000 for the purchase of travellers cheques from either 'Knife 
and Dagger Ltd', a company owned by George Tan or "Silver Present Ltd' an investment company 
owned by Datuk Hashim. Interestingly in September 1981 Datuk Hashim's company, 'Silver Present' 
received HK$10 million from Carrian and HK$ 3 million from the wife of one Chung Chin Man, 
who was the head of a company called Eda Investments Ltd. Apparently shortly afterwards BMF lent 
a subsidiary of Eda some US$38 million (MB, 16:10:1984).
37 See MB, 1:4:1986.
38 An August 1982 letter from George Tan to Musa, discussed a secret Johore Barn City Development - 
supposedly a joint venture between UMNO and the Johore State Government - which was to provide 
10 acres in the Johore Barn town centre for a commercial development project George Tan, through 
one of the Carrian companies, put up a deposit of $1.5 million in the form of an interest-free loan for 
six years to AAY Holdings, a company owned by two UMNO members. Tan also promised to 
'donate 20 per cent of the net profit to UMNO to be utilised as a new UMNO headquarters 
construction fund' (Insan, 1986:13).
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was to purchase Grand Marine Holdings for HK$800 million and resell it to the 
Malaysian Government for HK$ 1,000 million.39 During the subsequent trial of Hashim 
Shamsuddin in Hong Kong in 1987 his lawyer claimed that the BMF officials were 
only carrying out instructions from Dr Mahathir and Musa Hitam (AWSJ, 15:1:1987). 
Further fuel on the links between the UMNO leadership and BMF were added by 
Lorrain Osman just before the 1990 election when he claimed that, 'It was Tengku 
Razaleigh more than anyone who was responsible for what happened in Hong Kong to 
BMF and Carrian' (NST, 17:10:1990). Whatever the truth of those accusations and 
counter accusations, it was nevertheless most apparent that when deep rifts occurred 
within the UMNO leadership, first between Dr Mahathir and Musa, and later between 
Mahathir and Razaleigh, none of the key personalities felt disposed to capitalise on the 
BMF affair in their political struggles.
The extraordinary spate of scandals which appeared to characterize Malaysian 
public and corporate life in the 1980's40 illuminated some highly patrimonialist aspects 
of the relationship between the state and business. Yet, at the same time, the reforms 
that were instituted in the mid 1980's showed the relationship between the state and 
business to be a more complex matter, and demonstrated a strength and imperviousness 
on the part of the state hitherto thought unlikely. What prompted the reforms and how 
was the state able to implement measures that threatened the interests of its most 
important constituency, the Malay middle class and the growing and politically 
significant Malay business community? Moreover, what do those reforms show us 
about the relationship between the state and business?
It is generally agreed that the transition in Malaysia from policies of state 
intervention and an emphasis on ownership restructuring to policies emphasizing 
economic liberalization, deregulation, profit, growth and public sector restraint, were 
prompted by the severe economic recession of 1985-86. During those years there was 
an across-the-board decline in commodity prices and a weaker demand for the country's 
manufactured products. In 1986 alone, the prices of Malaysia's major export 
commodities, oil tin, and palm oil, all fell by 50 per cent or more (Khor, 1987:3). Other
39 The BMF Report stated that ' Tan claimed to have been requested to purchase Grand Marine 
Holdings by BMFs former alternate director, Rais Saniman, who was claimed to have been acting on 
behalf of the then Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Musa Hitam' (MB. 1:4:1986).
40 Besides BMF, Maminco and Makuwasa other scandals included those linked to the Malaysian 
Overseas Investment Corporation (MOIC), a plethora of mini-scandals linked to the Deposit Taking 
Co-operatives (DTC's), and of course Tan Koon Swan and the Pan Electric or 'Pan El' affair. See 
chapter 8.
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factors which exacerbated the situation were the high value of the ringgit which resulted 
partly from strong inflows of official capital generated by external borrowing, and 
falling profitability of the tradeable sector (6MP:6). External debt increased from $11 
billion in 1980 to $51 billion (equivalent to 77 per cent of GNP) in 1986. To service 
this enormous debt $7.4 billion was paid out in 1986, equivalent to 11 per cent of GNP 
(Khor, 1987:3). During the recession, there was a virtual collapse of private investment, 
both domestic and foreign and, as a result, GDP registered a negative growth of 1.1 per 
cent in 1985 and improved only slightly to 1.2 per cent in 1986 (6MP:6).
The severity of the recession (for Malaysia) provided a catalyst for radical policy 
reform in the hope of quick recovery which was critical if the economic advances 
already made by the Malays were to be sustained and built upon. But while an 
atmosphere of crises precipitated policies of economic reform and liberalization, some 
observers have pointed out that they did after all reflect a consistency of view where 
Mahathir was concerned. Khoo for instance has observed that Mahathir's antipathy to 
the "subsidy mentality" associated with much of the NEP, and his praise for the 'virtues 
of accumulation via enterprise, not get-rich-quick schemes through sales of assets and 
tribute', stretch from his writings in the Malay Dilemma (1970) to The Challenge (1976) 
and the Mid Term Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan released in March 1984 (Khoo, 
1992:57-58).
Important measures of economic reform and liberalization instituted by Mahathir 
and Daim included new investment incentives (through the Promotion of Investments 
Act, 1986); lower interest rates and bureaucratic restructuring with a view to making 
the bureaucracy more efficient and responsive to business and investment. While such 
reforms were of benefit to the business community generally others, most notably the 
speeding up of the privatization of government enterprises and public works, provided 
opportunities for the emerging Malay business class in particular. At the same time 
however a number of key reforms championed by Mahathir and Daim had a severe 
impact on Malay business and particularly on those elements of it that remained heavily 
dependent on state support. For instance the Prime Minister's announcement in the mid 
80's that there would be less emphasis on the redistributional goals of the NEP, as a 
consequence of which the equity guidelines of the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) 
were liberalized, significantly reduced business opportunities for Malays. So did the 
savage cutbacks in public expenditure particularly development expenditure, which 
reduced the numbers of contracts available to Bumiputras, while many sections of
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Malay business (still only in the formative stages of their establishment) were 
particularly hard hit by the severe restrictions on bank credit.41
The parlous economic situation of many Malay businesses was highlighted by 
resolutions passed by a Bumiputra National Economic Symposium which in April 1986 
called on the government to establish a trust fund to prevent the forfeiture of property 
used by Bumiputra businessmen as collateral for loans, and (in order to make loans for 
Bumiputras easier), 'even changing the rules of the game if necessary'42. Prominent 
Bumiputra businessmen, also urged Daim to place a moratorium on loans which were 
due to be repaid by them and for the CIC and the FIC to 'relax' approvals for corporate 
deals.43
Yet despite the pleas from Bumiputra businessmen, a general election in 1986, the 
split in UMNO (and looming challenge to Dr Mahathir's leadership at the UMNO 
general assembly elections in 1987), neither Mahathir or Daim were swayed from their 
commitment to economic reform. Why in those circumstances was the political 
leadership able to resist pressures to significantly alter or amend its course of radical 
policy change? There were two main reasons, one related to the strength of the political 
leadership itself and the other to the composition and character of the evolving Malay 
business class.
As this chapter has shown significant shifts occurred within the Malaysian polity in 
the 1970's and 1980's as the locus of power passed from politicians and administocrats 
to a combination of politicians and businessmen, ancillary to which were the 
bureaucrats and regulators. The trend towards a growing concentration of powers in the 
executive accelerated after Dr Mahathir became Prime Minister. In that regard as Jomo 
(1993:12) observed, 'the concentration of powers and discretion in the hands of the 
political executive - at the expense of the bureaucracy, the legislature, the judiciary and 
the constitutional monarchs - enhanced the significance of this (state) autonomy in 
operational terms, enabling the executive to make bold initiatives without seeking prior
41 For a discussion of the economic reforms instituted by Mahathir and Daim in the mid 1980's see 
Jomo, 1993:22.
42 The resolutions were discussed and agreed at the end o f a two-day Bumiputra and National 
Economic Symposium organised by the Federal Territory branch of the Malay Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry in April 1986. See NST, 14:4:1986 and MB, 1:5:1986.
43 The memo to Daim containing these requests was dated 23 January 1986. It was signed by ten 
prominent (Bumiputra and Chinese) businessmen. See The Star, 5:2:1986 and MB, 1:5:1986.
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endorsement or support even within the state, let alone society at large'44. In the late 
1980's Mahathir's executive powers were further enhanced after he overcame 
opposition to his leadership from within UMNO by a combination of political skill, 
ruthlessness and the judicious employment of patronage.
While Mahathir's commitment, and the strength of his executive powers were 
important in his capacity to overcome resistance to his reforms, so was the fragmented 
character of Malay business. Most Malay businessmen owed their creation to the state 
or at least received some state backing in the initial stages of their business careers. 
Malay business people therefore did not yet constitute a class determined to further its 
common interests, but rather consisted of a number of individuals and groups whose 
independence and autonomy from the state varied. At one end of the spectrum were 
rent-seekers, whose existence and prosperity remained closely tied to their sources of 
state or party patronage; further along were 'transitional capitalists' (less dependent): 
and further along the spectrum still, entrepreneurs who were moving beyond the 
networks of state support which had spawned them.
The group most affected by economic liberalization were the 'rentiers,' that is those 
Malays whose survival in business was heavily dependent on access to patronage. Such 
people were concentrated within UMNO primarily at the branch level and within the 
various Malay chambers of commerce. However the political influence of these mainly 
small to middle-level businessmen was contained, partly by their 'dependence' on the 
one hand, and partly by the capacity of the leadership (through the dispensation of 
patronage), to 'divide and rule' on the other. At the other end of the spectrum the more 
dynamic entrepreneurs (and mostly 'bigger' Malay businessmen), saw opportunities for 
further growth and profit through economic liberalization and de-regulation and so were 
generally supportive of the reforms.
Finally, what were the reactions of Chinese business to these various measures of 
economic liberalization and what were the implications for the relationship between the 
state and Chinese business? As noted previously, the huge expansion of the state sector 
in the 1970's and early 1980's and the inflow of foreign capital had made the 
government less dependent on Chinese investment (though Chinese enterprises
44 While Jomo's general point regarding the increasing concentration of power in the executive and the 
enhanced significance of state autonomy is valid, that power and autonomy should not be overstated. 
It did not, for instance, prevent a challenge to Mahathir’s dominance of UMNO in the 1987 party 
elections, a challenge he survived by only a narrow margin.
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continued to constitute a substantial part of the economy). Chinese business had 
protested strongly against the increasing strictures and bureaucratic controls that were 
placed in its way in the 1970's, and against the ICA in particular, but such protests had 
little effect. Thus while the precipitating factors for economic liberalization were the 
recession and a concern to attract foreign investment, Chinese business was 
nevertheless a direct beneficiary of the reforms and welcomed the shift towards greater 
government flexibility and de-regulation where business was concerned. Moreover as 
this thesis will later show, economic liberalization which was generally welcomed by 
big business, whether Malay or Chinese (and for much the same sorts of reasons), also 
facilitated a more intimate and integrative relationship between the state and the Malay 
and Chinese business elites.
In the course of this survey of the new alignments which have occurred between 
politics, the bureaucracy and business in the 1980's a number of themes have emerged, 
some complementary some apparently contradictory. First, as the state became more 
activist in the context of the NEP, so former boundaries between politics and business 
blurred as the government sought to enlarge Malay ownership and promote a new 
Malay capitalist class. In concert with that development power shifted in the Malaysian 
polity from politicians and administocrats to a combination of politicians and 
businessmen subordinate to which were the bureaucrats. These changes - structural, 
political and personal - also provided the catalyst which gave Malaysia's political 
system an increasingly patrimonialist cast in the 1980's. Yet while Malaysia's political 
system exhibited some highly patrimonialist features, the state also displayed a 
considerable degree of autonomy (viz the economic reforms of the mid 1980's) as 'no 
group or class had yet developed sufficient political or economic coherence to 
subordinate the state to their interests' (Jomo, 1993:12). The shifts we have observed in 
the relationship between the state, politics and business and at some points the 
porousness of such categories will be continuing themes as we now turn to an 
examination of how those elements have combined in the rise of Malay capitalism.
Chapter 3
THE STATE AND THE EXPANSION OF MALAY
OWNERSHIP
The assertion of Malay dominance in the political sphere and over the key instruments of 
economic policy was a necessary precursor to the crucial role played by the state in 
transforming the ethnic pattern of economic ownership that existed in 1970 and the 
creation of what the Second Malaysia Plan called "a new Bumiputra Commercial and 
Industrial Community" (BCIC), in short Malay capitalists.1 The focus of the next four 
chapters will be on the relationship or intensity of the fusion between the three main 
vehicles through which greater Malay ownership of the economy was pursued - the 
government, the party and the private sector - since it was the merging of those categories 
that has determined the character of Malay capital and provided the impetus for its 
growth. Although in the context of the NEP the spheres of 'government', 'party' and 
'private' activity have become inextricably intertwined, our use of these terms as 
seemingly discrete categories will nevertheless serve a useful heuristic purpose in 
illuminating the relationship between them in the development of Malay capitalism.
First however this chapter necessarily sets the scene, that is it gives an account of the 
state's role, particularly in the first decade of the NEP in extending Malay ownership over 
the commanding heights of the economy. It begins by providing an overview of the 
structural changes that have taken place in the Malaysian economy since the 1970's and 
some of the factors, domestic and foreign, that supported the massive expansion of the 
state sector, particularly from 1970 to 1985. The chapter then turns to a study of the most 
important state enterprises and trust agencies set up under the NEP. In doing so particular 
attention is paid to their role in the restructuring of ownership in the corporate sector as a 
whole, as well as in major individual sectors notably mining, agriculture, manufacturing 
and banking and finance.
l The NEP was introduced in the Second Malaysia Plan.
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Growth of the State Sector
The strong financial position of the state throughout much of the 1970's and early 1980's 
facilitated a large shift in ownership from foreign, to national (essentially Malay), 
interests. During those two decades the character of the Malaysian economy also 
underwent important changes. In the 1970's Malaysia's economy grew at a rapid rate of 
7.5 per cent per annum. After 1980 however the growth of the economy slowed to 5.9 
per cent per annum, a trend due in large part to the prolonged recession of the world 
economy after the second oil shock in 1979 (OPP2:36). The factors contributing to the 
severe recession of the mid-1980's (when GDP registered a negative growth of 1.1 per 
cent in 1985), and the policy reforms it precipitated, have been discussed in the previous 
chapter. Suffice to note here therefore that partly as a result of those policy reforms, but 
also an improved external economic environment - and of particular importance in that 
regard were the large inflows of investment to Malaysia from East Asia with the 
appreciation of the yen - Malaysia’s economy recovered from 1986 onwards with GDP 
growing at 6.7 per cent per annum from 1986 to 1990 (6MP:6).
The generally high economic growth of the seventies and eighties was accompanied 
by substantial structural change in the economy as the contribution of the manufacturing, 
construction, banking and finance sectors rose, and that of the agricultural sector fell 
(5MP: 11). The rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector was apparent from its growth 
of 10.3 per cent per annum which resulted in its share in GDP rising from 13.9 per cent 
in 1970 to 27 per cent in 1990.2 By contrast there was a reduction in the agricultural 
sectors' share of GDP from 29 per cent in 1970 to 18.7 per cent in 1990 (OPP2:40). 
Thus Malaysia's growth was increasingly being led by expansion in the manufacturing 
and mining sectors. In the latter case, the production of oil and the discovery of gas 
reserves contributed significantly to export earnings from the second half of the 
seventies. By 1980 crude petroleum exports had taken over the historical position of 
rubber as the chief foreign exchange earner and, in that same year, 16 per cent of 
government revenue came from petroleum, a figure which rose to 25 per cent by 1985 
(Ministry of Finance, 1985:95).
A decade of high economic growth, to which the oil windfall made a significant 
contribution, swelled government revenues and enabled the government to deploy
2 The manufacturing sector grew at a higher rate 11.3 per cent per annum during the seventies as 
against 9.4 per cent per annum in the eighties. However, during the second half of the eighties the 
sector grew on the average at a higher rate by 13.7 per cent (OPP2:42).
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enormous resources in pursuing its objective of increasing Malay participation in the 
modem sector of the economy. The magnitude of public sector growth is apparent from 
the increase of public sector expenditure which leapt from $4,242.2 million in the First 
Malaysia Plan (1966-70) to $80,331 million in the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-85).3 
During approximately the same period (1970-1983), the number of government 
employees, who were mainly Malay (about 70 per cent), also increased dramatically from 
403,900 to 837, 100 making the government the single largest employer in the country 
(Chan, 1986:31). A significant component of public sector development expenditure 
were the allocations to Commerce and Industry, much of which represented funds for 
public enterprises. In the framework of the NEP public enterprises played a central role in 
the restructuring of ownership and the creation of a Malay middle class. Allocations to 
Commerce and Industry grew from just $141.3 million or 3.3 per cent in the First 
Malaysia Plan (1966-70) to $20,211 million or 27.3 per cent of total public sector 
development expenditure in the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-85).4
Under the NEP state-owned enterprises and trust agencies were charged with the 
responsibility of mobilizing resources and accumulating capital on behalf of the Malay 
community as it was apparent that little change in ownership could be achieved by the 
actions of private Malay capitalists alone. (In terms of corporate ownership of the 
economy, holdings by Malay individuals in 1970 amounted to only 1.6 per cent 
(3MP:86), simply far too small a base from which to effect a significant change in 
ownership.) Thus of the NEP's target of 30 per cent of share capital which was to be in 
Bumiputra hands by 1990, 22.6 per cent was to be accumulated by trust agencies with 
the ultimate intention of transferring such capital to bumiputra individuals by the expiry of 
the NEP. As to the raison detre of the process Mehmet (1988:102) observed that 
"Compared to the alternatives of nationalisation or confiscation, equity restructuring by 
trusteeship offered a piecemeal yet pragmatic solution to the traditional Malay state of 
capitalist underdevelopment." In addition to their role of mobilizing and accumulating 
capital for the Malay community, public enterprises such as Perbadanan Nasional (Pemas 
-National Corporation), and Permodalan Nasional Bhd (PNB - National Equity 
Corporation), were also important vehicles for gaining control of strategic sectors of the 
economy on behalf of Bumiputras. Other important functions of state enterprises and 
trust agencies - such as Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA - Council of Trust for the 
Indigenous People), the Urban Development Authority (UDA) and the State Development
3 See 2MP:71 and 5MP:227.
4 See 2MP:69 and 5MP:226.
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Corporations (SEDCs) - were the fostering of Malay entrepreneurship through manpower 
development, and the facilitation of joint ventures between Chinese and foreign 
businessmen with Bumiputras. In some cases the same corporation played a number of 
roles, for example Pemas and the SEDCs, while expanding Malay ownership also 
provide training and experience for potential Bumiputra entrepreneurs.
The large allocations of funds made by the government to state enterprises indicates 
both the extent to which the state sector grew (particularly from 1970 to 1985), as well as 
the importance of state enterprises in the achievement of NEP objectives. For instance 
before the NEP, MARA’s allocation in the First Malaysia Plan (1966-70) amounted to 
$50.9 million, but this leapt to $495.30 million in the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-85). 
Over the same period the allocation to Pemas grew from $10.0 million to $200.00 
million. The SEDCs which received $192.93 million in the Second Malaysia Plan (1971- 
75) were allocated $1, 131.49 million in the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-85), while over 
the same period allocations to UDA grew from $175 to $568.79 million. These sums 
however were tiny compared to the funds allocated to PNB, which from 1976 to 1980 
received $500 million, and from 1981 to 1985 another $2,923 million.5 After describing 
the principal activities of the more important state enterprises we shall examine the key 
role some have played in the restructuring of ownership in the economy.
State-owned Enterprises
Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA - Council of Trust for the Indigenous People), and Bank 
Bumiputra were established before the NEP. As noted previously it was pressure from 
the First Bumiputra Economic Congress in 1965 which led to the establishment of both 
these enterprises. MARA was founded in 1966. Its major purpose was to provide loans 
and advice to assist the development of small Bumiputra entrepreneurs and petty traders. 
MARA also established a financial corporation, Kompleks Kewangan, which invested 
Bumiputra capital in the securities market and, by means of a loan scheme, encouraged 
Malays to purchase shares in companies. MARA also established a number of technical 
and vocational training institutes. Bank Bumiputra on the other hand was established to 
provide financial support to assist Malays improve their position in commerce and 
industry through easier access to credit facilities and soft loans. As we saw earlier, 
however, it was the dominance of social rather than economic criteria where the banks 
lending policies were concerned that contributed to the huge losses and scandals that 
plagued the bank in the 1980's.
5 See 2MP:69; 3MP:240 and 4MP:241.
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In the 1970's, Perbadanan Nasional (Pemas), was the most important agency in the 
government's efforts to intensify Malay participation in commerce and industry. Pemas 
was established in November 1969. It is a state agency registered as a corporation and is 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Enterprises (Chan, 1986:58). Pemas' first 
chairman, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (1970-74), was formerly the chairman of Bank 
Bumiputra, and a protege of Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak. The pivotal role assigned 
to Pemas in the first decade of the NEP was apparent from its size and the breadth of its 
activities. Starting in insurance and construction it quickly expanded into engineering, 
mining, trading, real estate and securities, and by the late 1970's had grown into a large 
conglomerate of 67 subsidiary, joint venture or associated companies, involving 
investment of $393 million and total assets of $1.17 billion (Gale, 1981:92). The 
patronage of the state was, of course, central to Pemas' capacity to transform itself into a 
conglomerate and its ability to control strategic sectors of the Malaysian economy.
Pemas employed a number of strategies in the course of its growth and efforts to 
indigenize key economic sectors. First it set up new businesses and subsidiaries of its 
own such as Malaysia National Insurance (MNI), which obtained monopolistic control of 
the insurance business from government organizations. In other instances Pernas 
obtained control of the management of other corporations by buying a strategic portion of 
their equity. It was by such means Pernas obtained control of the United Malayan 
Banking Corportion (UMBC). On other occasions, Pemas participated in corporate 
takeovers of companies, the most notable examples of which included London Tin and 
Sime Darby. Government patronage also gave Pemas trading monopolies. Pemas was 
authorized, for example, to oversee all trade links with China. Finally Pemas also 
established joint ventures with multinationals, especially those with high technology and 
an international market network such as Pemas Plessey Electronics, Pernas-NEC 
Multiplex, and Pemas-Sime Darby6. In 1981 Pemas, at the request of the government, 
transferred eleven of its most profitable companies, together worth approximately $1 
billion, to PNB. PNB then became the prime vehicle in the government's efforts to 
increase Malay ownership in the corporate sector of the economy.
The impetus for the establishment of Permodalan Nasional Bhd (PNB) the National 
Equity Corporation, sprang from the need to expedite Malay corporate ownership of the 
economy which was falling behind the targets set. By 1975 Malay (individual and state) 
corporate ownership had risen to only 7.8 per cent, instead of the targetted 9 per cent for
6 For a comprehensive account of the growth and development of Pemas, see Gale, 1981(a):Ch 4.
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that year under the NEP, so that unless the rate of Malay ownership was accelerated the 
government was likely to fall well short of the 16 per cent target set for 1980. Established 
in March 1978, PNB was incorporated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Yayasan 
Pelaburan Bumiputra (YPB) or Bumputra Trust Foundation. During the 1980's PNB 
became Malaysia's leading trust agency and made a substantial contribution towards 
increasing Bumiputra ownership and participation in the corporate sector. PNB's main 
function was to select and acquire a sound portfolio of shares in companies with good 
growth potential. The close association between the political leadership and the 
management of PNB reflects its key role in state capital accumulation. Tun Ismail Ali, a 
former governor of the central bank, Bank Negara, has been the chairman of PNB since 
its inception. As Chairman of PNB, Ismail is directly responsible to the Chairman of the 
Board of Trustees of the Yayasan Pelaburan Bumiputa (YTB), who is the Prime 
Minister, Dr Mahathir. Dr Mahathir is also Tun Ismail's brother-in-law.
In 1981 PNB established the Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN) or National Unit Trust 
Scheme. ASN's mandate was to buy at cost PNB's assets and sell them to Malay 
individuals. It was a unique plan that simultaneously kept state managers in control of the 
companies, redistributed profits to the wider Malay community, and kept shares in Malay 
hands as an individual could buy and sell only through ASN. Individuals could purchase 
a maximum of 50,000 M$1 units in ASN while the minimum investment was $10 
(FEER, 23:1:1981). The attraction of the scheme was enhanced by a guaranteed 
minimum of a 10 per cent return on investments. By December 1990, ASN had attracted 
a total of 2.5 million or about 45 per cent of eligible Bumiputras. Net investment of ASN 
unit-holders rose from $299.1 million in December 1981 to $8, 511.4 million in 
December 1990 (PNB Annual Report, 1990:62). The distribution of the investors, 
however, indicated that the pattern of ownership was skewed. While, on average, about 
8 per cent of the investors held more than 10,000 units in ASN, the majority of 
subscribers held, on average, only about 500 units. This reflected the low level of 
savings among the majority of Malays (6MP:104). and led some critics to claim, 
correctly, that ASN benefitted the poor Malays only marginally.7
7 From January 1991 ASN was obliged by its trust deed of 1981 to trade at market prices with the 
prospect to unit-holders of greater gains but also the risk of losses. Popular demand from Bumiputra 
investors indicated that many, particularly rural investors, were reluctant to venture into a more 
complex and risky scheme. As a result, an entirely new scheme, the Amanah Saham Bumiputra 
(ASB), was set up alongside ASN in January 1990 which had a fixed transaction price. This was to 
enable Bumiputra unit-holders to continue investing in a scheme with similar features to that of ASN 
before the latter commenced operations based on market price in January 1991. See MB (January, 1- 
15:1990) and PNB Annual Report, 1990:62.
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By the 1990's PNB had become Malaysia's largest conglomerate with assets of 
nearly $10 billion (MB, January 1-15:1990). Profitable companies built up by Pemas and 
other government agencies in the 1970's were transferred to PNB, a move often deeply 
resented by their creators. With the savings mobilised under the ASN scheme, and 
generous allocations of state funds, PNB also purchased substantial stakes in many of 
Malaysia's most profitable companies. By September 1991, PNB had interests in 142 
companies (PNB, Investment Portfolio, mimeo). In addition, PNB benefitted from the 
pressure applied on companies by the FIC and the CIC to restructure equity by making 
shares available to 'Malaysian interests' or more specifically the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry. Generally such shares were later allocated to PNB. By 1988 it was estimated 
that PNB controlled 25 per cent of the finance sector, 36 per cent of plantations, 23 per 
cent of the industrial sector, 11 per cent of property, and 5 per cent of mining (Asiaweek, 
20:5:1988).
Other important enterprises set up in the 1970's to encourage bumiputra participation 
in commerce and industry, or which went into business on behalf of bumiputras 
included, as mentioned earlier, the Urban Development Authority (UDA), and various 
State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs). The Urban Development Authority 
(UDA) was established in 1971. It was the second major public enterprise set up by the 
then Prime Minister, Tun Razak, to assist Malay participation in business. UDA's 
primary purpose was to help Malay traders expand their businesses in the small 
manufacturing, retailing and service sectors of the economy by providing business 
premises in the Chinese-dominated urban commercial centres. UDA also provided loans 
to Bumiputra businessmen and entered joint ventures with them. Many of UDA's loans 
to Bumiputra businessmen however were not repaid, and many of its joint ventures 
incurred losses, factors which, combined with various administrative malpractices, cost 
the Authority millions of dollars (Gale, 1981:141).
A description of UDA's role in the encouragement of Malay participation in business 
would be incomplete without including mention of its subsidiary, Peremba. Peremba was 
set up in May 1979 with the aim of better supervising UDA's investments in more than 
30 joint-venture companies involved in property development (Gale, 1981:169). The 
initiative to set up Peremba came from Daim Zainuddin, who became its first chairman, 
and who later served as Minister of Finance (1984-1991). In the early 1980's Peremba, 
under Daim, became an important 'corporate nursery' for the training of a core of young 
Bumiputra managers, a number of whom later emerged as some of the most prominent 
Bumiputra businessmen in the private sector.
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In order to expand Malay participation in commerce and industry at the state level in 
the early 1970's Malaysia's 13 state governments set up State Economic Development 
Corporations (SEDCs). Access to generous funds from the central government, and easy 
availability of credit, led to a proliferation of SEDC subsidiaries and of their activities. 
SEDCs were involved in agriculture, construction, mining, manufacturing, property 
development and the expansion of cottage industries. By 1981 SEDCs had fostered a 
total of 321 subsidiaries with a total investment of $564 million (NST, 20:11:1982). 
However, with few exceptions, the growth of SEDCs was seldom matched by profit or 
performance.8 In 1981 the Ministry of Public Enterprises revealed that of 260 SEDC- 
linked companies on which it had been able to obtain information, ninety-four were 
making losses and twenty-one had yet to operate (Jesudason, 1990:99).
The poor performance of SEDCs was due to a combination of factors. First and 
foremost there was confusion at both state and federal level as to whether profit was the 
main objective of SEDCs, or whether their primary role was a social one, that is to act as 
caretakers to develop and support Bumiputra participation in trade and industry. 
Secondly, many SEDCs suffered from poor management as the pool of trained or 
experienced Malay managers from which they could draw in the 1970's was very limited. 
Finally, until the early 1980's, the Chief Ministers of each state were also the chairman of 
their state's SEDC. As a result, the proliferation of SEDCs and their subsidiaries became 
an important source of patronage for state UMNO leaders. As one former SEDC officer 
revealed 'new projects provided employment as well as directorships and contracts - and 
many of the latter were awarded to family-related companies of state politicians and 
bureaucrats' (NST, 3:9:1981). So while some SEDC subsidiaries made huge losses, 9 
state authorities were reluctant to close them down because their importance as sources of 
patronage often overrode considerations of economic viability.
In 1981 the then Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Musa Hitam, ordered an urgent 
reassessment of the role of SEDCs with the exhortation that 'SEDCs must make money'
8 The Johore SEDC was one of the few well- managed SEDCs and the most profitable. The mainstay 
of the group’s activities was, and remains, the downstream processing of resource-based industries in 
the state such as the manufacture of rubber products, palm oil, furniture and the canning of tropical 
fruits. In 1985 the JSEDC made profits o f $33 million; in 1986 $55 million and in 1987, $71 
million. See The Star, 10:6:1989 (P Y Chin, 'Growing from strength to strength').
9 For instance, five plantation projects managed by subsidiaries of the Trengganu SEDC had obtained 
loans totalling $98.3 million from the federal government but had made no profit (NST, 2:11:1981). 
The Pahang SEDC, with total investments of $170 million made losses of $3 million in 1984, 
while in the same year the Kedah SEDC which had borrowed about $150 million from the federal 
government had accumulated losses of $10.8 million (MB, 1:8:1985).
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(ST(S), 7:9:1981). But confusion over their role quickly re-emerged when the Minister 
of Public Enterprises, Rafidah Aziz, claimed that profit was not the main motive of 
SEDCs 'which also had to act as catalysts to speed up the process of developing 
Bumiputra businessmen' (ST(S), 25:9:1981). However, as the recession of the mid- 
1980's deepened, and government debt grew, pressure from the federal authorities led to 
the suspension of some SEDC subsidiaries, the shelving of others, and a restructuring of 
SEDC operations to concentrate on profits.10 The federal government's determination to 
curtail and control the activities of SEDCs was further apparent from its close monitoring 
of their performance through the Central Information Collection Unit (CICU), * 11 which 
was set up in 1985, and with the government's directive that many of the SEDCs more 
profitable companies be transferred to PNB.
Finally, besides the public enterprises and trust agencies noted above, the 
mobilization of some large Malay institutional savings funds have also been important 
vehicles by which the restructuring of ownership in the corporate sector has taken place. 
Two of the most prominent Malay institutional savings funds used to increase bumiputra 
equity in the corporate sector include the Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH) the 
Pilgrims' Management and Fund Board, and the Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentara 
(LTAT), the Armed Forces Fund Board.
LTAT was established in 1972 to provide superannuation benefits for servicemen. 
During the 1970's LTAT took advantage of the equity restructuring opportunities under 
the NEP to channel its large funds into profitable investments and emerged as an 
important corporate group in its own right. In early 1983 LTAT already ranked as the 
11th largest stockholder of the 145 largest public companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (Mehmet, 1988:137). By 1991 LTAT had about 100,000 members, 
whose contributions amounted to $14 million a month, and its investment portfolio was 
valued at $4 billion (MB, September 16-30:1991). In September 1990 LTAT became the 
controlling shareholder of the large and diversified Boustead Plantation group, whose 
turnover from 1985 to 1990 averaged $340 million a year (MB, January 16-31:1992). 
Besides Boustead Holdings Bhd, LTAT also controlled another quoted subsidiary, Affin
10 See NST, 3:9:1981 (’Buck up or close down!); NST, 3:11:1988 (SEDC firms close to cut further 
losses); NST, 15:8:1987 (Operations of 12 Government agencies suspended) and BT, 10:6:1988 
(SEDCs restructure to focus on profit motive).
11 In April 1985, the Finance Ministry entrusted PNB to establish, manage and operate the CICU on 
behalf of the government. CICU has developed the most comprehensive data base on public 
companies and public enterprises in the country. See MB, 16:5:1987 ('Keeping tabs on public 
firms').
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Holdings Bhd. By September 1991 LTAT's portfolio also included 15 non-quoted 
subsidiaries and 43 associated companies12, four of which were publicly-listed.13 
LTAT's subsidiaries were involved in a wide range of activities including plantations, 
trading, manufacturing, telecommunications, transport and financial services.
The Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH), the Pilgrims' Management and 
Fund Board, has also emerged as an important institutional saver for equity restructuring. 
The Tabung Haji, as it is popularly known, encourages Malay savings in deposit 
accounts by Moslems intending to go on pilgrimage to Mecca, as well as providing travel 
and other tourist services. At the same time Tabung Haji, like the LTAT, has directed 
savings so generated into a rapidly growing and diversified investment portfolio. 
Through opportunities provided by the NEP's restructuring requirements, and its close 
links to government and the financial establishment, Tabung Haji has been able to enter a 
number of profitable equity restructuring arrangements, the most notable being that with 
the Swiss company, Nestle's (Mehmet, 1988:139). By November 1990 Tabung Haji had 
1, 739, 067 depositors with total accumulated savings of $3.8 billion, six subsidiary 
companies, nineteen associated companies and equity interests in over 50 companies, 
more than 30 of which were listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (LUTH, 
1990:14 mimeo). Tabung Haji's diversified investment portfolio covered the 
manufacturing, plantation, pharmaceutical, food, construction and telecommunications 
industries and so, it too, has become another important agency in expanding Malay 
ownership through the mobilization and investment of its depositors savings in the 
corporate sector of the economy.
The Expansion of Malay Ownership : The Corporate Sector
Before we turn to the key role played by public enterprises in extending Malay ownership 
of the major corporate sectors of the economy it is pertinent to note the overall changes 
that have occurred in corporate ownership since 1970. As we saw earlier, in 1970 it was 
officially estimated that 63.3 per cent of share capital in limited companies in Peninsular 
Malaysia was held by foreigners, 34.3 per cent by 'other Malaysians,' and only 2.4 per 
cent by Malays and 'Malay interests'. The 2.4 per cent Malay share was composed of 
holdings of individuals, which amounted to 1.6 per cent, and 'Malay interests', that is
12 Associated companies include those where the investment amounts to 30 per cent plus.
13 The publicly-listed companies were: Asiatic Development Bhd, Goh Ban Huat Bhd, Amalgamated 
Steel Mills Bhd and Perwira Habib Bank (M) Bhd (MB, 16:9:1991).
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government trust agencies and institutions which held shares on behalf of Malays which 
amounted to only 0.8 per cent (3MP:86).
The NEP called for the attainment of the 30:40:30 target in ownership of corporate 
equity by 1990, that is 30 per cent equity in Malay hands, 40 per cent for other 
Malaysians, principally Chinese, and 30 per cent for foreigners. The architects of the 
NEP hoped to meet those targets in the context of a rapidly expanding economy thereby 
increasing the relative Malay share of the modem sector without causing an absolute 
decline in Non-Malay participation. At the same time, the NEP envisaged an expansion of 
the national share in ownership of the modem sector of the economy through a relative 
decline of the foreign share. In fact the foreign share fell from 61.7 per cent in 1970 to 
25.1 per cent in 1990 (OPP2:103). However, although the foreign share declined in 
relative terms, foreign equity in the Malaysian economy continued to expand in absolute 
terms, that is from $3, 377.1 million in 1970 to $27, 525.5 million in 1990, an increase 
of almost nine-fold (OPP:103). Nevertheless during the 1970's and early 1980's majority 
stakes by foreign interests in nearly all sectors of the economy reverted to Malaysian 
control.
Juxtaposed to the relative decline in the foreign share of ownership was the 
substantial change in the distribution of corporate equity among Malaysia's ethnic 
groups. The Malay share of corporate equity grew from 2.4 per cent in 1970 to 20.3 per 
cent in 1990. In other words, Malay holdings increased from a negligible $125.6 million 
in 1970, to $22.3 billion in 1990, an increase of about 180-fold (3MP:86 & OPP2:103). 
Of the 20.3 per cent corporate equity held by Malays in 1990, 14 per cent was held by 
Bumiputra individuals and enterprises and 6.3 per cent by trust agencies such as PNB, 
Pemas and the SEDCs. According to official estimates, the amount held by Malays as 
direct investors represented about 8.2 per cent of total Malay equity (OPP: 102-4).
Under the non-Malay category, ownership of the corporate sector grew from 34.3 per 
cent, or $1.8 billion in 1970, to 45.9 per cent or $50.3 billion in 1990, an almost 50-fold 
increase (3MP:86 and OPP: 103). Of the 45.9 per cent of the corporate sector categorized 
as owned by non-Malays, 44.9 per cent was Chinese and 1.0 per cent was Indian. 
Considerable controversy surrounds the official estimates, however, and in particular the 
actual Bumiputra share of the corporate sector.
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Apart from conflicting official estimates of ownership,14 a number of analysts have 
claimed that the Malay share has been grossly under-estimated. In that regard it is argued 
that categorizing the proportion of ownership held by nominee and locally controlled 
companies as belonging wholly to non-Malays underestimates the Malay share. In 1985 
the proportion of share capital (at par value) of limited companies held by nominees and 
locally controlled companies amounted to 16.7 per cent (5MP:107). The distortions 
which result from such categorization are apparent when one considers such huge 
conglomerates as the Fleet Group and Hatibudi Nominees in the 1980's and Renong in 
the 1990's where ownership through a single nominee company or a few individual 
'nominees' masked Malay interests in a plethora of companies, many of which were the 
largest counters on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. In the OPP2 shares held by 
nominee companies were classified separately and accounted for 8.4 per cent ownership 
of share capital in 1990 (OPP2:103). So assuming, as most Malaysian economists do, 
that a significant proportion of nominee companies represent Malay equity, it would 
appear that, at the very least, Bumiputra are much closer to reaching the 30 per cent 
equity ownership target than is conceded by the official statistics.15
An alternative estimate of Malay ownership was given by the Gerakan party which 
estimated that the weighted average of Malay ownership was already 30 per cent in 1983.
Table 3.1: Estimated Malay Ownership of Share Capital in the Corporate Sector by
Industry, 1983
Industry
Modem agriculture 
Mining
Finance and banking 
Manufacturing 
Construction and others
Weighted Average
Malay Ownership (in %)
45
50
7 0 -8 0
18
10- 15
30
Source: Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, NEP Selepas 1990, Table 2: 187.
14 For instance, as Lim Lin Lean points out, the Mid-Term Review of the 4MP: 101 showed the Malay 
share of the corporate sector to be 18.7 per cent in 1983 while the Fifth Plan figure was only 17.8 
per cent in 1985. How, therefore, could there have been a decline when the 5MP:106 states that 
"ownership by Bumiputra individuals grew at a fast rate of 32 per cent per annum" (Lim Lin Lean, 
The Erosion of the Chinese Economic Position paper presented at the MCA seminar, "The Chinese 
Community Towards and Beyond 1990 in Multi-Racial Malaysia," Sunday, 28 June 1987.
15 See estimates by Fong, 1989:5-7; Chan, 1986:75-82 and Lim Lin Lean, 1987:28-30.
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These estimates were rejected by the government and it is difficult to confirm them 
since their derivation was not explained. Nevertheless another indicator of the distribution 
of equity in the corporate sector is the distribution of capitalized equity of all the 
Malaysian-based companies on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). An analysis 
by Fong16 of the 237 Malaysian companies listed on the KLSE as at 30 September 1988 
is instructive in that regard. Based on the market value as at 1 March 1989, the companies 
had a total capitalization of about $65.2 billion. Based on nominal value, that is number 
of shares issued, Bumiputras owned 29.4 per cent of the shares issued compared to 41.9 
per cent for other Malaysians and 28.7 per cent for foreigners. However, based on 
market capitalization, Bumiputra interests owned 34.5 per cent of the total market value 
of companies listed, compared to 33.3 per cent for other Malaysians and 32.2 per cent for 
foreigners (Fong, 1989:6-10). Although argument over the exact Malay stake in the 
corporate sector is likely to continue it is nevertheless apparent, even from official 
statistics, that it has grown tremendously.
Having discussed the distribution of share capital at the national level, we shall now 
examine the extent of restructuring at the sectoral level and, in particular, the role played 
by public enterprises in that process. In order to achieve the restructuring goals of the 
NEP, and in particular the expansion of Malay ownership, the government had to reduce 
the foreign share in the economy while at the same time adhering to its promise that, "no 
particular group (including Chinese business), would experience any loss or feel any 
sense of deprivation" (2MP:1). Besides balancing domestic needs and sensitivities, the 
government was also concerned to encourage foreign investment. Foreign investment 
provided the stimulus for an expanding economy, the context in which it was envisaged 
that the restructuring of ownership would take place. Foreign investment was also crucial 
for the technology it provided for the government's industrialization program to increase 
employment and manufactured exports. Given the importance of such investment, the 
Government, in extending its ownership over the established export industries, was 
particularly concerned to avoid any accusation of 'nationalisation' that might scare such 
investment away. Consequently, it moved indirectly, and employed a number of 
approaches including the normal business practice of quietly purchasing shares on the 
stockmarket followed by a sudden takeover bid - the corporate joint venture option; and
16 See Fong Chan Onn, ‘Malaysian Corporate Economy Restructuring : Progress Since 1970’ paper 
presented at a seminar "The Future of the New Economic Policy" hosted by the Social Science 
Association of Malaysia, 24-26 July, 1989.
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in other cases the use of regulatory measures to pressure foreign companies to 
"voluntarily" reorganise their equity structures.
It was with these considerations in mind that the government set out in the 1970's to 
acquire control of the 'commanding heights' of the economy which had hitherto been 
controlled by foreign interests. The government's main targets were the resource-based 
industries - petroleum, plantations and tin mining, as well as banking and finance. It was 
also concerned to ensure that in the process of industrialization the Malaysian, and 
particularly Bumiputra presence, was expanded in the manufacturing sector.
The Mining Sector: Petroleum
The formation of PETRONAS, Malaysia's National Oil Corporation in 1974 was one of 
the first important initiatives taken by the Malaysian government to gain control of the 
major resource-based industries. Petronas was headed by Tengku Razaleigh, who had 
already attained national prominence as chairman of Bank Bumiputra and Pemas, the two 
foremost agencies concerned with the expansion of Malay ownership in the 1970's. 
Initially, the government's efforts to indigenize the development of Malaysia's oil and gas 
reserves were rather clumsy, and aroused considerable concern among foreign investors 
about possible nationalisation of the petroleum industry.
In 1974 Razaleigh introduced the Petroleum Development Act (PDA), which gave 
Petronas the exclusive right to explore and exploit Malaysia's petroleum reserves. 
Previously, foreign oil companies worked under a concession system with state 
governments which allowed them complete freedom in the management of oil resources, 
their only obligation to the federal government being the payment of taxes and royalties. 
The PDA required all oil companies to enter production-sharing contracts based on the 
example of Pertamina, the Indonesian state oil company. Through the introduction of the 
PDA the Malaysian government served notice on the foreign oil companies that their 
future status was to be merely that of contractors (Gale, 1981 (b): 1133). The most 
controversial provision of the PDA however was one which required the oil companies to 
provide Petronas with one per cent of their equity in the form of "management shares" 
that would carry rights equal to 500 ordinary shares. By this means Petronas gained 
strategic control of the oil industry at minimum cost The response was dramatic. Several 
companies, including Exxon, suspended activities in Malaysia. After protracted 
negotiations the government withdrew the controversial management-share concept in 
1976 and also the licensing of downstream activities. Such compromises showed the 
limits to indigenization, particularly in the oil industry where the government required the 
capital and technology of MNCs (Chan, 1986:45). Nevertheless, by the late seventies
82
Petronas had its own exploration subsidiary (Petronas Carigali), had begun refining, and 
was also challenging foreign companies in the local retail market.17
The Mining Sector: Tin
Besides the oil industry, the government also moved to extend national ownership of the 
tin industry. In the early 1970's there was still substantial foreign control and domination 
of the tin industry, particularly of the listed tin companies. Overall, the publicly-listed tin 
mining companies accounted for 58.6 per cent of the 1973 output, but 85.5 per cent of 
this (or 50.2 per cent of total output) was produced by companies owned and controlled 
by foreign interests (Tan, 1982:155). Before 1972, the two largest tin mining groups in 
Malaysia, London Tin Ltd and Charter Consolidated Ltd, were British-owned concerns. 
London Tin had control over eleven listed tin mining companies, and a number of private 
ones, while Charter Consolidated controlled a further four listed mining companies. 
London Tin was not only the largest tin company in Malaysia, but the largest tin group in 
the world, so it was a particularly attractive target for Malaysianization.
The Malaysian government used Pemas Securities, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the 
state trading corporation, Pemas, in its bid to gain control of London Tin. In 1975 
Pemas, through normal share market purchases, gained a 20 per cent stake in London 
Tin. Haw Par Brothers International, a multinational company based in Singapore, had 
also obtained a 30 per cent stake in London Tin. Pemas' intention was to merge with 
Haw Par, which would have given it 51 per cent control of London Tin and majority 
ownership of the company. The move was thwarted, however, by the Singapore 
government's investigation into the malpractices of Haw Par's directors and the decision 
by the London City Takeover Panel which required Haw Par and Pemas to buy all 
remaining London Tin shares (Lim, 1981:102) The latter was an expensive proposition 
that required Pemas to invest $258.5 million in the deal, an investment it was not 
prepared to make (FEER, 4:7:75).
In the wake of the collapse of the Haw Par deal, Pemas Securities reached a new 
agreement in 1976 with the second biggest tin group in Malaysia, Charter Consolidated, 
to establish a joint venture company, New Trade Winds Sdn Bhd, which succeeded in 
securing the balance of shares of London Tin not owned by Pemas or Haw Par (Gale, 
1981:123). The following year Charter Consolidated transferred its control of mining 
interests to New Trade Winds in exchange for a 28.65 per cent stake in the company of
17 For a good overview of the development of Petronas in the 1970's see Gale, 1981 (b).
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which Pemas became the major shareholder (Chan, 1986:63). In 1977 New Trade Winds 
changed its name to Malaysia Mining Corporation (MMC). In 1981 Malayan Tin 
Dredging (MTD) and Malaysia Mining Corporation merged to create an even larger 
conglomerate of tin mining and tin related companies. (Prior to the merger MTD had also 
acquired five other Perak-based tin companies.) In 1981 Malaysia Mining Corporation 
was transferred from Pemas to PNB.
Malay equity in the tin mining industry was also expanded by the action of state 
governments that used their powers over land matters to make the renewal of mining 
leases conditional on companies' restructuring their equity to give Malaysian interests a 
majority of shares. The successful application of such pressure led to the restructuring of 
Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd in 1982, which gave the Perak State Development 
Corporation 20 per cent equity, and Gopeng Bhd in 1984, in which the same state 
authority obtained 50.03 per cent equity (KLSE, 1986:1155&1205). At the same time 
state governments set up their own companies which established joint ventures with 
either or both the MMC and foreign companies.
In the light of these developments, the Fifth Malaysia Plan asserted that Bumiputras 
had succeeded in achieving significant control of the tin mining industry. More 
specifically, it concluded that "Bumiputra interests through PNB had, by 1981, a 
majority control in Malaysian Mining Corporation (MMC). MMC also had interests and 
control in eleven other quoted tin mining companies which were listed on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange" (5MP:110). From 1986 to 1989 MMC divested its entire 
interest in a number of mining companies including Aokam Tin, Ayer Hitam Tin 
Dredging, Kamunting Tin Dredging and Sungei Besi Mines. The significance of that 
divestment - and the interlocking ownership and directorship ties through which 
considerable assets were transferred from the state sector to either UMNO, or UMNO- 
related interests in the private sector - will be discussed in the next chapter.
Modern Agriculture: The Plantation Sector
The Bumiputra stake in the plantation sector was expanded by similar means to those 
which were employed by Pemas and PNB in the mining sector. In 1973, of the holdings 
under modern agriculture (that is estates, including government sponsored land 
development schemes such as Felda) planted with rubber and oil palm, 42.3 per cent 
were controlled by foreigners with the Malays, Chinese and Indians owning 21 per cent, 
26.3 per cent and 2.6 per cent respectively (3MP:183). In the plantation sector the 
dominance of foreigners was particularly apparent. In 1974 the three largest plantation 
groups (Sime Darby, Guthrie, and Harrisons and Crossfield) owned or controlled 29.1
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per cent of the total hectarage - including 25.6 per cent of rubber land and 32.0 per cent 
of oil palm land. Foreign interests had strategic control in all these companies. Among the 
top five largest plantation groups, only one (Lee Loy Seng group) was Malaysian owned 
(Tan, 1982:141-146). As a result the government, through Pemas and PNB, launched an 
aggressive strategy in the 1970's to acquire or wrest control of plantation companies from 
foreigners and increase the Bumiputra stake in the plantation sector.
The First target was Sime Darby, which was then the second largest foreign-owned 
company in Malaysia. Since the early 1970's Pemas had been building up its holdings in 
Sime Darby but the capital value of the company, about $650 million, made it an 
expensive proposition (Chan, 1986:65). Unable to afford a direct takeover, Pemas 
sought to replace four out of the eight British expatriate directors with its own appointees 
through a series of board-room manoeuvres with private Malaysian shareholders. This 
objective was achieved at the 1976 annual general shareholders meeting where Pemas 
mobilised sufficient votes to give effective control of the company to Malaysian interests, 
of which Pemas was the most important. Tun Tan Siew Sin, Malaysia's former Finance 
Minister, became the new chairman of Sime Darby. After Tun Tan's death in 1987, Tun 
Ismail Ali chairman of PNB, which by then was the largest shareholder of Sime Darby, 
became chairman of the company.
The next plantation group to be targetted for takeover was Guthrie. In 1980 PNB 
purchased 25 per cent of Guthrie shares from Sime Darby, after the latter just failed in a 
takeover attempt of the company. Apparently Guthrie offended Malaysian/PNB 
sensitivities by taking major corporate initiatives regarding the sale of assets and the 
diversification of its activities without consulting its shareholder, PNB (FEER, 
18:9:1981). This set the background for PNB to stage a dramatic 'dawn raid' on Guthrie 
shares in London. Early one morning in September 1981, PNB managed to acquire 
sufficient Guthrie shares on the London Stock Exchange for a general takeover. The 
takeover cost PNB a massive $928.3 million (Jesudason, 1990:91). The fate of Guthrie 
persuaded other plantation companies to restructure and sell off the majority of their 
assets to state corporations, especially PNB.
In 1982 PNB reached agreement with the third largest plantation company in 
Malaysia, Harrisons and Crosfield, to take majority control of its plantation subsidiary, 
Harrisons Malaysian Estates. Earlier, a number of other major plantation companies had 
also restructured to facilitate the acquisition of a majority of their shares by government 
and private Malaysian interests. In 1973 the Kuala Lumpur Kepong company became 
Malaysian-controlled and, in concert with Pemas, Sime Darby and other private
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Malaysian interests, gained control of another large plantation company, Highlands and 
Lowlands. Three years later Boustead Barlow, the fifth largest plantation group, also 
restructured which resulted in the Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT - Armed 
Forces Fund Board) and Felda owning and controlling a major stake in the company.18 
Finally, in 1981 Multi-Purpose Holdings, the then investment arm of the Malaysian 
Chinese Association, gained control of Dunlop's plantations in Malaysia.
By 1988, four of the five major plantation groups - Sime Darby, Kumpulan Guthrie, 
Harrisons Malaysia and Boustead Holdings - had been brought under Bumiputra 
control.19 Those four groups alone accounted for about 29.9 per cent of the plantation 
land in Malaysia (Fong, 1989:13). Overall, the government claimed that by 1987 the 
Bumiputra holding in the top 20 largest public companies in the plantation sector, held 
through PNB and other trust agencies, was 37 per cent (MTR/5MP:71).
The Banking and Financial Sector
As Fong (1989:20) has observed 'the banking system represents a strategic sector in the 
Malaysian economy because it controls the flow of funds and so can determine, to a large 
extent, the growth of the other sectors of the economy'. Increasing the Bumiputra stake 
in the banking and financial sector was therefore given a high priority. Before 
Independence, the banking system was dominated by a few foreign banks, primarily 
engaged in the mobilisation of savings to finance plantation agriculture, mining and 
international trade. Prominent examples included the Chartered Bank Ltd., the Hongkong 
and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd., and the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation 
Ltd (OCBC) (Tan, 1982:159). In 1959, two years after independence, the five largest 
banks were all foreign incorporated and accounted for 71.8 per cent of total bank 
resources (Bank Negara, Annual Report. 1979:144).
As we saw earlier, most of the twelve new banks established since 1957 were 
incorporated in the sixties by Chinese businessmen. In 1959 there were eight local banks
18 See KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook Vol X I 1, 1986:53.
19 Kuala Lumpur Kepong (KLK), the only one of the five major groups under Chinese control does, 
nevertheless, have significant Bumiputra representation and equity. As of June 1991 Bumiputra 
equity in KLK was 22.45 per cent. Besides ASN, Felda was a significant shareholder in the Lee Loy 
Seng group and was represented on the boards of KLK and Batu Kawan by RM Alias, the chairman 
of Felda. Before his appointment as Minister of Finance in 1976, Tengku Razaleigh was also a 
director of KLK. He was replaced by his brother, Tengku Robert, who was also a director of other 
companies in the Lee Loy Seng group, notably Glenealy and Batu Kawan. See KLSE, Annual 
Companies Handbook Vol XVII Bkl 199L767&871 andCheong, 1991:71-75.
86
with twelve branches. In 1970 the numbers had increased to sixteen and 177 
respectively, and all of them, with the exception of the state-controlled Bank Bumiputra, 
were substantially controlled by local Chinese (Bank Negara, Annual Report 1979:142). 
Throughout the sixties the Central Bank showed a liberal attitude toward local bank 
formation and expansion. Underlying this consideration was the urgent need to mobilise 
savings to finance the country's five-year development plans which had already been set 
in motion (Chin, 1984:197).
After 1971 the NEP signalled the government's desire for greater control and 
ownership of the commercial banks in order to influence lending patterns, particularly in 
ensuring compliance with the targets set by Bank Negara for lending to the Malay 
community. The 1973 Banking Act imposed a freeze on the setting up of new branches 
by foreign-owned banks. It also required all banks operating in the country but which 
were owned by foreign governments (such as branch offices of foreign banks that had 
been nationalized by their home governments), to be restructured to comply with the 
equity requirements of the NEP. As a result, a number of foreign banks upon 
nationalization by their home governments were "localized" with substantial, if not 
majority, Bumiputra equity. Banks which were restructured in this way included the 
Bank of India which after restructuring became the United Asian Bank in 1973, the Bank 
of Pakistan which became the Perwira Habib Bank in 1976, and the Bank of France 
which was restructured into the Malaysian-French Bank in 1982.20
State expansion in the banking sector had been facilitated earlier when financial and 
management problems were encountered by Malayan Banking in 1966 and a run on 
deposits led to government intervention and eventual majority control of the bank. A 
similar fate befell the United Malayan Banking Corportion (UMBC) a decade later, when 
financial problems also led to government intervention because the directors were 
suspected of fraud (FEER, 10:9:1976). Subsequent restructuring led Pemas to acquire a 
strategic stake in the bank. In May 1985, the then Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin, 
acquired outright control of UMBC in highly controversial circumstances, only to sell it 
back to Pemas a year later for a considerable profit.21
20 The data in this paragraph is taken from Fong, 1989:23.
21 For details o f the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the acquisition and sale of UMBC by Daim 
see chapter 5. In July 1992 it was reported that negotiations were in an advanced stage between 
Pemas and Bumiputra interests in the private sector for UMBC, then Malaysia's fifth largest bank. 
The potential buyers of Pemas' 85 per cent stake in the bank were Datuk Keramat Holdings and Bakti 
Kilat Sdn Bhd (MB, 1:6:1992). See also AWSJ, 2:7:1992.
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Table 3.2: Commercial Banks (Locally Incorporated) 
Top Ten in terms of assets as at 31 December, 1990
Assets*
Name of Institutions Size Ranking
Malayan Banking Berhad* 39,879,367 1
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad**** 34,985,563 2
United Malayan Banking Corp. Berhad*** 14,134,349 3
Public Bank Berhad 11,532,442 4
Development And Commercial Bank Berhad 9,269,254 5
United Asian Bank Berhad 5,570,603 6
Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Berhad 5,423,050 7
Kwong Yik Bank Berhad* 3,787,504 8
Bank of Commerce Berhad** 3,301,114 9
Southern Bank Berhad 2,837,832 10
Position as at 30 June 1990 *** Position as at 31 August, 1990
Position as at 31 January 1991 **** Position as at 31 March 1991
Source: Arab-Malaysia Merchant Bank, The Kuala Lumpur Bankers Directory. 1991/92
Thus from 1970 to 1990 there was a considerable shift from Chinese to Malay 
ownership in the banking and financial sector. Of the top ten banks in 1990 (in terms of 
assets), six were Chinese-owned in 1970.22 In 1990, of the top ten banks only one, 4th 
ranked Public Bank, was Chinese-owned. (The only other major Chinese-owned bank 
was llth-ranked MUI Bank.) The top three banks in 1990, Malayan Banking Bhd, 
Bank Bumiputra Bhd and United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd (UMBC) were all 
controlled by state-owned institutions and as Table 3.2 shows (except for 4th-ranked 
Public Bank), there was a considerable gap in the assets held by those institutions and the 
remainder of Malaysia's top ten banks.
The Manufacturing Sector
In order to achieve the NEP's objective of creating a Bumiputra commercial and industrial 
community the government gave a high priority to the rapid expansion of the 
manufacturing sector and to Bumiputra participation in it. The two major obstacles that
22 The six Chinese-owned banks in 1970 included: UMBC (Chang Ming Thien), Public Bank (Teh 
Hong Piow), Development and Commercial Bank (H.S.Lee), Kwong Yik (founded by Wong Ah 
Fook) Bank of Commerce, formerly Bian Chiang Bank (Wee Hood Teck) and Southern Bank (Loh 
Boon Siew). See Tan, 1982:196 fn60.
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had to be overcome if a Bumiputra presence in the manufacturing sector was to be 
expanded however were access to capital and the acquisition of entrepreneurial skills.
Earlier we saw how massive increases in public expenditure, particularly in the Third 
and Fourth Malaysia Plans, enabled Pemas, UDA, MARA and the SEDCs to either 
expand their training programs for Bumiputras or the credit facilities available to them. At 
the same time, many such public enterprises also enlarged the Bumiputra presence in the 
manufacturing sector by directly participating in manufacturing activities themselves. 
Puthucheary23 showed that even by 1977 public enterprises had invested a total of 
$443.3 million in 291 companies, with controlling stakes in all but 84 of those 
companies.
Many of those same enterprises and agencies, though most notably MARA, Petronas, 
the National Productivity Centre (NPC), the Public Works Department (PWD), and of 
course the Ministry of Education also awarded scholarships and instituted a wide range of 
training programs for potential Bumiputra entrepreneurs particularly in management, 
technology and commerce. Table 3.3 shows the number of participants that underwent 
various entrepreneurial training programs in 1981 and 1985. It can be assumed that the 
participants were overwhelmingly Bumiputras.
Table 3.3: Malaysia : Participants in Entrepreneurial Training, 1981 and 1986
1981 1985
Bumiputra Non- Bumiputra Non- 
Bumiputra Bumiputra
National Productivity Centre (NPC) 4, 940 15 2,901 11
Public Works Department (PWD) 222 - 398 -
Development Bank of Malaysia (BPMB) 134 - 343 -
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd (BBMB) - - 1,109 -
Council of Trust for the Indigenous People (MARA) 14, 614 - 15,000 -
National Corporation Pemas Edar 1,447 - 1,000 -
Source: Fifth Malaysia Plan. 1986-1990. Table 3-12: 116. Cited in Ho, 1990: 182.
23 Puthucheary, M. 1977 ‘Public Enterprise and the Creation of a Bumiputra Entrepreneurial 
Community’, paper presented at the Fourth Malaysian Economic Convention, Kuala Lumpur.
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The massive allocations made to public enterprises for restructuring activities from the 
1970's to the mid 1980's24 increased the Bumiputra share of employment in the 
manufacturing and industrial sectors. Bumiputra employment in the manufacturing sector 
rose from about 84, 400 or 28.9 per cent of total employment in 1970 to 605,700, or 
49.1 per cent in 1990. Bumiputra representation also rose dramatically in the professional 
and technical categories that is from 47.2 per cent in 1970 to 61.8 per cent by 1990, a 
considerable achievement notwithstanding the large contribution made by teachers and 
nurses to that category. The Bumiputra share of employment at the administrative and 
managerial levels also increased, from 22.4 per cent in 1970 to 31.3 per cent in 1990 
(20PP:47).
Another major obstacle to the expansion of Bumiputra participation in the 
manufacturing and industrial sector was access to credit. At one level this problem was 
addressed by the government's increased control over lending policy following the rapid 
expansion of state control of the banking and financial sector after 1970. Access to credit 
by Bumiputras was also facilitated by their designation as a "priority group" which meant 
that a minimum of 20 per cent of new loans had to be allocated to Bumiputra individuals 
and Bumputra-controlled companies. In addition credit was expanded to Bumiputras 
through such institutions as the Development Bank of Malaysia (BPMB), lending 
schemes by MARA and UDA and the Malaysian Industrial Development Finance 
(MIDF), the latter being the most important industrial development financing institution in 
Malaysia. By these various means Bumiputra increased their share of loans and advances 
enormously from $149.3 million or 5 per cent in 1971, to $4, 780 million or 20.6 per 
cent in 1980, and again to $31, 475 million or 28.9 per cent of the total loans outstanding 
by the end of 1990 (4MP:65 & 6MP:254).
The growth of Bumiputra equity in the manufacturing sector was also impressive, 
though Bumiputra institutions rather than individuals hold by far the greater proportion of 
that equity. In 1972 Bumiputra held only 6.9 per cent of total equity in the manufacturing 
sector (3MP:183). By 1988 research by Fong (1989:19) suggests that Bumiputras held 
between 25-30 per cent of the formal manufacturing equity that could be accounted for, 
either by calculations based on the number of industrial companies in production, or
24 According to Fong (1989:17) total allocation to public enterprises over 1981-85 for restructuring 
activities amounted to $20.2 billion. In absolute terms, total public investment amounted to $57.5 
billion over 1981-85, compared to $20.1 billion over 1976-80; and $7.2 billion over 1971-75. By 
1986, despite drastic cut-backs in government allocations to the public enterprises, their investment 
still accounted for 16.1 per cent of GNP.
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industrial capitalisation on the KLSE. Fong concluded that since any new listing on the 
Exchange would have to allocate at least 30 per cent of its equity to Bumiputra interests, 
in all likelihood Bumiputras achieved the 30 per cent target of corporate manufacturing 
equity by 1990
Summary
In Malaysia the state has played a crucial role in transforming the ethnic pattern of 
ownership that existed in 1970. The oil windfall, together with high rates of growth 
throughout much of the 1970's and early 1980's, facilitated the massive expansion of the 
state sector, particularly from 1970 to 1985. During that period public enterprises and 
trust agencies were charged with the task of mobilizing resources and accumulating 
capital on behalf of the Malay community as it was apparent that little change in 
ownership could be achieved by the actions of private Bumiputra capitalists alone. 
Notwithstanding the argument over estimates regarding the changes that have occurred in 
corporate ownership since 1970, it is nevertheless apparent that the Malay stake in the 
corporate sector has grown enormously in the last two decades.
In the restructuring of ownership, public enterprises and trust agencies also played 
important roles in extending Malay ownership over the commanding heights of the 
economy. The government, through Petronas, had by the late 1970's Malaysianized 
control over the development of Malaysia's oil and gas reserves and by the 1980's 
Bumiputras, through MMC, had achieved significant control of the tin industry. A similar 
change took place in modem agriculture where, by 1987, the Bumiputra holding in the 
top twenty companies in the plantation sector, held through PNB and other trust 
agencies, had reached 37 per cent A significant shift in ownership also took place in the 
strategic banking and financial sector. By 1990 of the top 10 banks (in terms of assets) 
only one was Chinese, compared to six only two decades earlier. In manufacturing, 
Bumiputra employment rose from 28.9 per cent in 1970 to 49.1 per cent in 1990, while 
Bumiputra equity in that sector was also believed to have reached the 30 per cent equity 
target by 1990.
Clearly the state achieved a large measure of success in the extension of Malay 
ownership in the corporate sector. But under the NEP another important function of state 
enterprises was the fostering of Malay entrepreneurship. So to what extent has the 
expansion of Malay ownership been matched by its intended corollory, the creation of a 
Malay commercial and industrial community, that is Malay capitalists. It is to that more 
controversial question that we now turn.
PART II
MALAY CAPITALISTS: STATE, PARTY, 
POLITICAL AND PRIVATE
Chapter 4
THE NEW MALAY STATE: 
CATALYST FOR CAPITALISM - OR CRONYISM?
In the development of Southeast Asian capitalism McVey (1992:27-30) has characterised 
the changing role of the state as moving from incubus to incubator. Does this capture 
contemporary Malaysian realities? In Malaysia many bureaucrats and state managers who 
were at the common frontier of the state and business in the government's efforts to 
expand Malay ownership have themselves become businessmen. But how did the 
relationship between the state and business facilitate the transition of some bureaucrats 
and state managers to the corporate sector and what sort of capitalists has state support 
produced? Or, in McVey's terminology, has the state been incubus1 or incubator in the 
development of Malaysian capitalism?
To answer these questions we shall divide bureaucrats and state managers who, to 
varying degrees have made the transition to the private sector, into five categories - 
Figurehead Capitalists, Executive-Professional and Executive-Trustee Directors, 
Functional Capitalists, Bureaucrats-tumed-Businessmen and finally, a group who have 
moved into business via the government's privatization program, State Managers-tumed- 
Owners. These categories are necessarily somewhat arbitrary, some individuals have 
characteristics which may fit one or another group at the same time, while others may 
shift from one category to another. Nevertheless, as elsewhere in this study, the 
employment of such categories serve a useful heuristic purpose in our analysis of the 
development of Malay capitalism. We shall now consider how individuals in these 
various categories have made the transition to business and what role the state has played 
in that transition, that is, has it been a catalyst for capitalism or cronyism?
l Incubus: 'an evil spirit, a person or thing that oppresses like a nightmare (Oxford Modem English 
Dictionary).
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Figurehead Capitalists
Figurehead Capitalists include former state officials, mainly senior bureaucrats and 
military officers, as well as some members of royalty, who, because of their stature in 
Malay society are invited to join the boards of companies - particularly those which are 
foreign or Chinese owned - in the expectation that their public standing and presence as 
directors will secure tenders, licences, contracts or other concessions from the state. 
Figurehead capitalists generally have little control over or interest in the companies of 
which they are directors, hence our terminology 'figurehead'. Figurehead capitalists can, 
and often do, serve on boards of companies that are in competition with one another, or 
companies that are totally unrelated to one another where their core economic activity is 
concerned. Because demand exceeded supply, particularly in the first decade of the NEP, 
different companies came to share many of the same public figures as directors-cum- 
figurehead capitalists.
During the 1970's the most obvious example of a figurehead capitalist was Tan Sri Hj 
Mohd. Noah bin Omar, a former Speaker of the Dewan Rakyat (Parliament) and father- 
in-law to two Prime Ministers, the late Tun Razak and the late Tun Hussein Onn. In 1977 
Tan Sri Noah, then aged 80, held directorships in at least 18 companies.2 Other examples 
of figurehead capitalists in the 1970's who held directorships in a large array of 
companies included Tunku Tan Sri Mohamed bin Tunku Besar Burhanuddin.3 Tan Sri 
Taib Andak4 and Tan Sri Abdul Aziz Mohamed Zain5. All were archetypal examples of
2 Company directorships held by Tan Sri Mohd Noah in the 1970’s included: Esso Malaya Bhd; United 
Malayan Banking Corp Bhd; Selangor Dredging Bhd; Malayan Flour Mills Bhd; Taiping Textiles 
Bhd; Malaysia Weaving Enterprise Bhd; Supreme Corporation; Malaysia Rice Industries Bhd; 
Matsushita Electric Co. (M’sia) Bhd; Johore Sugar Plantations and Industries Bhd; Genting Highlands 
Bhd; Kien Huat Bhd; Malayan Sugar Refining Bhd; Klang and Port Swettenham Omnibus Co.Bhd; 
Federal Cables, Wires and Metal Mfg Bhd; Hock Hua Bank Bhd and Malex Asbestos Cement Bhd. 
See Lim, M.H., (1981:56-57) and Tan, T.W., (1982:282).
3 The companies of which Tunku Tan Sri Mohamed was a director included: Ajinomoto (Malaysia) 
Bhd; Carlsberg Brewery Msia; Chemical Company of Malaysia; India-Malaysia Textiles Bhd 
(Chairman); Malaysia Mosaics Bhd (Deputy Chairman); PEGI Malaysia Bhd (Chairman); Timuran 
Holdings Bhd; United Engineers (M'sia) Bhd; Malaysian Amercian Assurance Company Bhd and 
Supreme Corporation (Tan TW 1982:283).
4 Those companies included: Associated Plastics Industries Bhd (Chairman); Hume Industries (Far East 
Ltd); Sime Darby Holdings Ltd; Synthetic Resins (M'sia) Bhd (Chairman); Tractors Malaysia Bhd 
(Chairman); Toshiba (M'sia) Bhd (Chairman); Malayan Banking Bhd (Chairman); SEA Development 
Corporation Bhd;Benta Plantations;Taiping Consolidated Bhd (Tan TW 1982:284).
5 Tan Sri Abdul Aziz was chairman of director of Bedford (m) Bhd; Hume Industries (M) Bhd; Kota 
Tanah Sdn Bhd; Kamunting Industries Bhd and Kao (Mai) Sdn Bhd as well as many other unlisted 
companies. See New Malaysian Who's Who, 1989/1990:12.
95
the Malay administocratic elite of the 1960's. Thus Tunku Tan Sri Mohamed, a member 
of the Negri Sembilan Royal family, was also a former Chief Secretary to the 
Government; Tan Sri Taib Andak was a former chairman of Felda and Malayan Banking; 
and Tan Sri Abdul Aziz Zain was a former Federal Court Judge. The number and range 
of companies of which these individuals were either chairman or directors clearly 
precluded them from playing anything but a figurehead role.
Figurehead capitalists remained a feature of Malay capitalism in the 1980's and 
1990's but, as the numbers of former bureaucrats and service personnel increased on the 
one hand, and a new generation of educated Malay professionals (particularly economists 
and accountants) began to emerge on the other, so the opportunities/directorships for this 
group shrank. Nevertheless prominent examples of figurehead capitalists6 in the decade 
from the mid-80's to the mid-90's included such individuals as: Tan Sri Hamzah Sendut. 
former Vice-Chancellor of the Universiti Sains (Chairman Tasek Cement Bhd and 
director of Carlsberg Brewery M'sia Bhd, Chemical Company of Malaysia Bhd, Datuk 
Keramat Holdings Bhd, The East Asiatic Company (M'sia) Bhd, Fima Metal Box Bhd 
and Oriental Holdings Bhd). Dato Mohd Tahir, former General Manager of the Selangor 
State Development Corporation (Director of SPK-Sentosa Corporation Bhd, Arab- 
Malaysia Development Bhd, Arab-Malaysia Merchant Bank Bhd, Matsushita Electric 
Company M'sia Bhd and IGB Corporation Bhd). Dato Hj Mohd Shamsuddin. former 
Secretary-General of the Ministry of Rural Development (chairman, Federal Flour Mills 
Bhd and director of Hume Industries (M'sia) Bhd, Malaysian Oxygen Bhd and 
Malaysian Pacific Industries Bhd); and Tan Sri Ibrahim Ali. former Secretary General of 
the Ministry of Home Affairs (Director, Dragon and Phoenix Bhd and Mount Pleasure 
Holdings Bhd).
Many retired military officers have also become chairman or directors of companies, 
but they too, play a largely figurehead role in corporate affairs. Some prominent 
examples of such directors since the mid 1980's include: General Ibrahim Ismail 
(Chairman, Petaling Tin Bhd, Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd and director of Cold Storage 
(M'sia) Bhd, Guinness Anchor Bhd); Mai-General Mahmood bin Sulaiman (Director, 
Chemical Company of Malaysia Bhd, Keck Seng (M’sia) Bhd and Kuala Lumpur 
Kepong Bhd) and General Mohd Ghazali Seth (Chairman, Nestle (M'sia) Bhd, and 
Director Chemical Company of Malaysia Bhd and Magnum Corporation Bhd). Some
6 Information regarding the directorships held by these individuals was drawn from KLSE, Annual 
Companies Handbook Vol XV and New Malaysian Who's Who 1989/1990.
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former high-ranking members of the armed forces are also invited to be directors of 
companies because of the equity held in those companies by LTAT, the Armed Forces 
Fund Board. So Lt General Abdul Jamil is a director of Lim Goh Tong’s Asiatic 
Development Bhd (LTAT is the second largest shareholder); General Tunku Osman is a 
director of Yeo Hiap Seng (M’sia) Bhd (LTAT is again the second largest shareholder); 
and General Mohd. Ghazali is a director of Bank of Commerce and Guthrie Ropel Bhd, 
companies in which LTAT is also a major shareholder.
Figure-head capitalists, drawn mainly from the former administocratic elite, were 
particularly prominent in the early years of the NEP when their social standing in Malay 
society had some value to companies which sought their services to facilitate relations 
with government and state authorities. But besides their representational activity, for 
which they receive generous fees and emoluments, figurehead capitalists play little or no 
role in the management of companies so that even the epithet 'capitalist' has little meaning 
except in a rather minimal and formalistic sense. Moreover, the representational role 
played by figurehead capitalists, particularly in the early stages of the NEP, became less 
relevant as Malay ownership of the economy increased and a new generation of Malay 
professionals emerged with corporate skills and connections more pertinent to the needs 
of companies in the eighties and nineties.
Executive-Professional Directors and Executive-Trustee Directors
Executive directors may be defined as the high-ranking employees of a corporation who 
do not own any substantial shares in the corporation. In the mid-1970's, Lim, M.H., 
(1986:67) found that of the Malaysian executive-directors considerably more than two- 
thirds were Chinese and the small remainder were Malays. Since the mid-1970's there 
has been a rapid increase in the number of Malay executive directors to oversee and 
manage the huge investments made by trust agencies to extend Malay ownership over the 
commanding heights of the economy. Two types of Malay executive directors can be 
identified - particularly in the huge plantation and mining conglomerates of which the 
state, through PNB, is a major shareholder - executive-professional directors and 
executive-trustee directors.
Executive-professional directors are basically professionals engaged to run the 
company. They are generally appointed or invited to sit on the board of only one major 
corporation or the boards of companies whose activities are confined to a particular 
economic sector - such as plantations, mining or banking - in which they have expertise 
as agronomists, mining engineers or bankers. While executive-professional directors play 
important roles in the formulation of certain decisions and the management of companies,
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their power in approving major company policies may, in some instances be quite limited 
compared to that of executive-trustee directors. Some prominent examples of executive- 
professional directors during the eighties and early nineties included:
Tunku Ahmad bin Tunku Yahva an accountant and former director of the central 
bank, Bank Negara and member of the Capital Issues Committee (CIC), Tunku Ahmad 
was Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Sime Darby and chairman or director of Sime 
subsidiary companies Consolidated Plantations Bhd, Tractors Malaysia Bhd and DMIB 
Bhd;7
Abdul Khalid bin Ibrahim the General Manager/Chief Executive of PNB who was 
also a director of Harrisons Malaysian Plantations Bhd and Kumpulan Guthrie in which 
PNB/ASN are major shareholders; and
Dr Ani bin Arope who was an agronomist and director of the Malaysian Agricultural 
Research and Development Institute (MARDI), and the Rubber Research Institute (RRI) 
in the late sixties and early seventies. Later, in 1987, he was appointed a director of the 
plantations group Kumpulan Guthrie (of which PNB was the major shareholder), as well 
as chairman and executive director of subsidiary companies, Highlands and Lowlands 
Bhd and Guhrie Ropel.
Executive-trustee directors may form a minority or majority on the same company 
boards with executive-professional directors but unlike the latter, whose roles are of a 
managerial and technocratic type, the roles performed by executive-trustee directors are 
more representational and political in nature. Invariably the top executive-trustee directors 
are closely associated with the political leadership and are appointed or invited to sit on 
the boards of a number of companies whose activities may span a variety of economic 
sectors, though in varying degrees all often share a common owner, the state through 
PNB or other trust agencies. Thus Tan Sri Nasruddin and Mohd Desa Pachi as directors 
of PNB are also directors of Malaysia Mining Corporation (MMC) of which PNB is a 
major shareholder, while Ibrahim Menudin, the Chief Executive of MMC, is also a 
director of a plethora of tin companies that are either subsidiaries of MMC or in which 
MMC has a substantial shareholding.
7 Although a member of the Kedah royal family, Tunku Ahmad's royal background is not the key to 
his appointments. He gained an honours degree in economics from the University of Bristol in the 
late 1950's early 1960's and since has had a long association with the Sime Darby and Dunlop groups 
in Malaysia.
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While executive-professional directors are often associated with the same company or 
corporate group for a considerable period of time, the appointment and tenure of 
executive/trustee directors on the other hand are subject to shifting allegiances within the 
political elite, a factor well illustrated by the changes that took place in the management of 
MMC during the 1980's.8 Sometimes however the contrasts drawn between professional 
and trustee directors in terms of their day-to-day management of companies are less clear 
because trustee directors of state-owned but publicly-listed companies, such as MMC, are 
also responsible to shareholders for the efficient management and profitability of such 
companies. Prominent examples of executive/trustee directors in the eighties and the 
multiple directorships they held are shown in Table 4.1.
As indicated earlier, the appointment of executive/trustee directors to company boards 
generally reflects their membership of peak trustee agencies on the one hand and a close 
association with the political leadership on the other. It is as a result of those 
characteristics that executive/trustee directors are closely involved in the allocation or 
shifting of often huge assets between state-owned companies, or moving such assets to 
UMNO-linked companies or to Bumiputra business groups in the private sector. The 
allocation in October 1991 of a large $800 million gas distribution project by 
PETRONAS to MMC and a private Bumiputra group, Shapadu (rather than the UMNO- 
linked United Engineers), was an example of the considerable influence wielded by 
trustee-directors who, through interlocking directorships9 and in concert with the political
8 Shortly after the incorporation of MMC in 1977 the then Finance Minister, Tengku Razaleigh, 
appointed Abdul Rahim Aki, a close friend since their student days as executive chairman of MMC. 
As Razaleigh's political fortunes declined in the early eighties, Abdul Rahim Aki, who was also the 
driving force behind the Maminco scandal, was replaced by Mohd Desa Pachi who was appointed 
chairman in 1982. Desa Pachi was a director of Fleet Holdings, UMNO's first major investment 
holding company, and was also a close friend and one-time business associate of Daim Zainuddin 
who became Minister of Finance in 1984. However the early 1980's were a disastrous period for 
MMC with the collapse in tin prices and as the corporations involvement in the Maminco scandal 
became public. Thus in January 1985 Desa Pachi was in tum replaced as chairman of MMC by Tan 
Sri Nasruddin bin Mohamed who, as a former Secretary General of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, had worked closely with the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir when the latter was the Minister 
of Trade and Industry from 1978 to 1981. Real power however apparently lay with Ibrahim Menudin 
who was appointed at about the same time as Nasruddin but to the post of Group Chief Executive. 
Ibrahim Menudin had come to the notice of the political leadership as a tough and effective state 
manager in Sabah under Harris Salleh. Source: Interview, Senior Manager of MMC 8 January 1992.
9 An example of interlocking directorships that may have been pertinent in facilitating the allocation of 
the $800 million gas distribution project from PETRONAS to MMC were those concurrently held at 
the time by Tan Sri Basir Ismail who was a director of PNB, the principal shareholder of MMC and 
also the chairman of PETRONAS.
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leadership, determine the distribution of enormous state resources.10 Another example 
was the separation in the mid-1980's of a number of publicly-listed tin companies from 
state-owned MMC and their transfer, via a web of common directors and minority 
shareholdings, to an UMNO-controlled company called Halim tan.* 11
There has been a rapid increase in the number of Malay executive directors since the 
mid-1970's to oversee and manage the huge investments made by trust agencies to extend 
Malay ownership over the commanding heights of the economy. By the late 1980's 
Malay executive directors, whether of the professional or trustee type, and the corporate 
knowledge and experience they had acquired, represented an important new element in 
the strengthening and development of a Bumiputra Commercial and Industrial 
Community.
Functional Directors
Functional directors are former state managers and senior bureaucrats who have played 
an important role in the expansion of Malay ownership of the economy.12 They are 
termed functional directors because their transition to the private sector is the result of the 
advisory and brokerage functions they can provide to companies. In the private sector 
they may or may not be owner-directors. As the NEP gathered momentum, and various 
forms of state licensing and regulation became more pervasive, companies eagerly sought 
the services of such individuals.
10 A British company, British Gas, had apparently hoped to participate in the $800 million gas 
distribution project through its partnership with United Engineers. United Engineers was part of 
Renong, the main holding company for the ruling party, UMNO. However the political leadership 
decided to award the gas project to MMC in order to assist that corporation's efforts to diversify its 
activities and so expand Bumiputra ownership through other avenues besides UMNO-controlled 
United Engineers. (United Engineers had already won lucrative government contracts, most notably 
the North-South Highway project.) Included in the MMC consortium was a private Bumiputra 
company, Shapadu Corporation, whose growth was also promoted by the award of the project to 
MMC. Sources: Interview Senior Manager of MMC 8 January 1992 and FEER, 17:10:1991.
11 A detailed account is given in chapter 5 of how through common directorships and interlocking 
ownership the transfer of tin companies from MMC to UMNO-controlled Halim tan was effected.
12 Lim M.H., (1981:69) also used the term functional directors in his work. Writing in the mid-1970's, 
when few state managers had yet emerged or made significant contact with the corporate world, Lim's 
definition of functional directors was more akin to what we have described as figurehead capitalists. 
Lim's functional directors were therefore former civil servants (and some politicians) who generally 
performed a more symbolic role, that is fulfilling the need for Bumiputra representation on company 
boards. In short while they might offer companies some advantage through their state or political 
connections, Lim’s functional directors did not have the combination of state and business 
connections/experience we have ascribed to the term.
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Many functional directors have been, or remain, centrally and powerfully located in 
key regulatory agencies or state corporations. In those roles state managers were brought 
into close contact with the business world where they established personal relationships 
with corporate heads and gained experience and expertise in various sectors of business. 
By the late eighties some functional directors such as Tan Sri Radin Soemano, Mohamed 
Ramli Kushairi13 and Raja Badrol Ahmad14 were mainly identified with private sector 
interests, while others such as Tan Sri Nasruddin and Tan Sri Dr Rashdan bin Baba, 15 
simultaneously held positions in private companies as well as state-owned companies, or 
as managers of corporatised state bodies. The ways in which state officials become 
functional directors and the roles they perform in the private sector can be illustrated by 
the examples of Nasruddin and Radin Soenamo.
As Secretary General of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), Nasruddin 
worked closely with the present Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, when the latter was 
Minister of Trade and Industry from 1978 to 1981. As Secretary General of MTI, 
Nasruddin was also a member of such key regulatory agencies as the CIC, the FIC, the 
Petroleum Advisory Council and the Council for Malaysian Invisibles Trade. After his
13 After obtaining an economics degree in the United Kingdom, Dato Mohamed Ramli Kushairi worked 
with Bank Negara in the 1960's and later joined the Tariff Advisory Board under the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry. In the early 1970’s he was managing director of the state-owned FIMA group of 
companies and was Executive Secretary of the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers. Ramli 
Kushairi's background in economic policy arms of government and his-first hand experience of 
business through FIMA, made him a much sought after director in the private sector. In the 1980's 
and early 1990's Ramli Kushiari was Chairman of South Malaysia Industries Bhd, Deputy Executive 
Chairman of Kesang Corporation Bhd, and director of South Pacific Textile Industries Bhd, DMIB 
Bhd, MCB Holdings Bhd and Gadek (M'sia) Bhd. See KLSE, Vol XI 1:1986; Vol XV.1989 & Vol 
XVI1 Bks 1 and 11, 1991 and also New Malaysian Who's Who, 1989/1990:719.
14 Raja Badrol is an economist who worked in various positions in the civil service until the early 
1970's when he was appointed Executive Director of state-owned Pemas Securities Sdn Bhd. After he 
left Pemas in 1972 he was appointed Executive Director of Malayan Banking Bhd, a position he held 
until 1988. Through Pemas Securities and Malayan Banking, Raja Badrol acquired experience and 
contacts in corporate and financial circles which meant he was able to move easily from the public to 
the private sector. During the 1980's he was a director of Island and Peninsular Development Bhd, 
Malaysian Industrial Finance Bhd and Malaysian Nation Re-insumance Bhd. In the early 1990’s he 
was also appointed as a director of Loy Hean Heong's MBf Finance group. See KLSE, Vols X I1, 
XV and XVI1.
15 Tan Sri Dr Rashdan bin Baba first trained as an agronomist and has a Phd from Leeds University. In 
1969 he was appointed Vice-Chancellor of Universiti Kebangsaan and from 1972-82 was Vice- 
Chancellor of Universiti Pertanian. Shortly after the takeover of the Guthrie Corporation by PNB in 
1980 he was appointed chairman of the company. Later he left Guthries to become Executive 
Chairman of Telekom Malaysia Bhd which was corporatized in 1987 and became Syarikat Telekom 
Malaysia Bhd. While chairman of Guthrie Ropel and as head of Syarikat Telekom, Rashdan was also 
chairman of Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd and a director of Malaysian General Investment Corporation 
Bhd and The Temerloh Rubber Estates Bhd. See KLSE, Vols X1L1986 & XV1L1991.
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retirement in 1984 Nasruddin was chosen to head the Heavy Industries Corporation of 
Malaysia (HICOM), the main instrument to implement Prime Minister Mahathir's heavy 
industrialisation program. He was also appointed a director of PNB, the government's 
principal trust agency charged with increasing Bumiputra ownership in the corporate 
sector.
From 1984 to 1991, Nasruddin provided one of the principal interlocks in 
management between PNB and its investments in the mining, plantation and property 
sectors. He was chairman of MMC in which PNB had a 51 per cent stake (KLSE, 
1991:748); a director of Sime Darby in which ASN and MMC were the two principal 
shareholders; a director of the property and plantation group, Island and Peninsular Bhd, 
of which PNB was the ultimate holding company; chairman of Austral Enterprises Bhd, 
of which Island and Peninsular was the largest shareholder; and a director of Lam Soon 
Huat Bhd in which PNB was also a major shareholder.16
As an important link between some of the state's principal investments in the 
corporate sector, Nasruddin was highly sought as a director by foreign, Chinese and 
Malay companies. In the property sector, Nasruddin was a director of Amalgamated 
Properties and Industries Bhd and Uniphoenix Corporation Bhd (Tan Sri Ibrahim 
Mohamed)17 and Mount Pleasure Holdings (Low Yow Chuan). In the industrial sector 
he was chairman of Malaysia ACIA Bhd, 18 Matsushita Electric Company (M'sia) Bhd 
and Sungei Way Holdings Bhd (Cheah Fook Ling); and a director of Amalgamated Steel 
Mills Bhd (Wiliam Cheng), Federal Flour Mills Bhd (Robert Kuok), and Hong Leong 
Industries Bhd (Quek Leng Chan).19
As the boundary between the state and business became increasingly blurred, the 
value to private enterprise of individuals such as Nasruddin, whose extensive corporate 
ties embraced both, increased. At the same time however, the number and variety of
16 ASN and MMC were substantial shareholders of Sime Darby holding 17.6 per cent and 10.1 per cent 
of shares respectively (KLSE, B kl. 1991:435). PNB held a 57 per cent stake in Island and Peninsular 
(KLSE, Bkl 1.1991:307).
17 Names in brackets indicate the entrepreneur with which the group/company is associated.
18 Malaysia ACIA Bhd is a joint venture between Malaysians and Aica Kogyo Company Ltd of Japan 
(KLSE, Bk 1. 1991:127).
19 Malaysia ACIA Bhd (KLSE, B kl. 1991:127; Matsushita (M'sia) Bhd (KLSE, Bk 11. 1991:146; 
Sungei Way Holdings Bhd (KLSE, B kl. 1991:459); Amalgamated Steel Mills Bhd (KLSE, Bkl. 
1991:11); Federal Flour Mills Bhd (KLSE, Bkl 1.1991:42); Hong Leong Industries Bhd (KLSE, Bkl. 
1991:133).
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directorships held by Nasruddin, suggest he was less active on those various company 
boards than our next example, Radin Soenamo, who was primarily identified with the 
fortunes of one corporate group, Mun Loong Bhd.
Radin Soenamo's civil service career culminated with his appointment in 1984 as 
head of the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), in the Prime Ministers Department. In that 
position he was influential in selecting and prioritizing all major government projects. 
During his period as Director General the EPU approved the controversial Penang bridge 
project, and gave firm backing for the manufacture of the national car, a HICOM project 
strongly supported by the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir (The Star, 6:5:1987). After 
retirement from the EPU in April 1987, Radin Soemamo's state/political links facilitated 
an easy transition to the private sector.
Less than two months after leaving the EPU, Tan Sri Radin was appointed chairman 
of United Engineers (M’sia) Bhd (The Star, 1:7:1987). United Engineers was then the 
main publicly-listed company of UMNO-controlled Hatibudi Nominees which was 
awarded the controversial $3.4 billion contract for the privatisation of the North-South 
highway project. At about the same time, Radin Soenamo was also appointed chairman 
of United Asian Bank (UAB), which in early 1991 was taken over by the UMNO- 
controlled Bank of Commerce Bhd (NST, 15:3:1991).
Tan Sri Radin’s close association with such a peak government agency as the EPU on 
the one hand, and as chairman of United Engineers and Bank of Commerce, with 
UMNO's corporate investments in the private sector on the other, meant he was well 
placed to provide the advisory and brokerage tasks of a functional director. In the late 
1980's he was invited to be chairman of the textile and retail group, Mun Loong Bhd. 
Significantly, shortly after his appointment Mun Loong gained approval from the FIC for 
the takeover of the well established Hankyu Jaya retail chain. The takeover transformed 
Mun Loong from a small company to a major retail chain and Tan Sri Radin's 
contribution to that transformation was reflected in his position as an owner-director of 
the company.20
The NEP has fostered the growth of a corps of state managers some of whom, as 
functional directors, have utilized the experience and contacts they have made with the 
corporate world to make (in varying degrees), a transition to the private sector. The
20 Radin Soenamo was the second largest shareholder in Mun Loong Bhd with a 15 per cent stake in 
the company. See KLSE, Bkl 1.1991:152.
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relationship between functional directors and business is however fundamentally different 
from that of figure-head capitalists whose appointment to company boards was largely 
symbolic and related to their social standing in Malay society. Functional directors by 
contrast are appointed for a combination of their corporate knowledge, contacts and 
experience in the state sector and the crucial linkages they offer between the state and 
business. As a result functional directors carry more weight than figure-head capitalists in 
the relationships/directorships they enter with foreign or Chinese companies and in that 
regard represent a significant advance in the development of Malay capitalism.
B ureaucrats-turned-B usinessm en
As noted earlier, in the 1960's and early 1970's educated Malays gravitated to 
employment in the public sector for reasons that were a combination of history, culture 
and economics. Inevitably, therefore, most of what may be termed the 'first wave' or 
generation of Malay businessmen to emerge after the NEP had commenced their working 
lives as bureaucrats in the 1950's and 1960’s. While many of those individuals still retain 
state links of various sorts, they are now primarily identified with the private sector, and 
so it is from that perspective that we shall examine their relationship with the state in a 
later chapter. In contrast, the "Bureaucrats-turned-Businessmen" discussed here are those 
whose business success has been closely tied to their bureaucratic backgrounds. To 
complete our account of the variety of ways state sponsorship has produced Malay 
capitalists we will consider the examples of two bureaucrats-turned-businessmen, 
Shahrani Haji Abdullah of Shapadu Holdings Sdn Bhd and Ahmad Mustapha bin Mohd 
Hassan chairman of South Pacific Textile Industries Bhd.
Shahrani Haji Abdullah was bom in 1947. During the sixties he was a government 
servant in the Ministry of Works at Port Klang. He later left the government service and 
in 1970 set up a company called Shahrani Hj Abdullah and Co, which was a general 
trading company that dealt mainly in scrap metal. He also set up another company to 
operate a private jetty to handle timber at Port Klang from which he diversified into 
various container haulage operations (Yoshihara, 1988:171). In 1978 Shahrani 
established Shapadu Holdings Sdn Bhd which became the parent company for his 
various business activities. The contacts Shahrani established whilst an employee of the 
Department of Works at Port Klang, and the experience he had acquired in container 
haulage meant he was well placed, particularly after the introduction of the NEP, to make 
a successful bid when the Port Klang container terminal was privatized in 1984 (BT, 
21:3:1984). At about the same time the Shapadu group was also awarded a $20 million 
contract to build and maintain the Port Klang by-pass road, again Shahrani's contacts
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with his former employer were apparently invaluable in securing that particularly lucrative 
contract (BT, 2:3:1984).
State support was obviously critical in the early stages of Shapadu's operations. 
However as the company gained greater experience and a reputation for efficiency, the 
group expanded and diversified its container operations and maritime activities. An 
important initiative undertaken by the company was a major 'cargo consolidation' project 
to direct goods for the ASEAN region from East Asia and elsewhere through Port Klang. 
By the late 1980's a Shapadu subsidiary, Shapadu Kontena Bhd (SKB), was the 
container haulier with the second largest fleet in the country (BT, July 16-31:1992). It 
had also established itself as a viable, profitable Bumiputra enterprise21 no longer largely 
dependent on government patronage. In the highly competitive container and haulage 
business, SKB claimed to control 26 per cent of the business at Port Klang 23 per cent at 
Johor Bahru and 14 per cent of the business that passed through the port of Penang (MB, 
July 16-31 1992). In January 1992 Shapadu Kontena Bhd was listed on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange and, because it was the only listed company in the high growth 
haulage industry, it was a most attractive investment and so was able to easily raise funds 
to finance further expansion.22 As the largest individual shareholder in SKB, Shahrani 
was an owner-director of the company and a multi-millionaire (MB, July 16-31 1992).
Initially state backing was crucial to Shapadu's growth, but the management and 
diversification of the company, and its emergence by the early nineties as a largely 
independent and self-sustaining Bumiputra industrial group, was due to the efforts its 
founder, Haji Sharani. Importantly, Haji Sharani demonstrated that it was possible for 
those whose origins were of a 'rentier' or 'client' type to capitalise on state support and 
develop as entrepreneurs.
Ahmad Mustapha bin Md Hassan, chairman since 1985 of South Pacific Textile 
Industries Bhd (SPTI) made a transition to business while still employed as a civil
21 While not spectacular, SKB has made good and steady profits. For FA" 1993 SKB was expected to 
record a pre-tax profit o f between $17 and $18 million, up from $12 million in 1992 and $10 million 
the previous year (MB, July 16-31:1992).
22 Interestingly, in 1992 there was also a management rift in Shapadu, the causes of which were similar 
to those experienced by many Chinese family-owned groups in the process of expansion. The 
management rift arose from differences between the founding-owner of Shapadu, Hj Shahrani and 
professional managers on how the Shapadu group would be transformed from a family-oriented 
enterprise into a modem corporate group. One of the central issues arising from such a 
transformation, and which appeared to be at the centre of the dispute, was the vexed issue of control. 
See MB, July 16-31:1992.
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servant. Ahmad Mustapha was bom in 1936 and, after completing his studies at the 
University of Malaya, worked as a civil servant in the land office in Kedah. He served in 
a variety of positions in the civil and diplomatic service before he became press secretary 
to Prime Minister, Tun Razak from 1974-75. A nephew of the Prime Minister, Dr 
Mahathir, Ahmad Mustapha also served as his press secretary when the latter was Deputy 
Prime Minister from 1976 to 1981. In October 1981, Ahmad Mustapha was appointed 
General Manager of Bemama, the national news agency, a position he held until 
December 1987.23
During the early 1980's, Ahmad Mustapha established links with the rapidly 
burgeoning business empire of Chinese entrepreneur, Vincent Tan. In April 1984 
Nautilus Corporation Bhd, a company jointly owned by Vincent Tan's family company, 
United Prime Corporation and Datuk Azman Hashim, then executive director of Arab 
Malaysia Bank, acquired a controlling interest in Berjaya Corporation (The Star, 
27:4:1985). Berjaya was to be the flagship of the huge conglomerate built by Tan during 
the 1980's. Shortly after the acquisition of Berjaya in 1984, Azman sold his 50 per cent 
stake in Nautilus to Serdang Enterprise Sdn Bhd, a Bumiputra company whose principal 
shareholders were later revealed as Ahmad Mustapha and Mohamed Shah.24 (See 
Chapter 9 The Links of Berjaya Corp). In the course of its rapid expansion, Berjaya 
acquired a 23 per cent stake in South Pacific Textile Industries Bgd (SPTI) in April 1985 
and Ahmad Mustapha was appointed chairman of the company. Since the mid-1980's he 
was also appointed director or chairman of almost thirty companies, though many were 
small and related to the SPTI/Berjaya group. At the same time the degree of ownership 
and control exercised by Vincent Tan and his Berjaya group over SPTI increased. In 
1991 Berjaya held a 61 per cent stake in SPTI (KLSE, 1991:447).
So what sort of capitalist is Ahmad Mustapha? The evidence would suggest that he 
cannot be dismissed as performing a purely 'Ali-Baba' role in the Vincent Tan group of 
companies. He was after all one of the key Bumiputras who provided Berjaya in its 
infancy with a critical combination of state/political connections on the one hand, and, 
through Serdang Enterprises, Bumiputra equity on the other.25 Furthermore, as
23 Sources: BT, 28:1:1987 and New Malaysian Who's Who 1989/1990, Part 11, Kuala Lumpur, 
Kasuyu Publishing Sdn Bhd.
24 Mohamed Shah is a son of a former Attorney General, Tan Sri Abdul Kadir.
25 According to a reliable source, Ahmad Mustapha was also a director/shareholder of the lucrative 
lottery company, Sports Toto before it was privatized in May 1985. He was alleged to have 
accumulated considerable funds, either through the sale of Sports Toto shares and/or by the guarantee
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chairman of SPTI he has apparently played an active role in the company's corporate 
affairs. Ahmad Mustapha therefore appears to be a transitional figure. He is not a 
figurehead capitalist, but clearly he has not emerged as an entrepreneur in his own right in 
the fashion of Shahrani of Shapadu.
The examples of Haji Shahrani and Ahmad Mustapha show there are various ways by 
which former bureaucrats become businessmen. Some, like Shahrani, who have worked 
in technical departments or authorities such as the M inistry of W orks or 
Telecommunications, use the expertise and contacts gained in those areas of government 
to make a transition to business and the private sector. Others, like Ahmad Mustapha, use 
their govemment/political contacts to establish links with Chinese and Bumiputra groups 
in the corporate sector where they provide services similar to those provided by 
functional directors. These examples also suggest that there is a considerable range as to 
the sort of capitalists that emerge from a background as bureaucrats. Some bureaucrats- 
tumed-businessmen remain little more than rent-seekers, others have eventually emerged 
as entrepreneurs in their own right, and some seem to be at some transitional stage 
between the two.26
State Managers-turned-Owners
Privatization of government enterprises has provided another avenue by which state 
managers and bureaucrats have been able to make the transition from the state to the 
private sector. Malaysia's privatization program has been closely identified with the 
views of the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, who introduced the policy in 1983.27
Initially privatization was justified primarily on economic grounds. That is since the 
public sector was generally considered inefficient in providing various services such as 
railways, ports and power supplies so, it was argued, the transfer of those services to the 
private sector, where competition was a spur to productivity, would bring about greater 
efficiency. Another justification for privatization was that since the expenditure incurred
of a huge loan by Sports Toto just before the company was privatized. The privatization of Sports 
Toto was awarded to Vincent Tan's company B&B Enterprises. Interview, 14:10:1987.
26 In chapter 7 the relationship between the state and individual business groups will be explored in 
more detail in order to illuminate the implications of that relationship for the emergence of Malay 
capitalists whether as rent-seekers, transitional groups or entrepreneurs.
27 Mahathir's long held views in support of the concept of privatization are apparent in The Malay 
Dilemma where he wrote: "it is generally recognised that the Government is incapable of energising 
the maximum economy required in business. Thus, the de facto nationalisation of the railway 
services, port services and power supplies etc., which constitutes limitations o f free enterprise, are 
not favoured even by the Government" (Mahathir, 1970:52).
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by the government in providing those services was high, their privatization would ease 
the financial burden of the government.
Most analysts however have been sceptical as to the depth of Malaysia's privatization 
program. Echoing a common theme in that regard, Bowie (1991:140) has argued that 
thus far privatization in Malaysia has simply entailed the piecemeal and ad hoc selling of 
portions of the public sector to stem losses and reduce the public debt. More importantly, 
he notes that in most cases, despite forfeiting ownership stakes of 50 per cent or more, 
the state has preserved its control over the "privatized" concerns, often by sale of equity 
to quasi-state entities such as Petronas or the central bank. Examples of such 
'privatization', or more accurately 'corporatization' include Malaysian Airlines, the 
Malaysian International Shipping Corporation (MISC) and Syarikat Telekom Malaysia 
(STM).
Whatever the economic arguments for privatization, the raison d'etre for the program 
in Malaysia has been primarily political. In the words of Datuk Napsiah Omar, the 
Minister of Pubic Enterprises, "privatization is part of the NEP to create new Bumiputra 
entrepreneurs" (BT, 24:9:1990). As indicated earlier, during the 1970's state institutions 
were the main vehicles by which Malay ownership and participation in the economy was 
increased. The government's success in that regard had, by the early 1980's, spawned a 
growing pool of Bumiputra entrepreneurs who, with the support of the political 
leadership, were making increasing demands upon the government for business 
opportunities. So political factors provided an important impetus as to the timing of the 
government's 'embrace' of privatization in the 1980's - as previously the only 
beneficiaries of such a policy would have been Chinese. Later, we shall see how 
privatization also offered UMNO a means by which the party could quickly and 
massively extend its corporate empire, but now we shall focus on how privatization by 
management buy-out (MBO), has been another way by which state managers have 
become businessmen. An MBO scheme involves a group of senior management buying 
up a majority share in a company with its own or external funds and subsequently 
extending ownership to employees.
Jomo (1993:7-8) has argued that in Malaysia the desire by state managers to run their 
firms could well arise from the perceived opportunities for rent capture by the politically 
well-connected desiring to transform themselves into members of the bourgeoisie, albeit
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of a rentier, rather than entrepreneurial type.28 Gomez (1991:27) is harsher still and 
dismisses those involved in management buy-outs as little more than UMNO proxies, 
who safeguard the companies in question for the political leadership. We shall consider 
these arguments in our examination of two of the three biggest MBO's29 that have taken 
place in Malaysia in the early 1990's, notably those of Kumpulan FIMA Bhd and 
Peremba Bhd.
The Management Buy-out (MBO) of Kumpulan Fima.
The privatization of Kumpulan Fima and Peremba was announced by Datuk Napsiah 
Omar, the Minister of Public Enterprises, on 17 September 1990. Kumpulan Fima, 
originally a food processing company, was incorporated in February 1972 and was 
substantially owned by the Ministry of Finance Incorporated. Dr Mahathir, it will be 
recalled, was appointed a director of Kumpulan Fima shortly after it was set up and later 
became chairman, a post he retained until his appointment as Prime Minister in July 
1981. He was succeeded as chairman of Kumpulan Fima by Tan Sri Basir Ismail who, 
with Datuk Mohamed Nor Ismail, the managing director of the company, and Mohd 
Fauzy Abdullah, later comprised the management buy-out team. Kumpulan Fima 
included two publicly-listed subsidiaries, Fima Metal Box and United Plantations (BT, 
18:9:1990). Twelve months before the management buy-out, Fima Metal Box under 
another government privatization scheme acquired an assured source of income, the 
Security Printing Branch of the National Printing Department, which was responsible for 
the printing of all government security documents (The Star, 2:12:1989).
At one level the buy-out of Fima appeared to be a reward for a politically well- 
connected person, Basir, and for services he rendered to UMNO. Pertinent in that regard 
was the role he is commonly believed to have played in the mid-1980's when he assisted 
the Mahathir leadership ('Team A') successfully fend off a challenge by Tengku
28 Jomo argues that the ruling petty bourgeoisie tends to use the state and public enterprise to promote 
its own (class) interests, including personal wealth accumulation, thus qualifying as a statist - rather 
than - state bourgeoisie. So, since the state is also committed to create conditions suitable for 
indigenous private capital accumulation, its subsequent disengagement from direct intervention, with 
the diminution of the public enterprise sector, may be desired for the further development of the 
politically dominant indigenous petty bourgeoisie, rather than be perceived as inimical to its interests 
(Jomo, 1993:7-8 & 16).
29 The third MBO and the largest, was the sale by Renong Bhd in January 1993 of its controlling stakes 
in media companies New Straits Times Press Bhd (NSTP) and Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd 
(TV3) to a private company, Realmild Sdn Bhd, controlled by four NSTP executives for $800 
million. More detail concerning the NSTP/TV3 MBO can be found in the study of the Hong Leong 
Group (chapter 9). See also AWSJ, 6:1:1993.
110
Razaleigh and his supporters (Team 'B'). During that period Basir, as chairman of Bank 
Bumiputra, was apparently active in calling in many of the loans of Team B supporters, 
an action (particularly in the context of the then recession) that threatened many of Dr 
Mahathir's opponents with bankruptcy.
At another level the buy-out of Fima also showed the capacity of those wielding 
considerable influence in the state sector to combine public and private interests to project 
themselves into the corporate sector. Previously we saw how Basir occupied a number of 
key positions in the state sector during the eighties. He was a director of PNB, and 
chairman of Bank Bumiputra, Petronas, South-East Asia Bank Ltd (Malaysia's first 
fully-owned bank overseas), the corporatised Malaysian Airports Corporation, the 
Malaysian Association of Banks and most important of all the Capital Issues Committee 
(CIC)30. The extraordinary breadth of his influence was symbolized by his chairmanship 
of the CIC (which approves all share issues), while he himself was an active corporate 
player.31 In order to place the MBO of Fima in context it is first necessary to give some 
account of Basir's private sector activities before the buy-out
In September 1989, Basir and several other businessmen32 acquired a controlling 
stake in a Hong Kong-based company, Yung Pui Co Ltd (The Star, 13:7:1991). Yung 
Pui then acquired a stake in a publicly-listed company, Cycle and Carriage Ltd and its 49 
per cent owned Malaysian subsidiary, Cycle and Carriage Bintang. In November 1989, 
Cycle and Carriage Ltd bought a controlling 42 per cent stake in publicly-listed Cold 
Storage (M'sia) Bhd. Basir became chairman of all three companies and was believed to 
hold a substantial stake in each.33 At about the same time Basir and Mohd Noor set up a 
company called Kegiatan Makmur Sdn Bhd. Six months later, in June 1990, Basir 
through Kegiatan Makmur, joined another prominent Bumiputra entrepreneur, Tajuddin 
Ramli, who had acquired a controlling stake in publicly-listed Roxy Electric Industries. 
(Roxy was renamed Technology Resources Industries Bhd and Dr Mahathir's son,
30 See The Star, 13:7:1991.
31 Shortly after his appointment as chairman of the CIC in August 1990, Capitalcorp Securities Sdn 
Bhd, a subdiary of Basir's private company, Kegiatan Makmur, was granted a stockbroking licence 
after the government said no more such licences would be issued. Later it was claimed that 
Capitalcorp's licence replaced the earlier approved one of a defunct broker. Basir does not sit on the 
board of Capitalcorp. See NST, 19:3:1991 & MB, December 1-15:1992.
32 Basir's partners in Yung Pui were prominent Bumiputra entrepreneur and chairman o f General 
Lumber, Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah and Thomas Chua CEO of Cycle and Carriage Ltd (The Star, 
13:7:1991).
33 See The Star, 13:7:1991 and MB, October 1-15:1990.
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Mokhzani, became a director.)34 These seemingly disparate events formed the backdrop 
to the management buy-out of Kumpulan Fima in December 1990.
Basir and his partners in Kegiatan Makmur Sdn Bhd purchased Kumpulan Fima for 
$190 million after assuming the company's liabilities which amounted to $138 million 
(FEER, 3:1:1991). Kumpulan Fima had two highly profitable subsidiaries, Fima Metal 
Box and United Plantations. After the buy-out Kumpulan Fima sold its stake in United 
Plantations for $125 million (MB, 1-15:12:1992). The collateral for the $200 million loan 
raised by Kegiatan Makmur for the MBO was 2.8 million shares in Roxy Electric 
Industries and all shares of Kumpulan Fima. The $200 million loan facility was 
organised by Bumiputra Merchant Bankers Bhd, a subsidiary of the Bank Bumiputra 
group, of which Basir had been chairman until April 1990 (MB, December 1-15:1992).
Critics of the buy-out, most notably Opposition Leader, Lim Kit Siang, alleged it was 
further proof that privatization of state assets was just a smokescreen for "piratisation" by 
a club of politically well connected businessmen. Lim argued that the value of the Fima 
group was closer to $500 million, but Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim refuted Lim's 
claims and provided figures which seemed to justify the sale as a fair reflection of the 
group's worth (BT, 23:7:1991). Lim also alleged that Basir, as chairman of Petronas, 
had colluded with tycoon Ananda Krishnan (also a one-time Petronas director), in a tit- 
for-tat deal which allowed Basir to raise the $190 million he needed to take over Fima. 
Lim claimed that in return Petronas was 'steered' into buying a 51 per cent stake in 
Krishnan's Sri Kuda development project. Anwar denied the allegation and said that, 
'Petronas' participation was purely for commercial purposes and was not to repay any 
favours' (BT, 23:7:1991). While Lim's allegations were apparently untrue they did 
nevertheless highlight an extraordinary proximity of state and private interests in the Fima 
MBO.
Others, notably Gomez (1991:27), have argued that in the case of the Kumpulan 
Fima MBO Basir was a proxy for UMNO leaders and that his role was 'to keep a fond 
eye over (certain) companies'. There appears to be more than a grain of truth in such a 
claim. Certainly such companies as Cold Storage, Roxy and Fima itself were in the past 
associated with, or indirectly controlled by Daim and other powerful UMNO figures and 
in that regard Basir appears to provide a continuing link in that chain in the 1990's.
34 See KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook Vol X V I1, Bk 1:485.
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So what sort of capitalist is Basir? He is clearly a corporate player in his own right, 
albeit one whose considerable influence in the state sector has facilitated his transition to 
business. Yet he plays a multiplicity of roles - as a trusted state/party representative at 
PNB, Bank Bumiputra and Petronas (though his role in those institutions is by no means 
that of just a figurehead capitalist); on other occasions through his own company, 
Kegiatan Makmur Sdn Bhd, he is a private businessmen, but on others, as in the case of 
Kumpulan Fima, he apparently performs some proxy function. All roles appear to 
intermingle and it is difficult to sort one from the other but if his credentials as a capitalist 
are to be judged on the case of the Fima MBO, Basir and his team have yet to 
demonstrate a capacity to move beyond their origins of dependence on state patronage.
The Management Buy-out of Peremba Bhd
The members of the management team that bought out Peremba Bhd in September 1990 
included the company's chairman, Mohd Razali Abdul Rahman, chief executive Abu 
Bakar Noor and the managing director of Landmarks Holdings, Hassan Abas. Peremba 
was the controlling shareholder of Landmarks which was a publicly-listed company. The 
Peremba management team, like that involved with the buy-out of Fima, had close ties 
with the political leadership.
Peremba Bhd was set up in May 1979 at the initiative of Daim Zainuddin who was 
chairman of the company until his appointment as Minister of Finance in July 1984. 
Under Daim, Peremba became an important corporate training ground for a group of 
young Malay professionals. This group, mostly accountants, were also active in Daim's 
own companies and in the development of UMNO's business interests in the 1980's.35 
These personal and political connections were also reflected in the backgrounds of the 
Peremba management team. Mohd Razali, for instance, was a director of a number of 
Daim's companies36 and in the mid-eighties was a director of Hatibudi, then a major 
UMNO holding company, before again returning to Peremba as chairman in July 1988. 
Hassan Abas had also been involved in a Daim-related company, Sri Alu Sdn Bhd with 
Daim's brother, Abdul Wahab Zainuddin (AWSJ, 31:5:1988).
35
36
Later some such as Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, Tajuddin Ramli and Samsuddin Abu Hassan also 
became important corporate players in their own right.
Daim's companies, of which Mohd Razali was a director included Syarikat Maluri Sdn Bhd, Pradaz 
Sdn Bhd, Daza Sdn Bhd, Taman Bukit Maluri Sdn Bhd and Baktimu Sdn Bhd (Gomez, 1990:44).
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Peremba became one of Malaysia's largest property companies in the early 1980s. As 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of UDA, Peremba, with Daim at the helm, got the best of 
UDA's property developments and shareholdings such as Landmarks Bhd, Saujana 
Resort (M) Bhd and UBN Holdings Sdn Bhd. Landmarks, a property company, owned 
the former Regent Hotel and the Sungei Wang shopping plaza in downtown Kuala 
Lumpur. It had formerly belonged to Chinese entrepreneur, Chong Kok Lim, who was 
forced to relinquish control of the company in the wake of the 1985-86 property crash 
when control passed to Peremba (MB, May 16-31:1992). Saujana Resort's assets 
comprised a golf course and hotel, Hyatt Saujana, while UBN Holdings included the 
Shangri-Lah hotel and office/apartments. Peremba had undertaken these major 
development projects just before the slump in the property market in 1986 and had 
borrowed heavily to finance them. After the property slump Peremba was left with 
massive debts37 but by the end of the decade the company's fortunes had revived. 
Peremba’s ownership of valuable real estate in central Kuala Lumpur, and the property 
boom of the late 1980's, meant that purchase of the company had, by the early 1990's, 
become an attractive proposition for its managers (MB, October 1-15:1990).
The management troika that bought out Peremba, paid $250 million for the company. 
Datuk Napsiah Omar, the Minister of Public Enterprises, claimed that the buy-out was 
'not a handout' and that in fact 'Peremba was valued at $175 million, but the management 
was paying a higher price to settle Peremba's debt to its parent company.38 Nevertheless, 
as with the Fima MBO, there were strong allegations that this was yet another case of 
'piratisation' of state assets by a group of politically well-connected businessmen.39
The management team financed the acquisition by pledging all of Peremba's shares to 
creditors, mainly government-owned banks (MB, May 16-31:1992). Another feature of 
the purchase was the sharp share shuffling that preceded the buy-out. In May 1990, 
about six months before the MBO, Peremba's publicly-listed property company, 
Landmarks Bhd, agreed to purchase some of Peremba's most lucrative real estate assets, 
notably Saujana Resorts Bhd and UBN Holdings. The purchase was accomplished
37 At one point in the mid-eighties Peremba had debts of $550 million (MB, October 1-15:1990). For 
a comprehensive account of Peremba's history, and particularly its debt problems in the mid 1980's 
see FEER, 3:9:1987 (Nick Seaward, 'Product of Daim's Domain' and 'Homecoming after a rough 
journey’).
38 Datuk Napsiah Omer did not reveal however what was Peremba's debt to its parent company (BT, 
24:9:1990).
39 See FEER, 15:11:1990 (Doug Tsuruoka, 'Landmark for minorities) and FEER, 3:1:1991 (Letters, 
'Pirates or privates?').
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through the issue of Landmarks shares to Peremba. In essence assets were shifted 
between related companies, and assets which had relatively fixed values were replaced 
with assets (Landmarks shares), whose values could be more easily manipulated (FEER, 
15:11:1990 & 3:1:1991). In the event there was an unexplained downward revision of 
Landmarks share price, which not only gave Peremba an increased shareholding in 
Landmarks but, more importantly for the new owners, made the management buy-out 
cheaper.40
After the buy-out, further asset shuffling to reduce debt, and a fortuitous upturn in the 
property market, appeared to augur well for the group’s success. For a time other 
developments contributed to a positive outlook for the group which included talks with 
the Kuok group about the possible listing of UMN Holdings, a joint venture with the 
Kedah SEDC, and rumours that Landmarks might obtain lucrative privatization contracts 
- such as an independent power producer (IPP) licence. But significant privatization 
contracts did not materialize. In addition, increased competition in the hotel industry and a 
flattening of property prices and growth also limited the immediate prospects of the 
group. It was against that backdrop that control of Landmarks, the 'jewel' in the Peremba 
group, passed to another rising Bumiputra entrepreneur, Samsuddin Abu Hassan41 in 
October 1993 (MB, 16:10:1993). Samsuddin promptly stripped Landmarks of its 
property assets selling some back to Peremba, and the stake he had acquired in Shangri- 
Lah Holdings back to the Kuok group.
What are we to make of all this asset shuffling and has the MBO of Peremba created 
new Bumiputra entrepreneurs? By a rather circuitous route it appears that the same assets 
have ended up in the hands of the original owners, presumably with profits to all the 
principals along the way. The chairman of Peremba, Mohd. Razali has declared, "Ours 
was a genuine MBO, we actually manage" (MB, May 16-31:1992). In that regard it has to
40 In May 1990 Landmarks Bhd purchased Peremba's controlling 50 per cent stake in UBN Holdings for 
$262.5 million by the issue of 125 million new Landmarks shares priced at $2.10 per share. The 
new Landmarks shares were acquired by Peremba whose stake in the company rose from about 40 per 
cent to 60 per cent. However six months later, in November 1990, Landmarks disclosed that it was 
revising the terms of the issue to 175 million shares priced at $1.50 each because Landmarks shares 
on the KLSE had tumbled to $1.93 per share from $2.92 per share. So the downward revision in 
Landmarks’ share price gave Peremba an increased shareholding in Landmarks and made the 
management buy-out cheaper. The curious fall in Landmarks share price was blamed on the crisis in 
Kuwait at the time (FEER, 15:11:1990 & 3:1:1991).
41 Samsuddin Abu Hassan is another of that small, but important group of Bumiputra entrepreneurs to 
emerge from Peremba when it was headed by Daim. For background regarding the corporate rise of 
Samsuddin Abu Hassan see (Gomez, 1994:114-116).
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be conceded that Razali and his team are clever accountants and deft wheeler dealers but 
they have yet to capitalize on their skilled paper entrepreneurialism to build a more 
diversified and resilient corporate group.
Conclusion
The pattern of ethnic ownership of the economy before 1970 meant that it fell to the 
bureaucracy and state enterprises to play the role of corporate nursery or 'incubator' in 
the development of the first generation of Malay capitalists. This chapter has shown that 
there was a variety of avenues by which bureaucrats and state managers effected a 
transition to the corporate sector and how, in some cases, the manner of the transition had 
implications for the sort of capitalists that emerged.
We have seen that figurehead capitalists remain a feature of Malaysian business in the 
nineties but the largely symbolic functions they perform are becoming less relevant with 
the rapid expansion of Malay ownership on the one hand and social change in Malay 
society on the other. The expansion of Malay ownership has also been accompanied by a 
rapid increase in the number of Malay executive-directors, both of the professional and 
trustee type, though, as we noted that distinction is often blurred, particularly where the 
day-to-day management of state-owned but publicly-listed companies is concerned. 
Nevertheless the emergence of an expanding core of Malay executives was identified as a 
necessary and important factor in the development and growing dynamism of Malay 
capitalism.
As the boundary between the state and business became increasingly blurred in the 
context of the NEP, so some state managers and bureaucrats were able to make a 
transition to the private sector as functional directors. Functional directors may wield 
considerable clout particularly in foreign and Chinese companies for the advisory and 
brokerage roles they can perform. However, as the examples of Nasruddin and Radin 
Soenamo showed, functional directors can cover a spectrum from those who play a fairly 
passive and representational role to those who actively utilize their corporate knowledge 
and state links to emerge as owner-directors of companies.
Like functional directors, bureaucrats who become businessmen also cover a 
spectrum in terms of their credentials as capitalists. Some bureaucrats-turned- 
businessmen are in essence only figurehead capitalists, some others have emerged as 
entrepreneurs, and others are at some stage between the two. Generally speaking, the 
successful entrepreneurs have combined technical and professional skills as architects, 
engineers or bankers with state support - that is 'connections', contracts or finance - to
116
become businessmen. But significantly a number of those individuals demonstrated that it 
was possible to capitalise on state support but also move beyond rentier origins to 
become entrepreneurs.
Finally what sort of capitalists has privatization by management buy-out (MBO) 
produced? In the cases of Kumpulan Fima and Peremba Bhd, the evidence suggests that, 
rather than create Bumiputra entrepreneurs, this form of privatization has been used a 
source of patronage for politically well-connected businessmen or granted as a reward for 
their past services. Stated baldly, a number of aspects surrounding the purchase of 
Kumpulan Fima and Peremba smack of cronyism, and although it may be premature to 
judge those MBOs on the basis of only 3-4 years performance, neither has yet shown 
much sign of moving beyond the networks of state patronage that sponsored them. 
(Peremba, in particular, appears to have been a case of paper entrepreneurism dependent 
on a buoyant property market and continued state support as the recipient of further 
privatization contracts.) In short the scepticism expressed by Jomo and Gomez regarding 
the motivation and results of privatization by MBO as a means of promoting Bumiputra 
capitalism, at least to date, seems well founded.
So has the new Malay state been a catalyst for capitalism or cronyism? This chapter 
has shown the state's role to be a complex one in that regard. It has produced capitalists, 
cronies and many groups somewhere between the two. But that is only part of the story. 
In the eighties the rise of 'party capital' assumed a growing significance in the corporate 
sector, and so it is to UMNO's role in the development of Malay capitalism that we now
turn.
Chapter 5
THE PARTY: UMNO'S ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
MALAY CAPITALISM
Few political parties in Asia have become so closely involved in business as the United 
Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the dominant party in Malaysia's ruling National 
Front coalition government1 From the mid-seventies to the mid-eighties UMNO changed 
from a passive to an active corporate investor whose interests spanned the entire 
economy. Officially UMNO owns no shares in any company however in reality it 
exercises proprietorship through trusted individuals who own shares and hold 
directorships in well over 100 companies. In 1990 the total value of shares owned by 
UMNO nominees was conservatively estimated to be about $4 billion (FEER, 5:7:1990).
The growth of UMNO's corporate investments in the eighties meant that the party 
itself played an increasingly important role in the restructuring of ownership in the 
economy and in contributing to the creation of a Bumiputra business and commercial 
class, roles that in the seventies had been largely played by the government and the state 
sector. As indicated earlier, the reasons for the change were structural, political and 
personal. In the wake of the recession of the mid 1980's economic pressures for a check 
on public sector expansion coincided with changing attitudes in UMNO as to the role of 
the state sector in the expansion of Malay ownership in the economy. When Dr Mahathir
1 While other political parties in Malaysia, notably the Malaysian Chinese Association(MCA) and the 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) have attempted to follow UMNO's example in mobilising their 
political resources to build corporate empires, those attempts have largely foundered or been heavily 
circumscribed by UMNO's dominance of economic policy and of the key institutions regulating the 
corporate sector.
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia other political parties have been involved in business. For example in 
Indonesia, at least three political parties - Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (PNI), Partai Socialis Indonesia 
(PSI) and Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi) - established business enterprises in the 
1950's, however the dominance of the military in the New Order and subsequent restrictions on 
political parties ended their involvment in business (See Robison, 1986:48-50,72). Yoshihara Kunio 
(1988:76) notes that, although there are presently government and military enterprises in other 
Southeast Asian countries, it is only in Malaysia that political parties own or control business 
groups.
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became Prime Minister in July 1982 his closest advisors included a group of mainly 
Malay businessmen who had emerged under the auspices of the NEP in the late seventies 
and early eighties. Members of this small but influential Malay business elite were also 
exerting pressure on the political leadership for greater business opportunites through 
curtailing the expansion of the state sector, and effecting a more rapid transfer of assets 
under the NEP from the state to the private sector.
The growing influence of the Malay business elite within the new political leadership 
was epitomised by the appointment of Daim Zainuddin as Minister of Finance in July 
1984. Daim brought to government a view that no longer saw the spheres of government, 
party or private interests as distinct entities. For Daim national, political and private 
interests might be pursued simultaneously or in tandem, a situation he described as a 
'commonness' rather than a 'conflict' of interests.2 His approach was to have profound 
implications for UMNO's role in the corporate sector in the eighties and its relationship 
with the emerging Bumiputra business groups.
This chapter begins with a survey of the extraordinary growth of UMNO's corporate 
investments in order to show how by the early nineties the vast conglomerate created by 
the party, and the corporate investments associated with it, spanned most sections of the 
economy. In the second part of the chapter the focus shifts to the relationship between the 
government and the party, and how that relationship has facilitated the growth of 
UMNO’s business groups. At various points in that analysis we shall note how the 
symbiotic relationship between the government and the party also promoted certain 
private Bumiputra business groups as well.
THE GROWTH OF UMNO’s BUSINESS GROUPS
The major business groups linked to UMNO in the 1970's and 1980's included Fleet 
Holdings Sdn Bhd., Hatibudi Sdn Bhd., Halimtan Sdn Bhd., and Koperasi Usaha 
Bersatu Bhd (KUBB). Within this group of companies Halimtan Sdn Bhd had some 
distinguishing features which set it apart from the rest. Halimtan's association with 
UMNO was less direct and the lines of what appeared to be government, party and 
private interests were more blurred. Consequently, the Halimatan network of companies
2 NST, 21:7:1984 (Hardev Kaur, 'Daim: Person behind the name').
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will be examined separately, later in the chapter. Since April 1990 these groups, except 
for KUBB, were subsumed under the common corporate umbrella of Renong Bhd
Fleet Holdings Sdn Bhd
According to Daim Zainuddin, Fleet Holdings was created to reduce UMNO's financial 
dependence on non-Malay supporters, such as Chinese businessmen, and to break the 
foreign hold over Malaysia's media (FEER, 5:7:1990). Fleet's origins can be traced to 
the breakup of the dominant Straits Times media group which, until 1973, controlled its 
Malaysian operations from its Singapore corporate offices. In 1972, the youth wing of 
the governing party, UMNO Youth, had protested strongly about foreign control over the 
Malaysian publishing media and passed a resolution requesting then Prime Minister, Tun 
Razak, to obtain control of the publishing company, The Straits Times Press. Tengku 
Razaleigh, who was head of Pemas and UMNO treasurer at the time, was then asked by 
Tun Razak to buy over a stategic bloc of shares held by the company (Gill, 1986:139). 
Shortly thereafter the Straits Times Press shares for the Kuala Lumpur operations were 
sold to Razaleigh, and the company was renamed as The New Straits Times Press Bhd 
(NSTB). The shares purchased by Razaleigh were directed to a new company, Fleet 
Holdings which later, in 1976, formed a wholly-owned subsidiary, Fleet Group Sdn 
Bhd, to act as the main operating arm of the company.3
The Growth of the Fleet Group
The development of Fleet was closely associated with Tengku Razaleigh and Daim 
Zainuddin, successively treasurers of UMNO and the principal trustees appointed by the 
party leadership to supervise Fleet Holdings. In his account of the Fleet Group, Gomez 
makes a useful distinction between the 'Razaleigh era' (1977-82), and the 'Daim era' 
(1982-84), in terms of the management styles and growth strategies associated with 
each.4 He points out that during the Razaleigh era, the trustees of Fleet were content to
3 Gill, 1986:139-40 and Gomez, 1990: 52-3.
4 Daim resigned from his position as Director of Fleet Holdings when he was appointed Minister of 
Finance and Treasurer of UMNO on 14 July 1984. However as party treasurer, Daim continued to 
exert considerable influence over the management of Fleet Holdings through his nominees, Datuk 
Mohd. Desa Pachi and Abdullah Mohd. Yusof, who were appointed by Daim as directors of Fleet 
Holdings and the Fleet Group. (Desa Pachi and Abdullah Yusof were also appointed as directors of 
the Fleet Group's main publicly-listed companies, The New Straits Times Press (NSTP) and Sistem 
Televisyen Malaysia Bhd (STMB) or TV3. In addition, Desa Pachi was appointed Chairman of the 
Bank of Commerce while Abdullah Yusof was appointed Chairman of Faber Merlin.) In reality 
therefore the 'Daim era' extended throughout the eighties and the early nineties since Desa Pachi and 
Abdullah Yusof remained directors of Fleet Holdings and Daim remained treasurer of UMNO. 
Moreover, prior to their appointments as directors of Fleet Holdings, both Desa Pachi and Abdullah
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allow the company to be sustained from the dividends it received from investments, 
whereas during the Daim era, the shift to a conglomerate style of growth was clearly 
evident* 5. An examination of the Fleet Group will serve to highlight this contrast, while at 
the same time indicating the extent to which Fleet grew to become a conglomerate in its 
own right in the 1980's.
The steady growth of the Fleet Group under Tengku Razaleigh was largely the result 
of earnings being reinvested in the New Straits Times Press (NSTP) and its related 
operations. Besides the New Straits Times Press and its subsidiaries, the other major 
investments made by the Fleet Group during Tengku Razaleigh's term were in the Bank 
of Commerce (formerly the Chinese-owned Bian Chiang Bank) and in the insurance 
industry through American Malaysian Insurance (MB, 16:12:1986) and (BT, 1:7:1986). 
By the end of Razaleigh's stewardship, the Fleet Group had substantial holdings in 23 
Malaysian corporations and was making a profit.6
The appointment of Daim Zainuddin, as a director of Fleet Holdings and the Fleet 
Group in July 1982, was widely believed to reflect the personal preference of the Prime 
Minister and party president, Dr Mahathir (BT, 4:7:1983) who was keen to remove 
Razaleigh following Daim's appointment. Daim’s appointment was also attributed to Dr 
Mahathir's concern to see an improvement in the Fleet Group's profits because except for 
the New Straits Times Press (NSTP), the performance of its other subsidiaries was rather 
poor.7
Under Daim, Fleet's portfolio of investments grew rapidly to include: Faber Merlin 
M'sia Bhd, the publicly-listed hotel and property group; Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd 
(STMB), the publicly-listed private television network, popularly known as TV3; and
Yusof were longtime business associates of Daim Zainuddin. In the 1960's, Desa Pachi had joined 
Daim in what was to prove an unsuccessful business venture to produce table salt. Later Desa Pachi 
and Abdullah Yusof became directors of Peremba, the commercial real estate arm o f the Urban
Development Authority (UDA), of which Daim was the head from 1979 to 1984. In addition Desa 
Pachi was on the board of Daim's family companies, Syarikat Maluri and Daan, as well as being a
director of several publicly-listed companies in which Daim had a significant stake, notably Sime
Darby and United Estates Projects (Gomez, 1990:43).
5 See Gomez, 1990:62
6 See Gomez, 1990:57
7 The AWSJ 9:8:1982 also attributed Daim’s appointment to Razaleigh's waning influence in the party 
and government in the wake of his unsuccessful challenge to Datuk Musa Hitam for the post of 
Deputy President of UMNO in 1982 - a post which in the government sphere equates to the position 
of Deputy Prime Minister.
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publicly-listed food retailer, Cold Storage M'sia Bhd.8 Controlling stakes were also 
acquired in American Malaysian Insurance (AMI), and a merchant bank, Commerce 
International Merchant Bank (CIMB), through the Bank of Commerce (NST, 
10:9:1986).9 By the mid-eighties, the number of companies in the Fleet Group had 
almost doubled and the company had become a vast conglomerate encompassing 
property, hotels, print and electronic media, construction, telecommunications, retailing, 
plantations, banking and insurance and managment services.10
The Fleet Group: Growth and Debt
Under Daim the style of management and strategies associated with the rapid growth of 
Fleet were in marked contrast to those associated with Razaleigh's earlier stewardship of 
the company. Where Razaleigh had pursued growth through the acquisition of companies 
in related fields of business to that of the New Straits Times Press (NSTP), chiefly 
publishing and information activities, under Daim Fleet acquired companies whose 
business activities had no relation to the media industry. But a common thread in a 
number of the diverse acquisitions made was a connection with some of Daim's family 
companies, or with his responsibilities as head (from 1979 to 1984) of Peremba, the 
commercial real estate arm of the Urban Development Authority.* 11.In addition, the 
manner by which Fleet acquired companies, through the extensive use of the sharemarket 
with rights issues and share swaps, as well as the heavy involvment of the Fleet Group in 
property development, also reflected Daim's own preferences and style of business.
Often the assets purchased by Fleet were either overvalued, or the shares offered 
were undervalued, allowing some individuals associated with UMNO to make large 
profits (FEER, 5:7:1990). With the onset of the 1985-86 recession and the collapse in 
property prices, however, the Fleet Group was left holding a large amount of overvalued
8 See NST 18:10:1983 and 30:3:1984; AWSJ, 21:9:1983.
9 In addition, Fleet, which already held an 86.3 per cent stake in Bank of Commerce, acquired the 
remaining 13.7 per cent from Morgan Guaranty Trust Corporation in June 1986 (BT, 1:7:1986) and 
(MB, 16:12:1986). Later the same year an abortive bid was also made for Peremba, the commercial 
property arm of the Urban Development Authority (The Star, 16:9:1987) and (FEER, 3:9:1987). In 
the course of its expansion, Fleet also sought to diversify into electronics and telecommunications 
through joint ventures with Dutch (Philips) and Norwegian companies (BT, 13:2:1984).
10 For the corporate structure of the Fleet Group see Gomez, 1990:103.
11 How Daim’s own corporate interests have been served through enmeshing them with those of the 
party are examined later in this chapter under ’Interlocking Directorships:Govemment, Party and 
Private' and in chapter 6 Daim and the Fleet Group'.
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property and shares and, as a result, the company made heavy losses.12 In 1985 Fleet's 
debt amounted to $222 million and by 1987, Desa Pachi, the chairman of Fleet, conceded 
that the Group's debt had grown to $343.5 million (FEER, 5:7:1990 and BT, 
23:5:1987). The losses incurred by the Fleet Group necessitated the sale of some of its 
best assets to the New Straits Times Press (NSTP), in which Fleet was the major 
shareholder. In other words the New Straits Times Press, which was a profitable arm of 
the Fleet Group, was used as a 'cash cow' to purchase its holding company's major 
subsidiaries.13
The Fleet Group's growing debt and 'concern' that the New Straits Times Press 
would experience the same fate as Fleet Holdings later became the subject of bitter 
dispute between the Razaleigh and Mahathir factions of UMNO after the party split in 
1987.14 More importantly, however, Fleet Holdings' inability to provide the financial 
resources required by UMNO meant that the party leadership had to look elsewhere to 
pursue its corporate ambitions.
Hatibudi Sdn. Bhd.
In 1987 a little known engineering company, United Engineers Malaysia (UEM), won a 
30 year government concession to build, manage and collect billions of dollars in tolls
12 In that regard, the timing of Fleet's investments in Peremba, the property and construction arm of 
the Urban Development Authority (UDA), and the Faber Merlin hotel group was particularly 
disastrous. Fleet's brief involvment with Peremba (1986-87) resulted in a loss by August 1986 of 
$18.6 million (FEER, 3:9:1987). See also Gomez, 1990:93-95. Faber Merlin recorded losses of 
$42.6 million in 1986 and $71.8 million in 1987 (FEER, 21:1:1988).
13 See Gomez 1990:65 and The Star 7:2:1987. Assets sold to the NST included: the 20 per cent stake 
in Bank of Commerce in March 1986 for $23 million; Fleet's entire holding in American Malaysian 
Insurance in March 1986 for $19.5 million; a 10 per cent stake in Sistem Televisyen Malaysia 
(STM) in May, 1986 for $10 million; 16.65 million NST shares, or 24.2 per cent, to foreign 
institutional investors for about $116 million; and a further 20 per cent in STM to publicly listed 
Malayan Cables in February, 1987, for some $27.5 million (FEER, 3:9:1987). See also NST, 
10:9:1986 and The Star, 7:2:1987.
14 Marina Yusoff, a prominent member of the Razaleigh faction, in a letter dated 14 April 1987 to 
UMNO president, Dr Mahathir, claimed that when Tengku Razaleigh handed over control of Fleet 
Holdings Sdn Bhd to Daim in 1983, Fleet’s assets totalled $500 million with a debt liability of only 
$56 million, but that by 1987 Fleet Holdings had debts totalling $448 million and was unable to pay 
interest of $3 million a month on its loans. In an article in the New Straits Times of 23 April 1987 
Fleet Chairman, Datuk Desa Pachi, disputed Marina's figures, but conceded that losses had been 
made, claiming them to total $343.5 as of March 1987. Desa further claimed that the net worth of 
Fleet at market value was $232 million as at end-March 1987 which compared favourably with the 
net worth at market value of $202.6 million in 1983 when Daim took over control of the Fleet 
Group from Razaleigh. Considerable contention surrounds the figures, however, which were also 
qualified by the Fleet Group's own auditors. See FEER, 3:9:1987.
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and other fees along the 900-kilometer North-South Highway from Thailand to 
Singapore. Controversy over the project grew when it was learned that UEM had been a 
loss-making engineering firm with little experience in road building and a record in the 
courts for alleged negligence.15 In July 1987 the then Minister for Public Works, S Sarny 
Vellu, revealed - apparently inadvertently - to Parliament that UEM's controlling 
shareholder, Hatibudi Sdn Bhd, was an UMNO-controlled company. He further stated 
that UMNO President, Mahathir Mohamed, Deputy President, Ghafar Baba, Secretary- 
General Sanusi Junid, and UMNO Treasurer, Daim Zainuddin were trustees of Hatibudi 
by virtue of their posts in the party (AWSJ, 18:1:1988).
The Growth of Hatibudi
Hatibudi was formed on 16 May, 1984 with $2 in paid-up capital. Its original registered 
office was the same address as that used by several of Daim Zainuddin's family 
companies and of Peremba Bhd., the property concern then owned by the state and 
headed by Daim. In June 1984, Halim Saad and Mohamed Razali Abdul Rahman were 
appointed directors of Hatibudi. At the same time Hatibudi's paid-up capital was 
increased to $1 million with the directors each holding 499,999 one dollar shares in the 
company. Both Halim Saad and Mohamed Razali Abdul Rahman worked with Daim at 
Peremba and since the late 1970's the careers of both men paralleled closely Daim's 
intricate corporate manoeuvres. Acknowledgement by the Minister for Works, Sarny 
Vellu, of Hatibudi’s links with UMNO was confirmed by Halim who said he held his 
shares in the company 'in trust for the beneficial owner, U M N O .'16
The first public indication of Hatibudi's links with UMNO occurred when the 
company arranged an $18 million loan to buy a 30 per cent stake in Seri Pacific 
Corporation which owned the Seri Pacific Hotel in Kuala Lumpur. The hotel formed part 
of the UMNO-owned World Trade Centre Complex in which the party has its 
headquarters (AWSJ, 18:1:1988). Among the directors of Seri Pacific Corporation were 
Daim Zainuddin and Mohd. Razali. In September 1984 Hatibudi purchased a further 30 
per cent of the shares in Seri Pacific Corporation thereby giving UMNO a 60 per cent 
stake in the hotel, which colloquially became known as 'UMNO's hotel.'
15 See The Star, 14:5:1983 ('Northam Court Case, UEM to settle out of court'?).
16 Stated in Halim Saad's affadavit, dated 3 September 1987, filed during the case bought by the DAP 
against the award of the contract to UEM. See AWSJ, 18:1:1988.
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Later, in March 1985, Hatibudi acquired a substantial stake in United Engineers 
Malaysia Sdn Bhd (UEM). It was the most important aquisition made by the company. 
UEM was a publicly-listed foreign manufacturer of machinery for the rubber and tin 
industries. From 1981 to 1985 United Engineers suffered five years of successive losses. 
In May, 1983, trading in the company's shares on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
was voluntarily suspended and by 1985 UEM had debts of $29.1 million.17 Only a fresh 
injection of funds or the prospect of getting a huge income-generating contract could save 
the UEM group from insolvency. UEM's majority shareholder was the Singapore-based, 
Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC).18 In late 1984 or early 1985 a mutually 
beneficial arrangement was worked out between OCBC and Hatibudi whereby Hatibudi 
gained control of UEM and OCBC recovered much of the debt UEM had incurred with it 
Two factors facilitated the arrangement; Daim's then ownership of the United Malayan 
Banking Corporation (UMBC), which provided guarantees for the loans taken, and 
assurances received by OCBC that UEM would soon be receiving lucrative government 
contracts.19
17 For a summary of UEM's balance sheet from 1981 to 1985 see The Star, 2:8:1987 (Tan Siok Choo, 
'UEM’s Road into the Black').
18 UEM was controlled by UEL (Singapore) and its subsidiary, United Engineers (Singapore) Pty Ltd 
which together held a 44 per cent stake in the company as of 31 December 1985. UEL's major 
shareholder was the Great Eastern Life Assurance Co. Limited, which in turn was substantially 
owned by the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC). See AWSJ, 18:1:1988 and Gomez, 
1990:111.
19 According to the AWSJ (18:1:1988), Mohd. Razali, one of the directors of Hatibudi, initiated 
discussions to buy a substantial stake in United Engineers with officials of OCBC in 
January/February 1985. OCBC, though keen to reduce its stake in UEM and the cost it imposed, was 
nevertheless determined to find a way of reviving the company as well as ensuring its relisting. 
Mohd. Razali's proposal of a link between UEM and Hatibudi achieved both goals. In essence the 
arrangement involved settlement of the debt of $75 million UEM owed its Singapore shareholders by 
converting the loans into ordinary and special shares that were later sold to Hatibudi. The transaction 
gave Hatibudi a controlling 33.3 per cent interest in UEM. The quid pro quo, which made the scheme 
attractive was, 'that it was made clear that the government and statutory-board contracts would be 
coming into the company (UEM) through Hatibudi' (AWSJ, 18:1:1988). In July 1986, when tender 
results for the North-South highway project were pending, Hatibudi strengthened its interest in UEM 
by subscribing to an additional 25 million $1 units of convertible unsecured loan stock, which if it 
elected to covert to ordinary shares by 1991 would increase its stake in UEM to 50 per cent. The 
AWSJ (18:1:1988) reported that, 'Hatibudi bought the loan stock with a $25 million loan 
arrangement in July 1986 from the Great Eastern Life Assurance Company (controlled by OCBC and 
the largest shareholder in Singapore's United Engineers Ltd). United Malayan Banking Corporation 
(UMBC), at the time controlled by then Finance Minister, Daim's family companies, then guaranteed 
Hatibudi's loan from Great Eastern using the loan stock as security'. For accounts of the restructuring 
of UEM see AWSJ, (18:1:1988), Gomez (1990, 112-115), MB (1:6:1985) and BT (10:4:1985).
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Shortly after Hatibudi gained control of UEM, the raison d'etre for the exercise 
became apparent. Under the Mahathir government's privatisation policy UEM was 
awarded the $3.4 billion contract for the the North-South Highway Project, thereby 
securing a strong source of recurrent earnings for the party which the financially 
beleagued Fleet Group could no longer provide.20 Access to such a source of recurrent 
earnings had become critical for the UMNO leadership faced with the heavy debts 
incurred by the party, most notably for the $360 million Putra World Trade Centre which 
included the party's 41-story headquarters building. When challenged about the probity 
of using the privatisation of the North-South highway (and associated government 
contracts) to pay UMNO's own debts, Dr Mahathir himself defended the contract 
arrangements between Hatibudi and UEM, responding somewhat disingenuously that, 
'Who (else) is going to pay for the $360 million UMNO complex'?21
After obtaining the contract for the North-South highway project, UEM formed a 
subsidiary company, Projek Lebuhraya Utara Selatan (PLUS), to manage the project. By 
mid-1989, UEM had a 50 per cent stake in PLUS, the balance being held by a Bumiputra 
investment group, Cantuman Bahagia Sdn Bhd. However, just as the party leadership 
had secured a lucrative source of funds and patronage via the Hatibudi-UEM link, 
political developments in UMNO put that prized cash-generating asset temporarily out of 
reach.
Hatibudi and the 1987 UMNO Split
At the 1987 UMNO General Assembly, Tengku Razaleigh challenged Dr Mahathir for the 
party presidency. It was a close fought contest. Dr Mahathir won a narrow 43-vote 
victory from the 1,479 voting UMNO delegates but the challenge split the party into two 
camps - Dr Mahathir's supporters, identified as as Team A' and Tengku Razaleigh's 
supporters who were identified as 'Team B'. Amidst complaints of irregularities in 
counting and the disclosure that there had been members from unregistered branches who
20 Though the Letter o f Intent was issued by the Works Ministry to UEM for the project on 29 
December 1986 the contract was not signed until March 1988. The reason for the delay was a legal 
suit filed in August 1987 by the Opposition Leader, Lim Kit Siang, claiming that the proposed 
award was unlawful and tainted by a conflict of interest involving senior government officials who 
were also UMNO leaders. However on 15 January 1988 Malaysia's Supreme Court dismissed the 
challenge thereby clearing the way for the government to give the contract to UEM. See AWSJ, 
18:1:1988. Meanwhile Lim Kit Siang was detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA).
21 The Star, 29:8:1987. The UMNO Youth leader and Minister for Youth and Sports, Najib Tun Razak 
also defended the contract on the grounds that the party needed the money to repay the loans ($360 
million) attached to its headquarters building in Kuala Lumpur. See The Sunday Star (30:8:1987) and 
FEER (10:3:1988).
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had affected the divisional selection of the 1, 479 candidates to the assembly, eleven 
disgruntled Team B supporters petitioned the High Court in July 1987 to declare the 
election results null and void. On 4 February 1988 the High Court declared that 'UMNO 
was an unlawful society, ’ a judgement which took all sections of the party by surprise. 
An immediate consequence of the decision was that the party's assets were turned over to 
the government Official Assignee for safekeeping or eventual liquidation until UMNO 
exhausted efforts to sort out its legal problems.
Responding to these developments Dr Mahathir, and his Team  A' supporters, 
registered on 13 February 1989 a party called UMNO Barn (New UMNO), which 
supplanted the 'outlawed UMNO' as the backbone of the ruling National Front Coalition 
Government Although Dr Mahathir steadily consolidated his position in the government 
and the party (UMNO Barn), recovery of the old party's considerable assets nevertheless 
assumed a greater urgency with the approaching general election, due by August 1991. 
The problem was that after UMNO was declared 'illegal', the party's 'trustee companies, 
'such as Hatibudi Sdn Bhd had to relinquish their holdings (which in Hatibudi's case 
included its stake in UEM), to the Official Assignee's office. Fortunately however the 
Official Assignee's office happened to be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs headed by none other than the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir himself.
In June 1988 the official assignee sold UMNO’s interests in UEM but it was not 
revealed to whom the shares were sold. However the following month, on 25 July, a 
relatively small publicly-listed engineering company called Time Engineering Bhd (TEB) 
announced that it had acquired $37.5 million convertible unsecured loan stock (CULS), 
in UEM from a company called Hatibudi Nominees (AWSJ, 26:7:1989). Besides the 
similarity of the company's name (Hatibudi) to that of the former trustee of the party's 
holdings in UEM, its major shareholders, Halim Saad and Anuar Othman, were also 
directors of the older Hatibudi and of UEM. Hatibudi Nominees, the controlling 
shareholder of UEM, then through a rather convoluted share-swapping arrangement was 
offered 52 per cent ownership of Time Engineering (AWSJ, 14:2:1990). In return, Time 
Engineering was awarded a $400 million contract by UEM, to supply equipment for the 
North-South highway project.22 The Hatibudi Nominees/UEM/Time Engineering 
transaction thus effected a shift of UMNO's interest in UEM from one holding company, 
Hatibudi Sdn Bhd, to another holding company, Hatibudi Nominees, both, as it turned
22 For a detailed account of the Hatibudi Nominees/UEMyTime Engineering deal see AWSJ 26:7:1989 
and 14:2:1990; FEER 7:9:1989 and Gomez 1990:132-4.
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out, controlled by the same people. The objective of that (successful) transaction was to 
ensure that UMNO's most lucrative asset, UEM, was returned (via the Official 
Assignee's office) to the control of Mahathir's faction. It also, with the addition of Time 
Engineering, expanded the number of companies under UMNO's control.
Shortly after Mahathir's faction regained control of its main investment vehicle, 
UEM, it set about further expanding its business interests. In April 1989 publicly-listed 
Hume Industries was drawn into the orbit of UMNO's business empire when it was 
announced that Hume had secured a $500 million contract to supply concrete products for 
the North-South highway. (Hume Industries was controlled by the Singapore-based 
Quek family through its holding company, Hong Leong Malaysia Bhd.) The quid pro 
quo for the lucrative contract was apparently the divestment by Hume of a significant (26 
per cent) stake to an UMNO-controlled company, called Jaguh Mutiara Sdn Bhd.23 
Having gained a stake in Hume, UMNO, through UEM, then made a successful take­
over bid in August 1989 for Cement Industries of Malaysia Bhd (CIMA).24 UEM's next 
acquisition took place in November 1989 when it announced a reverse take-over of Kinta 
Kellas Investments PLC, a property and leasing company. Capping this spate of 
acquisitions was the purchase by Hatibudi Nominees in January 1990 of a controlling 32 
per cent stake in MCB Holdings Bhd, a publicly-listed property and manufacturing 
company.25
By early 1990 the Mahathir faction had, through 'proxies' working on its behalf, 
principally Halim Saad and Anuar Othman, regained control of most of UMNO's assets. 
Furthermore, largely through UEM, those proxies had also built UMNO's latest 
investment arm, Hatibudi (Nominees), into another large business conglomerate that was 
ultimately beholden to the UMNO leadership.26 Within a few months almost all of 
UMNO's considerable assets, including Hatibudi, were reorganised and subsumed 
within a new super UMNO conglomerate, Renong Bhd. Before outlining those
23 According to the AWSJ (10:8:1989) Jaguh Mutiara Sdn Bhd was a newly created company directed by 
two businessmen long associated with Daim Zainuddin in managing UMNO-controlled companies. It 
acquired the 26 per cent stake in Hume when the company's two largest shareholders did not take up 
their entitlement in a rights issue in October 1989.
24 For details of the purchase of CIMA by UEM see AWSJ, 14:2:1990. CIMA, a publicly-listed 
company, was acquired from the Perlis state government through a share-swapping arrangement
25 AMCB was presumed to be Hatibudi Nominees' vehicle to oversee its and United Engineers’ property 
operations (AWSJ, 14:2:1990).
26 For the corporate structure of Hatibudi Nominees see Gomez, 1990:135.
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developments it is necessary however to briefly describe one other major business group 
associated with UMNO, Koperasi Usaha Bersatu Bhd (KUB).
Koperasi Usaha Bersatu Bhd (KUB)
In contrast to the Fleet Group and Hatibudi, Koperasi Usaha Berasatu Bhd or KUB has, 
since its formation, been openly acknowledged as one of UMNO’s business ventures. It 
was launched by the then party president and Prime Minister, Datuk Hussein Onn, on 11 
May 1977. Officially registered under the Cooperatives Society Ordinance, KUB is the 
cooperative arm of UMNO. It was established to utilise the considerable financial 
potential of the party's large Malay membership and 'to further the active participation of 
Bumiputras in the fields of commerce and industry' (Cheong, 1990:19). KUB was also 
partly a response to the early success of the Multi-Purpose Cooperative Society (KSM) 
set up by the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA).
To coordinate its investments KUB formed an investment and holding company, 
Permodalan Bersatu Bhd (PBB), which was incorporated on 29 November 1979 as a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of KUB. PBB's first directors were Tan Sri Kamarul Ariffin, 
then chairman of Bank Bumiputra, and Dr Agoes Salim, then chairman of Bank 
Pertanian. Under the stewardship of Kamarul Ariffin and Agoes Salim, PBB acquired a 
number of companies, the most important of which was Idris Hydraulic Tin PLC in 
November 1981.27 Although purchased in early 1982 at, it was alleged, an exorbitant 
price, 28 Idris remained a shell company until September 1983 when it was reactivated 
following a reconstruction scheme29 and used to spearhead KUB's move into the 
corporate sector.
27 Other important companies acquired by PBB in 1981 and 1982 included: Syarikat Perumahan KUB 
Sdn Bhd (property development); Kumpulan Ladang Bersatu Sdn Bhd (a joint venture with Malayan 
Mining Corporation to undertake mining exploration); Advanced Electronic (M) Sdn Bhd (distributer 
of electronic appliances); Masa Merdeka Sdn Bhd and Mengawati Sdn Bhd (property development); 
Telasco Insurance Sdn Bhd; and Kewangan Usuaha Bersatu Bhd (KUBB), one of the biggest finance 
companies in Malaysia (FEER, 2:8:1984). See also Gomez (1990:143-4).
28 Members of the Youth Wing of the party (UMNO Youth), alleged that PBB bought Idris for $18 
million when the market price for the shares was only $12 million (MB, 16:6:1988).
29 Under the reconstruction scheme, London-based Idris Hydraulic Tin PLC was placed under voluntary 
liquidation, and a new company, Idris Hydraulic (M) Bhd, was incorporated in Malaysia on 30 
November 1983. Idris Hydraulic (M) then acquired the whole undertaking and assets of Idris Hydraulic 
Tin PLC. In return the company issued and transferred to the shareholders of Idris PLC 1.28 million 
shares of 50 (Malaysian) cents each on the basis of one share in the company for each Idris PLC 
share held (KLSE Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XV, 1990:679).
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The reactivation of Idris coincided with a change in PBB's management when in 
August 1983 the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, changed the trustees and appointed Datuk 
Ibrahim Mohamed and Datuk Azman Hashim to the board (Gomez, 1990:147-164). 
Ibrahim Mohamed, then chairman of Promet Bhd, and Azman Hashim as chairman of 
Arab Malaysia Merchant Bank, were amongst the vanguard of the new Malay business 
elite to emerge in the 1980's. Both men had, through extensive use of such stock market 
mechanisms as rights issues and share swaps, built large business fortunes. After taking 
over PBB, Ibrahim and Azman applied to Idris those same strategies for rapid corporate 
growth which they had applied to their own businesses and Idris made a string of 
acquisitions, most of which were purchased through the issue of Idris shares.30 The 
purchase of assets in this manner, some of which were clearly overpriced, such as 
Talasco Insurance for example, enabled PBB (and presumably therefore UMNO) to make 
huge capital gains.31
Under the leadership of Ibrahim and Azman, Idris also sought to further expand its 
activities in the finance and property sectors. The significance of Idris' involvement in the 
property sector was that it coincided with Ibrahim Mohamed's leadership of KUB and 
involved private companies in which he had an interest32 That association proved fateful 
for both when, in the wake of the 1985-1986 recession, property prices slumped and 
both Idris Hydraulic and Ibrahim's own company, Promet Bhd, suffered large losses. 
(Idris incurred pre-tax losses of $9.01 million in 1985 and $17.66 million in 1986 while 
Promet suffered a massive $92.73 pre-tax loss in 1985 alone.)33 In 1987 Ibrahim 
resigned from Idris and a new board of directors was appointed.
Leading members of the new team of directors appointed to the board of Idris 
Hydraulic Bhd included the chairman, Datuk Harun Idris, managing director, Puan
30 Four wholly-owned subsidiaries of PBB were acquired by Idris. They were Kewangan Usaha Bersatu 
Bhd (KUBB), one of Malaysia's largest finance companies; Advanced Electronic (M'sia) Sdn Bhd, a 
distributor of electronic home appliances; Masa Merdeka Sdn Bhd and Mengawarti Sdn Bhd (both of 
which are property companies (Gomez: 1990:147). Idris also acquired an insurance company, Talasco 
Insurance Sdn Bhd. All five companies were purchased through the issue of Idris Hydraulic shares.
31 According to Gomez (1990:148) 'PBB paid $15.42 million cash for 6.855 million shares of Talasco 
Insurance, which meant each Talasco share cost PBB $2.25. However Idris Hydraulic purchased each 
Talasco share from PBB at $3.72, thereby giving PBB a massive capital gain from the sale.’ See 
also (FEER, 2:8:1984).
32 Gomez (1990:157). The ways in which Ibrahim enmeshed his responsibilities as overseer of 
UMNO’s corporate interests in Idris with those of his private companies for personal gain are 
examined in chapter 7.
33 See KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XV 1990:681 and 471.
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Marina Yusof, Datuk Rais Yatim and Datuk Zainal Abidin Zin. All were prominent 
supporters of Tengku Razaleigh, who had narrowly lost in his bid to wrest the leadership 
of UMNO from the Prime Minister and party president, Dr Mahathir, in 1987. So the 
rivalries which had split UMNO asunder were also reflected in the boardroom at Idris. It 
was against this background of bitter party rivalries that the mismanagement of Idris and 
the financial losses which had long beset the cooperative became public as the Mahathir 
faction sought to discredit its political opponents on the Idris board. (A far cry from the 
hopes expressed earlier by party leaders, including Dr Mahathir himself, that the 
cooperatives operations would be free of politics and run on commercial lines.)
In the revelations that followed it soon became apparent that irrespective of which 
faction had controlled KUB in the past, all were guilty of mismanagement and the use of 
the cooperative to dispense political patronage. For instance, in the early eighties Idris 
had no fewer than 17 directors on its board, most of whom were politicians (MB, 
16:8:1988). Some senior executives were also paid colossal salaries. For example, the 
chief executive of Talasco Insurance, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Idris, received 
almost a million dollars in salary and expenses in 1985 (MB, 16:6:1988). Moreover the 
credentials of Datuk Harun to be chairman of KUB, and a Financial company such as 
Idris, were at best questionable. Harun, the Mentri Besar (Chief Minister), of Selangor 
from 1964 to 1976, had been sentenced and jailed for corruption and criminal breach of 
trust in the Bank Rakyat case, the biggest financial scandal of the 1970's.
By the end of 1986 KUB was technically insolvent.34 The co-operative's financial 
problems were further compounded by its being embroiled in party conflict. While 
opponents of party president, Dr Mahathir, dominated the board of KUB and its main 
vehicle, Idris, there was little prospect of obtaining much needed funds. Idris languished 
until January 1991, when Tanjung Layang, a company identified with the Mahathir 
leadership and his UMNO Barn (or new UMNO), 'recaptured' a controlling stake in the 
company. Subsequently, most of the personalities on the Idris board associated with 
Tengku Razaleigh and his 'Semangat 46,' notably Datuk Harun, Datuk Rais Yatim and 
Datuk Zainal Abidin Zin resigned on 10 January 1991.35 The newly appointed deputy
34 The 1986 KUB Annual Report revealed that accumulated losses rose from $3.3 million in 1985 to 
$3.8 million in 1986 while that of the group reached $114 million from $65.5 million in 1985. The 
registrar of co-operatives declared that the group's losses at the end of 1986 'made it capital deficient 
by $77 million' and therefore 'technically insolvent’ (MB, 16:6:1988).
35 The only pro Razaleigh, or 'Semangat 46' survivor was Marina Yusof. However she announced her 
withdrawal from politics and, though her position as Idris' managing director was based on a three
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chairman of Idris, Ishak Ismail (commonly believed to be a close associate of Finance 
Minister, Anwar Ibrahim), left no doubt about the links between UMNO (Baru) and 
Idris, when he said that, 'Idris was formerly controlled by UMNO members and it was 
good to have it back.'36
Renong Bhd
By the end of the eighties UMNO presided over a vast sprawling corporate empire. Each 
of the main elements within that empire, the Fleet Group, Hatibudi and KUB had become 
large conglomerates in their own right. While government patronage guaranteed the 
prosperity of some companies within those groups, such as United Engineers, many 
others, notably those in the Fleet Group were burdened with heavy debt. At the same 
time the extent of UMNO's involvement in the corporate sector had attracted considerable 
public criticism. With the approach of national elections and UMNO's need for funds, the 
resolution of these problems assumed a greater urgency. It was against such a 
background that a massive restructuring of UMNO's corporate assets was undertaken.
Restructuring UMNO's Corporate Assets: The Renong Takeover
On 30 April 1990, a relatively unknown publicly-listed property company called Renong 
Bhd, 37 announced that it had entered into arrangements to purchase the entire equity of 
Fleet Group Sdn. Bhd. and Hatibudi Nominees Sdn. Bhd. as well as a 2 per cent stake in 
UEM, for $1.23 billion, in one of the largest takeovers in Malaysia's corporate history 
(FEER, 17:5:1990). The restructuring of Renong was essentially a reverse takeover 
through share-swapping. Renong bought the entire equity of the Fleet Group from its 
holding company, Fleet Holdings, for $794.92 million and the entire equity of Hatibudi 
Nominees from Halim Saad (90 per cent), Anuar Othman (5 per cent) and Zulkafli 
Hussein (5 per cent) for $244.90 million.
The reverse takeover gave Renong effective control of eight publicly-listed companies 
as well as unlisted subsidiaries. Following the takeover, Fleet sold 439.7 million new
year contract which was not due to expire until February 1992, was not expected to complete her 
term (MB, 1:4:1991). She has since rejoined UMNO.
36 (MB, 1:4:1991). Reasons given for the presumed close association between the Finance Minister, 
Anwar Ibrahim, and the new board at Idris were largely circumstantial. Both owners of Tanjung 
Layang, Ishak Ismail and Datuk Abdul Aziz Mohamed, were Penang businessmen and supporters of 
UMNO. Ishak was formerly secretary to the party's Permatang Pauh division which is headed by the 
Finance Minister (MB, 1:4:1991).
3 7 For background on Renong see Gomez, 1994:117.
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Renong shares at a dollar each to the company's shareholders which generated about 
$440 million in cash for the party (FEER, 17:5:1990). The restructuring brought under 
one corporate roof some of the most important publicly-listed companies in Malaysia 
including-UEM, Hume Industries, Time Engineering, Cement Industries of Malaysia 
(CIMA), Kinta Kellas, The New Straits Times Press (NSTP), Bank of Commerce and 
Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd or TV 3. At the conclusion of the restructuring exercise 
the three major shareholders in Renong were, Fleet Holdings (28.5 per cent), Halim Saad 
(17.7 per cent) and Pacific Fleet Sdn Bhd (6 per cent). The total holdings of those three 
shareholders, all of whom were related to UMNO interests, amounted to 52.2 per cent, 
enough to control Renong and through it all key companies in the group (MB, 
16:5:1990).
Figure 5.1: The Takeover of Renong
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Source: MB, 16:5:1991
After the initial consolidation of UMNO's assets under Renong in April 1990 a 
further restructuring took place in February 1991. Through that restructuring Renong 
increased its stakes in UEM and TV3, the two companies which were expected to 
contribute most to Renong's profits.38
3 8 Renong, which had a 20 per cent stake and a 9 per cent indirect stake in UEM increased its direct 
shareholdings to nearly 33 per cent by acquiring the 30.5 per cent stake of Time Engineering in the 
company for $675 million or $4.50 per share. Renong also acquired a 43 per cent stake in TV 3 for 
$152 million from New Straits Times (NST), a subsidiary of Fleet Group (FEER, 14:2:1991).
Figure 5:2
Renongs Bhd's Corporate Structure: Before the Deals 
Reasons for the Renong Takeover
Figure 5.3:
Renong Bhd's Corporate Structure: After the Deals
lu lle d  C o m p iw c i
Source: MB, 16: 2:1991
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In addition the Faber Group, a hotel company which had been left out of the initial 
deal because of heavy debts, was also brought under Renong's control.39 Faber also 
acquired a 50 per cent interest in Projek Lebuhraya Utara-Selatan (PLUS) for $1 
billion.40 Basically, according to Malaysian Business (16:2:1991), the purpose o f the 
subsequent restructuring of Renong was to maximise benefits from the more profitable 
components within the group, such as United Engineers and TV3. At the same time, the 
revitalistion and acquisition of the Faber Group indicated future plans by UMNO to make 
the company the cornerstone of a lucrative property group within Renong.
As indicated earlier, the restructuring of UMNO's corporate investments assumed 
greater urgency with the approach of expected national elections and the consequent need 
to bolster the party's coffers.41 More specifically, however, the reverse takeover of 
UMNO's corporate investments by Renong appears to have been directed at resolving the 
financial problems of the party's main corporate flagship, Fleet Holdings.42
As of October 1989, Fleet Groups total debt amounted to $310.4 million, worse than 
previous disclosures had suggested (AWSJ, 23:8:1990). But the financial plight o f the 
Fleet Group was only part of UMNO's financial problems. The party owed $450-$500 
million in bank loans and interest payments for the Putra World Trade Centre43 and
39 The Faber Group had debts estimated to be between $220-$300 million at the time of the Renong 
takeover in April 1990 (FEER, 14:2:1991). In June 1990, Halim Saad was appointed as Faber's chief 
executive officer. The appointment of Halim, one of the principal overseers of UMNO's corporate 
assets, underlined the party’s determination to resolve Faber's financial problems. On 6 September 
1990 Fleet Holdings, Faber's largest shareholder, initiated a capital reconstruction plan for the 
company which included Fleet Holdings injecting $222 into Faber, a step which largely settled 
Faber's debt. For details of other measures taken to reduce Faber’s debt see: FEER (14:9:1990) and 
(20:9:1990) and also Gomez (1991:17-22).
40 Renong's sale of PLUS to Faber was generally seen as part of UMNO's plans to strengthen the Faber 
Group or property wing of its assets. PLUS' access to steady income through its management of the 
North-South highway project, provided the Faber Group with a firm financial base (MB, 16:2:1991). 
A possible quid pro quo for PLUS appeared to be that its acquisition by Faber also enabled the 
contractor to gain an indirect listing. PLUS could not list directly on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange because it lacked the requisite five-year track record (PEER, 14:2:1991).
41 Dr K S Jomo, an economist at the University of Malaya, conservatively estimated that the ruling 
coalition headed by UMNO would spend an average of $2 million per parliamentary constituency or 
$360 million. Other estimates put the coalitions campaign expenditure as high as $1.5 billion 
(FEER, 5:7:1990).
42 A Fleet Group director confirmed that at least 75 per cent of the $440 million raised by the Renong 
takeover would be used for that purpose (Gomez, 1991:18).
4 3 According to a Reuter report, arreas in repayments for the party's 40-story headquarters building at the 
Putra World Trade Centre had reached $600 million from accumulated interest over the period 1989 to
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apparently an additional $100 or more in loans issued to various sections of the party. 
UMNO's total debt therefore appeared to be closer to $1 billion or about twice the 
previous estimates of approximately $500 million (AWSJ, 23:8:1990) and (FEER, 
17:5:1990). The $440 million raised in the course of the Renong takeover was sufficient 
to cover the Fleet Group's own debt, but fell far short of erasing UMNO's total debt. 
Nevertheless, action to restructure UMNO's corporate holdings had become imperative 
as the party was increasingly pressed to pay at least a significant portion of its debt, 
though most notably that arising from overseas loans obtained by the Fleet Group.44
In addition to financial considerations, the centralisation of most of UMNO's assets 
in one corporate entity also presented political and managerial advantages for the party. 
Criticism of UMNO's growing involvement in the corporate sector and, in particular 
allegations that some, notably Finance Minister and party treasurer, Daim Zainuddin, had 
personally gained in the process, were expected to resurface in the forthcoming 1990 
general election. In the wake of the 1987 UMNO split, Marina Yusof and other Semangat 
46 leaders had also blamed Daim for the massive debts accumulated by Fleet Holdings.
So, besides resolving the debt associated with Fleet, the consolidation of UMNO's 
corporate assets under Renong also provided a pretext for party officials, Daim in 
particular, to claim that the party was 'out of business.'45 In that regard Daim argued that 
since the party's assets had been taken over by the official assignee - after UMNO was 
declared illegal in February 1988 - he was no longer responsible for UMNO's business 
operations. He further contended that, with the restructuring of UMNO's assets in 
Renong, the party's former links with various business groups had been severed, and it 
therefore no longer played a role in Malaysia's corporate sector.46
1994. Reuter, Kuala Lumpur, 16:8:1994 ('Malaysia: Mahathir's party could have more debts than 
assets').
44 According to the AWSJ (23:8:1990), a loan of $50 million Swiss francs (approximately $92 million 
Malaysian dollars) issued by an overseas branch of Bank Bumiputra in 1985 was to be fully repaid by 
July 1990. Most of Fleet Group's debt of $310.4 million was owed to state-controlled Bank 
Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd and Malayan Banking Bhd.
45 MB, 1:8:1990 (Malaysian Business, 'Interview with Daim Zainuddin').
46 Daim claimed that, 'since all UMNO's assets were vested with the Official Assignee, the new UMNO 
has nothing now'., hence .. 'the assets question (should) be addressed to the Official Assignee, not to 
me. As far as I'm concerned a burden has been lifted from m e.'... In addition, Daim maintained that 
the Renong deal effectively 'put us {UMNO} out of business.' See MB, 1:8:1990 (Malaysian 
Business, 'Interview with Daim Zainuddin').
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Legal technicalities aside, Daim's argument was hardly convincing as the senior 
executives that soon emerged in Renong, most notably Halim Saad and Anuar Othman, 
were the same executives who had played key roles in the growth of UMNO's corporate 
investments in the eighties and were directors of most of the companies that had come 
under the party's control.47 The role played by Halim Saad as one of UMNO's principal 
'proxies' in the corporate sector is discussed in the next chapter, suffice to note here 
however that with the consolidation of UMNO's assets under Renong, Halim emerged as 
the principal owner of the company. Such a concentration of assets and ownership not 
only facilitated more effective control of the party's investments, but also enabled some 
of its high profile proxies to shed ties with a number of UMNO-controlled companies and 
so deflect criticism that they were holding too many top positions in the party's corporate 
empire. As a consequence, in January 1991 Halim Saad shed his concurrent posts as 
chief executive officer of four major UMNO-controlled companies: the New Straits 
Times Press (NSTP), United Engineers Malaysia (UEM), Projek Lebuhraya Utara- 
Selatan (PLUS), and the Faber Group (NST, 17:1:1991).
The Renong takeover also achieved another important goal for the UMNO leadership 
- it removed most of the party's assets from the hands of the Official Assignee. The role 
played by government officials in that exercise was never explained but Dr Mahathir's 
archrival, Tengku Razaleigh, in raising questions about the manner in which Fleet's 
assets were transferred from the Official Assignee's office established that Renong's 
financial advisers had bypassed the Official Assignee and talked directly with 
representatives of Fleet Holdings.48 In a number of other important respects apparently
47 Shortly after the takeover of Renong, Halim Saad replaced Dr Chan Chin Cheung as chairman of the 
company and Anuar Othman was also appointed a director (AWSJ, 28:5:1990). Halim Saad, it will 
be recalled was a director of both Hatibudi Nominees and Halimtan, and chairman of the Fleet Group 
and Pitisan Sdn Bhd. Anuar Othman was managing director of United Engineers, a director of both 
Hatibudi Nominees and the Fleet Group, and also a director of UMNO-linked Sungei Besi Mines 
(M'sia) Bhd. Halim Saad’s ’ownership' of Renong and its implications for his role as UMNO's 
principal proxy are discussed in chapter 6.
48 See FEER, 17:5:1990 and AWSJ, 23:8:1990. Lawyers close to UMNO claimed the transfer of Fleet 
Holdings to Renong, and the bypassing of the Official Assignee's Office was effected legally. 
However, a court order to effect the transfer was not attained nor was the transfer advertised by 
publication in the parliamentary gazette or in two newspapers as required by the Societies Act. 
Furthermore, neither was the Stock Exchange informed of the transfer even though there was a 
significant ownership change in public companies controlled by Fleet (FEER, 5:7:1990). UMNO 
officials, including the party treasurer, Daim Zainuddin, argued that the Official Assignee's Office was 
not acting as a receiver and thus did not need to file a public notification of transfer. This 'problem' 
was evidently overcome by separating the majority of Fleet's debts (held by the Fleet Group), from 
the actual ownership vehicle (Fleet Holdings) that was held by the Official Assignee. (FEER, 
5:7:1990).
137
little regard was paid to required procedures and regulations, indicating again the extent to 
which the party was able to use the levers of government to promote and protect its 
corporate interests.49
Summary
During the 1980 s the growth of UMNO's corporate investments meant that the party 
itself became a major vehicle through which a restructuring of ownership in the economy 
was effected. In that regard we saw how the appointment of Daim Zainuddin as director 
of Fleet Holdings in July 1982 marked a significant shift in the management of the 
party s assets from Razaleigh's 'incremental' approach to Daim’s extensive use of the 
stockmarket to quickly build a huge conglomerate. But Daim's approach was to mire the 
Fleet Group in debt and prompted the party leadership to look to Hatibudi, the controlling 
shareholder of UEM, to be the new vehicle for the party's corporate ambitions.
Figure 5:4: The Many Faces of UNMNO's Business Empire
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The 1987 UMNO split put that valuable asset temporarily out of reach until the various 
nominee companies, bound by loose alliances of crossholdings and directorships (to 
mask UMNO's involvement in business), were consolidated under one company, 
Renong Bhd. By the early 1990's Renong had emerged as one of the top three companies
49
As noted earlier, the same procedures and regulations were bypassed when Hatibudi, which controlled 
UEM, was transferred out of the Official Assignee's Office in June 1989 to a 'new' company 
controlled by the same shareholders, Hatibudi Nominees.
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on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and, with a market capitalisation of $6-7 billion, it 
ranked as one of Southeast Asia's largest conglomerates (FEER, 17:5:1990) and was a 
testament to the economic clout commanded by UMNO in Malaysia's corporate 
economy.
GOVERNMENT - PARTY RELATIONS AND THE GROWTH OF 
UMNO’s BUSINESS GROUPS
In the context of the NEP the relationship between the government and business became 
increasingly blurred as the Malay ownership and create Malay capitalists. The blurring of 
the relationship, or what Daim described as a 'commoness rather than a conflict of 
interests' (NST, 27:7:1984), facilitated the extraordinary growth of UMNO's corporate 
investments. But the symbiotic relationship between the government and the party also 
had a third dimension, that is a capacity to promote the growth of some Bumiputra 
business groups as well. So now the focus of this chapter moves to an examination of the 
various ways assets and business opportunities have been shifted from the state to the 
party and UMNO-related interests in the private sector.
Government 'assistance' to the expansion of UMNO companies
At the most basic level, the close relationship between government and party has 
facilitated easy access to credit and finance for UMNO. Obvious examples in that regard 
were the loans UMNO obtained from government-owned banks in the early eighties to 
finance construction of the party's headquarters building, notably a $200 million loan 
from Bank Bumiputra and $50 million from Malayan Banking (AWSJ, 9:10:1989). (As 
we saw earlier, most of the Fleet Group's debt of $310 million was owed to those two 
banks, the total outstanding loans having reached $600 million by 1994 due to 
accumulated interest50.)
In addition to ready finance from government-owned banks, UMNO has also been 
able to expand its business interests through preferential access to special Bumiputra 
share issues made by companies in order to restructure their equity in accordance with 
NEP guidelines. The way in which Fleet Group gained control of the hotel and property 
group, Faber Merlin, illustrates how the party benefitted from preferential access to
50 See AWSJ, 23:8:1990 and Reuters Report, 16:8:1994 ('Malaysia, Mahathir's party could have more 
debts than assets').
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special Bumiputra share issues and, at the same time, the dual roles often played by 
senior UMNO figures in terms of their government and party responsibilities.
The Faber Merlin Group was formerly owned by Chinese interests, primarily the late 
Chang Ming Thien, also the founder of the United Malayan Banking Corporation 
(UMBC). After Chang's death in 1982, Faber became an attractive proposition for 
takeover by a Bumiputra group - given its profitability at the time, its diverse interests, 
and lack of Malay equity. When, in May 1983, Faber Merlin made a special Bumiputra 
share issue which would bring Malay equity to 15 per cent, the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry directed that the entire issue be given to the Fleet Group (BT, 1:11:1983). A few 
months later, in October 1983, Fleet increased its stake in Faber Merlin to 23.6 per cent 
and became the largest single shareholder in the group (NST, 18:10:1983). Concerning 
Fleet's takeover of Faber Merlin, Fleet Group chairman Mohd. Desa Pachi later admitted 
that, 'the Fleet strategy to control Faber Merlin was by obtaining the special share issue 
which was known to be going to be issued by Faber Merlin.' (NST, 23:4:1987). 
However as Gomez has pointed out, 'since it was the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
which instructed Faber Merlin to allocate all its special Bumiputra issue to Fleet Group, 
this would suggest that there had been "close rapport" between the officials of Fleet and 
the Ministry which was then headed by Tengku Ahmad Rithaudeen, an UMNO vice- 
president’51 (Gomez, 1990:80).
A more important aspect of the government-party relationship which has facilitated 
UMNO's business activities was the influence wielded by the party leadership over 
appointments to key institutions and agencies charged with the implementation of the 
restructuring goals of the NEP in the corporate sector. Confidence that such departments 
and agencies as the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), Bank Negara, the Capital 
Issues Committee (CIC), the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) would facilitate 
UMNO's corporate ambitions, gave the party a decided advantage against other 
competitors, particularly in the stockmarket. So whenever UMNO-linked public 
companies such as New Straits Times Press, United Engineers or Aokam, sought to 
acquire assets through share swaps, the high premiums generally attached to the shares of 
those companies were in large part predicated on market confidence that such deals would
5 1 Another noteworthy aspect to the acquisition of Faber Merlin by Fleet was the dual role played by 
Daim, as private entrepreneur with a personal stake in Faber Merlin and overseer of the party's 
interests as director of Fleet Holdings. Daim's capacity to profit from mixing his private and party 
interests in this manner was feature of the allegations made by Marina Yusof at the height of the 
UMNO split in 1987 and are examined in chapter 5 ('Daim and the Fleet Group').
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be supported by the various regulatory agencies concerned. This factor, together with the 
blurring of govemment/party interests, also seems to have enabled UMNO to ignore the 
spirit, if not the letter, of government procedures and regulations when they posed 
obstacles to the promotion or protection of its corporate interests.
We have seen how, contrary to required procedures, UMNO apparently had little 
difficulty circumventing the government's Official Assignee in its bid to regain control of 
such valuable party assets as United Engineers and Fleet Holdings. Similarly, Fleet was 
apparently able to ignore requirements of the central bank, Bank Negara, as to the size of 
its shareholding in a financial institution. Under amendments to the Banking Act, which 
came into effect in January 1986, corporate shareholders were limited to a maximum 20 
per cent stake in a financial institution. Yet in July 1986 the Fleet Group obtained 100 per 
cent control of the Bank of Commerce, formerly a Chinese family bank incorporated 
under the name Bian Chiang Bank in Kuching, Sarawak (BT, 1:7:1986). When 
questioned in Parliament as to why Bank Negara permitted Fleet to buy the entire 100 per 
cent shareholding in Bank of Commerce, then Deputy Finance Minister, Datuk 
Sabbaruddin Chik, replied that any acquisition of equity by corporations before 
amendments to the Banking Act came into force were exempt from the limitations (NST, 
29:10:1986). Although the Fleet Group was a major shareholder before the limitations 
took effect, the group was still required by the Act to reduce its stake in Bank of 
Commerce to 51 per cent within two years. It failed to do so, indicating some partiality in 
the government's enforcement of regulations concerning ownership in the banking 
system, at least where UMNO’s interests are concerned52.
The Government's Privatisation Program: UMNO as a Beneficiary
Various forms of privatisation have been employed in Malaysia to transfer assets or 
business opportunities from the government sector to UMNO. The most obvious was the 
privatisation of public works and attendant construction projects and the granting of those 
services or contracts to UMNO-related companies. The controversial $3.4 billion North- 
South highway contract awarded to Hatibudi-controlled United Engineers was the most 
notable example of such 'privatisation'. The manner by which that contract was awarded,
52 By October 1989, almost three years after the amendments to the Banking Act came into effect 
limiting limiting ownership by corporate shareholders in a financial institution to 20 per cent, the 
Fleet Group still retained a 59 per cent stake in the bank (KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook, Vol 
XV:664). For an account of the changes that have occurred in the structure and ownership of BOC see 
Gomez (1990:68-69) and (1994:76-80).
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and the benefits it bestowed on UMNO in terms of wealth and patronage, clearly showed 
the often incestuous nature of the relationship between the government and the party.
It will be recalled that although UMNO-owned Hatibudi gained control of UEM in 
March 1985, the Minister for Works, Datuk Sarny Vellu, did not publicly acknowledge 
UMNO's links with UEM until July 1987. In the interim, the close political ties between 
the company and the government gave UEM a considerable headstart in preparing its bid 
for the highway contract. Reports later revealed that on 14 August 1985, the chief 
executive officer of United Engineers, Halim Saad, wrote to the Prime Minister, Dr 
Mahathir, forwarding the company's proposal on the privatisation of the highway 
project53 (Lim Kit Siang, 1987:11). Cabinet discussed the proposal in August or 
September 1985 (AWSJ, 18:1:1988). On 27 December 1985 United Engineers paid 
$26,030 to the Malaysian Highway Authority for documentation and plans for the 
highway project yet public tenders for the contract were not called until 4 April 1986 (Lim 
Kit Siang, 1987:11). In addition, applicants were required to submit their tenders by 2 
July 1986. So while United Engineers had almost 12 months to work on its proposal 
other competitors had less than 3 months to work on theirs.
Controversy over the project grew further when the DAP revealed that two other 
companies, Pilecon and Syarikat Hashbuddin, had produced more competitive proposals 
than United Engineers. In addition, it was found that United Engineers had never built a 
major road or bridge and that the company was insolvent (The Star, 1:8:1987). In August 
1987 the Leader of the Opposition, Lim Kit Siang, filed a legal suit in which he charged 
that the proposed award of the highway contract to United Engineers was unlawful and 
tainted by conflict of interest involving senior government officials who were also 
UMNO leaders. But the case only delayed matters, for on 15 July 1988 Malaysia's 
Supreme Court dismissed the challenge, thereby clearing the way for the government to 
grant the $3.24 billion highway contract to United Engineers (AWSJ, 18:1:1988).
In response to charges of 'conflict of interest', government spokesmen, notably 
Works Minister Sarny Vellu, countered that Cabinet had not been involved in the decision 
to award the contract to United Engineers (NST, 11:7:1987). It seems that Daim insisted 
that the matter not be decided by the Cabinet but within the Ministry of Works and that
53 Apparently the plan to privatise the highway project originated with United Engineers which initially 
hoped to be awarded the contract without even having to go through the motions of a competitive 
bidding process (AWSJ, 18:1:1988).
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Ministry officials make the 'right decision' in favour of United Engineers54. Apparently 
the quid pro quo was a payoff to the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), the ethnic Indian 
component of the government headed by Works Minister, Sarny Vellu. On 29 December 
1986, ten days after the Public Works Ministry gave United Engineers the Letter of 
Intent, an official of the MIC wrote to Halim Saad, the Chief Executive Officer of United 
Engineers, and requested the company purchase $290,000 worth of lottery tickets from 
an MIC-sponsored Institute (AWSJ, 18:1:1988). Later, Halim Saad, in an affidavit to the 
Supreme Court responding to the legal suit brought against United Engineers by Lim Kit 
Siang, acknowledged that the company had indeed purchased $250,000 of MIC lottery 
tickets but claimed, somewhat disingenuosly, that the purchase "wasn't in any way 
connected with the award of the contract" (AWSJ, 18:1:1988).
The close relationship between the government and the party was not only evident in 
the manner by which the North-South highway contract was awarded to UMNO- 
controlled Hatibudi, but also the extraordinarily generous terms of the contract. The 
contract provided large government loans to United Engineers, a toll collection 
concession along the highway for 25-30 years, allegedly worth $54 billion (Lim Kit 
Siang, 1987:111) and a government guarantee of minimum traffic volume for a 
substantial portion of the life of the concession (AWSJ, 1:18:1988). Such generous 
government support not only protected United Engineer's profits but also shifted much of 
the costs and risks of privatisation to the government.
Besides the North-South highway contract, United Engineers Malaysia (UEM), was 
awarded a string of highly profitable contracts for services the sum of which generated a 
huge source of funds for the party. The most notable included:
• (1985) a $250 million contract to design a national sports complex (BT, 
24:12:1985).
• (1987) UEM was part of a consortium that was awarded the $47.5 million 
Peninsular Gas Utilisation managment consultancy project in Trengganu (Lim 
Kit Siang, 1987:v).
• (1990) the privatisation contract for the highly profitable chain of pharmaceutical 
outlets operated by the Malaysian Governments Health Ministry (FEER, 
20:12:1990).
54 Interview October 1987. Source close to the Ministry of Works.
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• (1990) the contract to construct the $1 billion second causeway between Malaysia
and Singapore (FEER, 20:12:1990).
Another form of privatisation is to issue licences to allow private companies to 
provide services previously monopolised by the government. This form of privatisation 
has provided another avenue by which the close govemment/party relationship has 
facilitated the development of UMNO's business interests. An example of such 
'privatisation' was the award by the government in August 1983, of a licence to operate 
the country's first private television network, Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd (STMB) 
or TV3, to the UMNO-owned Fleet Group55.
Almost from its inception TV3 has been a highly lucrative business, its pre-tax profit 
rising rapidly from $2.16 million in 1985 to $31.6 million in 1990 (KLSE, Vol 
XV: 1990:534) and (NST, 31:12:1990). The initial shareholders of TV 3 were Fleet 
Group (40 per cent), Utusan Melayu (20 per cent), Syed Kechik Foundation (20 per 
cent), Maika Holdings (10 per cent) and Daim Zainuddin (10 per cent) (AWSJ, 
8:5:1991). Fleet Group won the television licence in competition against a foundation 
controlled by the then wealthy Bumiputra enterpreneur Syed Kechik Syed Mohamed 
(AWSJ, 21:9:1983). The ownership of TV 3 was noteworthy for the combination of 
party and private interests involved - those of Fleet and the private family companies of 
Daim Zainuddin, which collectively held 50 per cent of the company.56 The fact that 
Daim was chairman of the Fleet Group when TV 3 was set up meant that he was able to 
combine the interests of the party with those of his private companies in a highly lucrative 
business.
5 5 Besides obtaining the licence to operate Malaysia's first private TV channel, the Fleet Group also 
later obtained the rights to service users of Malaysia's new mobile telephone system. Apparently 
Fleet 'cajoled' government-owned Telecom Malaysia to create a new company to service that rapidly 
expanding and most profitable aspect of telecommunications services (FEER, 20:12:1990). In 1988 a 
joint-venture company called STM Cellular Communications Sdn Bhd (Celcom) was incorporated in 
which Fleet Communications held a 49 per cent stake while government-owned Syarikat Telecom  
Malaysia Bhd (STM) held the remaining 51 per cent equity (Gomez, 1990:97). Later this valuable 
asset was reshuffled within UMNO's own corporate empire when, in April 1990, Time Engineering 
bought Fleet Communications' stake in Celcom from the Fleet Group for $81 million. Both Fleet 
and Time Engineering were UMNO-linked companies which were later incorporated within the party's 
magaconglomerate, Renong Bhd. Time’s chairman, Datuk Mohd Desa Pachi, was also a director of 
Celcom and the Fleet Group (AWSJ, 19:4:1990).
56 Daim's interests were held through two family companies, Daan (5 per cent) and Dani (5 per cent). 
Gomez (1990:73).
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Fleet's later sale of the TV3 licence to another UMNO subsidiary, Pitisan Sdn Bhd),, 
and to Bumiputra interests in the private sector, Malayan Cables, as well as TV 3's own 
disparate acquisitions, notably including the food retailer Cold Storage, also provided 
fascinating insights as to how the enmeshing of interests between UMNO and UMNO- 
connected individuals in the private sector can assist the growth of both. Particularly 
pertinent in that regard was the lucrative licence a private Bumiputra company, Malayan 
Cables, received from the government to operate payphones and its apparent willingness 
in return to pay an inflated price to the Fleet Group for the 20 per cent stake it held in 
TV3.57
Government/Party/Private Sector Relations - 
Interlocking directorships and the transfer of assets
The use of common directorships between companies controlled by the party and 
publicly-listed companies controlled by the government has been another mechanism 
used to effect a shift of assets from the government sector to the party or UMNO-related 
Bumiputra business groups in the private sector. This may be illustrated by examining 
how a number of publicly-listed former tin mining companies were separated from the 
government-owned Malaysia Mining Corporation (MMC) and, via a web of minority 
shareholdings and common or sympathetic directors, later became the core of the 
UMNO-controlled conglomerate, Halimtan, whose activities embraced gambling, gold 
mining, manufacturing, food retailing and Financial services.
57 Fleet Group sold its stake in TV3 to Pitisan Sdn Bhd, and Malayan Cables in 1987. Fleet made a 
total of $38.75 million from the sale but $27.5 million of that came from the higher price Fleet 
charged Malayan Cables for its TV3 shares perhaps, as was noted at the time, as a quid pro quo for 
past favours (BT{S'pore} 23:7: 1987).
In July 1987 Fleet charged Malayan Cables $5.50 per share for the remaining 20 per cent stake Fleet 
held in TV3 whereas two months earlier in May 1987 Pitisan paid Fleet $4.50 per TV3 share for a 
10 per cent stake, the same price it paid the Syed Kechik Foundation and Nabila Sdn Bhd for their 
interest in TV3, that is 20 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. Pitisan paid only $4 per share to 
Utusan Melayu which also had a 10 per cent stake in TV3 (BT(S'pore) 23:7:1987) and (NST, 
8:5:1987).
Malayan Cables, which changed its name in January 1988 to Uniphone Telecommunications Bhd is 
owned by Sapura Holdings, controlled by Shamsuddin Kadir, formerly a director of Permodalan 
Bersatu Bhd (PBB), the holding company of UMNO's cooperative, Koperasi Usaha Beraatu (KUB). 
Malayan Cables had made large profits as the only company to receive a government licence to 
operate payphones (1975-1990) and, along with three other Bumiputra companies, shared in 1983 a 
highly controversial $2.5 billion cable laying contract from the government. The development of 
Sapura Holdings is examined in chapter 7.
The Cold Storage shares can be traced ultimately to Daim Zainuddin. An account of the movement 
of those shares between various UMNO-related companies illustrates the extent to which party and 
private Malay interests are often inextricably enmeshed in the corporate sector.
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In June 1986 MMC, together with its subsidiary Tronoh Mines, sold its entire 42.9 
per cent interest in Aokam Tin Bhd to a then unknown company called Halimtan Sdn 
Bhd. The sale went through despite vociferous objections from minority shareholders 
that Aokam Tin was being sold for half its market value (FEER, 6:10:1988). In order to 
understand the relationship between government-owned MMC and Halimtan it is 
necessary to give some background regarding the principal figures involved in both and 
their linkages with UMNO.
When MMC sold Aokam to Halimtan, the directors of MMC included Mohd Desa 
Pachi and Zain Azahari bin Zainal Abidin. Desa Pachi had been appointed by Daim as a 
director of UMNO's Fleet Holdings, and was chairman of many of the publicly-listed 
companies within the Fleet Group. He also sat on the board of some of Daim's family 
companies and had been a director of government-owned PNB, the major shareholder in 
MMC. Zain Azahari had been appointed chairman of the United Malayan Banking 
Corporation (UMBC) when Daim had control of the bank and had been appointed a 
trustee of Daim's considerable private business investments. Halimtan Sdn Bhd, the 
company to which MMC sold its interest in Aokam Tin, was founded in part by Halim 
Saad on 17 August 198258. Halim Saad, it will be recalled, acted as an important proxy 
overseeing the growth of UMNO's business investments during the eighties. Some of his 
most important appointments in that regard included his position as director of Hatibudi 
and chairman of the Fleet Group and Pitisan.59 He was replaced as a director of 
Halimtan60 in December 1986 by Datuk Mohamed Rahmat, then Minister of Information 
and UMNO Secretary General.
On 29 October 1986, Halimtan made a takeover bid for the remaining shares in 
Aokam held by MMC's subsidiaries Tronoh Mines and Ayer Hitam Tin Dredging Bhd. 
The bid prompted a mandatory general offer61 which was accepted by the subsidiaries 
concerned, again indicating that government-owned shares were being directed to 
UMNO-controlled Halimtan (Gomez, 1990:119). Tunku Abdullah, a member of the
58 Halimtan was founded by Halim Saad and Daniel Tan See San. Daniel Tan's brother, Vincent Tan 
See Yin was a close associate of Tunku Abdullah's Melewar group (FEER, 6:10:1988).
59 Until January 1991 Halim Saad was also director of United Engineers, Projek Leburaya Utara Selatan 
and the Faber Group (NST, 17:1:1991).
60 In March 1988 Halimtan was renamed Waspavest Sdn Bhd.
61 Malaysian regulations make it mandatory for a firm on the threshold of acquiring 33 per cent 
ownership of a publicly-listed company to make a general offer for the remaining shares of that 
company.
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Negri Sembilan royal family, was appointed chairman of Aokam. He was a close 
personal friend and one-time business associate of the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir. 
Other board members included Shah bin Abu Mansor (managing director and a director 
of Halimtan), Tunku Iskandar, Tunku Abdullah's son, and Mohd Asri bin Abdul Ghafar, 
a son of the Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba (BT, 27:10:1986).
Aokam ceased all tin mining operations in April 1986 and, after its takeover by 
Halimtan, was turned into an investment holding company. In 1987 Halimtan, using 
Aokam as its vehicle, acquired significant interests in a string of publicly-listed 
companies including Cold Storage (M'sia), Roxy Electric Industries (M'sia) Bhd, D & C 
Bank and Granite Industries Bhd.62 The stakes purchased in Cold Storage were from 
Pradaz, a family company belonging to Daim Zainuddin (NST, 11:11:1986). Daim also 
had a stake in Roxy, and his protege and founder of Halimtan, Halim Saad was on the 
board of directors of both Cold Storage and Roxy. Aokam also bought a significant stake 
in Malaysian Assurance Alliance (MAA). Tunku Abdullah, the chairman of Aokam, 
controlled the Melewar Group which was the ultimate holding company of MAA (BT, 
9:3:1987). Later MAA bought a parallel stake in Aokam (FEER, 19:4:1990). The 
significance of those acquisitions was again the apparent enmeshing of interests between 
UMNO and UMNO-connected individuals in the private sector. In other words, it was 
difficult to determine the extent to which the key figures in Halimtan, most notably Tunku 
Abdullah, were acting for UMNO, or using their ties with UMNO to benefit personally 
as directors of publicly-listed companies.
Besides Aokam Tin, other companies were also separated from government-owned 
MMC and, via a web of common directors and minority shareholdings, were drawn into 
UMNO-controlled Halimtan. In February 1987, MMC/Tronoh divested its controlling 
31.3 per cent stake in Ayer Hitam Tin Dredging to a private company called Sendarta Sdn 
Bhd, 63 the main director of which, until his appointment as Information Minister, was 
UMNO Secretary-General, Datuk Mohamed Rahmat (FEER, 6:10:1988). Mohamed
62 In June 1987, Aokam acquired a 5.2 per cent stake in Granite Industries Bhd, and in July a 32.5 per 
cent stake in Cold Storage (Malaysia) Bhd; 20 per cent of Malaysian Assurance Alliance (MAA) and 
14.7 per cent of Roxy Electric Industries (Malaysia) Bhd. The shareholding in Cold Storage was 
subsequently reduced to 22.5 per cent. See BT{S'pore, 11:11:1986, NST, 9:3:1987 and 20:7: 1987, 
BT, 20:6:1987 and KLSE Annual Companies Handbook, Vol X1V:38.
63 Sendarta Sdn Bhd was incorporated on 15 February 1986 (FEER, 6:10:1988). It was a holding 
company which was 19.5 per cent owned by Visia Nominees. The owners of Visia Nominees were 
unknown (FEER, 19:4:1990). As of 31 October 1989 the 31.4 per cent contolling stake held by 
Sendarta in Ayer Hitam was held indirectly by Dr Abdul Razak bin Abdul who was also a director of 
Ayer Hitam (KLSE,Vol XV:886).
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Rahmat was then also a director of Aokam Tin and, as noted earlier, also a director of 
Halimtan.64 The links with UMNO were extended from Sendarta to Ayer Hitam through 
Datuk Mohd Noor Mohd Dom, the chairman of Ayer Hitam, who was also a member of 
the UMNO Supreme Council (KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XV:886) and 
(FEER, 19:4:1990).
Soon after its disposal by MMC, Ayer Hitam embarked on a series of acquisitions 
which bore some startling similarities with those of Aokam, that is they involved 
companies in which Daim also held stakes, most notably Cold Storage and Roxy. The 
passage of Cold Storage Malaysia Bhd (CSM) through various UMNO-related 
companies also illustrates well the extrordinary meshing at some points of 'party' and 
'private' Bumiputra business interests.
In 1984, a 32.5 per cent stake in Cold Storage (CSM), a manufacturer and distributor 
of food products, was sold to a Bumiputra company Pradaz, as part of an exercise to 
allow CSM to comply with bumiputra-ownership provisions of the NEP. As indicated 
earlier, Pradaz was a family company owned by Daim Zainuddin. Shortly after that 
acquisition Daim was appointed as a minister and, as such, was required by a cabinet 
directive to divest his shareholdings. In November 1986 Pradaz' 32.5 per cent stake in 
CSM was bought by UMNO-controlled Halimtan through Aokam Tin in a deal which 
valued CSM at $3.80 a share and Aokam at $1.90 a share (FEER, 6:10:1988). Less than 
a year later Ayer Hitam acquired Aokam's 10 per cent stake in CSM and 14 million 
shares in Aokam itself. The price it paid in cash for the CSM stake was 88 per cent above 
market value (FEER, 6:10:1988). In September 1988 those same CSM shares were sold 
again to another UMNO company, The New Straits Times Press (NSTP), for a profit of 
$3 million!65 (Ayer Hitam also purchased a stake in Roxy.) At the same time, Sistem 
Televisyen Malaysia Bhd (STMB) or TV3 entered into agreements with Aokam to 
purchase Aokam's 22 per cent stake in Cold Storage though these were later abrogated.66 
(Desa Pachi was chairman of TV3, chief executive officer of NSTP, and director of Fleet 
Holdings.) In other words, the Cold Storage shares originally bought by Daim, whether
64 On 30 June 1988, Mohamed Rahmat was replaced as a director of Halimtan by Shah bin Abu 
Mansor who also became the companies main shareholder.
65 According to Malaysian Business, Ayer Hitam paid $17.8 million for its 10 per cent stake in Cold 
Storage in 1987 but sold it in late 1988 for $26.7 million which resulted in a gain of $3 million 
after accounting for money paid for Cold Strorage's rights issue subsequent to the purchase (MB, 
1:6:1989).
66 See KLSE Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XV:534.
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on his own behalf or for UMNO, were, to use Seaward's terminology, 'being shuffled 
from one (UMNO) safe haven to another' (FEER, 6:10:1988). More importantly, since 
those 'safe havens' were publicly-listed and cash-rich companies, initially Aokam and 
Ayer Hitam, and later NSTP, UMNO and presumably certain 'private' interests (Daim), 
profited in the course of those sales.
Two other companies were also separated from government-owned MMC in the 
eighties, notably Kampung Lanjat Tin Dredging Bhd (in April 1987) and The Sungei 
Besi Mines Malaysia Bhd (in June 1989). Both were also rapidly incorporated into 
UMNO-controlled or related conglomerates in much the same fashion as were Aokam 
and Ayer Hitam. Again, as publicly-listed companies, both were used to raise money for 
the expansion of their respective groups. Kampung Lanjat was drawn into the Halimtan 
network when, on 13 April 1988, Aokam acquired a 10 per cent stake in the company. 
Thus Halimtan, Sendarta, Aokam and Ayer Hitam were all linked through cross-holdings 
and interlocking directorships as indicated in Figure 5.5. By the early 1990's companies 
such as Aokam, Roxy, renamed Technology Resources (TRI), and Cold Storage had 
separated from the Halimtan network of companies67 and constituted the nuclei of new 
Bumiputra conglomerates headed by some of the leading members of the emerging 
private Bumiputra business elite.
The growth of the Halimtan conglomerate illustrates how through common or 
sympathetic directorships and a web of minority shareholdings, publicly-listed companies 
controlled by the government (MMC) were shifted from the state sector to the party. In 
concert with that shift of resources was an enmeshing of the corporate investments of the 
party with those of some Bumiputra groups in the private sector. A notable example was 
the interlocking directorships held by Tunku Abdullah - as head of UMNO-controlled 
Aokam (through Halimtan), and the cross-holdings between Aokam and Abullah's own 
company, the Melawar Corporation through Malaysian Assurance Alliance (MAA). 
Another was the extraordinary passage of Cold Storage shares, originally acquired by 
Daim, through Aokam, Ayer Hitam and New Straits Times Press - all UMNO-linked, 
and at the time, cash-rich companies. Although it was difficult to determine at what points 
the individuals concerned were acting for the party, or their private corporate interests, 
ultimately it appeared that both were served by the relationship.
67 For an account of developments within the Halimtan (later renamed Waspavest Sdn Bhd) network of 
companies in the early nineties see Gomez, 1994:105-116.
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Figure 5.5: Halimtan and Sendarta: Common Directors and Cross-ownership
circa 1988
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Conclusion
This chapter has shown the extent to which UMNO itself became a major corporate 
player in the 1980's and its role in expanding Malay ownership of the economy. Critical 
to that development was the merging of government and party interests in the context of 
the NEP which facilitated the growth of UMNO's business groups. That close, if not 
incestuous relationship was highlighted by the various mechanisms UMNO was able to 
employ to effect a shift of resources from the state sector to the party or UMNO-related 
interests in the private sector. Those mechanisms included assistance from government- 
owned banks and key regulatory agencies such as the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MTI), the FIC and the CIC. Special (Bumiputra) shares, issued by companies to 
restructure their equity in accordance with NEP guidelines, were another means by which 
UMNO was able to extend its corporate empire, as in the case of the Faber Merlin group 
in the early eighties. The Mahathir government's privatization program also facilitated a 
shift of resources (and patronage), from the state to the party, the North-South highway 
and TV3 prominent amongst a host of other examples. (With regard to the latter there also 
appeared to be a quid pro quo arrangement between party capital (Fleet), and private 
Malay capital (Malayan Cables), that was advantageous to both and showed the intimacy 
and mutual advantage inherent in the relationship between UMNO and some Bumiputra 
groups in the private sector.) Finally, the use of common directorships between 
companies controlled by the party and publicly-listed companies controlled by the 
government, was another way that assets and business opportunities were shifted from 
the government sector to the party or UMNO-related interests. This was well illustrated 
by the way in which the Halimtan network of companies grew into a large conglomerate. 
In its growth, the Halimtan conglomerate again highlighted the complementary 
relationship between 'party' and 'private' Malay capital. But what sort of capitalists has 
that relationship produced and what are its consequences for the development of Malay 
capitalism? These questions are matters for our next chapter.
Chapter 6
POLITICAL CAPITALISTS: RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTY 
CAPITAL AND PRIVATE MALAY CAPITAL
In our examination of how the government-party relationship facilitated the growth of 
UMNO's considerable corporate investments it was apparent that the business interests of 
the party, or 'party capital,' were often inextricably entwined with Malay interests in the 
private sector. In this chapter we shall focus on how the fusion between elements of party 
and private Malay capital has facilitated the growth of "political capitalists". As the term 
implies, political capitalists derive their wealth primarily through their association with 
UMNO.
Political capitalists may be divided into two broad groups. The first consists of 
politicians and others who, as a result of their political prestige or party connections, are 
able to project themselves into business through the purchase of land and timber 
concessions or by the acquisition of contracts and directorships. Some prominent 
examples of politicians-tumed-businessmen include the former Deputy Prime Minister, 
Ghafar Baba, Datuk Syed Kechik, Datuk Abdullah Ahmad, and the former Chief 
Ministers of Selangor and Sarawak, Dato' Harun Idris and Tan Sri Datuk Patinggi 
Rahman Yakub. A second group of political capitalists consists of those individuals 
whose entry to business was facilitated by their management of UMNO's corporate 
assets in the private sector. The most prominent individuals in this group of 'UMNO's 
proxy capitalists-tumed-businessmen' share a common background of having worked 
with the former Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin at Peremba, and include, besides 
Daim himself, Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, Mohd Razali Abdul Rahman, Halim Saad, 
Samsuddin Abu Hassan, Ahmad Sebi and Tajuddin Ramli. In the 1980's most members 
of this group, apart from Daim, were still in their thirties and many had qualified overseas 
as accountants.
While both groups of political capitalists become businessmen, the starting point of 
each is different. On the one hand the transition of politicians or former politicians to 
business is largely as a result of their own political standing or connections, while that of 
'UMNO's proxy capitalists' is due, at least initially, to their position as trustees of
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UMNO's corporate assets. Not only is the starting point of the two groups different but, 
as we shall see, so is their capacity to eventually emerge as successful businessmen in 
their own right. In the five case studies that follow we shall be concerned to show the 
different methods of capital accumulation associated with these two groups of political 
capitalists, and how differences in the relationship between politics and business also 
relate to the capacity of individuals in those two groups to move (or not) beyond the 
networks of political patronage that originally sponsored them. With these purposes in 
mind we shall now examine the corporate rise of two prominent politicians-turned- 
businessmen, former Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba, and the former 'strongman' of 
Sabah state, Syed Kechik.
POLITICIANS-TURNED-BUSINESSMEN
Abdul Ghafar Baba
Ghafar Baba's status as a senior UMNO politician was crucial to his rise in business.1 
Often characterised as 'a man for all seasons', Ghafar's political and business survival 
has, in large part, depended on his capacity to quickly side with the majority or winning 
faction in the fluid atmosphere of UMNO politics. As an UMNO vice-president since 
1962, Ghafar twice appeared poised to take the deputy presidency, and with it the 
position of Deputy Prime Minister, but both times was passed over.2 The second rebuff 
occurred after the death of Tun Razak in 1976, when Hussein Onn became Prime 
Minister and party president. Hussein chose Dr Mahathir as his deputy over Ghafar and 
Tengku Razaleigh, both of whom had outpolled Mahathir in the party's vice-presidential 
election the year before.3 Reportedly angered by Hussein's decision, Ghafar resigned 
from the cabinet and went into business. Nevertheless, he remained an MP and, more
1 A party veteran, Ghafar joined UMNO in 1951 and was appointed Chief Minister of Malacca in 
1959. He became the first chairman of MARA in 1967 and from 1971 to 1976 served as Minister of 
National and Regional Development.
2 When Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Ismail, died in 1974 the then Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, 
gave the deputy positions in the party and the government to another vice-president, his brother-in- 
law Dato' Hussein Onn.
3 It is generally believed that Hussein wanted to appoint Ghazali Shafie as Deputy Prime Minister, 
despite the fact that Ghazali had not succeeded in his attempts to win one of the three vice-presidential 
positions in the party. As rumours spread of Ghazali's possible ascension, the then three vice- 
presidents - Ghafar, Razaleigh and Mahathir - demanded that tradition be followed and the Prime 
Minister choose one of them as his deputy. See MB, 1:1:1987. Tengku Razaleigh corroborated this 
version of events in a biography by Ranjit Gill (1986:147).
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importantly, continued to serve as secretary-general of the ruling multi-party Barisan 
Nasional or National Front.
Ghafar acquired the necessary capital for business from large profits made from 
buying and selling land in Kuala Lumpur (MB, 1:1:1987). In December 1979 Ghafar, 
through a family company, Goodyield Plaza, bought a 41 per cent stake in Pegi Malaysia 
Bhd. for about $850,000. At the time Pegi was estimated to be worth $3.2 million but the 
company had been suspended from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (MB, 1:1:1987). 
Shortly after Ghafar acquired his stake in Pegi, the company was re-listed on the KLSE 
and its share price soared from $2.50 to $16 at the height of the then (1981), stock 
market boom. (As a member of the BMF Commitee of Enquiry observed, 'the right 
connections' can facilitate the re-listing of a suspended company and minimise the time 
taken to obtain the necessary approvals from the regulatory authorities concerned.)4 
Besides the 'right connections', the principal reason for the extraordinary rise in Pegi's 
stock was that in m id-1980 the company had started buying into the British 
manufacturing giant, Dunlop Holdings. By the early eighties most of Malaysia's 
resource-based industries had been wrested from foreign, mainly British, control. The 
few remaining London-based companies, such as Dunlop Holdings, were obvious 
targets for restructuring to accord with NEP guidelines. Dunlop had two major Malaysian 
subsidiaries, Dunlop Estates Bhd (DEB), a plantation company, and Dunlop Malaysian 
Industries Bhd (DMIB), a manufacturing firm.
By May 1982, Pegi had acquired 26 per cent of Dunlop making it the single largest 
shareholder in the multinational. Pegi's acquisition was applauded as a patriotic 
endeavour and Ghafar contended that the Dunlop purchase was 'dirt cheap' (MB, 
1:1:1987). Pegi bought most of its Dunlop shares for under 50 pence a share which 
valued the company at under $120 million when its world wide assets were estimated to 
be worth nearly $1 billion (Asiaweek, 9:3:1984). But it soon became apparent that while 
Dunlop had considerable assets, it also had huge debts (350 million pounds sterling). 
Moreover, in the midst of a recession in the tyre market in the early eighties, Dunlop's 
prospects were rapidly declining. In the circumstances, it was obvious that Pegi could not 
afford a fullscale bid for Dunlop, and did not have the resources to revive the debt-ridden 
conglomerate. In early 1986, after another company (BTR), one of the largest industrial 
concerns in Britain, took over Dunlop, Pegi gradually divested its holdings in the 
company (MB, 1:1:1987). Our principal concern here, however, is not with the details of
4 See Chooi 1987:12.
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Pegi's rather convoluted, and ultimately unsuccessful, attempts to acquire substantial 
stakes in Dunlop Holdings units in Malaysia, but rather how Ghafar's status as a senior 
UMNO politician and secretary-general of the Barisan assisted his move into business. 
The Pegi saga highlighted a number of issues in that regard.
First, it was apparent that Ghafar's considerable political status enabled him to 
borrow massive funds from local and foreign banks to finance his Dunlop bid which, in 
the context of the NEP, he was not adverse to painting as an exercise in the 'national 
interest' (NST: 1/7/82). In that regard he also received financial backing from Kompleks 
Kewangan, a subsidiary of MARA. Ghafar was Executive Chairman of Kompleks 
Kewangan which is a Bumiputra unit trust that invests Malay capital in the securities 
market. Its six subsidiary companies include a bank, the Amanah Chase Merchant Bank 
Bhd.5 (Ghafar relinquished his responsibilities for MARA when he resigned as Minister 
for Rural Development in 1976 but continued to hold the post of Executive Chairman of 
Kompleks.)6 Kompleks Kewangan was an early and substantial buyer of Dunlop shares 
for 'investment purposes' (FEER, 27:2:1981).
Ghafar’s political credentials were also important factors contributing to investor 
confidence and the extraordinary rise in the price of Pegi's shares. As the share price of 
that 'wonder counter' rose in August 1980, the directors of Goodyield Plaza, then 
ultimate owner of Pegi, reaped enormous profits. (During early 1980 Ghafar's fellow 
directors of Goodyield Plaza, Eng Chin Ah and Phoon Ah Lek, bought large blocks of 
Dunlop shares in their personal capacities.) When in August and September 1980 it was 
apparent that Pegi was making a bid for Dunlop, and Dunlop shares rose, Eng and Phoon 
sold their Dunlop shares to Goodyield Plaza.7 At the same time, while Pegi's shares and 
investments were rising in spectacular fashion, those of another related company,
5 The other subsidiary companies included Amanah Saham MARA Bhd, Amanah Saham MARA 
Nom inees, Malaysia Discount Bhd, Pelaburan Amanah Nasional and Amanah dan Arthur 
International Sdn Bhd Gale (1981:57).
6 See FEER, 27:5:1986 and Malaysia: Who’s Who 1983:93
7 Eng bought 3.27 million Dunlop shares between 13 February and 21 August 1980. He sold most of 
those shares between July and September 1980 when the market was at its peak and, according to 
Hugh Peyman, would have made between 465 and 620 thousand (pounds sterling) profit depending on 
whether he (Eng) made 15p or 20p profit per share. Phoon bought 1.71 million Dunlop shares 
between mid-March and the end of May 1980. In September, Phoon told the inspectors he had sold 
1.37 million shares which with judicious timing he could have made a profit o f approximately 275 
thousand pounds sterling. See FEER, 27:2:81.
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Goodyield Holdings, were concidentally falling by almost the same amount.8 Shortly 
afterwards, Pegi was named in a petition by disgruntled shareholders of Goodyield 
Holdings for an official investigation of the affairs of twelve Pegi-related companies, 
companies that were all connected by Ghafar's chairmanship; but nothing ever became of 
the proposed suit.9
In the course of his rise in the corporate world, Ghafar's business interests became 
inextricably entwined with those of his sons who sought to capitalise on their father's 
standing in UMNO to further their own political and business careers. Most notable in 
that regard was Mohd. Tamrin, who was an MP, an executive committee member of 
UMNO Youth, and a director of Talasco Insurance. (Talasco Insurance was a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of Idris Hydraulic, the ultimate owner of which was Koperasi Usaha 
Bersatu Bhd (KUB), an UMNO-owned company which, was also one of Pegi's 
principal bankers.)10 Besides Ghafar, two of his sons, Mohd. Asri and Mohd. Sofi, 
also became directors of Pegi.* 11 Apparently, in the course of Pegi's attempts to take over 
Dunlop (1980-83), father and sons all borrowed heavily against their holdings in the 
company. When Pegi's fortunes slumped, as the recession of the mid eighties deepened 
and the company's losses mounted, so too did the debts of its most notable directors12 
Throughout, Ghafar retained his status as an UMNO MP, and in 1984 also retained one 
of the three vice-presidential positions in the party. Developments in UMNO then thrust 
Ghafar into the national leadership, just as his business fortunes appeared on the verge of 
collapse.
In March 1986 Musa Hitam resigned from his cabinet post as deputy Prime Minister 
citing "irreconcilable differences" with Prime Minister Mahathir (MB, 1:1:1987).
8 Goodyield Plaza's investments rose 30-fold to over $10 million in one year (1980) while Goodyield 
Holdings decreased by the same amount (FEER, 10:4:81).
9 See BT, 1:7:1981 (Letter to the Editor, "Pegi Relisting" by Datin Peggy Taylor).
10 See KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook Vol XIV, 1988: 560.
11 When Ghafar resigned on 30 April 1986, Mohd. Asri replaced him as chairman of Pegi.
12 By March 1984 Pegi had made a huge loss of $59 million; its original investment ($110.4 million) 
was far in excess of the then market value of its shares, around $51 million (MB, 1:1:1987). Since 
1985 Pegi's losses continued to mount totalling $139.2 million by 1989. Pegi's progressive 
accumulation of debt occurred thus: 1985 ($47.5-) ;1986 ($42.7-) ; 1987 ($8.0-) ; 1988 ($11.4-) ; 
1989 ($29.3-) KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook (VOL XV, 1990, P455). Pegi's investments in 
palm oil plantations (Swee Lam Estates) and Sateras Resources (Malaysia) Bhd, a company closely 
identified with business interests associated with the former Chief Minister of Sarawak, Abdul 
Rahman Yakub, were particularly hard hit by the 1985-86 recession. See Investors Digest, KLSE 
December 1986:34 and Cheong, 1990:16.
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Confronted by a vacuum in government and an imminent general election, Dr Mahathir 
turned to the ranks of the party's vice-presidents to select a deputy (MB, 16:5:1990). The 
three contenders were Ghafar Baba, Datuk Wan Mokhtar and Datuk Abdullah Badawi. 
But in effect it was a no-contest affair. Wan Mokhtar was unacceptable because he was a 
'state' rather than 'federal' politician. (Wan Mokhtar was then Chief Minister of 
Trennganu and such appointments have traditionally come from federal level politicians.) 
Abdullah Badawi, on the other hand, was 'seen' as sympathetic to Musa (MB, 
1:1:1987). Viewed as neutral in the growing split in UMNO between the Mahathir and 
Musa factions, Ghafar was the obvious choice, and on 10 May 1986 was sworn in as 
Deputy Prime Minister.
On the same day that Ghafar was sworn in as Deputy Prime Minister, Standard 
Chartered Bank gave notice that it was initiating bankruptcy proceedings against his son, 
Tamrin. Two days later, the bank withdrew the notice without elaboration (Asiaweek, 
15:3:1987). Meanwhile, Ghafar's debts grew as companies associated with him, 
particularly Pegi and Kompleks Kewangan,13 made huge losses. Ghafar's opponents 
accused him of taking the post of Deputy Prime Minister only to ward off irate bankers 
(Asiaweek, 15:3:87). Whatever the case, it was apparent that as the split between the 
Mahathir and Razaleigh factions widened, and UMNO politics was, from 1986 to 1990, 
at its most fluid, Prime Minister Mahathir had a deputy who could ill-afford any notion 
other than total loyalty to the leadership.
Ironically, as Ghafar's business fortunes declined his political influence grew and 
facilitated, at least indirectly, business opportunities for other members of his family. 
Ghafar's political influence grew largely as a result of the key role he played as mediator 
or 'trouble-shooter' for UMNO in attempting to resolve disputes within the parties of the 
Barisan and between the federal leadership and that of the states.14 Ghafar's considerable
13 Founded in 1972, Kompleks Kewangan registered its first ever loss of $16.6 million in 1985 and 
continued to make big losses for the remainder of the decade. Eventually, in the late eighties it was 
necessary for PNB to inject a substantial amount of capital into Kompleks Kewangan in a bid to 
again make it solvent. See MB, 1:1:1987 and MB, 16:5:1990.
14 In 1975 Ghafar played a key role in the formation of the Beijaya party, used by the Federal leadership 
to oust Tun Mustapha's USNO which had threatened to take Sabah out of the federation. In 1977 
Ghafar and Tengku Razaleigh, then Minister of Finance, encouraged the formation of Parti Beijasa in 
Kelantan which was later used by UMNO to oust its main Malay rival, the Parti Islam (PAS) from 
its 20 year rule of that state. In 1983 Ghafar helped to defuse a political crisis in Sarawak which arose 
after quarrelling in the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) and worked to admit its breakaway I ban-based 
faction, Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak into the coalition. See Asiaweek, 13:4:1986. In 1985 Ghafar 
also played an important mediating role in a bitter dispute which had split the MCA into two 
factions, one led by Tan Koon Swan and the other by Neo Yee Pan. See Means, 1991:178. Ghafar's
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influence as a power-broker at party and state level appeared to coincide with the 
appointment of Tamrin Ghafar as chairman of a company called Mycom Bhd. The 
principal shareholders of Mycom Bhd were UMBC and KUBB Nominees.15 In early 
1990 Mycom obtained control of the Lotteries Corporation (Sabah) Sdn Bhd which was 
authorised to organise lotteries in Sabah under a licence issued by the Sabah state 
govenment. Lotteries Corporation operated the highly lucrative Sabah Big Sweep. For 
1990 alone Mycom's projected profits were $54 million. As chairman, Tamrin was 
allocated 2 million shares in the company (MB, 1:5:1990). Mycom's profitability was 
expected to further increase after amendments were passed to the Gambling Act in July 
1989 which effectively restricted legal gambling to UMNO-linked companies.16
Ghafar Baba's status as a senior UMNO leader and secretary-general of the ruling 
National Front Coalition Government enabled him to borrow huge funds from state- 
owned banks with which he was able to finance his purchase of Pegi and so make his 
foray into the stockmarket. Ironically, as a longtime chairman of MARA, Ghaffar’s 
political persona, as one committed to the expansion of Malay ownership and the 
promotion of Malay capitalists, sat oddly with his own record as a 'capitalist'. In 
business Ghafar appears to have been little more than an 'Ali Baba' figure, albeit a 
particularly high-profile 'Ali', who relied on his rather unscrupulous Chinese partners to 
manage Pegi. Stated baldly, but nonetheless accurately, Ghafar was a politician in 
business but he never became a businessman. He was a speculator whose short time 
horizons for quick profits relied upon political connections and a buoyant stockmarket. 
Luckily for Ghafar, he remained a politician, because it was only his ascent to the office 
of Deputy Prime Minister, that saved him from creditors when companies with which he 
was associated became mired in debt.
Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamed
Another prominent politician-tumed-businessman was Datuk Syed Kechik. Syed Kechik 
also used political influence to accumulate capital which in turn facilitated his rise in 
business. A lawyer and son of a small shop keeper, Syed Kechik played an important
efforts in the MCA dispute prompted a joke in the Singapore press that The Malays have their Ali 
Baba, the Indians their Sai Baba; for the Chinese...it's Ghafar Baba' (MB: 1/1/87). (Again in the 1986 
'Sabah Crisis' Ghafar, as secretary-general of the Barisan, played an important role in defusing 
tensions between the Federal Government and the newly elected PBS Sabah State Government)
15 See KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XV, 1990:406.
16 See Gomez, 1991:3-7.
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role in the mid-sixties as an intermediary in the central government's 1965 conflict with 
Singapore and the 1966 constitutional crisis in Sarawak. At that time he was also asked 
by the then Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, to assist Tun Mustapha build his 
power base in the United Sabah National Organisation (USNO), in preparation for the 
forthcoming 1967 state elections in Sabah. Syed Kechik played a key role in Tun 
Mustapha's subsequent victory in those elections and, until Mustapha's defeat in 1976, 
was widely regarded as the eminence grise of Sabah politics, or the real power behind 
Tun Mustapha, who as chief minister turned Sabah into a personal fiefdom.
The interlocking roles played by Syed Kechik in Sabah's politics, government and 
then largely timber-based economy, quickly produced a huge fortune.17 The body 
through which each of these interlocking roles came together was the Sabah Foundation, 
of which Syed Kechik became the first director on 15 June 1967. Although the objectives 
of the Sabah Foundation were social and economic - to provide scholarships for needy 
students and uplift the living standards of Bumiputras in Sabah - it was in fact an 
ancillary political base for Tun Mustapha for the distribution of patronage.18 From 1970 
to 1974 income for the Sabah Foundation from the sale of timber logs amounted to 
$167.3 million (NST:26/6/1976).
The source of that patronage was Sabah's massive timber resources, most of which 
were controlled by 12 major companies or concessionaires. Through the unscrupulous 
use of legal loopholes in the original leases signed by the 12 companies and with the
17 The positions held by Syed Kechik in government, politics and business included: Senator for Sabah 
in the Federal Parliament (1973-77); member and Deputy Speaker of the Sabah Legislative Assembly 
(appointed September 1975); Member of the Central Executive Committee of USNO (1968-73); 
member and legal advisor to USNO and the Sabah Alliance 1968-74); legal advisor to the Chief 
Minister, Tun Mustapha (1968-75); chairman of the Sabah Land Development Board (1971-72); 
Secretary of the United Sabah Islamic Association (1969-71); Member of the Board of Trustees of the 
Sabah National Park; Managing director of Rakyat Berjaya Sdn Bhd, Rakyat Bersatu Sdn Bhd, 
Director of Syarikat Pintasan Sdn Bhd, Syarikat Segama Sdn Bhd and Pulau Bohayan Sdn Bhd. See 
MB, July 1975 and Who's Who in Malaysia, 1982:345.
Syed Kechik's rise in business in the seventies through combining his roles in government, politics 
and business was, in that respect, later replicated by Daim Zainuddin in the eighties - one at state 
level, the other at national level.
10 Such patronge included a cash distribution scheme that handed over $38 million to the public. Every 
adult person in Sabah was, in theory, a Foundation benificiary. There were handouts of $50 a head in 
1971 and $60 in 1973 and 1974. A further $2.4 million was spent on a branch of the Universiti 
Kebangsaan in Sabah and about $6 million was spent on secondary and tertiary scholarships for 
Sabah students. Although Foundation money was also spent on buildings and recreational facilities, 
funds expended to improve the living standards of Sabah's Bumiputra's still appeared to fall far short 
of the considerable income available to the Foundation from timber. See MB, August 1976
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backing of a panoply of state powers, not the least of which included those of detention 
and immigration, Syed Kechik successfully negotiated the return of 5, 900 square miles 
of timber land to the state government Approximately 3, 500 square miles of the best of 
this timber land was immediately allocated to the Sabah Foundation and was in theory 
'sacrosanct', in that none of it could be allocated or exploited for any other purpose.19
After negotiations with the 12 concessionaires in 1970, Tun Mustapha's brother, 
Datu Salam, arranged for Syed Kechik to be given interests in three timber companies in 
exchange for assuming responsibility for their legal affairs and management (Ross- 
Larson, 1976:141). The total area of timber land allocated to the three companies 
amounted to 270 square miles, 100 square miles of which was carved out of the 
supposedly 'sacrosanct' area reserved for the Sabah Foundation.20
One condition of Syed Kechik's appointment as Director of the Sabah Foundation 
was that the position be part-time, enabling him to open law offices in Sabah (Ross- 
Larson, 1976:97). The core business of his practice was handling the legal work of the 
Chief Minister, Tun Mustapha (ST, 15:2:1977). Tun Mustapha was already a very 
wealthy man from investments in timber, property and commercial ventures in the state. 
Besides being Tun Mustapha's legal advisor, Syed Kechik was also Mustapha's political 
advisor, and in that capacity virtually ran the government during the Chief Minister's 
frequent absences overseas. As a result Syed Kechik soon wielded considerable political 
power, which in turn meant that many people and businesses found it opportune to retain 
his legal services out of 'goodwill'. His law practice soon became the state's largest. 
Syed Kechik channelled the lucrative income he obtained from both his timber 
concessions and his law practice into property development.
The initial success of the massive property developments undertaken by Syed Kechik 
in Sabah were, again, due to his capacity to combine his roles in public office with those 
of his private interests. The most prominent example in that regard was the Zara project.
19 The remainder reverted to the State Government, in effect the Chief Minister, who had the power to 
dispense portions of it as he saw fit
20 The three companies were: (1) Syarikat Pintisan Sdn Bhd which was allocated 100 square miles from 
the area reserved for the Sabah Foundation. The directors of Pintisan included: Syed Kechik, his 
brother Syed Salem Albukhary and Datu Abdul Salem bin Datu Harun, Tun Mustapha's younger 
brother. (2). Segama Sdn Bhd which was allocated 100 square miles of timber land, the directors of 
which included Syed Kechik, Syed Salem and Datu Abdul Salem bin Datu Harun. (3) Pulau Bohayan 
Sdn Bhd which was allocated 70 square miles of timber land in the Silibukan and Ulu Kinabatangan 
forest reserves. The directors of Pulau Bohayan were Syed Kechik and Datu Abdul Salem bin Datu 
Harun. See ST{S} 26:8:1975 and Hunter 1976:45-46 and 64-84.
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While chairman of the Sabah Land Development Board (SLDB), Syed Kechik and his 
partners, in a company called Zara Sdn Bhd, bought up or arranged the alienation of large 
tracts of land from the USNO state government (ST, 15:2:1977). The land, on the 
Inanam peninsula close to the state capital, Kota Kinabalu, was to be developed by Zara 
into a $200 million commercial-resort complex. Zara subsequently 'donated' some land 
in the project area free to the Sabah Foundation, a donation which then attracted state 
funding for necessary (and expensive) infrastructure, which in effect serviced the entire 
project and considerably enhanced its value.21
By combining his roles in government, politics and business, Syed Kechik quickly 
amassed a huge fortune. But a fortune built on political influence on the one hand, and 
timber concessions and property on the other, was vulnerable to the vagaries of politics. 
Already concerned about Tun Musapha's corrupt and dictatorial rule, the then Prime 
Minister, Tun Razak, was particularly incensed when, on 23 April 1975, Mustapha 
circulated a paper canvassing the possibility of Sabah's secession from Malaysia. In 
response, the federal government withdrew its support from Tun Mustapha, and paved 
the way for his defeat by the newly formed Beijaya party when state elections were held 
in April 1976.22 One of the first actions of the new Berjaya government was to expel 
Syed Kechik, the principal architect of Mustapha's power in the state, from Sabah. In 
addition, all timber licenses and land purchases associated with Syed Kechik's business 
interests, the latter alone allegedly worth $200 million, were frozen by the state 
authorities.23 In the meantime, however, Syed Kechik had channelled large sums of 
money into stock and property investments in peninsular Malaysia and so was able to 
start a new business career in the federal capital.24
When Syed Kechik returned to Kuala Lumpur in 1975, he benefited from the NEP's 
restructuring requirements, and used his accumulated capital, together with additional 
capital from bank loans, to build stakes in over 40 companies.25 At the same time, 
although he was no longer an active politician, political links remained important to Syed 
Kechik's continued rise in business.
21 See ST, 15:2:1977 and Ross-Larson, 1976:142.
22 See Bedlington, 1978:161-63 and Ross-Larson, 1976:176.
23 See ST {S} 8:2:1977. Syed Kechik confirmed that claims filed by his companies, notably Zara Sdn 
Bhd, for compensation had been unsuccessful and that he had not recovered "one cent back." Interview 
with author, 21 September 1987.
24 See ST, 15:2:1977.
25 See Jesudason, 1990:106 and also Lim M. H., 1985:53.
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In the early 1980's members of the emerging, but as yet small Malay 
political/business elite, were a closely knit group, bound together in many mutually 
supportive and beneficial business arrangements. Syed Kechik's Bumiputra business 
partners at the time were quite illuminating in that regard. He was, for instance, a 
principal shareholder in Asiavest Holdings, a merchant bank and discount house whose 
other shareholders included Tengku Razaleigh (then (1975) chairman of Petronas and 
later Minister of Finance), Senator Kamarul Ariffin (chairman of Bank Bumiputra), and 
Datuk Syed Nahar Shahabuddin (the Mentri Besar or Chief Minister of Kedah).26 Syed 
Kechik was also a director of Tengku Razaleigh's family company at the time, Highlands 
and Lowlands Bhd, in which he had a 10 per cent stake, and shared business interests 
(commercial real estate in Kuala Lumpur) with Dr Mahathir, a fellow home-town 
compatriot from Alor Star.27
As a politically influential Malay, Syed Kechik was an attractive partner and much 
sought after by Chinese firms seeking to restructure their equity to accord with the NEP's 
requirements. One of Syed Kechik's biggest investments in the mid seventies was a 
multi-storey building project, Wisma On Tai, with Tun Sir Henry Lee (Malaysia's first 
Minister of Finance), and his sons (MB, July 1975). In 1978 he bought a 30 per cent 
share in Development and Commercial Bank, the sixth largest commercial bank in 
Malaysia, then controlled by Tun Sir Henry and his family. While that ploy kept the 
government out of the bank and allowed it to expand, 28 it also showed that even the 
(Chinese) company of a former finance minister was not immune from NEP imperatives 
and had to restructure in favour of Malay interests (Jesudason, 1990:106). At the same 
time the Lee family also found that Syed Keckik was not prepared to play an 'Ali-Baba' 
role in the business but indeed threatened their continued management and control of the 
bank.29
In May 1982, Syed Kechik was again the centre of corporate attention when he and 
others were involved in a share-swapping scheme in which Khoo Kay Peng's, Malayan
26 The inspiration behind Asiavest came from Tun Ismail Ali, then Governor of the Central Bank, Bank 
Negara and brother-in-law of Dr Mahathir, then Deputy Prime Minister. See MB, July 1975.
22 Later, in 1980, Dr Mahathir sold a 17 per cent share in an office building, Wisma Budiman, in 
downtown Kuala Lumpur to Syed Kechik. See New Nation, 14:5:1980 and Lim, M H., 1985:53.
2 8 Confirmed in author's interview with Syed Kechik 21 September 1987.
29 Syed Kechik denied that during 1982-83 he attempted to obtain a majority shareholding in the bank 
and also claimed that at the time he did not have the funds for such a purchase. These claims were 
strongly refuted by Alex Lee then general manager of the bank. Authors interviews with Syed 
Kechik, 21 September 1987 and with Alex Lee, 9 November 1987.
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United Industries (MUI) was supposed to take over the Development and Commercial 
(D&C) Bank and Kwong Lee Bank (Lim M. H., 1985:53). The association of Syed 
Kechik with MUI was expected to be a boon to the fast growing conglomerate whose 
'Chinese character' had, by early 1982, become an impediment to further rapid growth.30 
Under the proposed scheme, Syed Kechik would have exchanged 30 per cent of his 
equity in D&C for 9.8 per cent of the enlarged MUI conglomerate, 31 but the deal fell 
through because of a revision of the terms of the valuation of D&C shares by the Capital 
Issues Committee (CIC).32
In addition to his investments in D&C and MUI, Syed Kechik was also a major 
shareholder in a property development company, Sri Hartamas Corporation Bhd. His 
fellow director-shareholders were Datuk Wong Kee Tat of Kuala Lumpur Industries and 
Tan Sri Chong Kok Lim who then owned Landmarks Holdings (MB, 1:2:1986). Syed 
Kechik's other investments included a controlling stake in Castlefield Development, 
equity in the Regent Hotel, Penang, the Pan Pacific and Oriental Hotels in Kuala 
Lumpur, huge investments in a Bumiputra movie empire (Solar Organisation) and a 10 
per cent stake in Sistem Televisyen Malaysia (STMB) or TV 3, the private television 
network.
Syed Kechik's corporate career peaked in 1984, when he acquired Temerloh Bhd, an 
old publicly-listed plantation company. Temerloh was to become a holding company for 
all his investments and eventually, Syed Kechik hoped, a large diversified international 
conglomerate. With assets reported to be worth $800 million, Syed Kechik then appeared 
to represent the beginnings of a new class of independent Malay entrepreneurs. Syed 
Kechik himself certainly believed so, telling one interviewer that, 'there is now a new 
class of financially independent Bumiputras .. but there is still no big private international 
Bumiputra company (Asiaweek, 18:6:1982).
But Syed Kechik's rise in business, spectacular as it was, remained closely tied to 
property, stock and political influence. The 1985-87 recession in the stock and property 
markets wiped out much of the former value of Syed Kechik's holdings, while his
30 See Asiaweek, 10:6:1982.
31 MUI's share capital before the proposed merger was $296 million and the company had a 
capitalisation of more than $1.2 billion. See Lim, M H., 1985:53 The other major shareholders of 
D & C at the time were: Alex Lee (32.5 per cent); Lee Loy Seng (9 per cent); Magnum Corp. (12 
per cent) and Permodalan Nasional Bhd (8 per cent) See FEER, 21:5:1982.
32 See Gill, 1985:193
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considerable debts - mostly in US and Singapore dollars - rose with higher interest rates 
and a depreciating ringgit (Asiaweek, 15:4:1988). The shuffling of anticipated assets for 
debt in related, and frequently indebted, companies only exacerbated an already parlous 
debt position. (A graphic example was the defaulting of Sri Hartamas on a US$40 million 
loan from scandal-ridden BMF in Hong Kong.)33 Mounting debt forced Syed Kechik to 
shed most of his assets, including his stakes in D&C Bank and TV3. However it was the 
forced sale of Temerloh in March 1988, that symbolised the end of Syed Kechik's 
ambition to head his own conglomerate. Significantly, the buyer was Azman Hashim, 
one of the new generation of Malay business leaders whose wealth was based on banking 
and financial services.
Syed Kechik's major forms of capital accumulation were through the acquisition, as a 
minority shareholder, of property and stock in already existing and profitable companies. 
The companies in which he was a major shareholder did not perform well.34 Like many 
other politicians-tumed-businessmen, Syed Kechik's rise in business depended largely 
on two props, property and shares on the one hand, and political influence on the other. 
By the mid eighties changing political and economic circumstances had significantly 
undermined both those props. The 1985-87 recession wiped out much of Syed Kechik's 
assets in land and shares. At the same time as the Bumiputra business elite grew, so it 
was less the closely knit group bound by various mutually supportive arrangements of a 
decade earlier. Instead, competition for political patronage increased, particularly as 
resources became more scarce in the recession. With the rise of Daim and the group of 
young Bumiputra entrepreneurs that surrounded him, Syed Kechik was increasingly 
marginalised from the new centres of power. His apparent bid to obtain a majority 
shareholding in D&C Bank was thwarted,35 so was his bid for the licence to run the
33 The 'loan' was to buy land in California. Syed Kechik, Wong Kee Tat and three others were later 
ordered by the Kuala Lumpur High Court to repay the US$ 40 million to BMF. See ST(S) 
14:8:1988.
34 Several o f his aides agreed that Syed Kechik's tragic flaw was that he had become the classic 
politician-tumed-businessman, who trusts no one and can't tolerate an independent voice “In any 
project where he was a minority partner, he always made money”, said an aide. 'But whenever he was 
on his own, he always got into trouble.' New Nation, 14;5;1980. Syed Kechik lost a huge amount 
by indulging his passion for film production and distribution. One source claimed that the $12 
million invested in movies was probably a total loss (New Nation, 14:5:1980).
35 Whatever the truth about Syed Kechik's alleged attempt to obtain a majority shareholding in D&C 
Bank may have been, it was clear that in the personal feud between Syed Kechik and Alex Lee over 
the management of the bank, Daim supported Lee. Alex Lee was an old friend of Daim and had 
helped finance Daim's first business ventures. Another key figure in the dispute was Aziz Taha, the 
governor of the central bank, Bank Negara. Aziz Taha accused Lee of irresponsible conduct and abuse 
of trust in his management of the bank. Ultimately a compromise was worked out whereby Lee
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private TV3 channel, which went instead to the Fleet Group, 36 and approval was not 
forthcoming for a huge property development by Sri Hartamas on the outskirts of Kuala 
Lumpur.
The rather extraordinary circumstances of Sabah politics in the 1970's allowed Syed 
Kecik to control, for a time, the key levers of political and bureaucratic power in the state. 
Political power facilitated his access to state resources, principally land and timber. Later, 
as one of Malaysia's first Bumiputra entrepreneurs, he was much sought after by Chinese 
companies seeking to restructure their equity to accord with NEP requirements. However 
Syed Kechik's relationships with his Chinese partners, particularly the Lee family, was 
the cause of considerable tension as with capital and (initially) state support he apparently 
sought to challenge them for control of the bank. Although Syed Kechik was a politician 
who became a businessman, he remained heavily dependent on political patronage, 
particularly where his huge property investments were concerned. The collapse of his 
fortunes therefore also illustrated the often narrowly based nature of capital accumulated 
by politicians-tumed-businessmen and the vulnerability of such capital to changing 
political relationships.
UMNO’s PROXY CAPITALISTS: THE ‘SPECIAL CASE’ OF DAIM
ZAINUDDIN
In our analysis of Malay capitalism we have noted how a key feature of the emerging 
Malay business class was the extent to which its rise was dependent on a fusion of state, 
party and private interests. The fusion of those three elements was most intense however 
in the rise of UMNO's proxy capitalists-tumed-businessmen, and in the extraordinary 
corporate rise of a key figure in that group during the 1980's, Daim Zainuddin. Indeed 
Daim was the focal point at which the corporate interests of the party and those of 
business converged. Earlier, as head of Peremba from 1979 to 1984, Daim also groomed 
a group of young Bumiputra managers, mostly qualified accountants in their early
resigned as general manager, but not from the board, in exchange for a tacit commitment from Aziz 
to approve a complex transaction that allowed the Lee family to take over another public company, 
Roxy Industries Bhd (AWSJ, 16:8:1984). See also FEER, 30:8:1984.
36 While Syed Kechik's bid for the TV3 licence did not succeed, Fleet later invited him to take 10 per 
cent in the company however, as indicated above, mounting debt in the mid eighties forced hm to sell 
that stake.
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thirties, who played important roles in the management and growth of UMNO's 
corporate investments (and in most cases of those of Daim as well).
By the early 1990's many members of this group of UMNO's proxy capitalists- 
tumed-businessmen had utilized their experience and corporate links with the party to 
become major corporate figures themselves. Prominent examples included Wan Azmi 
Wan Hamzah (Land and General), Samsuddin Abu Hassan (Landmarks), Ahmad Sebi 
(Batu Lintang), Mohd Razali Abdul Rahman (Peremba) and Tajuddin Ramli (Technology 
Resources). That is not to say that this group of businessmen cut themselves off from 
networks of political patronage, but clearly some had moved beyond those networks to 
become relatively independent businessmen in their own right. While Daim was also a 
member of this group of UMNO proxy capitalists-tumed-businessmen, as its sponsor 
and by virtue of the pivotal positions he occupied in the government and the party, he 
was a 'special case'. But as a special case Daim's corporate rise highlights in dramatic 
fashion the merging of state, party and private interests so characteristic of this group of 
Malay capitalists, at least in the early stages of their development Daim also serves as an 
important reference point, somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, between those who 
remain proxy capitalists of UMNO and those who have established new corporate 
empires.
Daim's rapid rise in business attracted more criticism than that of any other Malay for 
the way in which he combined his roles in government and the party to amass a huge 
personal fortune, and become by the mid-eighties one of Malaysia's most prominent 
businessmen.37 Commenting on his own corporate rise, Daim, without the slightest hint 
of irony, said, 'I learned that if you want to do business you've got to go inside 
(government') (FT, 6:6:1984).
Daim grew up in the same village as the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, in the northern 
state of Kedah. From 1957 to 1959 Daim read law at Lincoln's Inn, London, where he 
had the opportunity to know and befriend some of Malaysia's future political leaders 
including Tun Hussein Onn, Tengku Razaleigh, Datuk Abdul Manan Othman and Alex 
Lee (NST, 15:7:84). On his return to Malaysia, Daim worked as a prosecutor and later as
37 In 1984 Daim’s personal wealth was estimated to be close to $6oo million or US $259 million 
(Asiaweek, 27:7:1984). Daim dismissed the estimate saying, 'If I had that kind of money .. I should 
be relaxing’ (NST, 5:9:1984).
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a magistrate (FT, 6:6:84). In the mid-sixties he joined a private law Firm in Kuala Lumpur 
and at the same time strengthened his ties with UMNO leaders38.
Daim's first 'break' in business came in 1973 when he acquired with the help of an 
old friend, the Chief Minister of Selangor, Datuk Harun Idris, a large piece of land on the 
outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. Initially Daim, a then unknown Malay businessman, had 
some difficulty in obtaining a loan from the banks to purchase the land. The problem was 
solved by Alex Lee, an old friend from student days in London who, through his ties 
with D&C Bank, was able to facilitate the $5-6 million loan that Daim required.39 In 
order to develop his property interests Daim formed a family-owned company called 
Syarikat Maluri Sdn Bhd. The properties of the company became a source of wealth for 
Daim who used it to borrow against, and later exchange for cash or shares in other 
companies (AWSJ, 24:8:84). Nevertheless during the seventies Daim's involvement in 
business remained relatively slight for in 1977 he was able to leave Malaysia for 
Berkeley, California, where he studied urban planning.
When Daim returned to Malaysia in 1979, another old friend from his student days, 
Abdul Manan Othman, then Minister for Public Enterprises, persuaded him to head 
Peremba, the property and commercial arm of the Urban Development Authority (UDA). 
According to the Asian Wall Street Journal, Daim's reorganistion of Peremba greatly 
enhanced his prestige and by 1980 he was regularly acting as an informal consultant on 
business matters for then Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir (AWSJ, 24:8:84). 
Although the two had been acquainted previously, the relationship between Daim and 
Mahathir only developed after 1975 when they were brought together by Datuk Harun 
(FT, 6:6:84). Daim's meteroic rise in politics and business has been attributed to his close 
connection with Dr Mahathir.
In July 1981 Dr Mahathir became Prime Minister with an ambitious agenda for the 
transformation of Malaysia's economy and the role of Malays in it. In many ways Daim 
typified Mahathir's image of the modem Malay as represented by a new generation of
3  ^ In 1966 Daim went to Sarawak to assist Syed Kechik in his efforts to remove the then Chief 
Minister of Sarawak, Datuk Stephen Kalong Ningkan, from office and in 1967 he joined Hussein 
Onn in championing the use of Malay as the national language. During the sixties Daim also made a 
number of attempts to embark on a business career, first producing table salt and later plastcs. Both 
attempts failed. According to Daim his venture into salt failed because he got 'no help from the 
government which allowed a rise in imports, 'prompting his earlier comment that 'I learned that if 
you want to do business, you've got to go inside' (FT, 6:6:1984).
39 Author’s interview with Alex Lee, 9 November 1987.
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dynamic Bumiputra businessmen. Supported by Dr Mahathir, Daim quickly rose to 
assume key positions in the government and the party. In 1980 he was appointed a 
senator, in 1982 he became a Member of Parliament and in July that year the Prime 
Minister, as UMNO's president, appointed Daim to head the party's main investment 
arm, Fleet Holdings. Only two years later on 14 July 1984, Daim was appointed Minister 
of Finance and UMNO treasurer.
Daim's growing influence and rapid rise in the government and the party, particularly 
from 1979 to 1984, concided with and was inseparable from the rapid expansion of his 
business interests during the same period. As noted earlier, in Daim's view national, 
political and private interests could be pursued simultaneously.40 On one occasion Daim 
told an interviewer that, 'I am a man who can do many things at the same time, I can put 
everyone of them in separate compartments'.41 Since our principal interest in Daim's 
business career was the extent to which his corporate rise was dependent on an ability to 
merge his public, party and private roles, we shall now by way of examples, illustrate 
how the merging of those roles facilitated some of his most important acquisitions.
Peremba - United Estates Projects - Baktimu
Daim's purchase of the lucrative property company, United Estates Projects Bhd (UEP), 
was facilitated by his capacity to combine his private business interests with his role as 
chairman of government-owned Peremba. (UEP was one-third owned by Peremba).42 
The UEP purchase also showed how Daim was able to raise large funds to finance his 
rise in business and the extent to which state-owned banks, Bank Bumiputra in 
particular, backed members of the emerging Bumiputra business elite in the early 
eighties.
In December 1982 Bandar Raya Developments, the property arm of the Malaysian 
Chinese Association's investment company, Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd, sold its stake 
in UEP for $74.2 million (NST, 24:12:1982). The buyer was a company called Baktimu 
Sdn Bhd that had been formed just a month earlier with $2 in paid-up capital. Baktimu 
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Syarikat Maluri Sdn Bhd which was owned by Daim. 
Under the terms of the sale Baktimu was given six months to pay for its UEP stake (BT,
40 NST, 21:7:1984 (Hardev Kaur, T)aim:Person behind the name').
41 FEER, 1:9:1988 (Nick Seaward, The Daim Stewardship').
42 The third largest shareholder in UEP was Permodalan Nasional Bhd (PNB), the government-owned 
equity corporation (BT, 4:7:1983).
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24:2:1982). During that period Daim sought to obtain the $75 million required for the 
purchase. Meanwhile, by late February 1983, rumours spread that the influential Daim 
was behind Baktimu, and the value of UEP shares began to climb. On 9 March 1983, 
one day after the government approved the UEP purchase, Baktimu issued one million 
new shares to its parent company, Syarikat Maluri Sdn Bhd (AWSJ, 24-25:8:1984). 
Baktimu also pledged some of the UEP shares it was buying to obtain loans from several 
banks. The loans totalling $35 million, were obtained from D&C Bank, whose chief 
executive was Daim's friend, Alex Lee, and Chung Kiaw Bank. The remaining $40 
million required by Baktimu to complete the purchase of UEP was obtained through a 
branch of the Union Bank of Switzerland in Singapore. To assist Baktimu to obtain the 
$40 million loan, state-owned Bank Bumiputra issued a guarantee on the company's 
behalf. (According to Raphael Pura, Baktimu was not even required to pledge further 
UEP shares to Bank Bumiputra as collateral for the loan and it was uncertain if Baktimu 
pledged any security to the bank in exchange for the guarantee.)43
Meanwhile, the strong financial backing Daim received in his bid for UEP prompted a 
rush to buy UEP shares. As the value of those shares rapidly increased, so did profits for 
the major shareholders. In six months Daim and his Maluri partners reportedly made a 
profit of $95 million on their $1 million investment in Baktimu (AWSJ, 24-25:8:1984). 
In addition, Daim in his dual roles as chairman of Peremba and owner of Baktimu, 
effectively controlled one of Malaysia's largest property companies.
Daim’s dual roles in government and the private sector also appeared to facilitate the 
later sale of Baktimu's stake in UEP to Sime Darby, in which the government was a 
substantial shareholder,44 on terms that were highly profitable for Daim and his partners. 
In January 1985 Sime Darby purchased a 32 per cent stake in UEP from Baktimu and 
Peremba, despite the vociferous protests of Sime's minority shareholders.45 The
43 AWSJ, 24-25:8:1984 (Raphael Pura, 'Malaysia's Daim Charts Path to Power').
44 Substantial shareholders of Sime Darby included ASN (16.6 per cent) and MMC (11.8 per cent). See 
KLSE Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XV:524.
45 The deal, agreed to in September 1984 meant that Sime Darby acquired 67.72 million shares or a 
32.1 per cent stake in UEP, while Sime in return agreed to issue 97.08 million new shares to 
Baktimu and Peremba, which represented about 11 per cent of Sime's enlarged equity (The Star, 
12:1:1985). Although the proportion of shares divested by Baktimu and Peremba were not disclosed, 
it was believed Baktimu put up 27 per cent, that is the bulk of the total 32 per cent of shares divested 
by Sime Darby (NST, 10:9:1984). Minority shareholders were particularly angry that there had been 
no choice but to accept the new Sime shares. Sime avoided the cash alternative by buying an initial 
stake of 32 per cent in UEP, just short of the trigger point of 33 per cent which would require a 
general offer for the minority shares. The offer was thus deemed a voluntary one and therefore did not
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purchase was extremely advantageous to Baktimu, because it overvalued Baktimu at a 
time when property prices were falling, and it grossly undervalued Sime's huge 
plantation holdings.46 The transaction also gave Daim a 7 per cent stake in Sime Darby, 
one of the regions largest conglomerates. In September 1986 a cabinet directive was 
issued which required ministers to divest themselves of interests in public companies, but 
Daim apparently had little trouble in selling his stake in Sime Darby to institutional 
investors, for what was reportedly a hefty profit, only a month later.47
Daim and the Fleet Group
As noted earlier, a feature of the Fleet Group's rapid growth after Daim Zainuddin 
became chairman of the company in June 1982 was the extent to which a number of its 
purchases, such as shares in TV3 and Cold Storage, also involved companies associated 
with Daim. The mix of party and private interests in Daim's corporate rise was also 
apparent in the links between Fleet, Faber Merlin, a hotel and property group and Daim's 
own companies.
In June 1983 Faber Merlin agreed to buy land from a company called Taman Bukit 
Maluri for $34.9 million (NST, 23:4:1987). At the time Daim controlled both companies. 
(Taman Bukit Maluri was then a wholly-owned subsidiary of Daim's corporate flagship, 
Raleigh Cycles (M'sia) Sdn Bhd) (AWSJ, 24:8:1984). One month earlier the Fleet 
Group, headed by Daim, had obtained control of Faber Merlin when it was allocated a 
Special Bumiputra share issue in the company by the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MTI). At the same time Fleet also purchased approximately 12.9 per cent of Faber's 
equity or 17 million shares on the open market from a private company called Citivest.
require a cash alternative. See The Star, 8:1:1985 (Letter, 'Unhappy with Sime offer for shares, 
signed Dean Bilis') and The Star, 12:1:1985 ('Rumblings over Sime's UEP Purchase').
46 The Sime/UEP deal was extremely advantageous to Baktimu for two reasons. First because the share 
swap was on the basis of two UEP shares with a then current market value of $6.36 for three Sime 
shares with a market value of $7.02. Secondly, UEP's assets were revalued shortly before the deal, 
while Sime's assets had not been revalued for the previous five years and thus were very much higher 
than their book values suggested. This was particularly true o f Sime's huge plantation holdings, 
much o f which could be converted for development purposes. In that regard an angry minority 
shareholder noted that Sime Darby had sold many pieces of land to UEP at agricultural values and 
was now buying UEP after the same land had been revalued and converted to commercial land. See 
The Star, 5:9:1984; NST, 10:9:1984 and The Star, 12:1:1985.
47 See NST, 11:10:1986) and Asiaweek, 22:4:1988.
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Citivest, which apparently made a handsome profit on the deal, was also owned by 
Daim.48
Shortly after the Fleet Group gained control of Faber Merlin, Faber purchased a hotel 
called the Subang View Hotel (later renamed the Merlin Subang) from United Estates 
Projects (UEP). (Marina Yusof, a leading member of Tengku Razaleigh's Semanggat '46 
claimed that Faber Merlin 'was directed' to buy the hotel from UEP and that the owners 
of UEP made large profits in the process.) The Subang View was bought for $56 million 
which was paid for through a share-for-property swap involving the transfer of 36 
million Faber shares valued at $1.60 each to UEP (BT, 23:4:1987). Since the cost of 
construction of the Subang View was $26 million, this meant that UEP made profits of 
not less than $30 million and, through the issue of Faber shares, UEP also gained an 11 
per cent stake in Faber Merlin (NST, 23:4:1987). Significantly, in a reply to Marina 
Yusof s allegations about the profits accruing to UEP's major sharehoders, the director 
of Fleet, Desa Pachi, did not attempt to refute the above calculations (BT, 23:4:1987). 
The reason for the sale of the Subang View became more apparent as the web of 
interlocking directorships held by Daim came to light. Daim effectively controlled two- 
thirds of UEP in his dual roles as chairman of government-owned Peremba and through 
his family company, Baktimu. Moreover at the time of the transaction the Fleet Group 
headed by Daim also had a stake in Faber Merlin. So Daim was in control of both the 
buyer and the seller in the deal, the outcome of which gave him an interest in another 
publicly-listed company, Faber Merlin through UEP, and a handsome profit (NST, 
23:4:1987).
Yet another instance involving the Fleet Group and companies controlled by Daim 
was the purchase by Fleet Trading and Manufacturing of an ailing Daim company, Daza 
for $1 million on 31 August 1984. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review the
48 Marina Yusof, a leading member of Tengku Razaleigh's Semangat 46 alleged that Daim and his 
partners made a profit of $50 million from the sale of Faber shares. In an interview with the New  
Straits Times, Fleet's director Desa Pachi did not dispute that Daim made a profit, only the size of 
that profit. While arguing that it was much less than $50 million, Desa declined to reveal how much 
Daim paid for the Faber shares and the price he sold them to Fleet. Nevertheless the New Straits 
Times reported that, 'there had been heavy buying of Faber shares in the light of the potential 
takeover by Fleet' (NST, 18:10:1983). For details regarding Fleet's purchase of Faber shares, 
including those of Daim see, NST, 23:4:1987, FEER, 8:10:1987 (Letters: Nick Seaward's reply to 
'National Traitors') and The Star, 19:10:1983.
171
deal, which was done in a highly convoluted way also breached foreign exchange 
regulations and ended up costing Fleet $6 million or more.49
The purchase and sale of United Malayan Banking Corporation (UMBC)
The extent to which Daim's corporate rise depended on an ability to mix his government, 
party and private roles was most apparent in his highly controversial purchase, and later 
sale, of a controlling stake in the United Malayan Banking Corporation (UMBC), 
Malaysia's third largest bank.
Just a week before he was named Minister of Finance in July 1984 two of Daim's 
family companies, Daan Sdn Bhd and Dani Sdn Bhd, purchased a 41 per per cent stake 
in the UMBC bank from Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd (MPH).50 To finance the cash 
portion of the purchase Daim borrowed from the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation 
(OCBC) in Singapore. According to internal bank documents, OCBC approved a four- 
year loan of $133 million to Daan and Dani on 15 August 1984, one month after Daim 
became Minister of Finance.51 As Minister, Daim had certain responsibilities under 
Malaysia's Banking Act of 1973 which included granting approval for any arrangement 
involving the sale of shares in a bank which resulted in a change of management or 
control. So Daim was in the awkward position of apparently contravening the Banking 
Act by approving, as Minister of Finance, bank transactions involving his own 
companies. The 'difficulty' was apparently overcome by having the office of the finance
49 The deal was an extraordinarily complex one and there were several interpretations of what transpired. 
For the most comprehensive account of the purchase of Daza by Fleet, see PEER, 3:9:1987 (Nick 
Seaward Fleet Group sails into heavy weather' and 'A sense of missing shares'). Gomez' (1990:85- 
86) account of the deal is substantially drawn from Seaward's articles. Desa Pachi, the chairman of 
the Fleet Group, claimed that Daza was used as a shell company to acquire the shares held by Times 
Publishing in Singapore and that after the transaction Daza was transferred to Fleet without any 
profits made (NST, 23:4:1987).
50 The opportunity to obtain a major share in UMBC arose as a result of a decision by Multi-Purpose 
Holdings Bhd (MPH), the investment arm of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) to sell its 
stake in the bank. In 1981 MPH had bought into UMBC hoping it would be able to control the 
bank, but that hope was frustated when following pressure from UMNO Youth the party leadership 
decided to restrict MHFs stake to 40 per cent. For a detailed account of the controversy see Gale, 
1985:141-153.
51 As security for the loan Daim mortgaged to OCBC all the UMBC shares he was to acquire. 
According to the Asian Wall Street Journal the transaction was highly profitable for Daim as his 
companies reaped, at least on paper, extraordinary profits of $95.3 million. At the same time Daim 
won control of a much bigger bank, all without risking any of his own capital. See AWSJ, 
30:4:1986 and Internal OCBC Memo dated 15 April 1985 (mimeographed).
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minister approve the transaction though it was not clear as to whether the Banking Act 
allowed ministerial aides to assume such powers on the ministers behalf.52.
By June 1985 Daim's family companies gained outright control of UMBC. The 
timing was significant as the takeover was completed just two months before the central 
bank announced a policy forbidding individuals or family-owned companies from 
holding more than 10 per cent equity in a local bank. The UMBC takeover was 
accomplished by a rights issue of new shares when Daim's companies, Daan and Dani, 
increased their shareholding in the bank to 50.3 per cent by buying the preferential rights 
issue allocated to, but rejected by the other co-controlling shareholder, Pemas.53 (Pemas 
never explained why it did not take up the potentially profitable preferential rights issue 
allocated to it, thereby giving up co-control of UMBC to Daim's companies.)
To complete the takeover of UMBC it was necessary under the Banking Act for 
Daim's companies to obtain approval from the Minister of Finance. Again Daim's dual 
roles as a private businessman and Minister of Finance clashed. The Governor of the 
Central Bank, Datuk Jaffar Hussein, in response to mounting criticism as to how Daim 
managed to evade the apparent requirements of the Banking Act, later revealed that the
52 To complete the takover of UMBC it was also necessary under the Banking Act for Daim’s 
companies to obtain the approval of the Minister of Finance. In response to mounting criticism as to 
how Daim managed to reconcile that apparent conflict of interest, the Governor of the central bank, 
Bank Negara, revealed that the transaction was approved by the cabinet. But critics of the transaction, 
including some lawyers, claimed that Malaysia's Banking Act of 1973 made no provision for the 
cabinet to approve equity changes in banks and that the power rested soley with the Minister of 
Finance. See AWSJ, 15:5:1985 and 30:4:1986.
53 Daim's companies bought control of UMBC by acquiring two allocations of new shares made by the 
bank. The first allocation of 9, 108, 061 shares was made by UMBC on 24 May 1985. Daim's 
companies through Malaysia Nominees bought 6,778,442 shares and Petronas 1,481,481 shares. 
Pemas, until that time the co-dominant owner, did not take any of the new shares. On 29 June 1985 
there was a second allocation of 7,558,685 new UMBC shares of which Malaysia Nominees took 7, 
444, 002 shares on behalf of Daim's companies. Neither Petronas or Pemas, the two state-owned 
shareholders in the bank, took any of the allocation. After the two share allocations Malaysia 
Nominees, which held the UMBC shares for Daim's companies, became the majority shareholder in 
the bank with 38,627,388 shares or 50.38 per cent of UMBC's expanded share capital of $76,667, 
285. Pemas' stake in UMBC fell to about 32 per cent after the company failed to take up its 
allocation of new shares (AWSJ, 30:4:1986).
The Oversea Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC) in Singapore lent a total of $164 million to 
Daim's companies for the purchase of UMBC. In its evaluation of Daim as a credit risk an internal 
OCBC memo noted that Daim was the 'Malaysian Minister of Finance and a close personal aide of 
the Prime Minister' but acknowledged that 'there was no definite source of repayment' (for the loan). 
OCBC Internal Memo dated 15 April 1985:4-5 (mimeographed).
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transaction had been approved by the cabinet.54 While cabinet's action absolved Daim 
from any involvement in the process of approval and the obvious conflict of interest 
situation that would entail, it nevertheless violated the spirit if not the letter of the Banking 
Act.55
Daim's sale of his controlling interest in UMBC was as controversial as his 
acquisition of the bank. On 19 September 1986 Dr Mahathir announced that a cabinet 
directive required all ministers to dispose of their direct and indirect holdings in quoted 
companies (The Star, 10:12:1986). The following day Daim announced that he would 
sell his family's stake in UMBC.56 While at the time, the cabinet decision provided Daim 
with a ready explanation for the sale of his UMBC shares, a more pressing reason for the 
sale appeared to be the deep recession of the mid-eighties which made an investment in a 
bank, at least in the short-to-medium term, less attractive. (The recession had also 
exacerbated the debt burden of Daim's own companies which had earlier borrowed 
heavily and used shares as collateral to effect the purchase.)57
Amazingly, the buyer of Daim's entire stake in UMBC was Pemas, the state-owned 
Malay investment holding company, which purchased the shares involved for about twice 
the price it had been offered, and rejected, barely twelve months earlier.58 (Pemas
54 While revealing that cabinet had approved the transaction, Datuk Jaffar also claimed that Daim 'was 
not at any stage involved in the process of approval, which was done strictly in accordance with 
proper and established procedures'. AWSJ, 15:5:1986 (Raphael Pura, Malaysia Defends Minister over 
Banking Transactions').
55 Critics of the transaction, including some lawyers, claimed that Malaysia's Banking Act of 1973 
made no provision for the cabinet to approve equity changes in banks and that this power rested soley 
with the Minister of Finance. See AWSJ, 15:5:1985 and 30:4:1986.
56 In large part the cabinet decision was a response to criticism by Dr Mahathir's opponents in UMNO 
of Daim for mixing his public role with his private business interests.
87 Corporate records indicated that Daim's family owned companies owed more than $300 million to 
local and foreign banks. Daan Sdn Bhd and Dani Sdn Bhd, the two companies that ultimately held 
Daim's UMBC stake alone owed $164 million to OCBC in Singapore AWSJ, 26-27:9:1988 
(Raphael Pura, Daim May Make Big Gain in Bank Sale').
58 Pemas' extraordinary turnabout and the terms of the sale contributed to the cluster of scandals that 
tarnished the government's self-proclaimed image of being 'clean, efficient and trustworthy in the lead 
up to the August 1986 general elections. The DAP, various interest groups, and Dr Mahathir's 
opponents in UMNO, attacked the government over the terms of the deal. Opposition Leader, Lim 
Kit Siang issued a statement asking, Why Pemas was negotiating to buy UMBC shares from Daim's 
family companies at $8.50 a share, nearly double the price of the rights issue of 7 million UMBC 
shares offered at $4.50 a share which the company had failed to take up earlier'. Lim claimed that had 
Pemas taken up the earlier rights issue at $4.50 a share 'it would have saved the Malaysian taxpayer 
$28 million (FEER, 9:10:1986). Daim claimed that his family companies' sale of UMBC stock to 
Pemas 'had not resulted in any loss or gain for his family concerns'. Bankers disagreed and indicated
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purchased Daim's 50.3 per cent interest in UMBC for $349.2 million).59 Pemas, which 
already had huge debts amounting to $996 million by the end of 1985, had to borrow 
additional funds for the purchase of Daim's UMBC shares (Asiaweek, 19:10:1986). To 
assist Pemas effect the purchase, Daim's own Finance Ministry obligingly arranged a 
large yen-denominated loan which, when the yen later appreciated sharply against the 
Malaysian dollar, left Pemas burdened with a heavy debt for years afterwards.60
By 1985 Daim had built a huge business empire. The extent of Daim's business 
interests was revealed when, in order to comply with the cabinet directive mentioned 
earlier, he had to dispose of his holdings in quoted companies. On 10 December 1986 
Daim indicated that his family companies were selling their stakes in 17 corporations, 
which included many of the largest and most profitable companies on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE).61 Controversy also surrounded the disposal of those assets. 
As the recession of the mid-eighties deepened the value of Daim's large shareholdings in 
many public companies tumbled. So when in February 1985 Daim, as Minister of 
Finance, froze all listings on the KLSE and in July the same year gave approval to 
government-owned or controlled investment agencies to buy large amounts of shares, his 
actions were widely interpreted as a move to bolster the price of his own stock-
that the sale enabled Daim's family companies to realise a cash gain of almost $100 million on their 
initial purchase of UMBC in 1984 through the share swap with Malaysia French Bank AWSJ, 
11:12:1986 (Raphael Pura, 'Malaysia Finance Chief Sheds Interests). For accounts of the controversy 
surrounding the sale of UMBC to Pemas see FEER, 9:10:1986 (Nick Seaward, 'The Stock Answer, 
Malaysia tells politicians to divest major shareholdings’); AWSJ, 26-27:9:1986 (Raphael Pura, 
'Daim May Make Big Gain on Bank Sale'); Asiaweek, 19:10:1986 ('A Bank Sale Raises 
Interest');'Skandal UMBC' Letter to the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir from Haji Suhaimi Kamaruddin 
(UMNO Supreme Council) dated 16 April 1987 (mimeographed); The Star, 6:10:1986, (Param: 
Reveal Details of UMBC Deal); The Star, 11:12:1986 ('Chandra to Daim: Give Details on Sale').
59 The price was not revealed until some time after the sale. See AWSJ, 22:7:1991 Raphael Pura 
('Malaysian Banks Cease Efforts on Big Merger, Failed Plan Leaves UMBC Still in Need of a Strong 
Parmer').
60 According to one banker, Pemas had to borrow additional funds to service its yen debt which further 
limited the company's ability to operate its own businesses. In 1991 the central bank, Bank Negara, 
was still attempting (without success) to unite UMBC with a stronger bank to relieve Pemas of the 
heavy debt it had acquired through the purchase of Daim's stake in 1986. AWSJ :22Jl/ \ 991 (Raphael 
Pura, Malaysian Banks Cease Efforts in Big Merger, Failed Plan Leaves UMBC Still in Need of a 
Strong Parmer).
61 Besides the sale of his controlling stake in UMBC, Daim’s divestments in the 16 other companies 
included: Raleigh Bhd; Sime Darby Bhd; Cold Storage Bhd; Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd 
(STMB); Malayan Banking Bhd; Guthrie Ropel Bhd; Tasek Cement Bhd; Sateras Bhd; Oriental 
Holdings Bhd; Malayan Flour Bhd; Bolton Properties Bhd; Syarikat Permodalan Kebangsaan Bhd 
(SPK)); Syarikat Permodalan dan Perusahaan Perak Bhd (SPPK) and Industrial Oxygen Bhd (IOI). 
The Star, 10:12:1986.
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holdings.62 Even after Daim disposed of his various corporate investments critics 
continued to allege that he used his public role, albeit indirectly, to serve his private 
interests63.
This survey of Daim's rapid rise in business has shown the extent to which that rise 
was facilitated by a symbiotic, if not at times incestuous, relationship between his public, 
party and private roles as Minister of Finance, as chairman of Fleet Holdings and as a 
businessman. As we have seen the fusion of those roles produced enormous wealth for 
Daim as in his purchase of UEP, the sale of property and shares to the Fleet Group and 
the acquisition of UMBC, Malaysia's third largest bank. At the same time such a 
multiplicity of roles also enabled Daim to protect the wealth he had already acquired, as in 
the disposal of his stake in Sime Darby, the sale of Daza to the Fleet Group, and the sale 
of his stake in UMBC to Pemas.
In the 1980's Daim Zainuddin was the prime example of what we have termed 
'UMNO's proxy capitalists', that is individuals whose rise in business was due, in large 
part, to a fusion of party and private interests. It was that fusion or, to put more bluntly, 
exploitation of party and private roles that made Daim the most controversial member of 
the emerging Malay business elite and led critics to question whether such Malays could 
ever be the harbingers of an independent Malay entrepreneurial class. To answer that 
question it is necessary to place Daim in the context of change occurring within the Malay 
business elite or more specifically that faction of it we have termed 'UMNO's proxy 
capitalists-tumed-businessmen'.
62 In 1985 Daim approved investments totalling $70 million by the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) 
in certain companies, some of which did not have trustee-stock status. At least one o f those 
companies whose shares were bought by the EPF (Raleigh Bhd) was closely associated with Daim. 
Daim later claimed that the government was responding to great pressure from the private sector to 
keep prices buoyant during the recession. Daim defended the decision to order the staturory bodies to 
invest, arguing that the scheme would have worked had it not been for the collapse of the Singapore 
Pan Electric group in December 1985. See FEER, 1:9:1988 (Nick Seaward, 'The Daim  
Stewardship').
63 In that regard there was a widespread belief that Daim's erstwhile stakes in such companies as 
Raleigh, General Lumber and Cold Storage were being looked after by proxies such as Vincent Tan, 
Wan Azmi and Halim Saad and that, as a result, such individuals received preferential treatment from 
the regultory authorities. In that regard see MB, 1-15:8:1990 (S. Jayasankaran, 'Daim De-Mystified).
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FROM PROXY CAPITALISTS TO BUSINESSMEN
A characteristic feature of UMNO's modus operandi in business, particularly during the 
eighties, was the use of proxies who held shares or managed companies on behalf of the 
party. But considerable change and evolution has occured amongst what we have called 
UMNO's proxy capitalists. At what may be termed the 'base' of this group of 
'capitalists' are those who remain proxies. Prominent examples in the early nineties 
included Halim Saad and Anwar Othman, individuals whose corporate stature and 
capacity to project themselves into the private sector was the result of their position as 
directors of Renong and other UMNO-related companies. At some halfway point in the 
evolution of UMNO's proxy capitalists-cum-businessmen were others, such as Daim, 
Tunku Abdullah (Melewar Group) and Ahmad Sebi (Batu Lintang), who had at least 
progressed to a stage where they managed their own companies (though the growth of 
those companies remained dependent to varying degrees on an enmeshment with the 
corporate investments of the party).
At the 'top end' of the spectrum are those former UMNO proxy capitalists such as 
Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah (Land and General), Samsudin Abu Hassan (Landmarks) and 
Tajuddin Ramli (Technology Resources Bhd) who have emerged from the corporate 
nursery of Peremba as managers within UMNO's network of companies to establish their 
own corporate groups. That is not to say that members of this group have cut themselves 
off entirely from party patronage but such patronage no longer appears to be critical to 
their survival and growth. In order to place the rather 'ersatz capitalism' associated with 
Daim and the eighties in some perspective, and show the broader processes of change 
and evolution at work amongst UMNO's proxy capitalists, we shall now consider 
examples at both the 'top' and 'bottom' of this spectrum. First let us turn our attention to 
those who remain proxies for UMNO.
UMNO’s Proxy Capitalists: Halim Saad
By the early 1990's Halim Saad had emerged as UMNO's foremost proxy capitalist. 
Halim was educated at the elite Malay College, Kuala Kangsar, an institution that also 
produced a number of other key managers of UMNO's business interests such as Anuar 
Othman, managing director of United Engineers, Khalid Hj Ahmad, managing director of 
New Straits Times Press (NSTP) and Amirullah Abdul Muhi Mayuddin, managing
177
director of PLUS.64 Halim later studied in New Zealand where he qualified as a 
Chartered Accountant and gained a Bachelor of Commerce degree.
Halim's corporate rise began when he joined Peremba in the early eighties. At 
Peremba, Halim quickly rose to become corporate services manager. At the same time, 
like others who later became part of this important core of the party's proxy capitalists, 
Halim also became involved with the personal interests of Daim, who was then chairman 
of Peremba. In that regard Halim was appointed in January 1984 as a director of one of 
Daim's family companies, Daza Sdn Bhd, that was later sold to UMNO-owned 
companies in the Fleet Group. Halim was also a director of the UMNO-linked Halimtan 
network of companies which included Pradaz Sdn Bhd, Cold Storage and Roxy, all 
companies that were then directly linked to Daim, as well as a director of Hatibudi Sdn 
Bhd, the company that in March 1985 acquired United Engineers (UEM). As noted 
earlier, Halim Saad himself revealed his role as an UMNO proxy when, in response to 
legal action by the DAP over the award of the North-South highway project to Hatibudi, 
Halim was obliged to state in an affadavit that he held the shares in Hatibudi 'in trust for 
UMNO’ (AWSJ, 18:1:1988).
Halim's role as an UMNO proxy was also apparent from the way his career closely 
reflected that of UMNO's own corporate manoeuvrings. So when UMNO lost control of 
Hatibudi Sdn Bhd (and its valuable assets such as United Engineers) to the Official 
Assignee in 1987, it was Halim Saad (and Anuar Othman) who reappeared a year later as 
the directors and principal shareholders of Hatibudi Nominees which, by a rather 
convoluted share-swapping arrangement, regained control of UEM. Finally, Halim was 
the key figure who orchestrated the massive restructuring exercise that brought most of 
the party's assets under the control of one huge conglomerate, Renong Bhd.65
64 Khalid Ibrahim is a member of the Chartered Association of Certified Accontants of the UK. He 
joined the NSTP Group in 1978 where he rose through various senior positions to become managing 
director in January 1991. Amirullah Abdul Muhi Mayudin is an economics graduate from the 
University of Malaya. He has held various posts at United Engineers, Idris Hydraulic, Promet and 
Aseam bankers Malaysia. He joined PLUS in 1988 as general manager of the corporate affairs 
division and was appointed managing director on 11 January 1991. See, The Star, 29:3:1991 (Profile: 
Halim - a young corporate giant).
65 In addition to his position as chairman of Renong, Halim also held senior positions in all the 
principal companies within that huge conglomerate including Kinta Kellas, Project Lebuhraya Utara 
Selatan (PLUS), Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd (TV3), United Engineers, New Straits Times Press 
and the Faber Group. He was also chairman of the Fleet Group and Pitisan Sdn Bhd. Although in 
January 1991 Halim Saad relinquished his post as chief executive officer of United Engineeers (M) 
Bhd (UEM), Projek Lebuhraya Utara Selatan (PLUS), New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd (NSTP) and 
the Faber Group, he remained as executive vice-chairman of those companies. The Star, 17:1:1991.
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While the corporate rise of proxy capitalists is dependent on their positions as 
managers of UMNO's assets, the relationship is by no means one-sided and is 
complicated by the ownership of such assets. In order for the party to claim that 'it does 
not own any company and is not involved in business' it was necessary for proxy 
capitalists to hold the party's assets, mainly shares, in their own names. So from a 
strictly legal and corporate point of view, owner-directors such as Halim Saad are not 
merely agents or 'proxies' but appear able to exercise a degree of independent action in 
their management of the party's considerable investments. The enormity of the wealth 
concentrated in the hands of UMNO's principal proxies became apparent in during the 
restructuring of Renong.
In the early 1990's Halim Saad, Anuar Othman and, for a time, Mohd Razali, were 
all owner-directors of UMNO-linked companies, though Halim Saad was by far the most 
dominant in terms of share ownership.66 When Renong acquired Hatibudi Nominees the 
$454 million purchase involved no cash but instead the issue of new Renong shares to 
the vendors - mainly Halim who held 90 per cent of Hatibudi in his name and Fleet 
Holdings the 100 per cent owner of Fleet Group (Asiaweek, 18:5:1990). Hatibudi's net 
worth as at 31 March 1990 was $244.9 million (The Star, 1:5:1990). By March 1991 
Halim was believed to control directly and indirectly a massive 73 per cent of Renong's 
shares (The Star, 25:3:1991). In a declaration required by the Companies Act, Halim 
advised the authorities that he held 15.07 per cent of Renong shares directly in his own 
name and a further 50.67 per cent indirectly through the shares registered under various 
nominees and Fleet Holdings in which he held an indirect 50 per cent stake (The Star, 
3:4:1991). In addition, Halim together with his wife, Datin Norani Zolkiffli wholly 
owned a company called Hanuma Sdn Bhd. Hanuma Sdn Bhd bought the entire equity in 
Pacific Fleet Sdn Bhd and Hanurai Sdn Bhd, both of which also had significant stakes in
6 6 Halim Saad and Mohd Razali Abdul Rahman were both owner-directors of Hatibudi Snd Bhd. In July 
1985 when Hatibudi's paid up capital was increased to $1 million, Halim Saad and Mohd Razali each 
held 499, 999 $1 shares in the company. Gomez: 1990:108. Anuar Othman was a director of Hatibudi 
Sdn Bhd, Hatibudi Nominees, United Engineers and Renong Bhd. In a form 29B notification of the 
change in interest o f a major shareholder Anuar Othman revealed that on 28 November 1990, under a 
sales and purchase agreement dated 26 April 1990 he acquired 12, 245 Renong shares registered under 
his own name. Anuar, who was also a director of Fleet Group Sdn Bhd, also declared that he owned 
another 60, 000, 000 shares registered under Syarikat Nominee Bumiputra Sdn Bhd. He added that on 
28 November 1990, 1, 990, 355, 177 million shares were purchased by Fleet Holdings in which he 
too declared a 50 per cent indirect interest. According to the KLSE Handbook of Companies Anuar 
Othman's shareholdings direct and indirect in Renong amounted to 31.98 percent. See BT, 17:1:1991 
and KLSE Annual Companies Handbook, V o l.X V ll Book I. p 700. The composition of Halim 
Saad's dominant shareholding in Renong is described in the following footnote.
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Renong.67 Already, by December 1990, Renong was one of Malaysia's largest publicly 
listed companies with assets totalling $1.26 billion, placing it second only to Sime Darby 
on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (NST, 8:12:1990). Control, direct and indirect, of 
73 per cent of Renong meant therefore a massive concentration of wealth in the hands of 
its executive chairman, Halim Saad. A study by Malaysian Business (16:4:1992) to 
determine ownership by directors of publicly-listed companies revealed that Halim Saad 
and his wife Noraini Zolkifli were among the top ten owners of corporate stock in 
Malaysia, the remainder being Chinese. The combined corporate equity owned by Halim 
($1.7 billion) and his wife ($717 million) amounted to over $2.4 billion more than that of 
any other group among the top ten owners of corporate stock.
The potential dilemma for UMNO in separating its ownership of such massive assets 
by the use of proxies was highlighted, perhaps inadvertently, by the Prime Minister Dr 
Mahathir who while claiming that 'Halim Saad was not a front man for UMNO, 'went on 
to point out that 'UMNO has been cheated many times in the past because people 
entrusted to look after UMNO's funds suddenly said there was no money at all.'68 In
67 When Renong took over the Fleet Group and Hatibudi Nominees in April 1990, Renong's largest 
shareholder was a company called Pacific Fleet which held 14 per cent of the company. Pacific Fleet's 
only two shareholders were Halim Saad and Anuar Othman. In January 1991 Halim Saad, as 
executive chairman of Renong informed the company that as of 28 November 1990 he had 
220,410,909 Renong shares registered in his own name. On 12 March 1991 Halim disposed of 20 
million shares, reducing his direct holding to 200,410,909 or 15.07 per cent. In addition to the shares 
held under his own name, Halim advised the company that he had an indirect interest in another 
476,739,620 Renong shares or 50.67 per cent. Halim's indirect interest was comprised of 
355,177,120 shares purchased by Fleet Holdings in which he had declared a 50 per cent interest, 
60,000,000 shares registered under Syarikat Nominee Bumiputra Sdn Bhd, 30,312,000 shares 
registered under BCB Nominees Sdn Bhd and a further 31,250,000 shares registered under Rothputra 
Nominees Sdn Bhd. In November 1990, Renong announced that Hanuma Sdn Bhd became a 
substantial shareholder of the company with 121,563,000 million shares or 9.1 per cent. This arose 
from the purchase by Hanuma of the entire paid-up capital of Pacific Fleet Sdn Bhd and Hanurai Sdn 
Bhd. Pacific Fleet and Hanurai were private holding companies; Pacific Fleet holding 60 million 
shares in Renong and Hanurai 61,563 million. Hanuma was wholly owned by Halim and his wife, 
Datin Noraini Zolkiffli. Halim's wife is also a director of Renong. See BT, 28:11:1990, NST, 
17:1:1991, The Star, 28:3:1991 and 3:4:1991 and KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook Vol XVII, 
Book 1 p 700.
68 NST, 19:7:1991 (’PM:UMNO not involved in business'). These comments were made by the Prime 
Minister, Dr Mahathir when he replied in Parliament to Opposition Leader, Lim Kit Siang who had 
earlier alleged that Halim Saad was a 'front man for UMNO'. Dr Mahathir said that, "I sleep well 
every night as I am not worried that UMNO's money will be lost because UMNO money is not 
involved. I admit that if UMNO money to the amount of $1 billion is involved, I will not be able to 
sleep well. UMNO has been cheated many times in the past because people entrusted to look after 
UMNO's funds suddenly said there was no money at all. As such, I am not trusting to the extent of 
allowing others to be fronting (for UMNO). ...Now I am aware that there are people who only want 
to take care of UMNO if they can own it".
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other words to view UMNO's principal proxy capitalists as little more than corporate 
cyphers of the party leadership underestimates the role they play. Indeed, of the three 
types of directors identified by Lim Mah Hui (1981:70) that is executive-professional 
directors, functional directors and owner-directors, the roles performed by 'proxies' such 
as Halim Saad combine the two most important of those categories, executive- 
professional directors (who perform the day-to-day management functions), and that of 
the owner-directors (who both own and take an active interest in the operations or 
policies of corporations).
UMNO's proxy capitalists wield considerable corporate power not only from their 
ownership, direct and indirect, of large amounts of shares but also from the multiple 
directorships they hold on the party's behalf. With regard to the latter, it is members of 
this small and select group who, to a large extent, determine the investment strategies of 
some of Malaysia's largest companies on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. The 
potential to use or exploit such a concentration of corporate power is of course 
considerable, the possibilities of which were highlighted in 1990 when several UMNO- 
owned or related companies were the subject of insider trading investigations. One 
investigation focussed on Renong's S 1.95 billion restructuring earlier that same year. The 
case involved trading in the shares of some of the most prominent listed companies 
within the Renong group, notably United Engineers, Kinta Kellas and Time 
Engineering.69 Halim Saad was a director and/or held substantial shares in all three 
companies. Of particular interest to the authorities was why United Engineer's share price 
leapt to more than $12 on the last day of trading of 1989 when it was $4.30 only nine 
months earlier (FEER, 18:7:1991). The Finance Minister, Datuk Anwar Ibrahim, 
acknowledged that Malaysia's Registrar of Companies and police had interrogated 
Renong personnel in connection with the Companys' restructuring but said they found 
insufficient evidence to pursue charges against any individual.70
69 According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, Malaysia's Registrar of Companies asked all 53 
stockbroking firms in February 1990 to provide trading information on shares in UEM from 1 April 
to 31 December 1989, for Time Engineering from 1 July to 31 December 1989 and for Kinta Kellas 
from 1 September to 31 December 1989. The government also requested information regarding share 
transactions in Multi-Purpose Holdings (MPH) which was the focus of a takeover by Hume 
Industries. Hume Industries was 23.8 per cent owned by a unit o f Renong's Fleet Group. Some 
observers claimed that the government's main purpose in mounting the insider trading investigations 
was to frighten would-be offenders but others argued that insider traders had offended powerful 
interests in UMNO by utilising advance information of corporate monoeuvres to engage in 
unauthorised transactions. See FEER, 18:7:1991 (Doug Tsuruoka, 'Unfair shares').
70 The NST, 13:7:1991 reported that Deputy Home Minister, Datuk Megat Junid said that police had 
recorded statements from the former chairman of Bank Bumiputra, Tan Sri Basir Ismail, Renong
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The corporate rise of Halim Saad, UMNO's most prominent proxy capitalist, 
highlights some key features associated with this important group within the Malay 
business elite. As both owner-directors and executive-professional directors of some of 
Malaysia's largest companies, UMNO's proxy capitalists exercise a considerable degree 
of power and independence in corporate circles where they are amongst the country's 
most influential 'movers and shakers' in business. Yet, at the same time, UMNO's proxy 
capitalists are still capitalists by virtue of their loyalty the party leadership and their 
positions as managers of the party's assets. However that fundamental limitation is 
temporary because most 'proxies' have utilised the considerable corporate experience, 
connections (and capital) amassed while managing UMNO's investments to become 
corporate tycoons in their own right.
From Proxy to Corporate Captain: Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah
How former proxies move beyond the networks party patronage to establish themselves 
as independent corporate entities can be seen in the case of of our next study, Wan Azmi 
Wan Hamzah. Wan Azmi's corporate background was typical of most former UMNO 
proxies - many of whom had also been associated with Daim at Peremba and managed 
various arms of the Fleet Group in the 1980's - and who, by the 1990's, had emerged to 
head their own Bumiputra business groups. In this survey of Wan Azmi's corporate rise 
we shall also pay attention to the complementary character of the relationship that appears 
to be developing between the new Malay and Chinese business groups as well as their 
common and close relationship with the state.
executive chairman Datuk Halim Saad and had questioned a lawyer, Zaid Ibrahim ’in connection with 
the probe into insider trading'. The following day Megat Junid claimed that he had not disclosed any 
names in relation to the probe and had been misreported by the press. See NST, 13:7:1991 ('Insider 
trading : Three questioned by police'); AWSJ, 19-20:7:1991 (Raphael Pura, 'BBMB Loss Spurs 
Illegal-Trading Charge’) and NST, 13:7:1991.
The Board of directors of another UMNO-related company, Sungei Besi Mines Malaysia Bhd, were 
reprimanded for being 'totally irresponsible' after a controversial share offer in which the company 
revised the price of its shares from $12 to $4 in order to finance a 30 per cent stake in a sugar 
refining company, Tradewinds Malaysia. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd's stockbroking unit BBMB 
Securities Sdn Bhd, lost $72 million in deals associated with Sungei Besi shares and in November 
1991 the unit's chief executive, Ghazali Noor, was found guilty and fined for illegal trading. For a 
detailed account of the convoluted price-rigging scheme that involved trading in Sungei Besi shares 
see Cheong, 1990:31-36 ('The Sungei Besi Mines Malaysia Bhd : Another UEM Link') FEER, 
18:7:1991 (Doug Tsuruoka, 'Unfair shares') and AWSJ, 7:11:1991 (Stephen Duthie, 'BBMB's Ex- 
Chief Fined for Illegal Trades').
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The son of a Supreme Court judge, Wan Azmi was bom in Kelantan in 1950 and 
qualified as a chartered accountant in the United Kingdom. After working briefly for the 
Guthrie Corporation in the mid 1970's he joined the UMNO-owned New Straits Times 
Press in 1977 where he rose to become financial controller of the organisation. Two 
years later he joined government-owned Peremba Bhd, then headed by Daim with whom 
he forged a 'deep and personal friendship' (The Star, 7:6:1990). In 1983 he became 
managing director of United Estates Projects, a publicly-listed company that was later 
renamed Sime-UEP Bhd, a director of the Malaysian French Bank Bhd in which Daim's 
family companies then had a majority stake, and was a director of the UMNO-controlled 
Fleet Group and some of its subsidiaries (MB, 16:3:1991). Later, as Minister of Finance, 
Daim appointed Wan Azmi as Chief Executive Officer of the government-owned Malayan 
Banking Bhd, Malaysia's third largest commercial bank in 1985. Wan Azmi was only 36 
at the time, extraordinarily young for such a senior position. His stay at the bank was 
shortlived, and a difficult one, as it coincided with the recession of the mid-1980's. As 
head of the bank, Wan Azmi had to call in the growing debts of many of his Bumiputra 
business friends. It also became public knowledge during this period that Bank 
Bumiputra and Malayan Banking had extended huge loans to Maminco Sdn Bhd, the 
company set up by the government in its ill-fated attempt to comer the world tin 
market.71 After less than two years he left Malayan Banking to strike out in business on 
his own.
Wan Azmi's entree to business was facilitated by Daim who offered him an 8 per cent 
stake in an ailing timber company called General Lumber owned by Raleigh Bhd72. 
(Raleigh had been Daim's former company before he relinquished control to his business 
associates after he became Minister for Finance in July 1984.) Wan Azmi obtained seed 
capital for the purchase of his stake in General Lumber from the sale of shares he had in 
UEP Bhd to Sime Darby and through borrowings from the banks. The banking sector 
was quite willing to lend capital to a rising Bumiputra businessman, particularly one who 
was already well known in financial circles as a former Chief Executive Officer of 
Malayan Banking (Interview, 13:1:1992 and MB, March 16-31:1991). Wan Azmi 
subsequently raised his interest in General Lumber to 14.5 per cent and became chairman 
of the company.
71 See Jomo, 1990:74 and The Star, 16:11:1986.
72 See FEER, 19:10:1989. Also confirmed in author's interview with Wan Azmi, 13:1:1992. General 
Lumber was formerly owned by a prominent Chinese businessman from Johore, Datuk Kang Kok 
Seng and his family. As a Chinese-owned company it apparently had had increasing difficulty in 
obtaining timber concessions.
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For Wan Azmi the attraction of General Lumber was that as a publicly-listed company 
it provided the vehicle for him to raise funds and launch his own corporate career. In that 
regard Wan Azmi later told the Far Eastern Economic Review that 'General Lumber's 
problem was that it neither had cash flow nor collateral. We had to go with a series of 
acquisitions of landed assets where the medium of settlement could be General Lumber 
shares. This allowed us, using the acquisitions as collateral, to source funds to activate 
the core business' (FEER, 19:11:1989). Wan Azmi and his brother-in-law, Nik 
Mahmood Haji Nik Hassan, then set about creating one of the few fully integrated timber 
operations in Southeast Asia. This coincided with the Malaysian Government's targetting 
of value-added wood products as a promising future growth area. Despite initially 
funding acquisitions through new share issues, General Lumber's share price leapt more 
than 200 per cent as brokers assumed that General Lumber would be a major beneficiary 
of the furniture industry's relocation from South Korea and Taiwan73 where costs had 
risen sharply (FEER, 19:10:1989).
While vertical integration within the timber business moderated the cyclical features of 
that industry, General Lumber sought to ameliorate these further by the diversification of 
its activities.74 Consequently since the late 1980's General Lumber branched into the 
manufacture of resins and compounds for the plastics industry, property development 
(through the acquisition of Sri Damansara) and stockbroking through a stake in Rashid 
Hussein Bhd. By December 1991 General Lumber's original core activity in primary 
logging was a relatively minor component of the groups activities and, to reflect that, the 
company changed its name to Land and General Bhd (NST, 6:12:1991). The 
transformation of Land and General from what had been a small struggling timber 
company to a profitable and diversified concern was a testament to Wan Azmi's corporate 
skills and was reflected in an assessment by a Malaysian business magazine (Corporate 
World, 7:1992), which ranked the company thirty-six in terms of profitability in 
comparison with more than 350 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
Although Land and General was the centrepiece of Wan Azmi's business holdings, it
^3 In the late 1980's General Lumber entered into a strategic alliance with one of Taiwan's top furniture 
exporters and also bought UMW Industries (UMWI), from an arm of the Pahang state government. 
UMWI manufactured furniture for export to the US, Britain and Japan (FEER, 19:10:1989).
^4 Political risks, that is the growing power o f the green lobby and international concern over the 
logging of tropical rainforests, provided a secondary justification for the diversification of General 
Lumber. (By the late 1980s General Lumber was already a substantial 'logger' in the region. In a $1.6 
billion deal it reportedly secured a 200,000ha forest concession in Papua New Guinea. In Indonesia 
Azmi entered into a joint venture with a local company, Kuala Langsa, to log 5,000 ha with an 
option to log a further 10,000ha in Sumatra.) See The Star, 7:6:1990.
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nevertheless constituted only part of a diverse investment portfolio which included stakes 
in a range of public companies including Gadek Bhd, Malaysian Resources, Cycle and 
Carriage, Cold Storage Bhd (the latter a company controlled by Daim in the early 
1980's), and an overseas bank, the Southeast Asia Bank in Mauritius.
In the course of his corporate rise Wan Azmi clearly benefitted from state support and 
the friendships of other powerful businessmen, Bumiputra and Chinese alike. However, 
on closer examination, a reciprocity was often apparent in those relationships that belie 
easy categorization so while his business investments on occasion appear to have had a 
'symmetry' with those of the party, by the early nineties he was generally regarded as a 
relatively independent corporate player. This apparent mix of roles can best be illustrated 
by reference to a number of his business dealings and relationships.
The coincidence between the corporate interests of the party and those of Wan Azmi 
appeared most notable in his purchase of assets of the hotel and property group, Faber 
Merlin. In our earlier survey of the Fleet Group, it was noted how in the early 1980s one 
of the Group's most important acquisitions was Faber Merlin, a company which after the 
recession and property slump of the mid-eighties was encumbered with large debts. In an 
attempt to salvage Faber, the Fleet Group called on several companies to either take-over 
Faber or purchase some of its assets, but none were prepared to do so (Asiaweek, 
30:9:1985). With the likely prospect of being wound-up, Faber was 'saved' when its 
principal asset, the Kuala Lumpur Merlin, was purchased in February 1990 by Ampang 
Hotel Sdn Bhd for $113 million - a company, which through various shareholdings, was 
linked ultimately to Wan Azmi75. Shortly thereafter Faber's financial problems were 
resolved after a restructuring exercise and its movement into UMNO's Renong group.76
Another instance where Wan Azmi's corporate investments also appeared to serve 
those of the party was his purchase in June 1990 of Nanyang Press, publisher of one of 
Malaysia's most influential Chinese newspapers, Nanyang Siang Pau. At the time many
75 Ampang Hotel Sdn Bhd was owned by Singapore-based Ampang Investment Pty Ltd which was a 
joint-venture company in which Cycle and Carriage Ltd had a 40 per cent stake. One of Cycle and 
Carriage's main shareholders was a Hong Kong-based company, Yung Pui Co Ltd, controlled by Wan 
Azmi and former Bank Bumiputra chairman, Basir Iamail (Gomez, 1994:85). See also KLSE Annual 
Companies Handbook Vol XV:754 and The Star, 1:9:1990.
76 After it was brought under Renong’s control, Faber was awarded a 50 per cent stake in PLUS the 
lucrative concession company incorporated by United Engineers (UEM) to implement the North- 
South Highway project. On Faber Merlin, see chapter five 'The Renong Takeover' particularly 
footnotes 37 and 38 and 'Government assistance to the expansion of UMNO companies' and also 
chapter six Daim and the Fleet Group.’
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observers speculated that Azmi was being used as a proxy by UMNO, under the direction 
of its treasurer, Daim to take control of a major Chinese newspaper ahead of the then 
forthcoming general elections77. Although Nanyang Siang Pau ultimately ended up under 
the control of UMNO-connected Hume Industries that, according to Azmi, was not the 
result of any machiavellian design but a combination of circumstances which involved 
him in a particularly troublesome investment. His own account of that episode, which in 
fact caused him some difficulty with Daim and the UMNO leadership, is illuminating.78
In March 1990 Wan Ariff, Wan Azmi's brother bought a 20.26 per cent stake in 
Nanyang Press through his Hongkong-based company, Oriental Highland. Although 
Oriental Highland had the largest stake in Nanyang, the company's stock was very 
divided as Pemas, Kuok Brothers, SEA Housing and a number of other investors held 
small stakes in it.79 Nanyang was a profitable company but, according to Azmi, it had no 
real leadership because its shareholding was so divided. Ariff turned to his brother for 
advice. Wan Azmi, with a background as a former financial controller of New Straits 
Times Press (NSTP), thought Nanyang was a good business proposition so, in June 
1990, purchased a controlling 30 per cent stake in the company (The Star, 7:6:1990).
It quickly became apparent however that the investment was a mistake as the Chinese 
community boycotted what was seen as Bumiputra, and possibly UMNO, control being 
extended over yet another major Chinese daily. For Wan Azmi matters were made worse 
when just before the 1990 general elections, Nanyang Siang Pau published (in English) 
the manifesto of the opposition Semangat '46, an action which resulted in a phone call 
and a rebuke 'What's this man?' from Daim. It was, according to Azmi, the only 
occasion on which Daim had called him on a business matter.80 Embroiled in controversy 
with both the Malay and the Chinese community by his Nanyang venture, Azmi gladly 
sold his stake in the company to Hume Industries, a unit of Quek Leng Chan's Hong 
Leong group.81 The sale was politically astute since Nanyang ostensibly remained in 
Chinese hands though Hume, at one step removed, was closely linked with UMNO's
77 See for instance FEER, 28:2:1991.
78 Authors interview with Wan Azmi, 13 :1: 1992
79 At the time Pemas held 13 per cent of Nanyang while Kuok Bros and SEA Housing each held about 
6 per cent with minority stakes held by a variety of other small investors (FEER, 12:4:1990).
80 Authors interview with Wan Azmi, 13:1:1992.
81 Wan Azmi's company, General Lumber, made a profit of $12.7 million on the sale (The Star, 
9:2:1991).
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Renong group.82 So while UMNO eventually extended its control, albeit indirectly, over 
Nanyang Siang Pau, it would nevertheless seem mistaken to characterise Wan Azmi's 
role in that exercise as that of an UMNO proxy.
Clearly Wan Azmi has benefitted from state support but, at the same time, he has 
successfully capitalised on the opportunities afforded by such support A notable example 
in that regard concerned the restructuring of the American-controlled RJ Reynolds 
Tobacco Company. RJ Reynolds was under pressure from the Malaysian government to 
indigenise its equity to conform to NEP guidelines by the end of 1990. Wan Azmi 
orchestrated a rather complex deal which involved the rejuvenation of a listed, but 
previously moribund, company called Juara Perkasa Corp (JPC), and the 
Malaysianization of RJ Reynolds through a reverse takeover. On that occasion luck, a 
willingness to risk his own capital, and strong links with the authorities all combined to 
serve the interests of both Wan Azmi/JPC and RJ Reynolds. In essence, RJ Reynolds 
was able to Malaysianize its operations, obtain a listing on the KLSE within six months 
of the merger, and remit $230 million back to its head office, while Wan Azmi made a 
handsome profit. For an outlay of $10 million he obtained a 14.5 per cent stake in a 
company with a net worth of $261.5 million (Asiamoney, March 1991). (A synopsis of 
the deal is given below.)83. So while state backing has been a 'facilitator' in Wan Azmi's 
corporate rise - importantly, as in the RJ Reynolds/JPC deal - he has capitalised on that
82 In December 1989 Jaguh Mutiara Sdn Bhd, a company owned by the Fleet group, obtained a 
substantial 23.8 per cent stake in Hume Industries. Later the Fleet group was subsumed within the 
Renong group. See chapter 4 and The Star, 6:4:1991.
83 In February 1990 Wan Azmi, through his family holding company, Rohas Sdn Bhd, acquired a loss­
making but publicly-listed company called Juara Perkasa Corp (JPC). Originally he had been 
considering a co-operative arrangement with the Hong Leong Group to revitalize JPC but, with Quek 
Leng Chan's agreement, called off the arrangement when he was approached by the RJ Reynolds 
which had to restructure its equity so as to conform to the NEP’s requirement of 30 per cent 
ownership in Bumiputra hands by 1990. In essence, the deal structured largely by Azmi involved four 
steps. First he converted JPC's $8.7 million debt to equity and then purchased J & P Coates, an 
associate of JPC for $5.7 million. Secondly JPC purchased RJ Reynolds Sdn Bhd issuing 250 
million new JPC shares to parent RJ Reynolds (New Jersey). In the reverse take-over, JPC became a 
95.6 per cent subsidiary of RJ Reynolds (New Jersey). Third RJ Reynolds (New Jersey) divested 29.6 
per cent of its share in JPC and remitted $230 million to the parent company. Finally, RJ Reynolds 
(New Jersey) agreed to sell another 6 per cent a year later. With a 60 per cent stake, the company 
completed its Malaysianization. Ultimately Wan Azmi held 14.5 per cent of JPC with 5.5 per cent 
going to Bumiputra institutions and 10 per cent to the Malaysian public (Asiamoney, March 1991). 
See also MB, September 16-30 1990. According to Azmi (author’s interview, 13:1:1992) the details 
and share prices involved in the deal as related by Asiamoney were essentially correct.
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support and, as one Kuala Lumpur investment banker observed, 'Wan Azmi now carries 
a lot of weight on his own. His survival isn't dependent on someone else'84
Wan Azmi's status as a corporate player in his own right was well illustrated by the 
role he played in the battle for a billion dollar housing project, called Sri Damansara, on 
the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. The details of that rather complex three-way deal between 
Wan Azmi and two Chinese tycoons Lim Thian Kit (T K Lim) and Vincent Tan are given 
later in the study.85 However, an outline of the story here, from Azmi's perspective, will 
serve to show the complementary character of the relationship between the new Malay 
and Chinese business groups and their common and close relationship with the 
government
By 1990 Sri Damansara was owned by a company called Magnum Corporation 
which had been acquired by T K Lim in the course of his takeover of the MCA's former 
investment arm, Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd (MPH). Vincent Tan, another prominent 
member of the new generation of Chinese tycoons to emerge in the 1980's, was - 
through his company the Inter-Pacific Industrial Group (Inter-Pac) - the other major 
shareholder of Magnum. A corporate tussle ensued between Lim and Tan for control of 
Magnum. Tan applied pressure on two fronts - on the one hand by increasing his stake in 
Magnum, and on the other by 'posturing' (Azmi's phrase), that he had more political 
clout than Lim.86
Already burdened with large debt, Lim turned to Azmi both for capital and political 
clout in his bid to avoid an entire sell-out of Magnum/Sri Damansara to Tan. At that point 
Azmi played a pivotal role in structuring a deal in which all the parties, though himself in 
particular, gained handsomely. In essence Azmi acquired Sri Damansara from 
Lim/Magnum for $200 million in a share swap as a result of which Lim/Magnum became 
a substantial shareholder in one of the leading Bumiputra conglomerates, Azmi's Land 
and General. The deal also doubled Land and General's paid-up capital and gave Azmi a 
'call option' that allowed him to purchase from Magnum whatever it held in excess of 20 
per cent of Land and General's expanded share base. In effect this meant that while
84 See FEER, 19:10:1989 (Jonathan Friedland, Malaysian Entrepreneur turns around General Lumber: 
Out of the Woods').
88 See chapter 9 and the study of the Hong Leong Group.
86 That assertion was given some credence when Daim, as Finance Minister, overruled a finding by 
Malaysia's central bank that Lim had violated the country's Banking and Financial Institutions Act 
(BAFIA) by failing to file notice of his share purchase (FEER, 14:6:1990).
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Magnum was a substantial shareholder, Azmi's control of the expanded conglomerate 
remained secure.
Vincent Tan, whose Inter-Pac group had a 23.9 per cent stake in Magnum, objected 
to the deal, arguing that the $200 million purchase price was too low (MB, 16-31:1991). 
So in November 1991 Azmi/Land and General sold 25 per cent of its stake in Sri 
Damansara to Sports Toto, a company owned by Vincent Tan for a profit of $9 million 
(The Star, 6:11:1991). Why the apparently conciliatory gesture? The reason, according to 
Azmi, was both profit and 'face'. Tan believed, correctly, he had missed out on a good 
investment where Sri Damansara was concerned and in Malaysia’s politicised corporate 
world it appeared he had been 'cut out of the action'. So Azmi gave him a 25 per cent 
stake for $59.5 million cash (The Star, 6:11:1991). The arrangement suited Azmi whose 
company, Land and General, was then under some strain owing to heavy borrowing, 
while Tan regained 'face' and a stake in a company whose profits were expected to soar 
as the economy continued to recover from the slump of the mid eighties.
From the incubus of the state and the party (Peremba and the Fleet Group) Wan Azmi 
emerged by the late 1980's to head one of Malaysia's largest Bumiputra business groups. 
After his own entree to the corporate world provided by General Lumber, Wan Azmi 
skillfully used the mechanisms of the stockmarket to finance an integrated timber 
operation which in turn was transformed into a more diversified, durable and profitable 
group. (Interestingly the manner of his rise and close relationship with the state bore 
striking similarities to that of the new Chinese business groups to emerge in the eighties.) 
In the case of RJ Reynolds, Wan Azmi capitalised on NEP requirements to orchestrate a 
deal ultimately to the satisfaction and profit of the government, foreign capital and 
domestic (Bumiputra) capital. In the Sri Damansara compact the pivotal role he played not 
only belied notions of 'proxy capitalist' or 'Ali Baba' type arrangements, but showed 
how the attractions for Chinese of integration with Bumiputra capital were not confmed to 
the latter’s connections with the state but, as importantly, the mutual benefits each offered 
the other in terms of finance and ownership. A reciprocity was also apparent in the 
relationship between Azmi and the corporate interests of the party. (Thus his apparent 
'rescue' of Faber Merlin was explained as a return or quid pro quo for past favours.) But 
the key feature of this more dynamic element amongst UMNO's former proxy capitalists 
represented by Wan Azmi, and others such as Samsuddin Abu Hassan and Tajuddin 
Ramli, is a capacity to build on, rather than become dependent on networks of state and 
party patronage and to move beyond them.
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Conclusion
Political capitalists who derive their wealth or gain an entree to business through an 
association with UMNO constitute an important element in the evolution of Malay 
capitalism. Two broad groups of political capitalists were identified, that is politicians 
who became businessmen and former managers of the party's own considerable assets 
(UMNO's proxy capitalists), who later also become businessmen. Not only is the 
starting point of the two groups different but, as we have seen, so was their capacity to 
move beyond rent-seeking activities and establish themselves as businessmen largely 
independent of party or political patronage.
From our study of the corporate rise of two prominent politicians-turned- 
businessmen, Ghafar Baba and Syed Kechik, a number of features emerged which 
appear fairly common to many who fall within this category. Politicians become 
businessmen through the power or influence they are able to use to acquire land and 
resources or contracts and directorships. But, as our case studies showed, the 
dependence and vulnerability of such capital to changing political relationships prompts 
speculative activity and short time horizons for quick profits. Capital accumulated in this 
manner is invariably narrowly based - property, timber or speculative plays on the 
stockmarket, the initial gains from which - unlike the more dynamic elements of Malay 
capital - are seldom re-invested to deepen or diversify capital and place it on a more 
durable base. Indeed a roll call of some of the more prominent politicians-turned- 
businessmen including Ghafar Baba, Syed Kechik, Abdullah Ahmad, Rahman Yakub 
and Harun Idris is a catalogue of rent-seekers and 'ersatz capitalists'. The static nature of 
this group was in contrast to the more varied and more dynamic characteristics associated 
with some of UMNO's former proxy capitalists who have become businessmen.
In contrast to politicians who become businessmen, the transition of UMNO's proxy 
capitalists to business is facilitated by the corporate experience and connections gained as 
managers of the party's considerable investments and/or, in some cases, by enmeshing 
their own corporate interests with those of UMNO. The record of UMNO as an incubus 
for this important group of capitalists is mixed. At one end of the spectrum are those like 
Halim Saad who remain proxies, that is they are capitalists by virtue of their positions as 
managers of the party's assets. Yet, as our survey indicated, notions of proxy should be 
tempered by a recognition that as both owner-directors and executive-professional 
directors of some of Malaysia’s largest companies, those who remain 'UMNO's proxy 
capitalists’ nevertheless wield considerable power, and it seems, a degree of 
independence in business. Another group of UMNO proxy capitalists-cum-businessmen
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included Daim, Tunku Abdullah, Ahmad Sebi and others who managed their own 
companies though the fortunes of those companies were tied in varying degrees to the 
corporate investments of the party. Indeed the capacity of such business groups to 
operate and develop as free-standing entities appeared limited. The archetypical example 
of this facet of Malay capitalism was of course Daim, whose extraordinary rise in buiness 
owed much to a fusion, if not exploitation, of his party and private roles.87
But as we saw Daim, and his sort were only part of the story, for proxy capitalists 
also included individuals such as Wan Azmi, Samsuddin Abu Hassan and Tajudin Ramli, 
who have emerged from the incubus of Peremba and UMNO's network of companies, to 
establish some of Malaysia's leading Bumiputra business groups. The important 
characteristic of this group was a capacity to build on networks of state and party 
patronage and move beyond them. These UMNO proxy capitalists-tumed-businessmen, 
of which the case of Wan Azmi is fairly typical, have transformed and diversified what 
initially were often narrowly-based and rather speculative enterprises into groups with a 
more solid asset base. In concert with this economic change, a complementary rather than 
clientalistic relationship also appears to have developed between Azmi (and others of this 
group) both with the state and with foreign and Chinese capital. The critical point 
however is that this group have shifted from proxy capitalists in the eighties to become 
relatively independent businessmen in the nineties, and that while this group has grown, 
the rentier and ersatz elements associated with Daim and others have remained static or 
declined. While change and transition is apparent amongst some elements of Malay 
capital spawned by the state and the party, it is also apparent in Malay capital whose 
origins have been largely based in the private sector. It is to this third leg in the 
development of Malay capitalism that we now turn.
87 In the development of Malay capitalism Daim’s greatest legacy may not be his own example but the 
opportunities he provided for that key group of Malay entrepreneurs who emerged from the corporate 
nursery of Peremba and the Fleet Group.
Chapter 7
PRIVATE MALAY CAPITAL: RENTIERS, TRANSITIONAL 
GROUPS AND ENTREPRENEURS
The growth of Malay capitalism in the eighties has attracted the attention of many 
scholars, but accounts of this important development have generally been given in 
descriptive or historical terms, 1 that is greater attention has been paid to the origins of 
Malay capital - ex-bureaucrats, ex-politicians, royalty and so on - rather than the 
dynamics involved in their emergence and development.2 By contrast the primary focus 
of our study has been on the relationship or intensity of the fusion between the three main 
vehicles through which greater Malay ownership of the economy was pursued - the state, 
the party and the private sector - since it was the merging of those categories that has 
determined the character of Malay capital and provided the combustion for its growth. 
Throughout we have been concerned to emphasise however that while such categories as 
'state', 'party' and 'private' serve a useful heuristic purpose in analyzing the development 
of Malay business groups, in reality there is considerable blurring and overlap between 
them. This chapter will be concerned with the third leg, or group, in the development of 
Malay capitalism, that is those Bumiputra entrepreneurs whose origins and growth have 
been largely based in the private sector, in short 'private capitalists.'
The spectrum found amongst Malay capitalists who have emerged from the incubus 
of the state and the party can also be found amongst those who have emerged from the 
private sector where we also find rent-seekers, transitional groups and entrepreneurs. 
This chapter will be concerned to identify the key factors associated with the static and 
more dynamic elements of Malay capitalism associated with each of those categories in 
the private sector. So in the case studies of rentiers, transitional groups, and 
entrepreneurs that follow, particular attention will be paid to the relationships between
1 See Sieh Lee, 1992:112-124; Lim, M. H., 1981:52-62; Tan, 1982:281-292; Jesudason, 1990:105- 
109 and Ho, 1990:263-275.
2 For a succinct but comprehensive overview of the evolution of the Malay business class see Crouch, 
Malaysian Government: Authoritarian Repression and Democratic Responsiveness (unpublished 
manuscript), chapter 11.
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Bumiputra capital, the state, and Chinese or foreign business on the one hand, and the 
implications of those relationships for the development of Malay capitalism on the other. 
First we turn to the rentiers, where the fusion of those relationships and their implications 
for rent-seeking behaviour were most apparent in the dramatic rise and fall of one of 
M alaysia's most prominent Bumiputra capitalists of the 1980’s, Tan Sri Ibrahim 
Mohamed.3
RENTIERS
THE CASE OF TAN SRI IBRAHIM MOHAMED AND PROMET BHD
The case of Ibrahim Mohamed and his company, Promet Bhd, illustrates in stark and 
dramatic fashion how patronage and a close relationship with the government and the 
party can sponsor spectacular growth but at the same time so politicize a company's 
image and operations as to destroy it. Moreover, as the case of Promet shows, such a 
relationship may also encourage and facilitate for a time a circuit of quick and easy wealth 
production that belies the government's goal of fostering a robust and resilient 
community of Bumiputra entrepreneurs. But to appreciate the political character of 
Promet's rise and demise some background is first necessary concerning the initial means 
by which Ibrahim accumulated capital in the 1970's, and the friendships he forged at that 
time with prominent Chinese businessmen and leading figures in UMNO.
Ibrahim Mohamed was bom in 1942 in Kota Bharu, Kelantan. After graduating in 
economics from the University of Malaya in 1965 he was awarded a Bank Negara 
scholarship and read law at Lincoln's Inn, London In 1970 Ibrahim commenced his 
career as a lawyer in Kuantan, Pahang with a $9,000 loan from MARA (FEER, 
2:9:1977). During that period, the early seventies, Ibrahim became acquainted with 
Tengku Ahmad Shah, the future Sultan of Pahang and later Agung (King) of Malaysia. 
Ibrahim assisted Tengku Ahmad Shah, often known in business circles by his acronym 
(TAS), in the development of the Sultan's business interests, notably Taman TAS, 
Kuantan's first major Bumiputra housing project (BT, 5:9:1983). In 1974, while still in 
his early thirties, Ibrahim also ventured into business on his own in Pahang and
3 Some other prominent examples of rentier or static capital whose origins are more commonly 
associated with the private sector include Mazlan Harun (son of the former Chief Minister of 
Selangor) and his company Bidara Holdings; Haji Matshah Safuan of Kesang Corporation Bhd; the 
late Tengku Ariff Bendahara of Pahang (TAB Holdings) as well as most other companies associated 
with royalty, particularly those linked to the Sultans of Selangor and Pahang.
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Trengganu where he obtained rights to log timber concessions covering 5,000 acres from 
which he made $500,000 (BT, 5:9:1983). He invested that capital in Kuala Lumpur's 
then (1971-1973) booming stockmarket and made profits of several million dollars4. 
During the mid seventies Ibrahim's business interests also expanded into the construction 
industry where within two years he was able to obtain contracts worth $140 million, 
while his legal practice, which was an early beneficiary of the NEP, was also making 
huge profits.5
Ibrahim's move into the corporate sphere began in 1975 when he was appointed 
chairman of Tan Sri Lim Goh Tong's tourist and gambling conglomerate, Genting 
Highlands Bhd. Since the bulk of Genting's interests were in Pahang, the company 
required a Bumiputra partner with links in that state. Ibrahim, already active in business 
in Pahang and a confidante of the Sultan was an obvious choice.6 At Genting, Ibrahim 
obtained the formal approvals necessary for the subdivision of land owned by the 
company and so enabled it to considerably expand its facilities. He was also involved in 
the company's bid for control of the London-based plantation group, Golden Hope. 
Although the bid failed, Ibrahim and his right hand man and then general manager at 
Genting, Tan Koon Swan (who later became head of the MCA and the party's investment 
arm Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd), gained valuable experience concerning the operations 
of the stock market (MB, May: 1983). Both were soon to employ that experience in 
building their respective corporate groups.
While chairman of Genting Bhd, Ibrahim also continued to develop his own business 
interests. In 1976 he acquired his own public company when two statutory authorities, 
the Selangor Economic Development Corporation and Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor, 
agreed to sell their shares in a company called General Ceramics to Ibrahim’s family 
company, Fawanis (BT, 5:9:1983). A year later, Ibrahim sold General Ceramics (which 
under its managing director, Tan Sri Low Keng Huat, had become a very profitable
4 Ibrahim received financial backing from state-owned Bank Bumiputra and Malayan Banking to fund 
his acquisitions of land and shares (BT, 5:9:1983).
5 By 1977, Ibrahim's legal practice alone, was making profits o f $1 million annually (FEER, 
2:9:1977).
6 A public indication of the Sultan's favour where Ibrahim was concerned was the conferring by the 
Sultan o f several state awards, including the honorific title, "datuk" on Ibrahim. The titles were 
conferred presumably for services rendered to TAS Industries and, it was rumoured, for settling some 
of the Sultan's debts in London. In November 1978 the Sultan stripped Ibrahim of his titles. The 
reason for the Sultan's action was never publicly disclosed but fortunately for Ibrahim he remained a 
"datuk" having received the same award from the Sultan of Kelantan (NST, 16:11:1978).
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company) to finance his acquisition of another company, Associated Plastics Industries 
(API). At the time API7 was in debt, but after Ibrahim purchased the company its shares 
became the focus of market speculation. Many, including the KLSE committee, 
suspected that API shares were being cornered by its directors and as a result the counter 
was suspended8
In the course of his corporate rise in the mid seventies, Ibrahim not only established 
ties with some of Malaysia's most prominent Chinese businessmen, notably Lim Goh 
Tong, Low Keng Huat and Tan Koon Swan, but also with senior UMNO leaders, 
particularly Dr Mahathir and Tengku Razaleigh, who at the time also held the most 
powerful economic portfolios in government. (Dr Mahathir was then Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry while Tengku Razaleigh was Minister of 
Finance.) Dr Mahathir's longstanding interest in business, and concern to rapidly 
promote a Malay business elite, drew him to young audacious Bumiputra entrepreneurs 
like Ibrahim. Ibrahim, for his part, played-up for public and corporate consumption the 
'close contact' and 'frequent consultation' he had with Mahathir and, as to his 
relationship with Tengku Razaleigh, claimed that 'He (Razaleigh) is like a big brother to 
me' (BT, 5:9:1983). (Ibrahim's longstanding aquaintance with Razaleigh started during 
his teenage years in Kota Bharu.)
Ibrahim's associations with senior UMNO leaders facilitated his appointment as a 
director or chairman of about twenty publicly-listed companies (FEER, 2:9:1977). He 
was also appointed deputy chairman of KUB, UMNO's Cooperative in April 1983 and 
managing director of PBB, a wholly owned subsidiary of KUB, in August the same 
year. After his appointment to the board of directors of KUB and PBB, the Cooperative, 
using its publicly-listed vehicle, Idris Hydraulic, became much more active in the 
corporate sphere, particularly the property develpment sector. Significantly, most of Idris 
Hydraulic's involvement in the property sector was with companies in which Ibrahim had 
an interest.9 In addition to his direct links with UMNO's business investments through 
KUB, Ibrahim also played a leading role in the development of joint ventures between the 
investment arms of UMNO and MCA. What facilitated that linkage was Ibrahim's earlier 
partnership with Tan Koon Swan at Genting. The fate of the joint ventures need not
7 After Ibrahim purchased API, the name o f the company was changed from Associated Plastics 
Industries to Amalgamated Properties and Industries.
8 It was widely believed that Ibrahim was involved in the incident See BT, 5:9:1983 (Kadir Jasin, Tan 
Sri Ibrahim Mohamed: A meteoric rise in the corporate world').
9 See section on KUB in chapter 5 and also Gomez, 1990:157.
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concern us here,10 though it is important to recall that the leading role played by Ibrahim 
in the early eighties in what appeared to be the beginnings of a co-operative business 
relationship between UMNO and the MCA, further enhanced his profile and value as a 
Bumiputra business partner. (At the same time the publicity surrounding the proposed 
joint-venture arrangements between PBB and MPH also added to the stature of Tan Koon 
Swan, then managing director of MPH, and assisted his political ambitions in the MCA.) 
But these various alliances and associations were a precursor to Ibrahim's identification 
with the fortunes of one of Malaysia's most prominent business groups in the 1980's, 
Promet Bhd, an acronym for Progressive Methods.
Promet: Rise and Fall
In the early eighties Brian Chang, a Singaporean with interests in oil rig construction, 
was seeking access to opportunities offered by Malaysia's rapidly expanding oil 
construction business. At the same time, Ibrahim Mohamed was also seeking to move 
into the oil industry and expand his interests beyond Malaysia. Both Ibrahim and Chang 
had a longstanding friendship going back to the late sixties when both were students in 
London. The combination of skills and connections in an Ibrahim-Chang partnership, 
and the business opportunities they offered both, led Chang, who owned Promet Pty 
Ltd, to make a reverse takeover of an ailing but publicly-listed company called Bovis 
Southeast Asia. Ibrahim had just been appointed chairman of Bovis after his family 
company, Fawanis, had paid $30 million for a one-third stake in the company (BT, 
27:6:1981). Chang and Ibrahim then reconstituted and renamed Bovis as Promet Bhd. 
Given NEP requirements, the Chang-Ibrahim partnership appeared to be an ideal 
combination to win lucrative contracts, particularly in the rapidly expanding state sector. 
Initially, that was indeed the case, and Promet rapidly grew into a massive conglomerate 
whose profits trebled in three years from $41 million in 1981 to $115 million in 1983 by 
which time it was the 14th largest company on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange with a 
market capitalisaton exceeding $100 million* 11.
10 Within only a few years, that is by 1987, the much vaunted hopes that joint venture arrangements 
between PBB and MPHB would signal the beginning of a beneficial inter-political-ethnic relationship 
came to naught as it became apparent that MPH largely saw its relationship with PBB as a means to 
obtain consent to develop various housing projects, while PBB seemed content merely to be well 
paid and make handsome profits for such services. For details concerning the verious joint ventures 
undertaken between PBB and MPHB, and their ultimate fate see Gomez, 1990:157-160.
11 See KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XI 1:625 and SCMP, 3:6:1986.
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Promet's profits came from a number of major government contracts, some of the 
most notable of which included a construction project (Terminal Two) at Subang airport, 
a $1 billion deal to build a tourist resort in Trengganu (MB, 1:2:1986), and a share in a 
controversial $2.25 billion contract for the construction of a gas grid project in Sabah.12 
Ibrahim admitted that Promet was "handpicked" for the Subang airport contract and, 
despite denials by Promet that the contract for the construction of the Sabah gas grid was 
awarded 'because of political connections with the Prime Minister' (The Star, 
30:4:1983), the manner and circumstances surrounding the award suggested otherwise. 
Senior state officials in Sabah told Jeffrey Segal of the Far Eastern Economic Review that 
the only serious bidders for the contract were a Japanese-American group consisting of 
Marubeni, Nippon Kokan and Brown and Root, and a South Korean-French consortium, 
Hyundai and Fleur. The third bidder, Promet with McDermott of the United States, was 
out of the running. In July 1982 the Sabah authorities selected the Marubeni consortium, 
since it offered the best financial terms, but the selection was rejected by the federal 
government. In August 1982 the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, instead sent back his own 
proposal for a "restructured" consortium of the three original winners, plus Promet 
(FEER, 14:4:1983). A likely explanation for the Prime Minister's intervention appeared 
to be that at the July 1981 UMNO General Assembly Ibrahim, by then the epitome of the 
NEP's success in producing a new class of rich Bumiputra businessman, had, amidst 
considerable fanfare, donated $9 million worth of shares to the party.13
While such huge donations to UMNO facilitated the generous patronage Promet 
received from the government, the company's intimate relationship with the political 
leadership also embroiled it in very costly ventures in which political considerations 
appeared to take precedence over profit. The most notable example of such a venture 
concerned the government’s ambitious plan to develop the island of Langkawi into an 
international tourist resort. Ibrahim was instrumental in procuring the Langkawi project 
for Promet (MB, 1:3:1986) but the project quickly became an enormous drain on the 
company's resources.
12 The project was questioned by many in Sabah on the grounds of cost and economic viability. See 
FEER, 14:4:1983 (Jeffrey Segal, 'The burning issue of Sabah's unused gas'). Ibrahim criticised 
Segal’s article and claimed 'the tender was fought very keenly' and that 'it was the pure envy of 
competitors that Promet got the contract' that prompted remarks that 'it was awarded because of the 
connections with the Prime Minister' (The Star, 30:4:1983).
13 See Interview with Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamed in Tan, C.K., 1984:63.
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The grandiose $3 billion plan developed by Promet for the Langkawi project 
committed the company to provide the massive infrastructure required to develop the 
resort and attract the huge foreign investment necessary to fund construction of luxury 
hotels and associated facilities. Government backing, state and federal, was critical to 
support Promet's heavy investment in the project. Consequently, much publicity was 
given in the press to the 'blessings' the project received from the Prime Minister, Dr 
Mahathir, and the Chief Minister of Kedah, Syed Nahar,14 and to indications of support 
by Mahathir regarding Promet's requests for special tax breaks and other incentives for 
all companies involved in the project.15 Seizing on the Prime Minister's call for greater 
co-operation between the state and private sectors, encapsulated in the slogan "Malaysia 
Incorporated, " an ebullient Ibrahim cited the combined efforts of Promet and the task 
force set up by the Federal Government as an example of the "Malaysia Incorporated" 
concept in action (The Star, 28:11:1983). However, notwithstanding the hype 
surrounding Promet's government connections, the much needed foreign investment 
crucial to the viability of the project did not materialise. Yet, since Promet had adopted 
such a high political profile where the project was concerned, the company had little 
option but to continue what became an extraordinarily costly commitment. In retrospect, 
Ibrahim admitted that Promet's involvement (in the Langkawi project) was more a "social 
obligation" than a pure business venture (MB, 1:2:1986). Brian Chang was more direct, 
claiming that "the $3 billion project originally mooted destroyed our (Promet's) credibility 
completely" (NST, 24:5:1986).
In addition to the financial costs associated with Promet's political profile, the 
company's rapid expansion into property development and oil exploration made it highly 
vulnerable to any slowdown in the economy. So when the stockmarket and property 
prices slumped in 1985 the reversal of Promet's fortunes was dramatic. In 1983 Promet 
made a profit of $115 million, but by 1985 it made a loss of $92 million, while the 
company's stock fell from $11 a share in late 1981 to 80 cents a share in 1986, and its 
indebtedness to eighteen banks soared to over $100 million.16
Promet's parlous financial situation was exacerbated by the actions of Ibrahim and his 
brother Abdullah who, it was believed, were seeking to reduce their large personal debts
14 Amidst much fanfare Dr Mahathir witnessed the signing of the agreement for the project aboard the 
Promet yacht, ASEAN Lady. See NST, 22:7:1983 and 28:11:1983.
15 See NST, 24:11:1984 (Mahathir : Government willing to consider Promet requests.)
16 See Asiaweek, 19:1:1986 and 2:9:1988. In corporate circles some wags dubbed Promet, Plummet 
Bhd.
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by transferring less profitable assets in other companies to publicly-listed Promet, thereby 
shifting their debt burden to the company's shareholders (The Star, 11:12:1985). Ibrahim 
and Abdullah had borrowed large sums of money from local and Singaporean banks 
during the boom, using Promet shares as collateral in order to buy land, develop property 
and buy more shares. A particular focus of their attention were shares in a large property 
company, SELPROP, which planned to develop a $3.6 billion town centre in Kuala 
Lumpur. Ibrahim reportedly bought $120 million worth of $2.5 SELPROP shares 
financed entirely through bank borrowings only to find their value slashed to $1.35 in the 
wake of the property slump (Asiaweek, 19:1:1986). It was alleged he planned to inject 
his 15 per cent stake in SELPROP and other property interests into Promet while at the 
same time enlarging his stake in the company at the expense of his partner, Brian Chang 
(BT, 16:1:1986).
Ibrahim's manoeuvres in this regard provoked a bitter power struggle with Chang for 
control of Promet during which Ibrahim and his brother Abdullah attempted to 'wrap 
themselves in the flag,' claiming Promet would have a better future if it were 
'M alaysianised '17. But Ibrahim's 'nationalist' appeals came to naught as the banks, 
which were owed over $100 million by Promet, successfully pressed for his removal 
from the company18. In February 1986 Ibrahim resigned as chairman and director of 
Promet and by November the company was placed in receivership and its assets frozen. 
Three years later Ibrahim restructured his company API, which became Uniphoenix 
Corporation Bhd, but, at least until the early nineties, the company continued to incur 
large losses (BT, 20:10:1989). Ibrahim's corporate fall seemed complete when in August 
1993 he pleaded guilty to selling 825,000 shares in a company, Union Paper Holdings 
Bhd (UPHB) he did not own and was fined $500,000 (AWSJ, 30:8:1993).
Of the leading Bumiputra businessmen to emerge from the private sector in the early 
eighties few had established such a powerful network of political and business 
relationships as Ibrahim Mohamed. More than any of his contemporaries Ibrahim was 
closely identified with the Mahathir leadership, as a result of which Promet enjoyed 
access to an enormous amount of political patronage and was, for some years, one of 
M alaysia’s wealthiest and fastest growing public companies. But dependency on 
patronage and a buoyant stock and property market (and an ill-timed move where the oil 
industry was concerned), meant that Ibrahim's corporate existence - like other rent-
17 See The Star, 11:12:1985 and BT, 22:1:1986.
18 See The Star, 31:1:1986 (It's Bankers who want to oust Ibrahim).
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seekers, be they from the state, the party or the private sector - was fragile indeed as soon 
as one of those props fell. But in addition, as Promet found, patronage and politicization 
of a company's image and operations could also be something of a double-edged sword 
as it could involve the company in expensive ventures for political reasons rather than 
profit. Significantly, after the departure of Ibrahim, Chang, who had to set about 
rebuilding Promet's image, emphasised that his first task was to "de-characterise Promet" 
(NST, 24:5:1986). In other words to regain its credibility and viability the political links 
and personality cult which had become associated with Promet's initial success had to be 
shed.
TRANSITIONAL GROUPS
While Ibrahim Mohamed provides a good illustration of static or rentier capital and the 
relationships associated with it the subject of our next study, Datuk Dr Mokhzani Abdul 
Rahim, formerly of Innovest provides important insights into an element of Malay capital 
somewhere between rentiers and entrepreneurs, that is of 'transitional groups'. Although 
by early 1993 Mokhzani had lost control of Innovest, the key point in our study is the 
role he played in the growth of the company and the relationships he forged with the state 
and his Chinese partners in the process. A combination of elements which again illustrate 
the increasingly variagated character of Malay capitalism.
Innovest: Datuk Dr Mokhzani Abdul Rahim
Datuk Dr Mokhzani was bom in 1938 and was in his early forties before he went into 
business. An economist and former academic with a Ph.d. from the London School of 
Economics, Mokhzani rose to become Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Public 
Administration (1971-76), and later Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the University of Malaya 
(1976-79), before 'university politics' prompted his departure from academe to business. 
Mokhzani's transition to the private sector was facilitated by Datuk Eric Chia, then chief 
executive of United Motor Works (UMW).19 At the time, August 1979, Chia had just 
lost the services of a prominent Malay on UMW's board Datuk Syed Nahar Shahabuddin 
who had resigned to become Mentri Besar of Kedah (MB, 16:8:1986).
19 Mokhzani was introduced to Eric Chia through mutual friends in the Chinese community who knew 
that Mokhzani was looking for an opportunity to enter the private sector. Author's interview with 
Mokhzani, 11:11:1987.
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Chia's personality, and the diverse range of UMW's activities,20 proved an ideal 
training ground for a 'would be Bumiputra entrepreneur'. As a Straits-bom Chinese or 
’Baba’, Chia was fluent in Malay and at ease with members of that community. He had 
also won the respect of the UMNO leadership for his entrepreneurial skills.21 The 
partnership between Chia and Mokhzani proved to be a mutually beneficial one where 
each capitalised on the strengths of the other, as for instance when UMW sought to 
diversify further and move into Malaysia's rapidly growing motor vehicle market. In 
1982 UMW won, in what was hailed as a 'brilliant coup, ' the lucrative franchise for 
Toyota automobiles in Malaysia from the then holder of the franchise, Inchape Bhd (BT, 
31:8:1981). The success of that venture was the result of five months of hard 
negotiations with the Japanese during which Mokhzani, as one of the principal 
negotiators, gained first-hand experience of the workings of the corporate world from 
Chia. At the same time Mokhzani's range of contacts amongst senior Malaysian 
government ministers, including the then Minister for Trade and Industry, Dr Mahathir, 
proved invaluable in terms of gaining access at the highest levels of government for 
Toyota's representatives. It was an access that UMW's competitor, Inchape, did not have 
and was important in helping to close the deal in UMW's favour.22
After five years at UMW, Mokhzani sought to branch out on his own and in early 
1984 with a former classmate, Cheam Tat Phang, he began negotiations with the owner 
of an ailing company called Fusan Fishing Net Manufacturing Company Bhd. Fusan was 
short of capital, its expansion plans were blocked by its suspension from the stock 
exchange, and its core business, the manufacture of fishing nets, was no longer
20 By the late sixties Chia had developed UMW from basically a distributer of construction and heavy 
equipment (mainly Japanese Komatsu products) into a company whose activities included engineering 
and manufacturing as well as insurance leasing and finance.
21 In 1979, Dr Mahathir then Deputy Prime Minister, had singled out Chia as a Malaysian 'who had 
ventured boldly into new fields and succeeded’ (Gill, 1985:163). Chia and Mahathir had formed a close 
friendship in the early seventies when both had worked together in the government-owned food-based 
company Kumpulan Fima Bhd.
22 UMW's good relationship with the government contrasted sharply with that of Inchcape, an old 
British company that was widely perceived as having moved too little too late to accept the NEP and 
which also suffered from the fallout of the deteriorating relationship between Britain and Malaysia at 
the time. See FEER, 15:12:1983.
Unfortunately for UMW, soon after it won the costly Toyota franchise ($160 million) the recession 
and the introduction of the government-backed national car, the Proton Saga, pushed the company to 
the brink of collapse. See The Star, 21:9:1982 and Asiaweek, 26:7:1987. Although UMW's 
difficulties were eased a little by its receiving a share in the distributorship of the Proton Saga, after a 
major restructuring exercise in 1987 control of the company passed to the government's principal 
trust agency, Permodalan Nasional Bhd (PNB). See The Star, 27:10:1987.
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profitable. Mokhzani and his colleagues believed that a new combination of experience 
and connections could offer Fusan a 'quantum leap and not mere incremental growth' 
(MB, 16:8:1986). The new combination of skills and connections included Lim Geok 
Chan, Fusan's founder, Cheam Tat Phang, a businessman with extensive contacts in the 
banking community, and Thomas Chong Teck Fook who controlled a profitable 
Singapore-based company, Hart Engineering.
To this combination Mokhzani bought the necessary Bumiputra participation that 
facilitated the re-listing of the company and in turn allowed it to raise more capital. But 
not only did he play a key role in bringing together a new combination of experience and 
skills essential for Fusan's future viability, but after the company was restructured he 
also became an owner-director of the company. In short, Mokhzani's role in the re­
activation of Fusan was not that of a mere 'figurehead capitalist' and nor could his 
relationship with his Chinese colleagues be characterized in Ali-Baba terms. But how did 
he became an owner-director and raise the necessary funds for a stake in the company? 
In order to obtain a re-listing on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, Fusan's equity had 
to conform to NEP guidelines in terms of Bumiputra participation. Fusan satisfied those 
guidelines through a special issue of shares at par to Bumiputra investors. Usually such 
share issues were taken up by a Malay statutory corporation (such as PNB) on behalf of 
the Malay community but in the case of Fusan Mokhzani managed to persuade the 
authorities to allow an individual, ie himself, to purchase the bulk of the special 
Bumiputra share issue.23 To obtain the necessary funds to take up the shares Mokhzani 
had to mortgage all his assets and borrow heavily from the banks. His own contacts in 
the banking sector as well as those of his Chinese partners (particularly Cheam Tat Pang) 
were all required to raise the necessary funds (Interview with Mokhzani, 11:11:1987).
23 As the Malay business class grew there was increasing pressure from its members in the early 
eighties for assets held by government institutions in trust for the Bumiputra community to be 
transferred directly to individuals or business groups in that community. It was against such a 
background that Mokhzani wrote directly to the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, seeking permission 
that he, as an individual be allowed to take up the special share issue in the case of Fusan. According 
to Mokhzani, Mahathir 'characteristically' did not indicate a position on the matter but his neutrality 
helped, indirectly, Mokhzani press his case in other quarters. (Mokhzani had got to know Mahathir 
personally many years before when as a youth he spent some time in Alor Star where Mahathir was 
then a medical practitioner.) Mokhzani also wrote to Tengku Rithaudeen, then Minister of Trade and 
Industry, to press his case. Some of Mokhzani's former students in the Ministry helped prepare the 
submission that was eventually approved. Mokhzani also approached Tun Ismail Ali, the chairman of 
PNB who, while initially cool towards the proposition, mainly because he thought Fusan a poor 
investment, also eventually agreed to Mokhzani taking up the special Bumiputra issue. Author's 
interview with Mokhzani 11:11:1987.
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After its re-listing in 1983, Fusan raised further capital which was used to acquire 
new companies in high growth sectors such as engineering, high-technology 
manufacturing and warehousing. Fusan's most important acquisitions included Hart 
Engineering (mainly engaged in the design and sale of fire protection equipment and 
services), Industrial Boilers and Allied Equipment (IBAE) (manufacturers of industrial 
boilers and organic water treatment plants), and Sun Metal Works (specialist designers 
for the manufacture of oilfield and gas equipment)24. Fusan also began to diversify into 
the food and service related industries when, together with a Bumiputra company, Antah 
Holdings, and Jardine Matheson, it acquired a share in the US-based 7-Eleven franchise 
in M alaysia.25 At the same time (late 1983), Fusan sold off its net manufacturing 
operations and in June 1984 changed its name to Innovest to better reflect its new core 
activities. The composition of those core activities was significant for unlike many other 
new business groups, whether Malay or Chinese, Innovest did not seek investments in 
the plantation or property sectors (where the quality of assets was often questionable), 
but instead concentrated on manufacturing and food and service related industries which 
the company identified as sectors with the potential for substantial, though not 
spectacular, growth.26
Innovest's most important acquisition in the food and service related industries was 
the purchase in June 1986 of Poon Guan Holdings, the local franchise holder for 
Kentucky Fried Chicken. The owner of the Kentucky Fried Chicken franchises in 
Singapore and Malaysia was an eccentric millionaire, Loo Cheng Gee. (Loo's hold on the 
franchise had been shaken not only by his own financial difficulties but also by the 
unorthodox antics he had employed in a self confessed attempt to comer the crude palm 
oil (CPO) futures market - antics that had antagonised the Malaysian authorities and many 
in the Malay community).27 Loo's difficulties aside, there was nevertheless considerable
24 See MB, 16:8:1986
25 See MB, 1:10:1984.
26 See MB, 16:8:1986 (Magasvaran, 'Innovest: Faith in new ways').
2 7 Loo alleged that the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange (KLCE) was being defrauded by an alliance 
of 'corrupt administrators and buccaneering businessmen' and that they were responsible for his 
financial troubles, including the price of palm oil which had become too expensive to fry his 
chickens. Loo provoked a crisis on the KLCE when he embarked on a "selling short" spree, selling 
oil futures to drive down prices. In March 1984 CPO prices plunged from $2, 600 per tonne to 
$1,200. The KLCE took several years to recover from the crisis. In addition Loo's public berating of 
some V IPs and other antics, such as getting his men to run around Kuala Lumpur dressed up as 
Mickey Mouse and Tonto (Loo thought of himself as the 'Lone Ranger'), soon began to affect his 
hold on the KFC franchise. Accusations were made by 'certain quarters’ that the chickens sold in KFC 
outlets were not 'halal' and therefore could not be eaten by Muslims. Such an accusation effectively
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scepticism at the time about the prospects of Innovest's proposed investment in the KFC 
franchise. The Malaysian economy was in a deep recession, the fast food business had 
no established record in the country and the price asked for the franchise, $75 million 
was considered very high (MB, 16:3:1992). Mokhzani and co-director Cheam Tat Pang 
had to extensively canvas their respective contacts in the financial community for a 
syndicated loan. Still short of the funds required as the deadline to finalise the deal 
loomed, Mokhzani successfully persuaded PNB to take up the balance, that is 
approximately a 30 per cent stake in the company.28
Though the purchase of KFC initially posed a huge strain on Innovest's financial 
resources, the investment proved to be highly lucrative for the company and provided an 
effective counter to the cyclical nature of the manufacturing and engineering activities of 
the group. Innovest broadened its fast food business by acquiring three additional 
franchises in 1988 and then consolidated its food related activities into a separate listed 
subsidiary, KFC Holdings, in November 1988.29 KFC Holdings quickly outgrew its 
original form of being just a fast food operator and by 1991 had established backward 
and forward linkages to become a fully integrated food processing group which had also 
begun to invest in similar operations overseas (The Star, 26:7:1991). At the same time the 
company continued to diversify its manufacturing and engineering operations. Innovest 
Systems and Services Sdn Bhd (ISS), a wholly-owned subsidiary, was active in the 
rapidly growing information technology industry where it won substantial contracts, 
while another subsdiary, Innopower Electronics Sdn Bhd (whose main activities included 
the design and manufacture of standby power supplies, microprocessors systems, 
transformers and thermo elements for local and overseas markets), was successful in 
attracting substantial Japanese investment.30
But the rosy picture of rapid growth and profits in the late eighties was replaced in the 
nineties by Innovest's large burden of debt. In essence Mokhzani and his colleagues’ 
belief that their combination of experience and connections could offer Innovest a
barred a large proportion of Loo's customers, the Malay public. However following the takeover of 
KFC by Innovest, Malays returned to eating Kentucky Fried Chicken. See MB, 16:8:1985 (Tone 
Ranger in Battle') and NST, 19:8:1989.
28 See BT, 10:7:1985 ('Innovest arranges Finance for acquisition') and MB, 16:3:1992 (Zoe Poon, 
'KFC:The best is yet to come').
29 The three additional franchises acquired in 1988 were Shakey's Pizza Restaurant, White Castle Burger, 
and State Ria (MB, 1:12:1988).
30 See The Star, 27:12:1989 and NST, 30:7:1991.
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'quantum leap' and not mere incremental growth, proved to be the groups achilles' heal. 
By May 1991 the group had 110 subsidiaries and 30 associated companies with 
operations all over the world (Innovest 1990 Annual Report). Many of Innovest's 
subsidiaries proved to be corporate haemophiliacs. Overdiversification and poor 
management of the group's subsidiaries, a number of which were engaged in dubious 
deals, saw the company's debt grow to $541 million by the end of 1990 (MB, 
16:3:1992). Of particular note were the activities of Innovest's Singapore-listed associate, 
Inno-Pacific Holdings, which had attracted the attention of both PNB and the regulatory 
authorities in Singapore concerning loans within the group and deals involving the 
purchase of land in Bangkok and Hongkong.31 By early 1993 Mokhzani and his partners 
had lost control of Innovest leaving a number of other corporate groups struggling for 
control of the company.32
While state backing was crucial to Mokhzani's rise as an owner-director he 
nevertheless effectively combined that advantage with the greater business experience of 
his Chinese partners to build the makings of a significant corporate group. In the process 
of building that group, Mokhzani, in concert with his fellow directors, had to risk his 
own capital and investment judgements in the market place. He was also actively 
involved in the day-to-day management of the company. Such attributes clearly set him 
apart from the 'static' elements of Malay capital such as 'figurehead' capitalists (that is 
directors who play little role or take little risk in the development of companies with 
which they are connected), or the 'Ali-Baba' type of business relationship where the 
Malay partner is often little more than a front man for Chinese interests. But as an 
entrepreneur, Mokhzani is clearly not in the same league as Azman Hashim and 
Shamsuddin Abdul Kadir, the subjects of the case studies that follow.
ENTREPRENEURS: AZMAN HASHIM AND SHAMSUDDIN ABDUL
KADIR
After our discussion of representative rentier and transitional businessmen, we now turn 
to the most dynamic element of Malay capitalism, the origins and growth of which has 
been largely based in the private sector - that of the entrepreneurs. Of central theoretical 
importance in our examination of this group however is the question of 'dynamic'
31 See FEER, 1:10:1992 (Malaysian fund questions Innovest deal).
32 See MB, 16:6:1994 (By fair means or foul).
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capitalism. We will, therefore, seek to highlight a number of characteristics associated 
with this group that are indicative of its being the harbinger of a more independent and 
'dynamic' Malay capitalist class. In that regard it will be argued that while the groups in 
question remain strong supporters of the state and the party, most have increasingly 
distanced themselves from such centres of patronage in their day-to-day operations and 
development. Secondly our studies will show that while some of these groups had rather 
'ersatz' origins in terms of their early methods of capital accumulation, and 
accompanying characteristics of rapid growth and high levels of debt, by the early 1990's 
many had diversified and/or, more importantly, consolidated their operations. (Indeed 
one of our studies, that of Sapura Holdings, developed capitalist credentials even by 
Yoshihara's lights, that is a capacity to compete internationally with its innovative high- 
tech products.) Finally, as with the rentier and transitional 'representatives' of Malay 
capitalism examined earlier, we shall focus on the relationship between this more 
dynamic group, the entrepreneurs, with foreign and Chinese capital.
While we shall be concerned to elucidate the more dynamic characteristics in the 
development of Malay capitalism that are associated with two particular groups, Arab 
Malaysia (Azman Hashim) and Sapura Holdings Sdn Bhd (Samsuddin Abdul Kadir), 
such characteristics are shared to varying degrees by a growing number of other 
Bumiputra groups including Rashid Hussain Bhd (Rashid Hussain), Diversified 
Resources and Gadek (Yahya Ahmad), the Sedap group (Amin Shah Omar Shah) and 
Grand Care Sdn Bhd (Ishak bin Ismail).
The Arab-Malaysia Group: Tan Sri Azman Hashim
Azman Hashim is one of Malaysia's most successful businessmen whose net worth by 
1994 was estimated to be around $1.5 billion (US$585 million). Unlike a number of 
others who rapidly accumulated great wealth in the eighties there has never been any hint 
of scandal associated with Azman's business dealings. Neither is there any trace of him 
having used politics for business gain despite the fact that he once sat on UMNO's 
political bureau and was a former director of Fleet Holdings (MB, 1:2:1990). Before the 
implementation of the NEP, Azman was already a qualified and experienced accountant 
with strong links in the banking sector. So he was well placed to benefit from the strong 
state support given to that relatively small group of professionally qualified Malays in the 
early 1970's who, by the 1990's, would constitute the nucleus of the Malay bourgeoisie. 
Though the path to wealth was rapid, and facilitated by the support of state-owned 
banks, Azman used those initial advantages to build a huge and diversified conglomerate
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that by the end of the eighties was noted for its profitability and professional 
management
In 1955 Azman, then only 16 years old, won a Colombo Plan scholarship and 
studied accountancy for five years in Australia. He qualified in 1959 and in 1960 returned 
to Malaya and joined the newly established central bank, Bank Negara. In 1964 he left 
the bank and set up his own accountancy firm which later became Azman, Wong Salleh 
and Co (MB, August 1978). The practice flourished, helped in part by good references 
from Azman's former chief and head of Bank Negara, Tun Ismail Ali. In 1966 Azman 
was also appointed to the Board of Malayan Banking Bhd. The bank was then in the 
process of being taken over by the government after it had been racked by a series of 
scandals arising form the activities of its managing director at the time, Tan Sri Khoo 
Teck Puat. (Apparently Tun Ismail was keen to have Azman assist in the process of 
refurbishing the image of Malayan Banking and in 1971 Azman was asked to become 
executive director of the bank, a position he held until 1980.)
By the early seventies Azman was already a wealthy man, having made large profits 
in the property and stock market (MB, 1:2:1990). At the same time, as head of Malayan 
Banking, Azman was introduced to the workings of the corporate world and made many 
valuable contacts in it. He was appointed to the boards of numerous state agencies 
including Malayawata Steel Bhd, Komplex Kewangan Malaysia Bhd, Malaysian Airline 
System, Pemas Securities, Malaysian Mining Corporation and the Pilgrims Management 
and Fund Board (LUTH). Azman also held senior positions in many business and 
professional organisations, including the presidency of the Malaysian Institute of 
Chartered Secretaries and was a member of the governing council of the Malaysian 
Institute of Management and chairman of the Association of Finance Companies of 
Malaysia (MB, November 1982).
However in terms of learning the workings of the business world Azman's most 
important 'corporate nursery' was Pernas, where he worked closely with Tengku 
Razaleigh, then (1970-76) head of the group. Azman's principal involvement with Pemas 
was with Pemas Securities, a vehicle used by the government to carry out such corporate 
activities as mergers and takeovers. Together, Razaleigh and Azman masterminded in 
1975 the acquisition by Pemas Securities of London Tin (FEER, 20:2:1981). Azman's 
close involvement in such complex deals gave him first hand knowledge and experience 
of the techniques of rapid expansion through borrowing and takeovers.
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Azman’s close association with Tengku Razaleigh, then UMNO treasurer, also led to 
his appointment as a director of Fleet Holdings, UMNO's first investment arm when it 
was incorporated in October 1972. However according to Gomez, Azman, who was then 
UMNO Selangor treasurer, was only a trustee for Fleet Holdings and he played no role in 
the management of the company which was handled solely by Junus Sudin in 
consultation with Razaleigh (Gomez, 1990:54). He resigned as a director of Fleet 
Holdings in May 1978. In other words, while Azman had a direct association with 
UMNO and its investment arm in the seventies, that association was a very formal one 
and since that time he apparently maintained a discreet distance from UMNO politics.
In 1980 Azman resigned from his position as executive director of Malayan Banking 
to become chairman of its subsidiary, Kwong Yik Bank. The reason for this 'sidestep' 
was because Azman was "under the impression" that he would be allocated a majority 
stake in the bank but two years later he was still a minority shareholder and so he left 
Kwong Yik (MB, 1:2:1990). The same year, 1982, he bought a 40 per cent stake in 
Taiping Textiles, a publicly-listed but largely moribund company. As Jesudason 
(1990:106) observed, Azman was less interested in textiles than gaining access to a 
corporate vehicle. In 1982 Azman also bought Arab Malaysia Development Bank 
(AMDB) a merchant bank jointly owned by state-owned Malaysian Industrial 
Development Finance (MIDF), and Arab interests33for $101.8 million.34 With the 
purchase of AMDB Azman had the distinction of being the only Malaysian to have for a 
time 100 per cent control of a bank (MB, November 1982). The purchase was facilitated 
by Azman's capacity to borrow from state-owned banks, particularly Malayan Banking, 
and its willingness to accept as security some of the shares he was purchasing. 
Apparently the quid pro quo was Azman's disposal to Malayan Banking of his substantial 
stake in its subsidiary, Kwong Yik Bank.35 In other words the acceptance by Malayan 
Banking of this 'risky form of collateral' was driven largely by the prospect of some gain
33 The shareholding in ABDB comprised state-owned Malaysian Industrial Development Finance 
(MIDF) 55 per cent, Arab Asian Investment Company of Kuwait 33 per cent and the National 
Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia 12 per cent (FEER, 7:5:1982).
34 The takeover was in two stages. In April 1982 Azman purchased a controlling 55 per cent from 
Malaysian Industrial Development Finance (MIDF) for $55.9 million by raising a $50 million credit 
line from local banks, principally Malayan Banking, in return for a collateral of 6 million shares he 
owned in other companies (BT, 28:4:1982). In the second stage, Azman bought out the remaining 
minority shareholders by again borrowing from local banks and other financial institutions and 
securing those borrowings by his AMDB shares and assets in other companies he controlled (MB, 
November 1982).
35 See Cheong, 1990:87
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rather than, as suggested by some, an altruistic committment to the development of a 
Malay bourgeoisie.36 Moreover Azman, in contrast to many Bumiputra businessmen, 
did have considerable security to offer his creditors by way of assets (estimated in 1984 
to have a net value of between $525 and $840 million), 37 as well as an established 
record as an experienced and successful banker.
By Decem ber 1983 Azman was ready to set about forging a major new 
financial/property/manufacturing group. To that end he used his control of Taiping 
Textiles to make the company buy 45 per cent of Arab Malaysia Development Bank. (At 
the same time, to more accurately reflect the activities of his principal companies, Taiping 
Textiles was renamed Arab Malaysia Development Bhd and Arab Malaysia Development 
Bank was renamed Arab Malaysia Merchant Bank {AMMB}). The cost of the proposed 
45 per cent stake in Arab Malaysia Development Bank to Taiping Textiles was $311 
million.38 In other words Azman proposed to sell for $311 million a stake in a merchant 
bank for which he had paid $120 million in total eighteen months earlier. The deal was 
criticised on the grounds that it was unfair to Taiping shareholders (FEER, 24:11:1983). 
In the event however the deal did not go through and Azman did not make the windfall 
profit claimed by some writers.39 Instead, the Capital Issues Committee (CIC)40 
intervened and drastically cut the proposed sale price of AMMD from $311 million to 
$144.9 million, a reduction of more than 50 per cent on the original consideration.41 So 
Azman, like a number of other prominent members of the emerging Bumiputra business 
elite, also found his corporate plans stymied somewhat by the CIC, which, under the 
chairmanship of Tan Sri Aziz Taha, often acted as an important constraint of the corporate 
excesses of this group of businessmen.
Despite the temporary set-back that the Arab-Malaysia group received as a result of 
the CIC's intervention, Azman pressed ahead with plans to diversify and extend the
3 6 See for instance Jesudason, 1990:106-7.
37 This estimate was made in a 1984 survey by the Singapore Mirror which rated Azman as one of the 
20 richest men in Singapore and Malaysia. Azman has downplayed the estimate with the comment, 'I 
wonder if they considered my liabilities". MB, 1:2:1990
3 8 See MB, 1:2:1990 (S Jayasankaran, 'Bona Fide Entrepreneur).
39 See for instance Jesudason, 1990:107 and MB, 1:2:1990.
40 The main role of the Capital Issues Committee (CIC) was to ensure that companies offering shares 
to Bumiputras did so at reaonably attractive and realistic prices and secondly to guard against abuse of 
new issues by prior inflation of profits and asset values.
41 The purchase was effected through the issue of 144.9 million AMDB shares (MB, 1:12:1988).
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activities of the group to provide a variety of financial services. At the same time he 
attracted to the group a highly talented and experienced team of economists and 
managers, the most prominent of whom included Malek Merican, formerly managing 
director of Aseam Bankers Malaysia Bhd and Group Director of Sime Darby, and Patrick 
Low Han Hing, a chartered accountant who was later to become chairman and chief 
executive of Daim's former publicly-listed vehicle, Raleigh Bhd.
When Malaysia's economy was plunged into recession in the mid-eighties it took a 
particularly heavy toll of the emerging Bumiputra business class. Azman’s growing 
Arab-Malaysia group was also hard hit when the value of loans secured against property 
and stocks plunged precipitiously. But Azman survived through shrewd management and 
the sound prospect of future profit he was able to offer potential investors. By a complex 
incentive deal that guaranteed prospective investors a certain minimum profit for three 
years,42 Azman was able to attract two substantial investors, first another Bumiputra 
group, Antah Holdings, which in February 1987 purchased 20 per cent of AMMB, and 
later in August the same year, Tokai Bank of Japan, which purchased another 20 per 
cent. Although he sold 40 per cent of AMMB, Azman retained effective control of the 
bank and at the same time was able to substantially reduce his debts.43 The sale also 
enabled AMMB to tap business opportunities from the diversified Antah Group and 
benefit from Tokai Bank’s links with Japanese business groups in Malaysia. (MB, 
1:2:1990).
Though the last of the twelve merchant banks to be established locally, AMMB was 
the first to be listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) on 12 December 
1988. Analysts have supported Azman's claim that AMMB has diversified its activities 
more than most other financial companies or institutions in Malaysia. AMMB owned a 
licensed finance company, a hire purchase financing and leasing company, a life and 
general insurance company and a stock broking company44. By 1990 AMMB was the 
largest merchant bank in Malaysia in terms of deposits, assets, shareholders funds and
42 Basically Azman pledged that the bank would reap profits o f at least $45.4 million over three years 
and prospective investors would get a portion (almost 20 per cent) of that if they bought into the 
bank. In hindsight, Azman's estimates of AMMB's prospective profits were vindicated and Tokai and 
Antah almost tripled their investment. See MB, 1:2:1990.
43 At one point in the 1985-86 recession banking analysts estimated that Azman's debts to be in the 
region of $350 to $400 million. It has been estimated that Azman made $161 million when he sold 
stakes in AMMB to Antah and Tokai. See MB, 1:2:1990.
44 See MB, 1:12:1988 (Yong Kwai Meng, 'Ahead with a suing of firsts').
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profits.45 The efficient and effective managment of the bank was also widely recognised. 
It won the award for the most outstanding Annual Report for three consecutive years 
(1986-88)46 and was ranked top portfolio manager for retirement and pension funds 
among leading fund managers in Malaysia by William Mercer Zainal Fraser, an 
independent professional actuarial firm47. In June 1991 Asiamoney, a Euromoney 
publication, also ranked AMMB amongst the Top Six Best Managed Listed Companies in 
Malaysia in 'recognition of the Group's ability to record consistent profits in changing 
economic and political circumstances'.48
Azman’s corporate empire grew further when in March 1988, through a family 
company, Arishah Sdn Bhd, he purchased a controlling stake in another publicly-listed 
company, Temerloh Rubber Estates Bhd, popularly known as 'TRE'. Temerloh had 
previously been under the control of Syed Kechik. Temerloh's sale represented the 
dramatic changes of fortune wrought by the recession of the mid-eighties amongst the 
Bumiputra business elite. Reputed to be the richest Bumiputra businessman in the 
seventies, Syed Kechik, as we saw earlier, was forced in the wake of the recession to sell 
Temerloh to Azman for $15 million (FEER, 1:12:1994), which was less than half of 
what he (Kechik) had paid per share for the company in 1983.49
After acquiring Temerloh, Azman converted it from a small plantation-based company 
into a well diversified group. From 1989 to 1990 Temerloh purchased controlling or 
substantial stakes in over half-a-dozen companies whose activities included the 
manufacturing of rubber and plastic goods, transportation, environmental and waste 
management, financing, freight handling and the repair and maintenance of equipment for 
the oil and gas services industry. In July 1991 Temerloh acquired a 40 per cent stake in 
AMMB from Antah Holdings (10 per cent) and Ginagini, a wholly-owned company of
45 See KLSE Annual Companies Handbook Vol XV 1990:659.
46 BT, 6:12:1988. Malaysian annual corporate report awards are co-sponsored by the Bank of America 
and the Business Times.
47 MB, 1:12:1988. Other notable achievements by AMMB include: its choice as financial advisor to 
Jabatan Telecom Malaysia, the first major public sector enterprise to commence privatisation; the 
launching in May 1987 of the Malaysia Fund Inc. a close-end investment company listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange in an effort to promote Malaysian stocks abroad; and in 1989 the launching of 
the Malaysia Growth Fund aimed at tapping Japanese financial resources to invest in the KLSE. See 
KLSE:Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XV, 1990 :659.
48 The survey compiled views from institutional investors of how the international investment 
community judged the managment skill in Asia's listed companies. See AMMB Annual Report 
March 1991, p l6.
49 See NST, 25:3:1988 (Azman takes control of Temerloh).
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Azman (30 per cent). It also acquired 30 per cent in Arab Malaysia Development Bhd 
(AMDB); 30 per cent in Redec Holdings; and 15 per cent in Rediffusion Malaysia (BT, 
26:7:1991).
By these acquisitions, all of Azman's principal companies were consolidated under 
Temerloh (renamed Arab-Malaysia Corp. or AmCorp) which in turn became a huge and 
diversified conglomerate and Azman's 'flagship company' (BT, 26:7:91). More changes 
followed. AAMB Holdings' wholly-owned finance company, Arab Malaysia Finance 
was listed on the KLSE in 1992 and raised $200 million and AmCorp bought Azman's 
stake in both AMDB and AMMB Holdings in a share swap that gave Azman 75 per cent 
of AmCorp. Twelve months later (1993) Azman sold 25 per cent of his stake in AmCorp. 
The sale raised $315 million and wiped out his debt.50 His financial empire was 
complete when in March 1994 Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim gave permission for 
Azman to acquire a commercial bank, Security Pacific Bank, the Kuala Lumpur branch of 
Bank of America (Asia).
Azman's rise in the early eighties was faciltiated by his access to funds from state- 
owned banks and the skilful use of the stockmarket to achieve rapid corporate growth. 
But he moved beyond mere 'paper entrepreneurism' to build one of Malaysia's most 
sound, efficient and profitable financial institutions. By 1994 the company Azman had 
bought for $101 million was worth more than $5.4 billion, putting it among the top 20 on 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (FEER, 1:12:1994). To achieve that transformation 
Azman combined entrepreneurial flair with a shrewd reading of Malaysia's volatile 
economic circumstances, particularly in the mid eighties. AAMB's rapid growth and high 
borrowings, especially in the early eighties, were also tempered by consolidation and 
professional and efficient management. That AAMB not only survived the 1985-86 
recession when many other Malaysian banks and financial institutions collapsed, but by 
the early nineties was debt free, was a testament to Azman's experience and skills as a 
banker. Finally, as Jayasankaran has observed 'Azman isn't regarded as someone who 
parlayed connections into profit - the image of so many other Malaysian businessmen' 
(FEER, 1:12:1994). Indeed Azman's relations with the government and the party appear 
'good and proper' rather than 'intimate and political', perhaps due in the past at least to 
his apparently cool relationship with the former Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin.51
50 See FEER, 1:12:1994 (S Jayasankaran, 'You Gotta Believe, Azman Hashim:a new-age Malaysian 
millionaire').
51 See FEER, 1:12:1984 (S. Jayasankaran, 'Icing on the cake'). Jayasankaran cites Azman's difficulty in 
obtaining permission to purchase a commercial bank during the Daim era and a listing of his stock-
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Tan Sri Shamsuddin Abdul Kadir: Sapura Holdings Sdn Bhd
Of the Malay capitalists who have built successful and self sustaining businesses, none 
defy the image of a fragile Malay bourgeoisie more than Tan Sri Shamsuddin, the 
founder and head of Sapura Holdings. Shamsuddin capitalised on the initial backing he 
received from the state, by way of large government contracts to build a company whose 
technical expertise enabled it to design, manufacture and export specialised 
telecommunications equipment to markets in Japan, the United States and Europe. In 
other words Sapura outgrew its origins of being nurtured by government to become an 
independent and profitable company whose growth did not come from mergers and 
takeovers but its ability to compete internationally with its innovative high-tech products. 
So Shamsuddin is a 'capitalist' even in Yoshihara's terms.
Shamsuddin was bom in 1931 and qualified as an electrical engineer in Britain in the 
mid-fifties. On returning to Malaya in 1959, he joined state-owned Jabatan Telekom 
Malaysia (JTM) where he rose to become Telecoms Controller for Perak. His twelve 
years with Telecom gave Shamsuddin a thorough knowledge of the workings of 
telecommunication systems and valuable contacts in JTM, the country's sole telephone 
authority. In 1971 Shamsuddin left Telekom for the private sector and joined Eric Chia's 
United Motor W orks (UMW), where he rose to become executive chairman. 
(Interestingly, two of the Bumiputra capitalists considered in this chapter, Mokhzani and 
Shamsuddin, were linked to Chia who played something of the role of a 'corporate 
trainer' in both cases.) It was during the five years he spent at UMW (1971-75) that 
Shamsuddin found the opportunity to strike out on his own (BT, 29:12:1989). His first 
breakthrough came with payphones. UMW was leasing red tabletop payphones to shops 
but the business had been unprofitable so UMW willingly sold the company, called 
Uniphone Works, to Shamsuddin when he left UMW in 1975 (MB, 1:4:1990). 
Shamsuddin's ability to purchase Uniphone Works was facilitated by a loan of $400,000 
from Bank Bumiputra and flexible terms by Eric Chia for payment of an inter-company 
loan of $1,158,000 million.52
brokerage Arab-Malaysia Securities, as indicative of the 'cool' relationship between Azman and Daim. 
He also relates a story, probably apocryphal, that Azman as an executive director of Malayan Banking 
turned down an application from Daim in the late 1970's. Nevertheless, in his interview with the 
FEER Azman agreed that 'if not for Anwar it (the purchase of Security Pacific Bank) would not have 
been possible'.
52 In an interview with Malaysian Business (July 1-15, 1993) Shamsuddin revealed that while he was 
able to obtain a loan of $400, 000 from Bank Bumiputra he was still short of $1,158,000 so he went 
back to UMW and said, 'Eric, I still cannot pay.' He (Chia) said, 'Ah, you pay me monthly.
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As an electrical engineer and former Telekoms man with considerable experience in 
the operations of telecommunications systems, Shamsuddin was able to make the 
payphone business profitable. He continued the business at his own company called 
Sapura Holdings. Sapura Holdings was incorporated in 1975 with a paid up capital of $2 
million and began operations in a one room office in Kuala Lumpur. Shamsuddin and his 
wife, Siti Sapura, after whom the company was named, owned all the shares in the 
company and sat on the board (NST, 31:8:1991).
Uniphone Sdn Bhd, a subsidiary of Sapura Holdings, had acquired considerable 
experience in telephone cable splicing and jointing projects and servicing payphones in 
Kuala Lumpur. Having established itself as a leader in the industry, Uniphone tendered 
successfully for a ten year licence to supply, install and maintain public payphone 
services in Malaysia when JTM privatised the loss-making service in 1975. Under three 
five-year contracts the licence was extended until 1989 with JTM/STM.53 On 1 January 
1989 the licence was renewed for another 15 years (BT, 13:6:1989). About $60 million a 
year was expected to be collected from payphones making it the most stable long-term 
source of income for the Sapura group (MB, 1:4:1990). Sapura was also one of the first 
local turnkey contractors to lay cables for JTM in the mid seventies, a record that enabled 
the company later to win a quarter share of a $2.5 billion cable laying contract in 1983, 
one of the biggest government jobs before the $3.4 billion North-South highway 
contract.54
Like most of the Bumiputra business elite, Shamsuddin is said to be close to some 
members of the UMNO leadership, most notably the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir55. He 
was once director of Permodalan Bersatu Bhd, the holding company of UMNO's co­
operative Koperasi Usaha Bersatu, but unlike some of his contemporaries he was not 
content to rely on good contacts and government contracts alone (MB, 1:4:1990). Rather
Whatever you collect.’ So from the payphone collections Shamsuddin paid the bank and other 
expenses. Whatever remained, he paid back to UMW. Payment took nearly two years.
5 3 JTM was corporatised into Syarikat Telekom Malaysia (STM) in 1987.
54 The contract was divided regionally among four Bumiputra contractors - Uniphone, Binafon, 
Electroscon and Sri Communications. Each had nearly $636 million worth of cable works to 
complete. Uniphone was the only company to deliver on schedule, and more than was promised. See 
MB, 1:4:1990 (Ngam Su May, 'Sapura Holdings, The Making of a Giant') and MB, 1:7:1993 (Rajen 
Devadasan, Making the right calls').
55 Sapura's deputy chairman Rameli Musa is said to be a confidante of Finance Minister Datuk Seri 
Anwar Ibrahim - they were class-mates at the Malay College, Kuala Kangsar (MB, 1:7:1993).
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than merely sourcing supplies for government, Shamsuddin went one step further and 
began to manufacture made-in Malaysia telephones through full franchise transfers of 
technology from various established int ernational companies in the field of 
telecommunications (Cheong, 1990:55). As a result Sapura won virtual control of the 
domestic market and between 1977 and 1989 supplied about 1.7 million phones to 
JTM/STM valued at about $131 million (MB, 1:5:1990).
In the eighties telecommunications had become one of the major growth areas in 
Malaysia's rapidly expanding economy. In order to take full advantage of further 
opportunities arising in the telecommunications sector Shamsuddin sought to expand and 
diversify. To raise the necessary capital his company, Sapura Holdings acquired a 
publicly-listed company, Malayan Cables Bhd, in September 1984. Shortly after the 
takeover of Malayan Cables by Sapura Holdings, Malayan Cables bought Uniphone Sdn 
Bhd, then Sapura's principal operating company which had already begun to diversify its 
product range by the manufacture of public payphones, feature phones, PABX's, main 
distribution frames and minature protector connnectors56. The takeover of Malayan 
Cables not only helped Sapura to raise capital and diversify but also established important 
backward linkages for the group. (Sapura's subsidiary, Uniphone, was already a turnkey 
contractor for JTM’s multimillion dollar cable laying contract, thus the takeover of 
Malayan Cables (later renamed Uniphone Telecommunications) meant that the company 
was assured of its cable supply). At the same time Sapura's growing technical capablities 
enabled the company to obtain the lucrative Apple Computer distributorship in Malaysia, 
Singapore and Brunei.57
In the mid-eighties overseas interest in Sapura's products increased after the 
weakening of the Malaysian dollar and the strengthening of the yen which had rendered 
some Japanese exports uncompetitive (NST, 14:7:1986). As Sapura's attention was 
turning to potential export markets, the considerable backing the company had received 
from the state in terms of valuable government contracts was undergoing change.
After the privatisation of Telekom in 1987 the new corporatised entity, Syarikat 
Telekom Malaysia (STM), became much more preoccupied with cost. The outlook and 
operation of the new entity, STM, eroded Sapura's formerly very good and highly
56 See MB, 1:4:1990 (Ngam Su May, 'Sapura Spreads its Wings').
57 The Star, 25:2:1986 (J.T. Khoo, 'Why Apple picked Uniphone'). Appple's regional sales manager,
Thomas Cullen said 'Apple considered Sapura’s technical background in communications vital and a 
perfect criterion for their selection’.
215
profitable relationship with that instrumentality as evidenced by two developments. First 
a dispute broke out between STM and Sapura's wholly-owned subsidiary, Uniphone, 
over the installation of card phones and the sharing of revenue from the payphone 
service. After bitter wrangling for almost a year the dispute was finally settled with 
apparently better terms for STM.58 Secondly Sapura lost a valuable $32 million contract 
to supply STM with telephones to a foreign (Taiwanese) manufacturer. Shamsuddin 
pleaded, but to no avail, for a 'level playing field' because although the Taiwanese 
company quoted a lower price it also enjoyed tax and other advantages associated with 
its 'pioneer status' in the Prai free trade zone near Penang (BT, 4:12:1989). (In addition 
the product manufactured by the Taiwanese company did not have the high local content 
of its Sapura counterpart {60 per cent} and was, according to Shamsuddin, of inferior 
design and manufacture.)59 Neverthless loss of the contract did provide a futher 
incentive for Sapura to produce innovative products that would find a niche in export 
markets.
Consequently Sapura concentrated on the manufacture of specialist 
telecommunications products that differed from those normally offered to the mass 
market. According to Shamsuddin, as of October 1990, the company had spent almost 
$10 million on research and development, an investment that led to the design and 
manufacture in Malaysia of a microcomputer-based phone, a voice-activated phone and 
various other high tech items including card payphones (BT,30:10:1990). As a 
consequence of these developments Sapura Holdings signed in August 1989 a five-year 
contract worth $70 million with GEC Plessey Telecommunications Ltd for the 
manufacture and sale of card payphones in Malaysia and eight other countries. With the
5 8 Previously a fixed formula for revenue sharing existed between Uniphone and JTM for providing the 
necessary telephone lines for public payphones. After 1987 that responsibility fell to the newly 
privatised STM. Consequently the new 15-year licence followed a different formula with better terms 
for STM. Another source of contention between Uniphone and ASTM concerned Uniphone's 'capture' 
of the more lucrative urban areas for the installation of public phones leaving the bulk of the rural 
(comparatively more expensive areas) to be serviced by STM. Although there were reports of a 
resolution to these disputes in the press, there were few details concerning the actual terms of the 
settlement. For background see MB, 1:4:1990, The Star, 4:10:1990 and Cheong, 1990:57-58.
59 The Taiwanese manufacturer was Formula Electronics. The $32 million contract issued by STM was 
for the supply of 600,000 S 2000A telephones. The contract was given to Formula Electronics 
which quoted a lower price - $37.20 - compared with Sapura's $54. (MB, 1:4:1990).
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contract Sapura became the first company in the ASEAN region to manufacture card 
payphones.60
Being a small player in the global telecommunications market, Shamsuddin did not 
attempt to confront his larger established foreign counterparts but rather adopted a variety 
of relationships that provided mutual benefits, so where licensing was not practical 
Sapura opted for equity participation on a joint-venture basis.61 For instance Sumitomo 
Electric Industries Ltd of Japan which has a 40 per cent stake in a Sapura subsidiary, 
Uniphone Cables, also assisted the company to penetrate export markets with its high- 
powered cables manufactured in Malaysia. But in another case Sumitomo, which was 
awarded a contract to supply $500,000 worth of phones to the Greater Dhaka 
Telecommunications network, turned to Sapura to manufacture and supply the phones62. 
Similar collaboration occurred with Sumitomo in El Salvador where the company 
obtained a contract and in turn sourced it to Sapura which then manufactured and 
exported to that country telephone testing equipment worth $200,000 (The Star, 
7:10:1989). In addition, Sapura successfully concluded joint venture arrangements with 
India, Pakistan, Jordan and Vietnam. The arrangements involved either the manufacture 
of phones or the transfer of various aspects of telecommunications technology developed 
by the company.
Sapura's success in the export of its products was probably most evident, however, 
when feature phones designed and manufactured by the company were sold to some of 
the most advanced telecommunications groups in the world including ITT, Net of Japan 
and Alcatel of Belgium.63 Sapura also began to make inroads into the US and German 
markets (NST, 31:8:1991). By a combination of various arrangements and strategies, 
therefore, Sapura has successfully penetrated niche markets worldwide. Although the 
Sapura Group only started exporting in the late 1980's, the contribution of exports to 
company profits leapt from $2 million in 1989 to $170 million in 1993, or about 24 per 
cent of sales (MB, 1:7:1993).
60 NST, 3:8:1989 The deal gave Sapura the exclusive rights to sell the phones in Malaysia and non­
exclusive rights to market the product in Indonesia, Brunei, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal 
the Philippines and Sri Lanka
61 BT, 30:10:1990 (R Ismail, 'Sapura won't fight the big boys').
62 See The Star, 7:10:1989 and NST, 9:7:1991.
63 Although having just commenced exports to Japan and Belgium, sales to those markets were 
expected to be worth $5 million in 1990. See MB, 1:4:1990.
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By 1991 the Sapura group comprised some 30 subsidiaries and two publicly-listed 
companies, Uniphone Telecommunications Bhd and Sapura Telecommunications Bhd. 
The Group's turnover had grown from approximately $11 million in 1980 to $700 
million in 1992 and its reputation as a profitable long-term investment or 'blue chip' stock 
was highlighted by the fact that foreign banks and institutional investors held some 25 per 
cent of UTB's paid up capital (Cheong, 1990:61).
Shamsuddin is an outstanding example of a Bumiputra entrepreneur who was not 
content to rely on good government contracts and contacts but used the initial advantages 
bestowed by state support to build a strong, dynamic and profitable company. Unlike 
some of his peers, Shamsuddin has not been associated with 'paper entrepreneurism,' 
that is acquisitions, mergers and takeovers to make quick capital gains. He also eschewed 
profit and growth by expanding into several unrelated sectors of activity, preferring 
instead to consolidate the group's operations in manufacturing where he focussed in 
particular on products associated with telecommunications and computer technologies and 
component parts for vehicle manufacture. Sapura's capacity to develop its own up-to- 
date technology on the one hand and its flexible approach in licensing, sales and joint- 
venture arrangements on the other has also enabled the company to take advantage of the 
growing internationalisation of Japanese capital to penetrate valuable niche markets both 
in the developed and developing world. In that regard Sapura also defies the oft-put 
image of Malaysian companies, whether Malay or Chinese, as mere 'screwdriver 
operations' for foreign capital.
Conclusion
There has been a strong tendency in studies of Malay capitalism to assert that since the 
emerging Malay business class shares a common starting point or path to wealth, the 
future development of that class will share a common trajectory and common outcome. In 
that regard scholars have been inclined to argue that since the origins to Malay wealth are 
based on strong links to political power, large borrowings, speculative investments and 
Malaysia's generally high growth rates, such origins will necessarily lead to a form of 
capitalism which is weak, parasitic and dependent rather than independent, robust and 
resilient. Evidence for such a view of the development of Malay capitalism is generally 
derived from a cursory examination of prominent Malay entrepreneurs who are seen as an 
homogeneous group. The differences that are identified are generally of a descriptive or 
historical nature. Less attention has been paid to the dynamics involved in the growth of 
Malay capitalism. In that regard our study of leading Malay businessmen or groups, in 
this and previous chapters, has been concerned to demonstrate that not only has the
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development of Malay capitalism been more complex and variegated than generally 
supposed but, more significantly, there is real evidence of important transformations 
taking place in the evolution of a Malay capitalist class. In other words, while some 
individuals and groups are static, others clearly are not and have developed beyond, and 
become more independent of, the networks of state or party patronage that first 
sponsored them. In that regard some groups have built self-sustaining and enduring 
economic bases in banking, financial and other corporate and technical services, 
agribusiness and the export of processed primary products. Throughout we have been 
concerned to emphasise, however, that it is not the background of Malay capital that is 
important, whether ex-politicians, ex-bureaucrats, royalty and so on, or its often 
speculative origins, that provide clues to its future development, but the interaction 
between state and business that is the source of dynamism or defeat in the development of 
Malay business groups.
PART III
CHINESE CAPITALISM : PARIAH OR ENTREPRENEUR? 
RELATIONS WITH THE STATE AND RESPONSE TO THE RISE 
OF MALAY CAPITALISM
The promotion by the state of a Malay capitalist class has had a profound effect upon 
Chinese business. The next three chapters look at the relationship of Chinese business 
with the state and its response to the rise of Malay capitalism. Linking all these chapters 
is the key question posed earlier, that is 'Have Malaysia's political circumstances 
trapped Chinese businessmen into dependency relationships similar in kind if not 
degree to Rigg's pariah entrepreneurs'?1 To answer that question we shall focus 
throughout on the nexus between the state and business because, it is argued, that 
nexus has been central not only to the growth and character of Malay capitalism but, 
since the introduction of the NEP, to Chinese capitalism as well. The first chapter in 
this section examines the case of Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd [MPH] or what has been 
variously dubbed the Chinese 'institutional' or 'group' approach2 to the NEP; the 
second examines the rise of some big Chinese conglomerates after 1970, regarded as 
'new wealth,' and their relationship with the state and Bumiputra business groups; 
while the third examines those same relationships but with regard to the response of 
'old wealth', that is Chinese capital accumulated before the NEP.
l
2
Mackie, 1992 [a]: 173. See also discussion that follows this quote in the introduction.
Heng, 1992:134-137 describes the MPH response to the NEP in 'institutional' terms while 
Jesudason, 1990:154-159 describes it as the 'Chinese group’ response to the NEP.
Chapter 8
MULTI-PURPOSE HOLDING BHD: THE FAILURE OF THE 
CHINESE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO THE NEP
In the early 1980's Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd (MPH) was one of the largest 
companies in Malaysia. Established, promoted and staffed by senior members of the 
MCA, it was the most ambitious of the party's attempts to maintain its leadership of the 
Chinese and safeguard the future of Chinese commercial life in the face of constraints 
posed by the NEP. The rise and fall of MPH has been examined by a number of 
scholars1, so an outline of the story here will suffice for our purposes. In that regard our 
principal concern is to contrast the close relationship described earlier between the 
government and UMNO in the expansion of Malay ownership, with the suspicion and 
obstruction that MPH encountered from UMNO when it attempted to mobilise and 
expand economic resources on behalf of the Chinese community. However while that 
contrast in the government-business relationship was a key factor in the demise of MPH, 
this chapter argues that the seeds of failure also had much to do with the intense mix and 
confusion of political, personal and business goals that bedevilled the company from the 
start.
The most important of the constraints on Chinese business imposed by the NEP in 
the 1970's was the introduction of the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) in 1975 through 
which the government sought of impose strong administrative controls on the 
manufacturing sector. Such controls threatened the interests of many Chinese small 
businesses and highlighted the MCA's political weakness. The party's response to the 
ICA was the formation in 1975 of MPH. MPH sought to mobilise funds held by 
individual family businesses, as well as those held collectively by voluntary associations 
and clans, into a financially viable "multi-purpose” enterprise that would be better able to 
compete with large Malay corporate organisations.2
1 See Gale, 1985; Jesudason, 1990; Heng, 1992 and Gomez, 1994.
2 See Heng, 1992:135 and Jesudason, 1990:155.
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While the formation of MPH was part of a wider program to improve the MCA's 
political fortunes after its debacle in the general elections of May 1969, it was also an 
attempt by the new party president, Datuk Lee San Choon, to increase his personal 
standing within the Chinese community. With his lower class background, Lee San 
Choon was not generally accepted by the Chinese multi-millionaires who had formed the 
party's traditional backbone. In that regard it has been argued by Gale (1985:11) that the 
formation of MPH can be seen as an attempt to bypass that group by getting the support 
of the Chinese middle class.3 Heng (1992:135) has also reiterated that theme, stating that 
'by getting the Chinese Chambers of Commerce (CCC) and the Chinese clan associations 
{huay kuari) to corporatize, the MCA leadership hoped to re-establish the close 
relationship the party had had with such middle class groups in the 1950's but had 
steadily lost in the 1960's'.
The most important point about the formation of MPH, however, was that from the 
beginning the company's directors brought conflicting political, economic and personal 
interests to bear in their management of the company. But in the late 1970's and early 
1980's the damaging consequences of those conflicting motives had yet to become 
apparent, so MPH received the enthusiastic support of the Chinese community. The 
company's initial issue of $30 million shares in 1977 was oversubscribed, and it had little 
difficulty in raising funds in its early years. Not surprisingly members of the various 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce were particularly strong supporters of MPH since such 
organisations generally represented the interests of medium-scale businessmen, who 
were the ones most adversely affected by the ICA. The MCA Youth's Cooperative 
Society, Koperatif Serbaguna Malaysia (KSM), set up in 1968 by the party's lower 
middle class membership, became the largest shareholder in MPH with just over 40 per 
cent of its equity (Heng, 1992:136). The bulk of KSM's shares were held by some 
80,000 families, mostly from Chinese in "New Villages" and small towns (Asiaweek, 
22:6:1986). But while the Chinese middle class was enthusiastic in its support for MPH, 
the company had little attraction for big business. Although the 'old-money' tycoons who 
had accumulated their wealth before 1970 were often supporters of the MCA, they had, 
especially, since the 1970s, relied more on personal connections with the UMNO 
leadership to protect or promote their interests than the MCA. The preference for dealing 
directly with the Malay political and business elite became even more pronounced, as the
3 Lee San Choon's difficulties in attempting to establish links with Chinese business leaders were also 
compounded by the fact that his cabinet position as Minister for Labour was not a key economic 
portfolio which would help him establish such links.
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next chapter will later show, where Chinese 'new' wealth was concerned; i.e. among 
those businessmen who had emerged after the NEP.
At the MPH's birth in August 1975 the MCA leadership chose two prominent 
Chinese businessmen to head the new corporation. Tan Sri Lee Loy Seng, popularly 
known as Malaysia’s "rubber king", was appointed chairman, and Tan Koon Swan, the 
epitome of 'new wealth,' was appointed managing director. In August 1983 Lee Loy 
Seng resigned as chairman of MPH4 and was replaced by Tan Koon Swan whose 
spectacular rise in business in the post-NEP era had earned him the admiration of many in 
the Chinese community. It was Tan who played a pivotal role in both the spectacular rise 
and the fall of the corporation, whose fortunes increasingly became deeply enmeshed 
with Tan's own political ambitions and business interests.
Tan began his career as a clerk in the National Electricity Board (NEB). In 1962 he 
joined the Income Tax Department which he left six years later to take up an appointment 
as a tax advisor with Exxon. In 1970 he became general manager of Genting Bhd where 
he developed a close relationship with the company's major shareholder, Lim Goh Tong, 
and other prominent Chinese businessmen including Khoo Kay Peng, head of Malayan 
United Industries (MUI), and Quek Leng Chan, head of the Hong Leong group.5 During 
the sharemarket boom of 1973, Tan made a huge profit by selling the shares he had 
acquired in Genting Highlands, which he then used to purchase a controlling stake in a 
publicly-listed company, Sungei Way Dredging Bhd (Gale, 1985:28). The company's 
name was changed to Supreme Corporation in 1976 and thereafter, as Tan's own family- 
based company, it embarked on a rapid expansion program, a prominent feature of which 
was the acquisition of property and other assets, generally already well-established 
enterprises, through loans and the issue of shares.6 This was a method of growth that 
bore many similarities to the preferences and business style of Daim Zainuddin and at that
4 These changes were not unexpected. In agreeing to head MPH in 1975, Lee Loy Seng said he would 
only hold the post for three years. When he resigned in August 1982 he said he would be happy to 
make way for a younger man but said he had been asked to stay on while the company consolidated 
its varied interests (Gale, 1985:179). It was generally known however that Lee had become 
increasingly annoyed with what he considered excessive political interference in what was in his 
(Lee's) view, purely a business concern. See MB, 1:3:1987.
5 Tan's friendship with Khoo Kay Peng and Quek Leng Chan led to his introduction to the MCA 
president Lee San Choon who later appointed Tan as managing director of MPH. See Gale, 1985:28.
6 In addition to Sungei Way Dredging/Supreme Corporation, Tan's other major acquisitions in the 
latter seventies included 100 per cent-owned Supreme Housing Development (involved in property 
development) and 46 per cent-owned Supreme Plantations, which was later renamed Everpeace 
Corporation. Supreme Plantations was formerly known as Mega Chemicals. Tan's other major 
acquisition was the purchase of a small finance company known as Kengsoon Finance, later renamed 
Supreme Finance. See The Star, 25:1:1986
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time, just as Daim had applied those same personal business methods - an extensive 
involvement in property and the stockmarket - to his managment of the Fleet Group, so 
Tan applied his methods of expansion at Supreme to MPH.
Under the stewardship of Tan, acquisitions and mergers became MPH's special forte. 
Through a series of bonus issues and share swaps MPH acquired substantial interests in 
Bandar Raya Developments, a property company, the lucrative gambling enterprise 
Magnum Corporation Bhd, Dunlop's Malaysian rubber estates, and Guthrie Bhd, a 
Singapore-based trading subsidiary of the Guthrie Corporation in Britain (renamed 
Mulpha Trading). MPH grew rapidly to become a huge conglomerate by 1985, with, the 
largest issued and paid-up capital (over $571 million) of the companies listed on the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. But rapid growth was also accompanied by soaring 
debt.
Unlike other Chinese companies, MPH sought a high profile but its political agenda 
led it to pay what many believed was far too high a price for such status symbols as 
Guthries.7 MCA leaders defended such acquisitions with the claim that by purchasing or 
establishing subsidiary companies in key sectors of the economy (plantations, trading, 
finance and shipping) MPH would prevent these traditionally foreign-dominated sectors 
from being monopolised by Bumiputra interests (Gale, 1985:11). In a more colourful 
vein Tan justified such purchases to the author by claiming that if such purchases were 
not made 'we (the Chinese community) would only be left with the rojak ' (leftovers).8
When MPH was established, some MCA leaders took care to reassure the UMNO 
leadership that the company posed no threat to the NEP's goals of expanding Malay 
ownership of the economy.9 In that regard they pointed to the joint ventures undertaken 
by MPH and UMNO's investment arm Permodalan Bersatu Bhd (PBB) as an extension 
of MCA-UMNO political co-operation in the economic field. As indicated earlier, the 
impetus behind the joint-venture company established by MPH and PBB in September 
1983, Multi-Purpose Bersatu Development Bhd, came primarily from the close alliance 
established between Ibrahim Mohamed and Tan Koon Swan when both worked together 
at Genting Bhd in the mid-1970's. But while Koon Swan referred to the joint ventures
7 MPH paid $48 million for its 73 per cent stake in Guthrie Trading (renamed Mulpha) which was two 
or three times what many experts thought the firm was worth (Asiaweek, 22:2:1986).
8 In Malaysia a dish of rojak consists of small pieces of various fruits and vegetables, essentially a side 
dish to more substantial and tasty morsels such as chicken, fish and rice which, presumably, Tan was 
equating with the strategic sectors of Malaysia's economy. Authors interview with Tan Koon Swan, 
July 1981.
9 SeeHeng, 1992:138-139.
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between MPH and PBB as the beginning of a lasting and beneficial relationship (BT, 
14:9:1983), it soon became apparent that MPH saw its relationship with PBB as a means 
to obtain consent to develop various housing projects, while PBB seemed content merely 
to be well paid and make handsome profits from the arrangement10 Eventually, by 1986, 
only three years after the formation of Multi-Purpose Bersatu Development Bhd, the 
much vaunted hopes for a beneficial inter-ethnic-political relationship between MPH and 
PBB had come to naught, and only served to emphasize Malay suspicions of MPH's 
high profile and avowedly 'Chinese' character. Those suspicions had been given vent in 
the controversies that erupted over MPH's proposed purchase of two companies, UMBC 
and Dunlop Estates Bhd.
In June 1981 MPH purchased for $204 million a 56 per cent share of UMBC, 
Malaysia's third largest bank, from other Chinese interests. The state corporation Pemas 
already held a 30 per cent stake in the bank (Gale, 1985:141). The takeover by MPH 
meant that Pemas was likely to lose control of the company and be reduced in status to 
that of a minority shareholder. Unfortunately for MPH, news of this impending takeover 
coincided with party elections in UMNO that year, when progress towards expanding 
Malay ownership in the economy was a hot issue in intra-party contests* 11. Datuk 
Suhaimi Kamaruddin, the then leader of the Youth wing of the party (who was also 
facing re-election), seized on the issue of MPH’s purchase of UMBC claiming that: 
These acts (takeovers) will not only affect the economic situation of the Malays and other 
Bumiputras but also threaten national solidarity and security' (NST, 22:3:1981). The 
political furore created by UMNO Youth was sufficient to force a top-level compromise 
between the leadership of UMNO and the MCA, in which Pemas and MPH were to hold 
an equal 40 per cent share in UMBC with the proviso that further purchases by either 
party would be shared between them.12 (Gale, 1985:151). Thwarted in its attempt to gain
10 See Gomez, 1990:157-160 and 1994:138-143.
11 See ST (S) 27:6:1981 (Uproar over sale of UMBC shares).
12 In 1981 the then Minister of Finance, Tengku Razaleigh, was standing against Datuk Musa Hitam, 
then Minister of Education in a contest for the deputy presidency of UMNO. The proposed takeover 
of UMBC by MPH gave Tengku Razaleigh's opponents in the party an issue they could use to 
discredit him, Tengku Razaleigh, whose popularity in UMNO was largely due to his close 
association with government agencies such as Pemas and Bank Bumiputra, responsible for expanding 
Malay ownership of the economy, could not afford to be seen as selling out to Chinese interests. So 
Razaleigh, who had earlier appeared supportive of MPH's proposed takeover of UMBC by saying that 
the matter should be treated as an ordinary business transaction and that he had told MPH executive 
director, Tan Koon Swan, 'to go ahead through the proper channels,' later backed away from his 
apparent endorsement of the takeover saying that, 'If you come to me to say you are getting married I 
would say go ahead, but whether you succeed or not might depend on whether the girls father accepts 
you' (BT, 8;4;1981). See also ST (S), 27:6:1981 ('Uproar over sale o f UMBC shares'); The Star,
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a controlling stake in UMBC, MPH disposed of its interest in the bank and acquired 
instead a controlling interest in a much smaller institution, Malaysian French Bank, 
whose major shareholder at that time was Daim Zainuddin.13
No sooner had the MPH/UMBC conflict been resolved then MPH became embroiled 
in another conflict with UMNO Youth, this time over MPH's proposed acquisition of a 
controlling 51 per cent stake in a major plantation company, Dunlop Estates Bhd (DEB) 
for $252 million (Gale, 1985:164). DEB's parent company was Dunlop Holdings of the 
UK. By September 1981, Pegi Malaysia, a company controlled by an UMNO Vice- 
President, Ghafar Baba, was the largest single shareholder in Dunlop.14 Fearing a 
possible takeover by Malaysian interests, Dunlop reached an agreement with Pegi 
Malaysia and MPH whereby Dunlop was to sell DEB to MPH, after which MPH and 
Pegi were to form a joint-venture company to share their assets in DEB and Dunlop 
Holdings. The quid pro quo was that Pegi would agree not to buy any further shares in 
Dunlop (Gale, 1985:156-71). Suhaimi Kamaruddin, the UMNO Youth leader criticised 
the deal claiming that the Pegi-MPH arrangement was "obviously against the NEP" (BT, 
16:12; 1982). Suhaimi argued that DEB should have been offered to Pemas or PNB the 
national equity corporation first, and not MPH. Furthermore, under the proposed 
arrangements, Suhaimi claimed that DEB would only be 40 per cent owned by Malays 
when a long established company in Malaysia like Dunlop should have ensured that 
Malay interests held a majority 51 per cent stake (BT, 13:10:1981). The controversy led 
to MPH and Pegi dissolving their planned joint-venture in December 1982, and to an 
undertaking by MPH to the authorities that Malay participation in DEB would soon be 
raised to 50 per cent (Jesudason, 1990:157).
The controversies surrounding MPH's takeover of DEB, and its failure to establish a 
financial arm through UMBC, highlighted the limits of the Chinese 'group' or 
'institutional' approach to protecting or expanding that community's wealth in the post- 
NEP era. MPH's mobilisation of resources on a communal (Chinese) basis invariably led
7:4:1981 '(The UMBC Deal: No control by single party'); Gale, 1985:141-153 and Jesudason, 
1990:156-157.
13 MPH sold its shares in UMBC to two of Daim's companies, Dani Sdn Bhd and Daan Sdn Bhd for 
$262.3 million in exchange for acquiring a controlling 51 per cent stake in Malaysian French Bank 
from Aslira Sdn Bhd whose shareholders were Daan Sdn Bhd and Dani Sdn Bhd (BT, 19:6:1984). 
Daim's controversial purchase of UMBC and later resale to Pemas is discussed in chapter 6. See also 
Gomez, 1994:203-206.
14 For details see chapter 6 'Politicians-tumed-Businessmen': Ghafar Baba.
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to conflict with the UMNO leadership and charges by ambitious Malay politicians that its 
corporate takeovers threatened the NEP's goal of expanding Malay ownership of the 
economy. The economic dimension of that conflict posed further difficulties for MPH 
since in its attempt to acquire stakes in foreign-owned companies, particularly in the 
planatation sector, it was often competing with powerful state-backed Malay 
organisations such as PNB, whose access to federal funding and government-secured 
loans gave them an unrivalled advantage in the market place.
MPH's problems were compounded by the fact that the company became closely 
identified with the political and business fortunes of Tan Koon Swan (Heng, 1992:139). 
MPH was critical to Tan's rapid rise in politics from an MCA MP in 1978 to party 
president in November 1985. As MPH grew so did Tan's political stature and the use of 
the media to publicise the rapid expansion of MPH added to his image as a dynamic MCA 
leader. At the same time, while MPH's conflicts with UMNO politicians had economic 
costs, such conflicts also had political benefits in that they enhanced the MCA's image as 
a champion of Chinese economic interests against the constraints imposed by the NEP 
(Jesudason, 1990:157). (In the eyes of its supporters MPH's image in the early eighties 
as a protector of Chinese interests clearly outweighed its relatively lacklustre economic 
performance and the fact that the company had not paid out dividends since 1977).15 The 
apparent nexus between the early growth of MPH and that of the MCA's popularity was 
reflected in the party's changing electoral fortunes. In the 1978 general elections, the 
MCA won only seventeen of the twenty-seven parliamentary seats it contested while in 
the 1982 elections, it won twenty-four of the twenty-eight seats contested (Jesudason, 
1990:157).
As managing director and later chairman of MPH, Tan Koon Swan was able to 
strengthen his political base among the many MCA members who comprised the majority 
of the corporation's small investors, a group that was culturally predisposed to accord 
high social and political status to anyone who had demonstrated capacity and success in 
business.16 Tan's opponents accused him of also using MPH to set up a parallel system 
of patronage. Although Tan rejected the accusation claiming that, 'All (his) chief 
executives with one exception were strictly professional managers'... he did nevertheless 
boast that, 'MPH had created 16,000 new jobs for Chinese' (FEER, 10:5:1984). In 
addition to bolstering his support in the MCA, Tan's position as head of MPH also
15 The parlous state of MPH's finances was already apparent by the end o f 1982 when Group
borrowings totalled $358 million and interest expenses at some $36 million equalled 62 per cent of
pre-interest profits. See FEER, 10:5:1984.
16 See Heng, 1992:139.
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facilitated his own business interests in that it afforded him access to important contacts in 
the Chinese business community and to the UMNO leadership.
When Lee San Choon the MCA President resigned in 1983, Tan Koon Swan and his 
supporters, who had built their political base on MPH, challenged the Acting President, 
Neo Yee Pan, for the party's top position. Tan’s challenge precipitated a debilitating two 
year leadership struggle in the party. In March 1984 Neo, under threat, used the power of 
the presidency to expel Tan and seven other supporters from the central committee of the 
MCA, 'in the interests of the party' (NST, 20:3:1984). The prolonged dispute between 
the two factions involved differences of personality, political style and substantive 
issues.17 Neo represented the archetype of a party bureaucrat whose rise was largely 
through party channels, whereas Tan, the self-made millionare rose through the status he 
acquired as a businessman and chairman of MPH. Expelled from the party, the Tan 
faction responded with a petition calling for an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) of 
the MCA that was supported by over one-third of the Central Committee members, as 
was required by the party constitution. The rejection of the pertition led the Tan faction to 
claim that it had discovered massive padding of membership by illegal registration of 
'phantom' members based on the identity cards of non-Chinese (Means, 1992:177). 
Various attempts to resolve the dispute by National Front leaders failed. It was only in 
November 1985, when the prospect of general elections drew near, that both factions 
agreed to settle the dispute. Tan Koon Swan and his faction emerged the victors, but the 
bitter struggle had severely damaged the party's standing in the Chinese community and 
the MCA only won seventeen seats in the August 1986 general elections compared to 
twenty-four in 1982. The decline in the MCA's fortunes was further emphasised by the 
fact that the party's victories came in 'marginal constituencies where substantial Malay 
votes helped offset the Chinese votes which went to the DAP in droves' (ST(S), 
4:8:1986). Thus, while MPH had enhanced the MCA's prospects in the 1982 elections, 
in the 1986 elections it had become a burden and a financial embarrassment.
While politically motivated policies and an entanglement with the faction fighting 
within the MCA sapped the capacity of MPH to operate as an efficiently managed 
business, the company's financial difficulties were also due in large part to economic 
factors, notably the recession and poor investment decisions by its managers (Heng, 
1992:140). The most obvious example of the latter was MPH's decision in April 1983 to 
buy into a Hong Kong shipping company, Promtpship, that operated a fleet of 35 ageing
17 For accounts of the differences in political style between Tan and Neo and of the issues involved in
the dispute see, ST(S), 15:4:1984 (Ismail Kassim, 'Mr Hatchet versus Mr Popular) and Means,
1991:176-179.
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bulk carriers and liner vessels at a time of over-capacity in the world shipping industry. 
Tan Koon Swan 'justified' the puzzling purchase on the dubious grounds that, 'MPH is a 
company for a thousand years and this (economic) downturn is just as good a time as any 
for us to move into shipping'.18 By 1984 MPH had acquired an 80 per cent shareholding 
in Promtship for which it paid $90-$100 million (FEER, 15:5;1986). That same year 
Promtship lost $12 million and in 1985 a further $45 million.19 The recession, depressed 
trading conditions and low prices for commodities placed further strain on MPH's highly 
geared financial structure. Besides Promtship, other subsidiaries also posted losses or 
significantly reduced profits in 1985. Mulpha (formerly Guthrie Trading) made a loss of 
$22 million. (Another puzzling decision was the change of name from the prestigious 
'Guthries' to the obscure 'Mulpha', particularly, as noted above, after MPH had paid $48 
million for its 73 per cent stake in Guthries, two or three times what many experts 
thought the company was worth).20 The profits of other MPH subsidiaries including 
Bandar Raya, Dunlop Estates, Malaysian Plantations and even the most lucrative 
concern, the lottery company, Magnum Corporation, also fell.21 Tan's strategies of rapid 
corporate growth through share-swaps and mergers also contributed to MPH's soaring 
debt. The company's borrowings by the end of 1985 amounted to a staggering $446 
million of which interest charges alone cost the group $46.7 million (BT, 24:2:1987). 
The parlous state of MPH's finances was reflected in its losses22 - $192 million in 1985 
and $228 million in 1986 - which until that time were the largest losses ever suffered by 
any local firm (BT, 24:2:1987).
MPH's financial difficulties were also greatly exacerbated by corruption. Tan Koon 
Swan and his fellow directors channelled MPH funds, and those of several Deposit-
18 See BT, 22:4:1983 CWhy Multi-Purpose went into shipping'). Tan also 'justified' MPH's move into 
shipping on the grounds that, 'it was partly in line with the government’s call to the private sector to 
help reduce the large deficit in the balance of payments due to invisible imports.’ MPH’s investment 
in Promtship nevertheless continued to mystify shipping circles in Hong Kong. In a profile of 
Promtship published by Maritime Asia in June 1985, it was stated that, 'the present management of 
the company admits that Promptship Corp. was on its last legs when Multi-Purpose Holdings 
stepped in' (FEER, 15:5:1986).
19 See Asiaweek, 22:6:1986 and Jesudason, 1990:158.
20 See Asiaweek, 22:6:1986. Apparently Mulpha is an approximate rendering of the Chinese characters 
Ma' and 'Hua' which form part of the word for Malaysianisation. But Malaysians and foreigners alike 
remained puzzled by the reasons for the change. See FEER, 10: 5:1984.
21 Bandar Raya's pre-tax profits dropped from $7.7 million in 1984 to $6.5 million in 1985 while 
Dunlop Estates profits fell from $24 million to $13 million due to low commodity prices as did the 
profits for Malaysian Plantations that were halved from $5 million to $2.2 million. Magnum's net 
income dropped by 25 per cent to $18 million (Asiaweek, 22: 6:1986).
22 See KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook:Vol XV 1990:394 and Asiaweek, 22:6:1986.
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Taking Co-operatives (DTC'S) linked to the MCA, to their own private companies whose 
fortunes had slumped with the onset of the recession and the slump in share and property 
prices. Besides managing MPH's diverse interests, Tan simultaneously built a personal 
corporate empire of bewildering complexity, of which the principal vehicles were 
publicly-listed Grand United Holdings (GUH) and Supreme Corporation. Through these 
companies Tan had a substantial shareholding in a Singaporean public company called 
Pan Electric (Pan El). It was the collapse of Pan El and circumstances related to Tan's 
purchases of shares in the company that resulted in Singaporean authorities sentencing 
Tan in August 1986 to two years imprisonment and a fine o f $S500,000 (US$232,558) 
for criminal breach of trust and stock market manipulation.23 In a desperate bid to prevent 
the collapse of Pan El, Tan, without the approval o f MPH's board of directors, 
transferred $23.2 million o f the company's funds to accounts associated with Pan El in 
Singapore. That action later resulted in a Malaysian court also finding Tan guilty of 
criminal breach o f trust for which he served a further term of imprisonment in 
Malaysia.24
23 Tan pleaded guilty to a charge that he abetted a director of Pan El, Tan Kok Liang in dishonestly 
paying S$144,853 on 11 September 1985 from Pan El's account to buy shares in his (Tan Koon 
Swan's) own company (Grand United Holdings). Fourteen other charges were dropped.
Tan, through companies he controlled, held an indirect 22.3 per cent stake in Pan El. Pan El had 
become a major player on the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore Stock Exchanges, borrowing heavily. In 
November 1985 Pan El's creditors, who were owed about SS450 million, were alarmed to discover 
that the company had also entered into more than S$100 million in forward contract obligations. 
(Forward contracts are agreements to sell shares for future delivery at a pre-determined price and are 
often used as collateral to raise cash).
The S$100 million in forward contracts were held primarily by two Tan-controlled companies, Grand 
United Holdings (GUH) and Supreme Corporation. Tan contracted to sell S$66 million worth of 
shares in GUH and its subsidiary, Supreme Corporation, to Pan El as part of an arrangement with 
former Pan El director, Peter Tham, who agreed to buy a corresponding block of shares in GUH and 
Supreme. Bankers in Singapore and Kuala Lumper characterised the arrangement of cross-holdings 
between Pan El and Tan's own companies as a "warehousing" operation that would shore up the 
prices of the shares involved during a period both parties needed to bolster their financial positions.
When Pan El defaulted on a loan arrangement in mid November 1985, trading in the company's 
shares was suspended on the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore Stock Exchanges. After Tan failed in an 
attempt to rescue Pan El, the company was placed in receivership on 30 November 1985. The 
announcement of Pan El's financial difficulties forced an unprecedented three day closure of the Kuala 
Lumpur and Singapore Stock Exchanges from 2 December 1985 and caused prices of other shares to 
plunge when the markets re-opened. See AWSJ, 4:12:1985 and 28:12:1987. For a complete account 
of the judgement against Tan Koon Swan see NST, 27:8:1986.
24 For details see NST, 19:1:1988. In June 1988 Tan Koon Swan was declared a bankrupt and ordered to 
pay $1000 a month to the Official Assignee. Outstanding claims against Tan amounted to $423.8 
million, which it was estimated would take him 35,316 years to pay (NST, 4:5:1989).
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The misuse by Tan and his fellow directors of the funds of MPH was by no means an 
isolated example of their exploitation of the enormous funds entrusted to them by many 
thousands of MCA supporters. A government investigation into the collapse of 24 
Deposit-Taking Co-operatives (DTCs) in 1986, in which half a million people, mainly 
working class Chinese investors lost $1.5 billion, found that losses were due to, "over­
investment in land and shares, (as well as) numerous instances of fraud, negligence and 
conflict of interest (that) led to imprudent lending of funds, including to directors and 
other interested parties."25 Besides Koperatif Serbaguna Malaysia (KSM), the largest 
DTC and largest shareholder in MPH, many other DTC's were also closely linked to the 
MCA. The chairman of one of those DTC's, Koperasi Pembangunan Ekonomi Pemuda 
Malaysia (Komuda), was Datuk Kee Yong Wee, a close associate of Tan Koon Swan. 
(Kee was also MCA Youth leader and briefly Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry). 
Under the chairmanship of Kee, Komuda spent about $20 million buying shares in 
companies controlled or associated with Tan Koon Swan, presumably to boost the share 
prices of those companies (Asiaweek, 1:6:1986). A number of those 'transactions' were 
revealed by a Government Report on the DTCs, for instance a $1 million advance was 
given by Komuda to Tan to buy shares in Grand United Holdings (GUH). In addition 
Komuda advanced $350,000 to its subsidiary, Komuda Credit and Leasing Sdn Bhd to 
acquire 400,000 GUH shares from Layman Sdn Bhd, a company in which Tan held 13.3 
per cent of the shares. Komuda also paid $, 140, 830 to acquire 600,000 shares in 
Supreme Corporation. Both GUH and Supreme were then controlled by Tan (NST, 
13:11:1986). Koperasi Jayadiri (M) Bhd (KOJADI), the MCA's educational co-operative 
of which Tan was a director, also held shares in Supreme, Genting, Malaysian 
Resources, Bandar Raya and Magnum, all of which were connected in some way to Tan 
either privately or in his capacity as head of MPH (Gale, 1985:218).
Like Tan, Kee Yong Wee also enmeshed his own business interests with those of the 
party. (Tan had drafted Kee to head Bandar Raya, the property subsidiary of MPH.) It 
was while managing Bandar Raya that Kee launched his own corporate career. In early 
1981 Kee took over a small chemicals manufacturer, Perak Carbide, and renamed it 
Malaysian Resources Corporation Bhd. The firm was quickly turned into a real-estate 
corporation. Its main shareholders were Kee Yong Wee, Datuk Chan Wan Kah and Kee- 
Chan Holdings, a company jointly owned by Kee and Chan (NST, 30:8:1986). 
Malaysian Resources' rapid growth was also accompanied by the accumulation of large 
debt, some $48 million by 1986. Yet that same year Komuda, the MCA linked Youth Co-
25 Report on the Deposit-Taking Co-operatives, Kuala Lumpur, 1986 pp 22 and 30.
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operative of which Kee was also chairman, entered into an agreement with Kee-Chan 
Holdings to buy 40 million Malaysian Resources shares from the latter for $34 million. 
This valued each share at 86 cents, even though the prevailing market price then was 
about 52 cents (MB, 16:2:1987). Later, in January 1988, Kee was found guilty on two 
counts of criminal breach of trust involving $3.3 million belonging to Komuda and was 
sentenced to two years jail.26
With the departure of Tan Koon Swan and some of his closest associates from both 
the MCA and MPH, the company underwent a major restructuring. On 13 February 1987 
the entire MC A-dominated board of directors of MPH headed by Datuk Lee San Choon 
resigned. In order to inject new confidence into MPH which had become a highly 
politicised, directionless and desperately struggling investment conglomerate, the MCA 
leadership persuaded the respected Chinese businessman, Robert Kuok, to head a new 
board. Kuok immediately set about shedding MPH's political and communal image in 
favour of a purely business approach where considerations of efficiency and profit were 
paramount.27 After its restructuring under Kuok, MPH again became a sufficiently 
attractive business proposition to attract a hostile takeover bid by Hume Industries, a 
company controlled by Quek Leng Chan's Hong Leong Group. The MCA viewed Hume 
as a hostile bidder because it believed the company might carve up MPH or share control 
of it with investors close to certain UMNO leaders. Although the MCA leadership 
succeeded in blocking Hume's bid and control of MPH ultimately passed to a perceived 
'friendly party', Kamunting Corporation, it was a pyrrhic victory. Shortly after acquiring 
a controlling stake in MPH, Kamunting's chief executive, Lim Thiam Kit, who also had
26 Kee was also fined a total of $2.5 million in default 15 months jail See NST, 30:1:1988.
Other dubious dealings by KSM/MPH directors came to light in another scandal, dubbed the 'Kok 
Lanas deal'. In May 1983 KSM purchased 41 acres of land in Kok Lanas, near Kota Baru for 
development as a housing estate. During KSM's annual conference in September 1983 a lawyer, Wee 
Choo Keong told the press that the $11.1 million KSM had agreed to pay for the land was 
exorbitant. (Wee was secretary of the 'No deal to Kok Lanas' ad hoc committee formed by over 500 
KSM members in Kelantan who were opposed to the purchase). According to Wee the Finance 
Ministry's property market report of 1982 stated that an acre of land in Kok Lanas cost between 
$13,000 and $41,000 at most. Yet KSM directors were prepared to pay about $287, 000 per acre, that 
is seven times the maximum price quoted by the report (Star, 26:4:1984). Wee and his supporters 
made representations to the Co-operative Department, apparently to good effect, because on 12 
November 1983 the department rejected the deal on the grounds that the price was too high and the 
prices of the houses to be built there were not competitive. (Author's interview with Wee Choo 
Keong, 16:1:1992).
27 Besides Robert Kuok, other new appointments to the board of MPH included: Tan Sri Lee Loy Seng, 
head of the large plantation group, Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd and the first chairman of MPH, Chan 
Hua Eng, a corporate lawyer from Sheam Delamore and Company, and Oh Bak Kim, executive 
director of Kuok's company, Perlis Plantations. Oh was appointed managing director of MPH. See 
The Star, 14:2:1987.
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close ties with UMNO leaders, stripped the company of its principal assets and the once 
mighty conglomerate was broken up - a process that signalled in dramatic fashion the 
ultimate failure of the Chinese communal or institutional response to the NEP.
In retrospect, the failure of MPH's 'institutional' or 'group' approach to the NEP was 
due as much to the poor investment decisions made by Tan Koon Swan and his fellow 
directors, and their corrupt use of the company's assets to enhance or protect their 
personal business interests, as to the resistance MPH encountered from the state and 
Malay politicians. From the beginning MPH's goals contained conflicting political and 
economic objectives. What was initially seen as an innovative response to the NEP, the 
mobilisation of funds in the Chinese community to safeguard certain sectors of the 
economy for Chinese business, became subordinated to the quest for rapid expansion and 
a high corporate profile to build loyalty and distribute patronage to bolster the political 
and business ambitions of MPH's chairman Tan Koon Swan and his supporters. But the 
critical difference with Malay capital was that whereas Tan's Malay counterpart, Daim 
Zainuddin, could rely on the state to facilitate and protect his business interests, and those 
of UMNO, Tan Koon Swan could not where his interests and those of the MCA were 
concerned.
But the fate of the narrowly focused approach of MPH to the NEP and the rise of 
Malay capitalism was a far cry from that adopted by those tycoons and large Chinese 
business firms who have carried out their economic activities in ways acceptable to the 
state and the Malay power brokers and who have generally prospered (Heng, 1992:142). 
So it is to the relationships established by ‘new’ and ‘old’ Chinese wealth with the state 
and Bumiputra business groups and the implications of those relationships for the 
question of their status as pariahs or entrepreneurs that we now turn.
Chapter 9
CHINESE BUSINESS GROUPS: NEW WEALTH
GROWTH AND RELATIONS WITH THE STATE AND BUMIPUTRA
BUSINESS GROUPS
A strong theme persists in studies of Chinese capitalism in Malaysia that determinedly 
seeks to classify Chinese capitalists in either/or terms, that is as either dynamic 
entrepreneurs or dependent pariahs. By an examination of a cross-section of Chinese 
business groups, the following chapters will show that such attempts to classify or 
characterise Chinese capital are no longer adequate to describe the complexity and 
dynamism found in the responses of Chinese capitalists to the NEP and their 
relationships with the state and Bumiputra business groups. Since the nexus between the 
state and business has also been central to the growth and character of Chinese capitalism 
after 1970 it is useful, for analytical purposes, to distinguish between 'old' and 'new' 
money that is, as indicated earlier, between those Chinese groups who accumulated their 
wealth before the NEP and those whose corporate rise took place after 1970, that is 
within the environment and constraints of the NEP.
We shall begin our study with an examination of a number of individuals/groups 
representative of 'new wealth'. More attention will be paid to members of this group 
because their relationship with the UMNO leadership and the emerging Bumiputra 
business groups is more 'intense' and complex than that of old money; secondly, less 
scholarly attention has been given to them than to members of the 'old' group whose rise 
has been charted by a number of writers; and finally, with the decline of many of the 
companies associated with old Chinese wealth, the relative importance of 'new' to 'old' 
Chinese money appeared, by the early nineties, to be moving toward some approximate 
balance.1
l In discussions with Chinese businessmen and Chambers of Commerce the author was given various 
estimates as to the relative importance of 'new' to 'old' wealth ranging from 60:40 old/new to the 
reverse 40:60 new/old.
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Prominent examples of 'new wealth' include Vincent Tan (Berjaya), Khoo Kay Peng 
(MUI), Lim Thian Kit (Kamunting), Quek Leng Chan (Hong Leong), Loy Hean Heong 
(MBf Holdings Bhd), Dick Chan Teik Huat (Metroplex), William Cheng Heng Jem 
(Lion Corporation), Yeoh Sock Ping (YTL Corporation Bhd) and Lim Kim Hong 
(Dreamland Holdings Bhd), and of course Tan Koon Swan whose corporate rise and fall 
was examined earlier. While the distinction between 'old' and 'new' money is a useful 
one for analytical purposes, the placement of individuals in one or other category is of 
necessity somewhat arbitrary. In that regard, two groups, Quek Leng Chan's Hong 
Leong group and Loy Hean Heong's MBf Holdings Bhd share characteristics in common 
with 'old money' (at least in terms of their origins), but at the same time also share 
characteristics associated with the 'new money,' that is in terms of the (relative) intimacy 
of their political links with the state and Malay capital. Since we are primarily concerned 
with the latter those groups will, for our purposes, be considered as new money.
Before turning to individual cases it is pertinent however to list some principal 
features associated with the rise of new Chinese wealth in the 1980s. These features 
include:
• rapid growth through dependence on external rather than private or internally- 
generated sources of finance. Principal sources of finance are banks, state funds 
and the mechanisms of the stockmarket. Particular attention is focused on gaining 
control of a public company or 'listed vehicle’ which can raise capital through 
share issues, mergers and takeovers.
• investment in divergent fields rather than concentration in or identification with 
one sector or core activity such as commodity production or manufacturing 
invariably property development, building and construction, banking (MUI and 
MBf) and the provision of financial services.
• the rapidity and the means by which the new groups were built meant that most 
were highly leveraged, and the personalities associated with them incurred large 
debts in the eighties, but by the nineties a number had consolidated and acquired a 
core of solid income-generating assets which gave them a resilience and durability 
that they clearly lacked a decade earlier.
• most of the new tycoons are closely associated with a prominent member of the 
Malay political-business elite. In contrast members of old or established groups
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tend to be associated with a Malay institutional partner such as PNB or a former 
senior bureaucrat.1 2
• while the tycoon's identification or association with a powerful member of the 
Malay political/business elite can offer mutual benefits and considerable rewards 
for both parties, such associations are also vulnerable to changing fortunes in 
UMNO politics.
• the close integration of the investments of the new tycoons with Malay capital has 
an interdependent and complementary character that promotes the growth of both 
parties. In order to illustrate the characteristics of 'new wealth' listed above and 
their implications for Chinese capitalism as 'pariah' or 'paragon’ - to use 
McVey’s3 terms - we shall now examine some of the most prominent Chinese 
business groups that have emerged in the 1970's and 1980's.
Vincent Tan Chee Yioun : Berjaya
More controversy has surrounded the rapid rise of Vincent Tan's conglomerate, Berjaya 
Corporation Bhd, than any of the other new Chinese groups.4 Vincent Tan Chee Yioun 
was bom in 1952 at Batu Pahat, Johore. He hoped to study law in New Zealand but had 
to shelve such plans when his father's fortunes failed. Instead he went to work in a bank 
but at night Tan sold insurance for American International Assurance (AIA). Since he 
obtained ten times more income from his part-time sales job, he left banking and at the 
age of 23 became an AIA agency manager. He held the postion until 1982 when he 
turned 30. At the same time Tan started private companies involved in trading, general 
insurance, real estate development and the haulage industry but his first major corporate 
breakthough came in 1982 when he won the McDonald's fast food franchise in Malaysia 
against very strong competition from such powerful and well established concerns as the 
See Hoy Chan, East Asiatic and Federal Hotels' groups of companies (BT, 31:3:1982). 
How could a 30-year old "unknown" Chinese win such a franchise? Observers could 
only speculate that Tan must have had strong backing from someone in UMNO.
1 In the NEP environment Chinese tycoons investing in new areas of business (such as leasing, 
insurance and opportunities flowing from the government's privatisation program) or those requiring
a good deal of 'up front' negotiations (such as contracts for property development and licences to 
provide banking and other financial services) are better served by a prominent member of the Malay 
political/business elite than a Malay institution or a former senior bureaucrat.
3 See McVey, R., 1992 ‘The Materialization of the Southeast Asian Entrepreneur’ in McVey (ed), 
Southeast Asian Capitalists
4 Vincent Tan Chee Yioun should not be confused with Vincent Tan See Yin who is closely associated 
with the Melewar Group controlled by Negri Sembilan royalty.
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The McDonald’s coup gave Tan the credentials he needed to seek more capital and 
further his corporate activities. In April 1984 Nautilus Corporation Bhd, a company 
jointly owned by Tan's family company, United Prime Corporation Bhd, and Datuk 
Azman Hashim, then executive director of Arab-Malaysia Bank, acquired a 38 per cent 
interest in Berjaya Corporation.5 Shortly thereafter Azman sold his entire stake in 
Nautilus in order to concentrate on his own business affairs at Arab-Malaysia Bank.6 
Azman sold his stake in Nautilus to Serdang Enterprise Sdn Bhd, a firm that was 
described as a 'Bumiputra company' whose principal shareholders were not disclosed at 
the time but were later revealed as Ahmad Mustapha bin Mohamed Hassan7, a nephew of 
the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, and Mohamed Shah bin Tan Sri Abdul Kadir, a son of 
the former Attorney General, Tan Sri Abdul Kadir.
Meanwhile, Berjaya, whose principal activity had been the manufacture of steel wire 
products, embarked on an extensive diversification program. Initially it diversified into 
property development and marketing and the distribution of consumer durables (most 
notably through Regnis (Malaysia) which operated the Singer sewing machine business). 
Berjaya also expanded its interests in insurance8 and textiles, the latter through South 
Pacific Textile Industries (SPTI),9 a publicly-listed company whose directors included 
several prominent Bumiputras and UMNO politicians.10 In retrospect, Berjaya's most 
significant acquisition however was a 20.1 per cent stake in Raleigh for $50.7 million, 
the company that the Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin had intended to make the flagship 
of his corporate empire (BT, 30:9:1987). By the mid-eighties these acquisitions had
5 Berjaya Corporation was formerly known as Berjaya Kawat Bhd. The 37.9 per cent stake was 
acquired from an Australian company, Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd (BHP) and National Iron and 
Steel Mills of Singapore for $20.5 million. See The Star, 27:4:1985.
6 Tan Sri Datuk Azman emphasised that he had enjoyed an amicable business association with Mr 
Tan and described his withdrawal as "very much regretted" due to his full-time involvement in the 
management of the Arab-Malaysia Development Bank group of companies (The Star, 27:4:1985).
Ahmad Mustapha's business career is examined in chapter 4 in the discussion of Bureaucrats-tumed- 
Businessmen.
8 Berjaya acquired a majority interest in United Prime Insurance, a joint venture with Tokio Marine 
and Fire, a Mitsubishi company. See Asiaweek, 27:5:1988.
9 In April 1985 Berjaya acquired a 23 per cent stake in SPTI but had by 1988 increased that holding to 
72.4 per cent of the company. See NST, 27:4:1985 and KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook, Vol 
X1V:684.
10 As noted in chapter 4, the chairman of SPTI was Ahmad Mustapha bin Mohd Hassan, a nephew of 
the Prime Minister Dr Mahathir. (His links with Berjaya via Serdang and Nautilus Corporation have 
been outlined in the text above.) Other directors of SPTI included Dato Abdullah Ahmad UMNO 
MP for Kok Lanas and Mohd Tamrin Abdul Ghafar, UMNO MP for Batu Berendam and a son the 
Deputy Prime Minister, Ghafar Baba. See BT, 28:1:1987.
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transformed Berjaya from a mere steel wire products manufacturer to a mini­
conglomerate.
While Tan's early career is a testament to his reputation as a shrewd and enterprising 
businessman, it was the spectacular growth of Berjaya, particularly after 1985, through 
the apparent close enmeshing of his business interests with those of powerful figures in 
the Malay political/business elite, that made Vincent Tan such a prominent and 
controversial figure in Malaysian business. The source of most controversy surrounding 
Tan was the award of one of the government's first privatisation projects, the lucrative 
Sports Toto lottery to a Tan company, B&B Enterprises. In the twelve months prior to its 
privatisation Sports Toto made a profit of $7.03 million (The Star, 28:5:1985). Sports 
Toto was set up under the Companies Act in 1969 to promote and develop sports from 
the proceeds of gambling. On 21 May 1985 the Ministry of Finance Incorporated (MOF), 
until then the sole owners, sold 70 per cent of Sports Toto shares to B&B Enterprise. 
Simultaneously, B&B sold 10 per cent of Sports Toto shares to the Melewar 
Corporation, a company wholly-owned by a branch of the Negri Sembilan royal family 
headed by Tunku Abdullah, brother of the Sultan (The Star, 12:7:1987). The chairman of 
the newly privatised Sports Toto was Tan Sri Thong Yaw Hong, who had only recently 
retired as Secretary General of the Ministry of Finance, the former owner - through MOF 
- of the company.
There was no open tender for the privatisation of Sports Toto, apparently no 
discussion in Cabinet and even Sports Toto chairman at the time, Dr Agoes Salim, had no 
knowledge of the proposal until rumours appeared in the press.11 Despite some intense 
questioning by the Opposition as to why there was no open tender for Toto, the Prime 
Minister Dr Mahathir would only say that:
"the idea came from a private sector group and it would have been unfair if their 
unique proposal had been accepted by the government and then awarded to 
someone else".12
The 'unique' aspect of Tan's proposal to which the Prime Minister referred was never 
spelt out. Neither was the price at which the 70 per cent stake in Sports Toto sold to B&B 
ever officially disclosed but it included a full payout to the Government of $35.5 million
11 See The Star, 18:1:1987 and 29:5:1985.
The Prime Minister's answer prompted the Opposition Leader, Lim Kit Siang, to conclude that, 
"the Government's privatistation policy had degenerated into piratisation where a select few were 
allowed to raid the public domain for their own interests" (The Star, 14:3:1987).
12
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in retained earnings as well as premiums estimated at $428 million.13 When the company 
was listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in June 1987 its share price rose 
fivefold within days (MB,16:6:1990). B&B made use of this opportunity to raise funds 
by reducing its holding to 45 per cent.14 Clearly Sports Toto was crucial to Tan's plans 
for further expansion. The company's lottery operations provided a much needed cash 
flow and Tan benefited enormously from the sharp rise in Sports Toto's market value 
after it was publicly-listed. Interestingly, Tan Sri Thong Yaw Hong who, as Secretary 
General of the Ministry of Finance was responsible for Sports Toto when it was 
incorporated as a government company, almost immediately reappeared after his 
retirement as chairman of the privatised and publicly-listed Sports Toto.
Reasons for the award of Sports Toto to Vincent Tan remain obscure, but subsequent 
corporate developments indicated the intimate and symbiotic nature of Tan's relationship 
with business interests associated with the former Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin. It 
is to the nature of that relationship that we now turn.
After Tan got control of Sports Toto he quickly swapped his shares in the lottery 
concern for additional shares in Berjaya, thereby gaining a controlling stake in the 
company. The swap took place when the newly listed B&B shares were at their peak in 
the Stock Exchange in late 1987. Less than a year later, in May 1988, "Tan repaid the 
favour (the Sports Toto windfall that had facilitated his gaining control of Berjaya) by 
swapping his Berjaya shares for control of Raleigh Bhd, the loss-making company 
closely associated with Daim Zainuddin" (FEER, 31:8:1989). Daim was Minister of 
Finance when the ministry sold Sports Toto to Tan. As indicated earlier, Raleigh was 
controlled until 1986 by Daim's family company, Seri Iras. Daim had intended to make 
Raleigh the flagship of a huge corporate empire but that aim was abandoned following 
Prime Minister Mahathir's decree that cabinet ministers could not hold shares in publicly- 
listed companies.15 Prior to selling off many of his assets in late 1986, Daim had injected 
several property companies into Raleigh. Shortly thereafter there was a severe slump in 
property prices and Raleigh's fortunes declined. In 1984 the company made a profit of
13 Under the privatisation agreement, B&B was required to pay 3 per cent of sales as an annual royalty 
to the government, as well as 10 per cent of pre-tax profits to the National Sports Council, but, as 
John Mulcahy observed, the only restraint to growth was the public's appetite for a punt. See 
FEER, 17:9:1987 (Shroff, ‘Pick a number - every one a winner’).
14 MOF still retained 30 per cent and Melewar’s shrunk to 7.5 per cent. (The MOF also retained a 
Special Share that meant its consent was necessary in basic decisions affecting company policy.) 
The remaining shares, about 17.5 per cent, were held by Sports Toto directors, employees and 
individuals. See The Star, 12:7:1987.
15 See section on Daim Zainuddin in chapter 6.
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$29.9 million but by 1987 it reported a loss of $1.2 million.16 "With bicycles and 
property development" said one observer, "Raleigh was doomed to go down the tubes" 
(Asiaweek, 27:5:1988).
After he became Finance Minister, Daim's holding companies, including Raleigh, 
passed to some of his close associates and to other friendly parties, a number of whom 
were - coincidentally or not - prominent in the stable of companies acquired by Berjaya. 
When Berjaya was absorbed by Raleigh in what was described as 'a friendly deal with all 
the hallmarks of a reverse takeover,’ it was also seen, as one analyst put it, as 'Daim's 
associates consolidating under one umbrella the diverse holdings they have' (Asiaweek, 
27:5:1988).
When Raleigh took over Berjaya, Tan renamed the company Inter-Pacific Industrial 
Group Bhd (Inter-Pac). Inter-Pac rivalled in size some of Malaysia's largest corporations 
with controlling stakes in some of the country's most profitable publicly-listed companies 
in manufacturing, financial services, property and construction, plantations and 
gaming.17 The takeover involved Raleigh buying 54 per cent of Berjaya for $70.5 million 
from B&B Enterprises, the private company controlled by Vincent Tan. Raleigh also 
acquired 45 per cent of Prudential Assurance Sdn Bhd and another 30 per cent of Sports 
Toto.18
The groups prepared to underwrite Raleigh's massive $253.7 million rights issue to 
finance these acquisitions also indicated the strength of Tan's political and state 
connections and the extent to which funding from state and party sources was important 
in facilitating the deal. Some of the principal groups that underwrote Raleigh's rights 
issue included the Employees Provident Fund (EPF), Mara, Arab-Malaysia Merchant 
Bank and Commerce International Merchant Bankers. The presence of Commerce
16 See KLSE Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XIV:596.
17 Some of the most prominent and profitable companies in the Inter-Pac group included the already 
diversified Beijaya, South Pacific Textile Industries, Sports Toto, Inter-Pac Securities, Prudential 
and Nam Fatt Engineering. See MB, 16:6:1990 (S. Jayasankaran, 'Big is Beautiful at Inter-Pac’).
18 With the new acquisitions Raleigh’s paid-up capital leapt from $72.4 million to $326.2 million. 
B&B Enterprises, which had sold 54.16 per cent of Berjaya to Raleigh for $70.5 million, bought a 
20.1 per cent stake in Raleigh (that Beijaya had purchased earlier, in September 1987) for $38.8 
million thus completing the complex reverse takeover. Vincent Tan's B&B Enterprises 20.1 per 
cent of Raleigh amounted to a controlling stake. Analysts said that the remaining 40 per cent 
shareholding in Raleigh was in the hands of friendly parties. The next largest shareholders included 
three state-owned foundations - Mara, the Employees Provident Fund and the National Savings Bank 
- which owned 15 per cent between them. See FEER, 26:5:1988 (Nick Seaward, 'Wheels of 
Fortune’); FEER, 16:6:1988 (Nick Seaward,’Shroff); Asiaweek, 27:5:1988 ('Reversing into 
Riches'); KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XV:220 and BT, 30:9:1987.
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International Merchant Bankers aroused particular interest because it was the merchant 
bank controlled by the same people as Hatibudi whose ultimate beneficial owner was 
UMNO.19 Other borrowings by Tan also indicated that the interests of other influential 
parties were being protected or promoted in the course of his corporate rise.20
Apparent political support for the Raleigh takeover was further reinforced by the 
controversial decision by the state holding company, Minister of Finance Incorporated 
(MOF), to sell its 30 per cent stake in Sports Toto to Raleigh. Apparently when Sports 
Toto was privatised in 1985, the MOF had promised to retain its 30 per cent stake in the 
gaming company. The MOF was thus criticised for agreeing to dispose of its entire stake 
with the exception of the one Special Share to Raleigh Bhd. As Cheong asked rhetorically 
"Why Raleigh?" (Cheong, 1989:140). Altogether in the course of the complex reverse 
takeover, Raleigh acquired a controlling 62 per cent stake in Sports Toto,21 one of 
Malaysia's most fecund 'cash cows' whose profits under Tan's management had soared 
from $5 million in 1985 to $36 million in the year to April 1989 (FEER, 31:8:1989). 
Raleigh was not the only winner in all these manouverings however.
19 See FEER, 16:6:1988. For background on Commerce International Merchant Bankers (CIMB) and 
its relations with UMNO see chapter 5 and sections on 'The Growth of the Fleet Group' and 
Hatibudi Sdn Bhd.
20 The Sports Toto transaction and several others by Tan were partly financed by borrowings from the 
Co-operative Central Bank (CCB), the Co-operative that collapsed in 1986 because of questionable 
loans. While many of CCB's borrowers were prosecuted or had their passports impounded and their 
assets frozen pending investigation, no action was taken against Tan, one of the institutions biggest 
customers (AWSJ, 6:11:1989). Tan had borrowed $68.6 million from CCB. In an affidavit in reply 
to allegations that 'certain persons (notably Vincent Tan and Loy Hean Heong) had their loans 
written off by Bank Negara appointees in the CCB’, Mr Lee Siew Kuan a special assistant to the 
Governor of Bank Negara (the central bank), said that Mr Tan had written to the bank undertaking to 
repay the amounts outstanding in his account and that "of certain related borrowers" (The Star, 
7:3:1989). Intriguingly the identity of the "certain related borrowers" was never revealed.
Two months before Tan and his associates began borrowing heavily from CCB, (May to December 
1985) the Co-operative's chairman, Mohamed Hassan Abdul Wahab, and its chief executive, 
Sinnappan Periasamy, joined the board of directors of Nautilus Corporation, the company Tan used 
to buy the initial stake in Beijaya. Both former CCB executives resigned from the Nautilus board 
more than a year later, after Tan and his associates stopped dealing with CCB and financial problems 
ended the institutions spending spree. See AWSJ, 6:11:1989 (Stephen Duthie, 'Malaysia's Tan 
Builds Image and Empire but Political Connections and Rapid Rise Continue to Stir Questions').
As of 9 March 1989 Tan had repaid $48.4 million. See The Star, 7:3:1989.
21 For a breakdown of Raleigh's direct and indirect interest in Sports Toto at that point, May 1988, see 
FEER, 26:5:1988 (Nick Seaward,'Wheels of Fortune’). Raleigh did not keep its Sports Toto stake 
for long and sold its shares in the company to Beijaya. In a round about way, control of Sports Toto 
went back to B&B Enterprises which controlled Berjaya Corporation and which in turn controlled 
Sports Toto (Cheong, 1989:137). The bewildering movement of Sports Toto within Tan's 
companies continued. In November 1991 it was announced that Far Eastern Assets (at least until 
August 1989 a Berjaya-related company) purchased Sports Toto for $600 million. See MB, 
1:11:1991 and FEER, 31:8:1989 (Inter-Pac Group's Structure).
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According to Nick Seaward, Vincent Tan (who had earlier taken Sports Toto over 
through his company B&B Enterprises and then swapped his shares in Toto to gain a 
controlling stake in Berjaya), also made a clear profit of $129 million on B&B's original 
investment in Toto.22 While Tan had amassed nearly $200 million in personal debt in the 
course of the purchase of Raleigh and its transformation into Inter-Pacific (AWSJ, 
6:11:1989), he was able to significantly reduce that debt when in August 1989, Tan Chin 
Nam's IGB Corporation Bhd bought a 20 per cent stake in Inter-Pac.23 (In a rare 
interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review Tan said he would be debt free, 'If I 
reduce my holdings in Inter-Pac a little bit'.)24 At the same time, Tan, through his private 
holding company B&B Enterprises, retained a controlling 20.1 per cent stake in Inter-Pac 
(which also became the holding company for Beijaya), a conglomerate that by 1990 had 
assets of over $2.1 billion and made a profit of $106 million.25
Inter-Pac associates and executives denied that political connections played any part in 
securing Sports Toto or in the eventual purchase of Raleigh,26 and Daim denied that he 
had appointed any of his friends, including Vincent Tan or Datuk Amad Sebi Abu Bakar 
(a well-connected UMNO businessman) as proxies to manage his business affairs after 
he joined the cabinet.27 Neverthless an examination of Berjaya's complex shareholding, 
the network of companies to which large blocks of Berjaya shares were moved, and the 
sources of funds for these various transactions will show how difficult it is to categorise 
relationships within the new Chinese conglomerates and to differentiate 'Malay' from 
'Chinese' capital/interests in some of them.
22 See FEER, 16:6:1988 (Nick Seaward, ’Shroff).
23 Several commentators also noted how Inter-Pac's alliance with IGB Corporation gave the fast 
moving Vincent Tan ’respectiblity' and an opportunity to consolidate. See FEER, 31:8:1989 
(Christopher Marchand,' The Burger Kingdom’); AWSJ, 28-29 July 1989 (Stephen Duthie, 
Malaysian Firms Plan Powerful Alliance’) and MB, 16:6:1990 (S Jayasankaran, 'Big is Beautiful at 
Inter-Pac').
24 See FEER, 31:8:1989 (Christopher Marchand, 'The Burger Kingdom').
25 KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook, Vol X V I1, Bk 1:28 &168.
26 AWSJ, 6:11:1980 (Stephen Duthie,'Malaysia's Tan Builds Image and Empire But Political 
Connections and Rapid Rise Continue to Stir Questions').
27 Utusan Malaysia, 16:4:1989 Daim added that,”All my shares in companies listed on the KLSE have 
been sold. I have no proxy. My own view is that I am better at business than Ahmad Sebi or 
Vincent Tan. (I am) better at saving money in a bank than any proxy". See also The Star, 
17:4:1989 (’Daim:I Don't Use My Friends as Proxies'); MB, 16:6:1990 (S Jayasankaran, 'The 
Mysterious McTan’) and MB, 1:8:1990 (S Jayasankaran, Interview with Daim entitled 'Daim De- 
Mystified').
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The close business associations between Daim and Ahmad Sebi in the early eighties 
have been discussed by Gomez.28 Suffice to note here, however, that in May 1985 
Ahmad Sebi apparently played a key role as a go-between or broker in the privatisation of 
Sports Toto and its sale to Vincent Tan's B&B Enterprises.29 Ahmad Sebi was also 
prominent amongst the small group of Tan associates who gave personal guarantees as 
part security for the $19 million loan arranged by Arab-Malaysia Merchant Bank to 
finance B&B's purchase of Sports Toto shares from the Ministry of Finance.30 He was 
also a director of Nautilus Corporation (the company used by Tan to acquire control of 
Beijaya from foreign interests) and a director and controlling shareholder of Sehasrat Sdn 
Bhd (The Star, 12:4:1988), a company which by September 1986 had a major 30 per 
cent stake in Berjaya.31 In addition, Ahmad Sebi was a director of Budimaju Sdn Bhd, a 
company that was incorporated on 23 December 1986 with paid-up capital of $2 but 
which on 27 October 1987 had its paid-up capital increased to $50,000 when 49,998 
shares were issued to none other than, Ahmad Sebi (The Star, 12:4:1988). At about the 
same time Budimaju also purchased a block of Beijaya shares so that Ahmad Sebi (or 
those interests on whose behalf he was acting), was, through Sehasrat Sdn Bhd and 
Budimaju, a substantial shareholder in Berjaya prior to, and including, the period when 
the company was absorbed in the reverse takeover by Raleigh.
Earlier we saw how in 1988 shares in the large food retailing company, Cold Storage 
(Malaysia) Bhd, originally bought by Daim (whether on his own behalf or for UMNO), 
were sold by Ayer Hitam Tin Dredging Malaysia Bhd to The New Straits Times Press 
(Malaysia) Bhd. In other words, as Seaward observed32, those same shares were
28 See Gomez, 1990:76,105,125 & 1994: 101-102,108-109, 169-170, 269-270.
29 Several well placed sources in banks and securities firms confirmed to the author that they 
understood that Ahmad Sebi was the broker between Daim/Ministry of Finance and Vincent Tan in 
the privatisation of Sports Toto.
30 The Star, 12:7:1987 (Tan Siok Choo, 'Things Investors are not told (but should)'). According to 
this report, security for B&B's $19 million loan to purchase 6,001 Sports Toto shares from the 
Ministry of Finance comprised: 6,001 Sports Toto shares; a debenture executed by B &B; land in 
Simpang Kanan, Batu Pahat owned by Indah Corporation; a corporate guarantee given by Nautilus 
Corp (a company in which both Mr Vincent Tan and his brother Mr Tan Chee Sing had 
considerable interests); and personal guarantees given by Mr Vincent Tan Chee Yioun, Mr Tan Chee 
Sing, Encik Shuib bin Yacob, Kapt. Zainuddin bin Basar and Encik Ahmad Sebi bin Bakar. The 
report noted that except for Encik Ahmad Sebi all those who guaranteed the loan were B &B 
shareholders. Ahmad Sebi was at the time managing director of Sistem Televisyen Malaysia or TV 
3. His name did not appear in the Registrar of Companies files either as a B&B shareholder or as a 
director.
31 By September 1988 Sehasrat Sdn Bhd had reduced its stake in Beijaya to 10.5 per cent. See KLSE 
Annual Companies Handbook, Vol X1V:46.
32 See FEER, 6:10:1988.
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apparently "being transferee! from one UMNO safe haven," namely Ayer Hitam Tin 
Dredging in the UMNO-controlled Halimtan network of companies, "to another," the 
more profitable New Straits Times Press in the Fleet Group, presumably to make profits 
for all concerned33. In the same year (1988) a similar exercise also occurred involving 
Ahmad Sebi and the sale of Berjaya shares. At that time, one of Ahmad Sebi's family 
companies, Sehasrat Sdn Bhd, controlled 20 per cent of Kampung Lanjut Tin Dredging 
Bhd and 10.47 per cent of Beij ay a (The Star, 11:4:1991).
On 11 April 1988, Sehasrat sold 5 million shares in Berjaya to Kampung Lanjat for 
$8 million, and the balance, 17 million shares, to Ayer Hitam for $27.2 million the next 
day. Both Ayer Hitam and Kampung Lanjut were key companies in the UMNO- 
controlled Halimtan network of companies. Altogether Ahmad Sebi, through Sehasrat 
sold a total of 22 million shares in Berjaya, representing Sehasrafs entire 10.47 per cent 
stake in the company, for $23 million.34 Besides whatever profits may have accrued to 
Ahmad Sebi, or those for whom he was acting, the Berjaya shares (like those of Cold 
Storage) had at the same time found another safe haven in the Halimtan group of 
companies controlled by UMNO.
The rapid growth of Berjaya after 1985 was facilitated by Tan's winning the 
privatised gaming concern, Sports Toto. Sports Toto gave Vincent Tan a much needed 
cash flow by which he was able to gain control of Beijaya and eventually the larger Inter- 
Pac. Along the way Tan made large profits, was able to reduce considerable debt and 
developed an independent capital base. At the same time state support that helped 
Berjaya/Raleigh/Inter-Pac to flourish also facilitated the capacity of the group to act as a 
safe haven for companies formerly associated with Daim Zainuddin, and possibly other 
UMNO-connected interests, where they were carefully nurtured (and probably 
appreciated in value), before being passed on to various other UMNO-controlled 
companies. Tan’s complex, interdependent relationship with the state and Malay capital 
defies easy categorization. He cannot be simply classed as a 'pariah', for while on the 
one hand he still needs access to contracts and concessions, on the other Malay business, 
both private and political, also needs his corporate acumen to protect and promote their/its 
interests. At some points Tan was a 'client' but at others a 'patron', often for the same 
Bumiputra business interests. Nevertheless it is clear that the amalgam of interests found 
in Berjaya, including Chinese and Malay capital as well as state support, has produced, 
as Figure 9.1 shows, one of Malaysia's biggest conglomerates.
33 See chapter 5 'Govemment/Party/Private Sector Relations : Interlocking directorships and the 
transfer of assets.
34 See The Star, 13:4:1988 & 11:4:1991.
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Figure 9.1 Berjaya: Corporate Structure as at 11 September 1993.
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Figure 9.1 (cont.)
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Khoo Kay Peng : Malayan United Industries Bhd (MUI)
Khoo Kay Peng typified much of the 'new' Chinese wealth in the eighties by the way in 
which he used the mechanisms of the stockmarket to raise capital and quickly build a 
huge conglomerate, Malayan United Industries Bhd (MUI), through share issues, 
mergers and takeovers. Such methods of growth and capital accumulation relied heavily 
on state support and that of the general public as shareholders. To ensure such support, 
MUI's corporate rise was also accompanied by considerable publicity regarding the 
alleged close relationship between Khoo and one of UMNO's most powerful figures in 
the early eighties, the then Finance Minister, Tengku Razaleigh. This survey of MUI's 
changing fortunes will focus on how too close an identification of the new Chinese 
groups with powerful members of the Malay political/business elite, while offering 
considerable rewards for both parties, can also undo both when there is a shift of political 
fortunes in UMNO.
Khoo Kay Peng was bom in 1938 in Batu Pahat, Johore - coincidentally, Vincent 
Tan's birthplace also - where his father was the manager of the local branch of the 
Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC). In 1955 Khoo also joined OCBC in 
Singapore where he worked for Khoo Teck Puat who was soon to become one of 
Malaysia's most prominent and controversial tycoons.35 In 1960 Khoo Teck Puat, after 
successsfully lobbying for support from the Chinese business community, was able to 
set up a new bank, Malayan Banking Bhd in Kuala Lumpur.36 Shortly thereafter Khoo 
Kay Peng joined his mentor, Teck Puat, at the newly established Malayan Banking where 
he rose rapidly to become a manager of the bank. In 1965 Khoo Kay Peng was seconded 
to Bank Bumiputra which had just commenced operations and required key personnel 
with experience in banking. At Bank Bumiputra, Khoo rose quickly to a senior position 
as director of banking operations (MB, 16:11:1985). The chief executive of Bank 
Bumiputra at the time was Tengku Razaleigh. Evidently Khoo Kay Peng impressed 
Tengku Razaleigh, with whom he worked closely at Bank Bumiputra, and gained the 
latter's confidence. The ties that Khoo forged with Razaleigh during the latter 1960's at 
Bank Bumiputra, as well as with Robert Kuok, a founder-director of the bank, and later 
with Tan Koon Swan and his Multi-Purpose Holdings group of companies were all to 
play important roles in Khoo's rapid corporate rise (AWSJ, 26:8:1980).
3 5 For an account of Khoo Teck Puaf s controversial corporate careeer see Gill, 1987:19-35.
Principal figures in the Chinese business community who supported Khoo Teck Puat's efforts to 
establish Malayan Banking included the late Loke Wan Tho, Oei Tjong, Goh Tjoie Kok, Ng Eng 
Hiam and Wang Teng Kiat. See Gill, 1987:12.
36
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In 1976, after ten years at Bank Bumiputra, Khoo Kay Peng left to build his own 
business. Khoo started by developing two small pieces of property in Kuala Lumpur 
with a loan from Southern Banking, an investment that gave him his first million 
dollars.37 In 1976 Khoo acquired a major stake in Malayan United Industries (MUI), a 
small household-utensils and toothbrush manufacturer which was incorporated in 1960 
and converted into a public company in 1971. MUI became the vehicle Khoo used for his 
corporate takeovers. Khoo demonstrated repeatedly a fundamental skill which other 
tycoons either misunderstood or failed to acquire that is, 'if you can create enough faith in 
a stock's performance, that faith can be utilised to acquire real assets' (Gill: 1985:154).
There were two distinct phases in MUI's rapid growth. In the first phase, from 1976 
to 1981, MUI acquired Tong Bee Finance (later renamed Malayan United Finance) and a 
joint venture in insurance with Continental Insurance Company of New York. After those 
acquisitions MUI gained control of Central Sugars Bhd, later renamed Malayan United 
Manufacturing Bhd, which had interests in cement manufacturing and sugar refining. 
During the second phase of MUI's growth from 1982 to 1987 the company expanded 
into prime hotels and urban commercial properties, and also acquired Kwong Lee Bank, 
later renamed Malayan United Bank. During this period the MUI group extended its 
operations beyond Malaysia to Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia and North America 
(MB, 16:5:1991). MUI's asset base grew tenfold and pre-tax profits catapulted from a 
mere $1.6 million in 1979 to $59 million, in 1988 only to almost double to a peak of $91 
million in 1984.38 On the then-booming Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, MUI's market 
capitalisation soared past $ 1 billion, with MUI stock trading at several hundred times 
earnings at one point (AWSJ, 26:1:1984).
The manner of MUI's spectacular growth earned the company a reputation as a 
swashbuckling outfit built on other peoples' money, shrewdly exploiting the free­
wheeling stockmarket and Khoo's close ties with the then Finance Minister, Tengku 
Razaleigh and other senior UMNO figures.
Khoo's good standing with the government and the UMNO leadership, at least until 
the mid-eighties, was indicated by Razaleigh's appointing him vice-chairman of 
government-owned Malayan Banking, his membership of delegations accompanying the 
Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, on official overseas visits and his appointment by the Prime
3 7 The original investment led to the building of a hotel, the Kuala Lumpur Holday Inn, which Khoo 
later sold to the Selangor Government for a profit (BT, 24:11:1980).
38 See AWSJ, 26:1:1984 and KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook Vol XV:314.
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Minister as director of the government-run Tourist Development Corporation (TDC).39 
At the same time Khoo was careful to allocate directorships in his companies to such 
luminaries of the Malay elite as Tan Sri Mohamed Noah bin Omar who was appointed 
chairman of MUI when his son-in-law, Datuk Hussein Onn, was Malaysia's Prime 
Minister (1976-1981). Other Khoo appointees included Tan Sri Mohamed Khir Johari, 
former minister and diplomat who became a director of Malayan United Manufacturing 
(MUM), and Mohamed Tamrin bin Abdul Ghafar, UMNO MP, whose father, Ghafar 
Baba, became Deputy Prime Minister in 1986 .
Khoo's takeover of Central Sugars Bhd, one of his most important acquisitions in the 
early eighties, illustrates how he combined political connections and savvy manipulation 
of Kuala Lumpur's freewheeling stock market to quickly acquire great wealth.40 The 
strategy involved a close alliance between Khoo's companies and the MCA-owned Multi- 
Purpose Holdings Bhd (MPH), of which Tan Koon Swan was chairman (AWSJ, 
26:8:1980). In 1977 Khoo took a small shareholding and was appointed chairman of 
Magnum Corporation, a lucrative lottery company. Shortly thereafter MPH also bought a 
stake in Magnum and in fact became the dominant shareholder in the company. At about 
the same time Khoo, in company with sugar tycoon Robert Kuok, and Quek Leng Chan 
whose family controlled the Hong Leong finance group, purchased a controlling stake in 
Central Sugars Bhd. Once the group controlled Central Sugars, and while the price of the 
company's shares was rapidly appreciating, the group had the company buy a major 
stake in Pan Malaysia Cement Works Bhd (PMCW), which in turn controlled another 
company, Pan Malaya Rubber Industries Bhd (PMRI).41 Both PMCW and PMRI were 
profitable publicly-listed companies.
3 9 Khoo was appointed to the board of Malayan Banking in August 1980 and appointed vice-chairman 
in December that year (BT, 8:10; 1982). It was an honorary position and one which Nik Hassan bin 
Wan Abdul Rahim, a director of Malayan Banking said was made under the advice of the Minister of 
Finance, Tengku Razaleigh (AWSJ, 26:8:1980). Khoo resigned from all his posts at Malayan 
Banking on 1 November 1982 in order to avoid any conflict of interest in view of MUI's proposed 
acquisition at the time of other banking interests, notably shares in D&C Bank and Kwong Lee 
Bank. See The Star, 8:10:1982.
Khoo was appointed chairman of the Tourist Development Corporation in March 1985 (BT, 
27:3:1985).
Khoo accompanied the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir on an official visit to the South Pacific in 
October 1982. Other businessmen in the delegation included Robert Kuok and Tan Koon Swan. See 
The Star, 9; 10; 1982.
40 The following account of Khoo's takeover of Central Sugars Bhd and the dealings and relationships 
connected with it is substantially drawn from the AWSJ, 26:8:1980 (David Zielenziger, 'Malaysian 
Tycoon Credits God, but Worldly Friends Help').
41 See AWSJ, 26:8:1980.
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In late 1979 and early 1980 Kuok and Quek sold their interests in Central Sugars, 
presumably at a profit, giving Khoo and his allies more than 55 per cent of the 
company's stock. During that same period there was intense trading in the shares. Much 
of the intense trading, which dramatically increased the value of Central Sugars shares, 
was stimulated by Multi-Purpose Holdings and various MUI subsidiaries which acquired 
large shareholdings in the company. Amongst the convoluted transactions that took place 
concerning Central Sugars stock was one in July 1980 when Multi-Purpose swapped 
most of its Central Sugars shares for MUI stock (AWSJ, 26:8:1980). Interestingly the 
Central Sugars shares were valued well below the market price thereby giving Khoo 
windfall profits and a shareholding of over 78 per cent in Central Sugars. At the same 
time Khoo's companies, MUI and the Central Sugars subsidiaries, were buying into 
Magnum, the gambling company in which Multi-Purpose was the dominant shareholder. 
Intense trading in Magnum shares meant that Multi-Purposes' interest in Magnum soared 
in market value from $16 million to $147 million.42
From the above it is apparent that because the issued capital of Magnum and Central 
Sugars was acquired by a tight group, the principals of that group, notably Khoo and his 
allies, were able to profit handsomely from the intense trading activity they were able to 
promote in the companies concerned. Simultaneously Khoo, as chief executive and main 
shareholder, was able to swap MUI shares (whose price rocketed in little more than a 
year (1980) from under $2 to over $24)43 'for controlling stakes in going concerns and 
float new stock to euphoric investors' (ASWSJ, 26:1:1984). Khoo's vaunted political 
connections also appeared to assist him when trading in Central Sugars shares became a 
matter of concern to the Registrar of Companies. In March 1980 the Registrar ordered all 
Kuala Lumpur brokers to report their positions in MUI and Central Sugars for a four 
month period, but suddenly he withdrew his order with the delphic comment that, 
"Whoever called it off called it o ff (AWSJ, 26:8:1980).
In the course of its rapid growth MUI's tactics provoked ire in some quarters. The 
major Bumiputra unit trust, Permodalan Nasional Bhd (PNB), refused to take up what it 
believed to be inflated MUI stock in a special Bumiputra share issue^and the Singapore
42 See AWSJ, 26:8:1980. While MPH increased its wealth in those transactions, analysts believed that 
the immediate beneficiaries were a small group of businessmen (presumably including Tan Koon 
Swan and possibly other directors of MPH) rather than the 27,000 small Chinese Malaysians who 
had invested their savings in MPH.
43 See FEER, 6:3:1981 (Hugh Payman, 'A slip by the superstars').
44 According to Hugh Peyman, PNB, which MUI had hoped would take up the bulk of the special 
Bumiputra share issue, turned it down, 'even at a third of the market price'. See FEER, 6:3:1981 
(Hugh Peyman, 'A Slip by the Superstars').
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authorities insisted on a cash alternative to MUI shares when the company attempted to 
buy a hotel in the Republic.45 In the mid-eighties Khoo sought to downplay MUI's 
earlier 'highflying' image in favour of one that showed MUI as adept at running its 
empire as it was in building it. In that regard analysts agreed that by 1985, MUI's image 
lagged behind the reality, and that MUI had matured into a sound conglomerate with solid 
longterm prospects.46 It had acquired real assets in profitable sectors such as cement 
manufacturing, building materials and rubber processing and had increasingly shifted the 
focus of its activities to banking and financial services which became the main contributor 
to the group's profits. In contrast to many other big Malaysian concerns, by good timing 
(and luck), MUI had deferred plans to make property one of its mainstays well before the 
1984-85 recession and so was one of the few groups to emerge from the recession with 
no debt and large reserves of cash. This put the company in a potent position to 
expand .47 Yet at that point, political and personal, rather than economic factors 
combined, to curtail MUI's prospects.
What had been perceived as MUI's strengths, its identification with one man, Khoo 
Kay Peng, and Khoo's close association with Tengku Razaleigh, became the company's 
Achilles' heel when Razaleigh lost out in a power struggle in UMNO and Khoo became 
embroiled in the Pan El scandal in Singapore. (Pan El had already claimed the political 
and corporate scalp of Khoo's erstwhile business colleague, Tan Koon Swan.)
The ties between Khoo and Razaleigh were forged, it will be recalled, when both 
worked closely together at Bank Bumiputra in the sixties. As Khoo rose rapidly in the 
corporate world, Razaleigh moved quickly through a series of senior posts in party and 
government to become by 1976 an UMNO vice-president and the Minister of Finance. 
Razaleigh's appointment as Finance Minister coincided with MUI's acquisition of Tong 
Bee Finance, later Malayan United Finance (MUF). MUF represented the first major 
breakthrough for the MUI group from a small manufacturer to a company with a base in 
financial services, a base which provided the platform for the group's more concerted 
takeoff subsequently (BT, 24:11:1980). As licences for finance and insurance companies
45 The Singapore Government through the Economic Development Board (EDB) was a large 
shareholder in the Ming Court hotel and therefore an interested party in the takeover. Consequently 
the Singapore Government insisted on a cash alternative to MUI shares as it was not enamoured of 
MUI shares at a value of $15 when PNB had turned them down at $4.50. See PEER, 6:3:1981.
46 See BT, 4:4:1983 (MUI’s ambitious blueprint: Building up a top-ranking company); The Times, 
3:10:1983 (MUI, set to be a money spinner); Financial Times, 7:7:1985 (Wong Sulong, 'Cash rich 
MUI well placed for expansion').
47 See AWSJ, 26:1:1984 (Raphael Pura, 'MUI's fast growth yielding solid results’); NST, 21:11:1985 
and BT(S), 24:7:1985.
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were limited, it was assumed that Khoo's relationship with Razaleigh was not unhelpful. 
It would also seem to have had a bearing on the unwillingness of the regulatory 
authorities to pursue with any vigour some of the dubious dealings by MUI in Central 
Sugars and Magnum shares. The benevolence of the authorities also extended to MUI's 
purchase of Kwong Lee Bank (later Malayan United Bank) in October 1982, a purchase 
affected by a share swap in which the (over) valuing of MUI shares was later to cause 
massive losses for the underwriter and implicate Khoo in the Pan El fiasco.48
While MUI initially benefitted from the general perception that Khoo enjoyed a close 
relationship with Razaleigh, Razaleigh's relationship as Minister of Finance with Khoo 
and other Chinese businessmen made him vulnerable to charges by opponents in UMNO 
that he was less committed than others to expanding Malay ownership of the economy. 
The charge, encapsulated by a play on Razaleigh’s nickname, "Ku Li" as "Tan Khoo 
Lee," denoting his association with Tan Koon Swan, Khoo Kay Peng and Lee San 
Choon, contributed in part to Razaleigh's loss to Musa Hitam in the contest for the 
deputy presidency of UMNO in 1981.
Khoo's relationship with Razaleigh rebounded against him as power struggles in 
UMNO led first to the marginalisation of Razaleigh and his supporters in the party, and 
subsequently their complete break from it. After Razaleigh’s second unsuccessful 
challenge for the deputy presidency of UMNO in 1984, he was moved laterally to the less 
important post of Minister of Trade and Industry and Daim Zainuddin became Minister of 
Finance, while other key posts were filled by men closely affiliated with Dr Mahathir.49 
The continuing power struggle within UMNO then led, it will be recalled, to Razaleigh 
and his supporters (Team B') challenging Dr Mahathir and his allies (’Team A') for 
leadership of the party and the government at the UMNO General Assembly in April 
1987. After narrowly losing that hard-fought contest, Tengku Razaleigh and his team 
were purged from the cabinet and shortly thereafter from all levels of the party and 
government as well.
An important feature of Team A's continuing campaign to weaken and isolate their 
opponents in Team B was to cut off or 'punish' all sources of patronage and support 
from which it was believed (or suspected) Tengku Razaleigh and his supporters had
48 See AWSJ, 25:5:1989.
49 In addition to Daim other key appointments of (then) Mahathir loyalists included Anwar Ibrahim 
who was promoted from Culture, Youth and Sports to Agriculture and Abdullah Badawi who 
became Minister of Education. Musa remained Minister of Home Affairs but was surrounded by 
those elevated by Mahathir in the reshuffle.
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benefited. In that regard MUI and its idenfication with Khoo came under a cloud where 
perceptions of government favour were concerned, and those clouds further darkened as 
Khoo was linked to the Pan El scandal. In July 1987 Khoo, in an effort to rid MUI of its 
image of being a one-man show dependent for its survival on his personal fortune, 
reduced his stake in the company to 20 per cent from 31.6 per cent the previous year 
(FEER, 23:7:1987). The shares were sold to his old friend, Robert Kuok, whose 
presence and impeccable establishment credentials 'were expected to enhance the image 
of MUI which had been the subject of viscous rumours' (BT(S), 13:7:1987). The 
rumours, though consistently denied at the time, that Khoo was implicated in the massive 
losses suffered by Pan El and feared arrest in Singapore, were later proved correct In the 
first half of 1988 Khoo paid S$36 million to the liquidators of Pan El in an attempt to 
clear the rumours which were sufficiently persistent to depress MUI's share price.50
Meanwhile Khoo continued to dilute his once dominant shareholding in the company 
by selling another large block of MUI stock to IGB Corporation, the property and 
construction-based company controlled by the family of Malaysian businessman, Tan 
Chin Nam. With IGB leading, the idea of a super conglomerate - a MUI-IGB-Inter-Pac 
troika - emerged but quickly crumbled amid recrimination and differences among the 
principals.51 The souring of that alliance and the general perception by the late eighties 
that MUI was a sleeping giant whose increasingly reclusive chief executive had lost his 
earlier entrepreneurial drive52 prompted some of the erstwhile principals of that troika, 
most notably Vincent Tan's Inter-Pac group to attempt a takeover of MUI. In the course 
of the bitter and prolonged struggle for MUI Khoo significantly increased his 
shareholding in the company and put Tan on the defensive with an attempted takeover of 
Inter-Pac.53
The details of that corporate struggle need not concern us here but rather, in 
conclusion, what it indicated is our interest lies in about the vulnerability of the new 
Chinese business groups not only to shifting alliances within UMNO but also other 
Chinese groups with better state/party connections. As noted previously, by the late 
1980's MUI's principal asset and the main contributor to the group's profits was MUI
50 See AWSJ, 25:5:1989 (Raphael Pura, 'Settlement links Tycoon to Pan-Electric').
51 See AWSJ, 28:7:1989 and 13:3:1991.
5 2 See MB, 16:6:1990 (The Giant Slumbers on).
53 In the end it was difficult to say who won the struggle between Tan and Khoo. Khoo retained his 
grip over his massive conglomerate but Tan made $30 million in the course of the tussle. For a 
good summary of the struggle between Khoo and Tan see MB, 16:6:1993 (The tussle for MUI - A 
chronology of events) and MB, 16:7:1993.
255
Bank. But MUI’s capacity to develop that key asset was severely circumscribed by the 
Banking Act and the attitude of officials at the central bank, Bank Negara. Pertinent in 
that regard were MUI's plans to seek a public listing for its bank. After Dr Mahathir's 
victory over his arch political rival, Tengku Razaleigh at the 1987 UMNO Assembly, 
there was doubt, in view of Khoo's former close association with Razaleigh, whether 
any application by MUI Bank for public listing would be favourably entertained.54 The 
'close attention' paid to MUI Bank by central bank officials, and persistent market talk 
that 'some quarters' (Team A) wanted to see control over MUI Bank change hands, 
finally led to an announcement in November 1993 that Khoo was relinquishing control of 
MUI Bank to a Chinese company renowned for its strong UMNO connections, Quek 
Leng Chan's Hong Leong group55.
In the early eighties Khoo Kay Peng used the mechanisms of the stockmarket to 
quickly build a huge conglomerate. The means by which he quickly accumulated capital 
depended on a buoyant economy and a perception in the market that MUI enjoyed 
political support. From rather sharp wheeling and dealing associated with MUI's rise 
Khoo nevertheless consolidated his early gains and established the company on a more 
durable base. But Khoo's identification with Tengku Razaleigh gave the company a 
'political identity’. It was a was a mixed blessing. As Razaleigh's political fortunes in 
UMNO fell, so MUI, or at least those elements of it most vulnerable to state control, 
notably MUI Bank, found their operations stymied. MUI’s vulnerability soon attracted 
the attention of another Chinese group whose strong state connections were the key to its 
capacity to wrest from MUI its most prized asset, MUI Bank.
Lim Thian Kit : Kamunting Corporation Bhd
Probably Malaysia’s youngest tycoon, Lim Thian Kit, more popularly known in business 
circles as T K Lim, the chief executive of Kamunting Corporation Bhd, controlled a 
conglomerate of interlocking public companies with a total market capitalisation of $4 
billion before he turned 30 in 1989 (AWSJ, 9:10:1989). In October 1992 Kamunting, by 
then the controlling shareholder in Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd, was the fifth largest 
group in corporate Malaysia.56 At one level T K Lim's rapid corporate rise again shows 
how closely enmeshed the new Chinese business groups are with Bumiputera
5 4 For comment regarding Bank Negara’s alleged preference for someone else other than Khoo to head 
MUI Bank see MB, 16:2:1992 and AWSJ, 12:11:1993.
5 5 The Quek-controlled Hong Leong Group purchased MUI Bank Bhd and MUI Finance Bhd for a total 
of $1.1 billion (US$431 million). See AWSJ, 12:11:1993.
56 See MB, 16:10:1992.
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political/business interests and the strong backing most such groups have from state- 
owned banks and financial institutions. More importantly Kamunting's rise highlights 
how the relationships such groups have with the Malay political/business elite can 
develop and mature with the growth of the group. While Kamunting's beginnings owed 
much to a patron-client type relationship with certain powerful Malays, as the company 
grew and forged mutually beneficial cross-holdings with Malay business groups a 
patron-client relationship gave way to a more sophisticated and inter-dependent set of 
relationships with Malay capital.
T K Lim is the son of a wealthy former tin miner, Dato Lim Bok Eng. By the early 
seventies Lim Bok Eng owned 14 mines, one of which at Puchong near Kuala Lumpur 
yielded a rich reservoir of ore at a time when prices for tin were high. (The Star, 
13:11; 1989). Before the sharp fall in tin prices Lim Bok Eng, together with his second 
son, Lim Thian Kit (who had returned to Kuala Lumpur from San Francisco in 1983 
with a degree in business administration), invested heavily in the Hong Kong property 
market Both made windfall profits. In December 1981 Lim Bok Eng formed a company, 
Seri Angkasa Sdn Bhd, to bid for government construction jobs. A $2 company, Seri 
Angkasa did nothing until May 1984. By that time Lim Thian Kit had returned to 
Malaysia and had already established close ties with Daim Zainuddin, well before Daim 
had become Minister of Finance,57 and with Daim's brother, Wahab Zainuddin. That 
combination of money, friendship and connections quickly transformed Seri Angkasa 
and, as in the case of Vincent Tan's Berjaya, promoted through a complex web of 
relationships both 'Chinese' and 'Malay' business interests in such a manner that all 
emerged wealthier as a result
The transformation of Seri Angkasa began on 22 May 1984 when the company 
allocated 999,998 new $1 shares to three parties: a Lim family concern called Triple 
Event Sdn Bhd, later renamed Triple Construction (30 per cent); a longtime Lim family- 
associate, Abdul Ghani Abdul Manap (35 per cent); and a company called Sri Alu Sdn 
Bhd (35 per cent).58 On 23 May, the day after the shares were allocated, Datuk Lim’s 
son, Lim Thian Kit ,and Datuk Abdul Ghani joined Seri Angkasa's board as did Abdul 
Wahab Zainuddin and Hassan Abas. As noted earlier, Wahab Zainuddin, a businessman,
57 See MB, 16:10:1992 (Rajen Devadason, 'Playing to Win, Interview with T K Lim').
5 8 This account of the shareholdings and personalities involved in the transformation of Seri Angkasa 
and its subsequent successful bid for the lucrative privatisation of the Jalan Kuching road toll 
concession in Kuala Lumpur is substantially drawn from a detailed account of the episode in AWSJ 
and a summary o f that account in ALIRAN Monthly. See AWSJ, 5:31:1988 (Raphael Pura, 
'Malaysia's Daim tied to Contract Award’) and ALIRAN Monthly, June 1988 (K J Khoo, 'Shuffling 
of Cards').and Gomez, 1990:132 and 1994:213.
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is the former Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin's brother and was a shareholder or 
director in a several companies associated with Daim.59 Hassan Abas, an accountant, had 
worked for Daim at Peremba Bhd and played a role in companies associated with the 
Daim family and UMNO. Messrs. Wahab and Hassan were the representatives of Sri Alu 
Sdn Bhd on Seri Angkasa's board. Sri Alu was established on 13 July 1984, one day 
before Daim was named Minister of Finance (AWSJ, 5:31:1988). Sri Alu’s registered 
office in the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Building also served as the legal domicile of 
several of Daim's companies and Sri Alu's original company secretaries were the same 
two women who played similar roles in several other Daim and UMNO associated 
concerns including Hatibudi Sdn Bhd., the trustee company through which UMNO 
controlled United Engineers.60
On 9 August 1984 tenders were called for the privatisation of the Kepong project 
which involved the upgrading of a highway and the construction of a highway 
interchange, a toll plaza and related facilities. In April 1985 the Kepong project was 
awarded to Seri Angkasa, apparently because the Ministry of Works had decided Seri 
Angkasa's bid was the "most suitable"61 even though the company had never done any 
construction work. Daim's Finance Ministry which was involved in approval of the 
tender by the Works Ministry had 'no objection' to the proposal. After obtaining the 
Kepong project Seri Angkasa had to obtain construction expertise and money. By August 
1985 the company had obtained government permission to sub-contract the entire project 
to Japan's Mitsui Company. To obtain funds for the project Seri Angkasa used the 
lucrative toll concession as leverage to arrange the necessary finance, a Swiss franc loan 
equivalent to $93 million through the Singapore branch of Union Bank of Switzerland. 
The loan was guaranteed by state-owned Malayan Banking. As security, Seri Angkasa 
assigned its toll-collection rights to Malayan Banking and the bank’s guarantee was also 
secured by personal guarantees by Seri Angkasa's directors, Wahab Zainuddin (who had 
by then resigned as a director), as well as a guarantee by Sri Alu which was owned by 
Wahab and Hassan.62
59 Wahab had functioned since 1984 as a trustee shareholder and director in Daza Holdings Sdn Bhd., 
the concern that held, through other companies, the Daim family's stake in United Malayan Banking 
until it was sold in late 1986. See AWSJ, 5:31:1988.
60 Sri Alu's original company secretaries were Wan Rohaya Wan Hassan and Engku Naiimah Engku 
Embong (AWSJ, 5:31:1988).
61 In response to written questions by the Asian Wall Street Journal, Daim's spokesman said that 
seven companies had submitted proposals for the project. It has never been publicly disclosed who 
the bidders were or what their offers involved. See AWSJ, 5:31:1988.
62 Malayan Banking's guarantee was secured by personal guarantees of all Seri Angkasa's directors at 
the time which included: Datuk Lim; his son Lim Thian Kit; Datuk Abdul Ghani and Mr Hassan.
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During 1986 and 1987 Seri Angkasa's board and shareholding structure continued to 
change. On 1 January 1986 Mohamed Amir Mohamed Senawi63, Daim Zainuddin's 
nephew, became a director and by mid-1986 Seri Angkasa's shareholders had transferred 
their registered offices to the Peremba building which also accommodated the registered 
offices of UMNO's Fleet Group and other companies associated with Daim's family. At 
the same time Datuk Abdul Ghani sold his 35 per cent in Seri Angkasa to another $2 
company Tjin Sdn Bhd. In early 1987 Sri Alu's 35 per cent stake in Seri Angkasa was 
transferred to another $2 company called Kencana Mewah Sdn Bhd. Those changes, as 
Figure 9.2 shows, left the Lim family controlling 65 per cent of Seri Angkasa, which in 
turn shared ownership of the lucrative Kepong project (expected to generate $209 million 
in toll revenues through 1995), with only Kencana Mewah.64
Why should a Chinese company be awarded such a lucrative toll-road project? It will be 
recalled that during this period, Daim in response to a cabinet directive in September 1986 
requiring cabinet ministers to shed their corporate holdings was in the process of 
divesting himself of his considerable investments, many of which were concentrated in 
his former flagship, Raleigh Bhd. Perhaps coincidentally in October 1986, less that 
twelve months after T K Lim's Seri Angkasa had been awarded the Kepong project, 
Daim's company Seri Iras announced that it had sold a 27.6 per cent stake in Raleigh for 
$40 million to an investment holding company called 'Main Chance'. The principal 
shareholders and directors of Main Chance were T K Lim and Encik Abdul Rahman, a 
company secretary of Seri Angkasa.65 In other words just as Vincent Tan's acquisition of 
the privatised Sports Toto and the later series of complex transactions associated with 
Berjaya’s reverse takeover of Raleigh66 appear to have assisted Daim in the divestment of 
his Raleigh-linked assets, so there also appeared to be a quid pro quo for the gains 
flowing to T. K. Lim/Seri Angkasa from the privatisation of the Kepong project.
Wahab Zainuddin also gave a personal guarantee to Malayan Banking even though he had resigned 
as a director of Seri Angkasa on 2 July 1985, reflecting as the Asian Wall Street Journal 
commented, 'his continuing interest in the company.' Triple Construction, a Lim family company 
also provided a corporate guarantee to Malayan Banking. See AWSJ, 5:31:1988.
63 Mohamed Amir Mohamed Senawi was a director of several UMNO-linked companies. In March 
1987 he was named managing director of Duta Consolidated Bhd, a publicly listed company of 
which Datuk Desa Pachi was chairman. See KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XIV: 139.
64 See AWSJ, 5:31:1988.
65 The Star, 25:10:1986 (Daniel Ng, ‘The people who are buying Raleigh stake'). The 27.6 per cent 
stake in Raleigh comprised 20 million Raleigh shares at $2 each or $40 million. O f the 20 million 
shares Seri Iras Sdn Bhd owned 16 million, Syarikat Maluri Sdn Bhd 3 million and Mekar Berbunga 
Sdn Bhd 1 million. See NST, 25:10:1986.
6 6 Before he divested his stakes in Raleigh Bhd, Daim held two-thirds of the company's shares through 
two of his companies, Seri Iras and Syrikat Maluri. See MB, 1:1:1986 (M. Magasvaran, 'Raleigh, 
Riding on Acquisitions’) and BT, 23:9:1986 (C.S.Tan, Daim selling Raleigh stake').
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Figure 9.2: Links Within Kamunting Corporation Bhd
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The assured flow of funds from the Kepong project enabled Seri Angkasa to take the 
next step in its corporate development, the acquisition of a publicly-listed company as a 
means of realising an early profit on the privatisation contract. The firm selected was 
Kamunting Tin Dredging (M) Bhd, later renamed Kamunting Corporation Bhd. 
Kamunting was a largely moribund company controlled by state-owned Malaysian 
Mining Corporation (MMC). The deal consumated on 3 August 1987 involved a reverse 
takeover whereby Kamunting agreed to acquire Seri Angkasa's road toll concession in 
exchange for Kamunting shares.67 The transaction gave Seri Angkasa a controlling 79.4 
per cent stake in Kamunting. Raphael Pura noted that approvals for the deal came 
unusually swiftly for a bureaucracy where proposed takeovers of public companies 
routinely languished for months (AWSJ, 5:31:1988). In addition, Seri Angkasa obtained 
further funds, notably a $67.5 million loan from state-owned Malayan Banking which 
was guaranteed by Seri Angkasa directors who included Daim's nephew Mohamed Amir 
Mohamed Senawi and again by Daim's brother Wahab even though he had resigned as a 
director of the company in July 1982.68
Undoubtedly T K Lim's greatest and most controversial corporate coup was the 
takeover of the MCA's investment arm, Multi-Purpose Holdings in June 1989, a 
company with capitalisation 15 times that of Kamunting (AWSJ, 15:5:1989). The 
takeover of MPH and the subsequent growth of Kamunting highlighted many of the 
elements associated with new Chinese wealth - political connections, a close and mutually 
rewarding relationship between Malay and Chinese capital, the backing of state-owned 
banks, and last but not least the considerable commercial daring and acumen of the 
tycoon concerned.
Earlier, it was noted how after MPH's disastrous losses in the mid-eighties, the MCA 
leadership persuaded prominent Chinese businessmen, notably Robert Kuok and Lee 
Loy Seng, to re-organise and return the ailing conglomerate to profitablity. By 1988 the 
salvage effort by MPH's new management and a booming economy had again made 
MPH a profitable concern and its considerable assets an attractive target for a takeover.
On 12 April 1989 Hume Industries (Malaysia) Bhd, a quoted subsidiary of Quek 
Leng Chan's Hong Leong group of companies, made a $1.13 billion bid for MPH. The 
MCA viewed Hume as a 'hostile bidder' whom it feared might carve up MPH or share
67 For details of the takeover see BT, 4:8:1987 and AWSJ, 5:31:1988.
The loan was to reduce Seri Angkasa’s foreign exchange exposure by refinancing locally a large 
portion of the $93 million loan (Swiss franc equivalent) that Sri Angkasa had obtained from the 
Union Bank of Switzerland in 1985 to finance the Kepong project. See AWSJ, 5:31:1988.
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control of it with investors close to UMNO (AWSJ, 9:6:1989). The basis for such a view 
was that on the same day Hume announced its bid for MPH it also disclosed that PLUS, 
the contractor for United Engineers, the UMNO-owned company overseeing the lucrative 
North-South Highway project, had awarded Hume a $500 million contract to supply 
materials for the project (MB, 16:6:1989). Chinese apprehension regarding Hume's links 
with UMNO were given further credence when in December 1989 Jaguh Mutiara Sdn 
Bhd, a company in the UMNO-owned Fleet Group, acquired a substantial 24 per cent 
stake in the company.69
Hume's move on MPH prompted a counter bid by Kamunting and a corporate battle 
between the two Chinese companies in which, despite the fact that both were closely 
linked to Bumiputra or UMNO-related interests - Hume through Jaguh Mutiara and 
Kamunting through Seri Angkasa - Kamunting, somewhat inexplicably, was hailed as 
the friendly 'white knight' in the contest.70 The key factors in Kamunting's ability to 
portray itself as 'friendly' to Chinese interests, and prevail over Hume in that contest, 
was the support the company received from MCA President Ling Liong Sik; the better 
terms it offered KSM depositors; and the financial backing the company was able to 
muster from state-owned Bumiputra financial institutions.71
Kamunting offered $592 million to acquire the assets of Koperatif Serbaguna 
Malaysia or KSM, the MCA-sponsored co-operative which held a controlling 28.9 per 
cent stake in MPH.72 MCA President, Ling Liong Sik, hailed Kamunting's bid as 
'friendly' because it involved a full refund for thousands of small MCA depositors in 
exchange for all the assets of the financially ailing co-operative.73 Ling's support 
coincided with a critical parliamentary by-election the MCA faced on 13 May 1988 
against its main rival, the DAP in Pahang. Many of the Chinese voters in the constituency 
were KSM's shareholders and were disillusioned with their investments in debt-burdened 
Multi-Purpose. The announcement of Kamunting's bid several days before the election 
bolstered the MCA's image as a defender of Chinese interests in Multi-Purpose and was
69 The links between UMNO, Jaguh Mutiara and Hume are discussed in the next case study in this 
chapter of the Hong Leong Group. See also The Star, 6:4:1991 and Gomez, 1994:87.
70 See MB, 16:6:1989 (Chew Lee Fun, MPH Takeover Bid, Knight and Suitor do Battle'), and AWSJ, 
5:18:1989.
71 See AWSJ, 5:8:1989 and 9:10:1989.
7 2 Kamunting acquired all the assets of KSM for $592 million in two parts. The first was the issue of
296 new shares valued at $1 each to the receivers, who converted them to cash. Secondly it issued 
296 million units of convertible loan notes directly to depositors of KSM. See MB, 16:3:1990.
73 KSM had been in the hands of the receiver, Price Waterhouse and Co. since 1986.
262
believed to have been an important factor in the party's overwhelming victory in that 
contest (AWSJ, 3:1:1990).
To fund its massive S592 million purchase of KSM's assets, Kamunting had the 
backing of an underwriting consortium of banks led by Bumiputra Merchant Bankers, a 
unit of state-owned Bank Bumiputra Bhd. The rapid approval of that arrangement by the 
central bank and other regulatory authorities was crucial to the success of Kamunting's 
bid.74 An element of political cynicism may also have been involved in the government's 
support and facilitation of Kamunting's proposal. Not only did T K Lim bear the high 
risk involved in the arrangement75 but, if in retrospect the break-up of MPH was 
probably inevitable, then it would be better for a Chinese company to carrry the odium 
attached to that. In any event, as Lim himself observed, Kamunting's bid, unlike that of 
Hume, involved a full refund for depositors and therefore 'saved the government the 
need to come in with additional (public) money.'
Despite his earlier portrayal as a 'white knight' protecting Chinese interests and 
assurances by Lim that he would keep MPH intact and dramatically increase its profits76, 
MPH's dire need for capital and Kamunting's small size in comparison forced Lim to 
restructure MPH and sell many of its assets. Thus MPH's plantation interests in Dunlop 
Estates, its trading interests in Mulpha International and its shipping interests in 
Promptship were either sold or the company's stake in them was reduced or reorganised. 
As a result MPH's debts of about $250 million were cleared (MB, 16:3:1990). At the 
same time prime property holdings in MPH subsidiaries, notably Magnum Corporation 
Bhd, were transferred to a Kamunting controlled company77 and several cash-rich Multi- 
Purpose units78 were pressed to obtain multi-million dollar loans or use their reserves to
74 See MB, 6:6:1989; AWSJ, 15:5:1989 and 5:8:1989. Lim admitted that the response of Malaysia's 
merchant banks to his audacious bid for MPH had been "cool," forcing the advisor and lead 
underwriter, Bumiputra Merchant Bankers (BMB), to turn to other sources, such as security 
companies, to get the whole issue underwritten. FEER, 15:5:1989 (Nick Seaward, 'Kamunting 
secures finance to buy MPH stake').
75 In an interview with Malaysian Business, Lim claimed that all the risks in the transaction were 
borne by him and him alone. His family were not involved and neither were there any 'hidden 
partners’. See MB, 16:3:1990 (Ngam Su May, T  K at the Top' Interview with T K Lim).
76 In May 1989 Lim boasted that he could boost Mult-Purpose’s pre-tax profit between six and 
eightfold by 1994 to at least $400 million and at the same time keep the company intact. See 
AWSJ, 3:1:1990.
77 See AWSJ, 3:1:1990; FEER, 7:12:1989 and MB, 16:3:1990.
78 Magnum and Dunlop Estates both had to buy Kamunting stock. See FEER,7:12:1989 (Christopher 
Marchand, 'Strip Search for Cash'). According to the Asian Wall Street Journal several of the stock 
purchases made by MPH units were made at prices above prevailing market rates. See AWSJ,
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build up a stake in Kamunting whose share price had fallen after the takeover of MPH.79 
While Lim claimed he was shedding liabilities, many commentators saw his activities 
more in terms of an asset-stripping exercise which also tightened through a complex 
series of cross-holdings the control of Seri Angkasa, Lim's family company, over 
Kamunting and MPH without him having to hold a majority stake in the company (MB, 
16:3:1990).
In his takeover of MPH, T K Lim had acquired considerable debt, at least $300 
million by one estimate (FEER, 26:4:1990). In the process of reducing that debt through 
shedding MPH's assets and transferring others to Kamunting controlled companies, Lim 
planned to purchase a mammoth housing project called Sri Damansara from Magnum 
Corporation. (In the takeover of MHP Lim had acquired Magnum, a lucrative gaming 
company which also held considerable property assets). Lim had hoped to use his 
leverage as Magnum's principal shareholder to have the valuable Sri Damansara property 
site on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur sold to one of his own subsidiaries, Kuala Lumpur 
Land for $184 million80 though the property was estimated by some to be ultimately 
worth as much as $2 billion (FEER, 14:6:1990). Vincent Tan, who controlled the rival 
Sports Toto gaming company, and who had built up a 23.5 per cent stake in Magnum 
through his Inter-Pac group, opposed the plan because it diluted the value of his holding 
in the company.
A bitter corporate battle for control of Magnum then took place between Lim and Tan. 
The details of that corporate episode and the central role played by the Malay tycoon, 
Wan Azmi, the head of General Lumber in it have been outlined earlier but from Wan 
Azmi’s point of view81. Our attention here therefore will focus on how, in the struggle 
for Magnum, Lim needed Azmi's capital at least as much, if not more so, than his 
political clout, thus highlighting the increasingly complementary nature of the 
relationships developing between the new Chinese business groups and their Bumiputra 
counterparts.
3:1:1990 (Stephen Duthie, 'Kamunting Draws Fire on Mult-Purpose: Once seen as a saviour, the 
Malaysian firm is said to be stripping assets').
79 Kamunting's share price had slumped from a high of $1.47 before the Multi-Purpose takeover in 
May 1988 to about $1.15 in January 1990. See AWSJ, 3:1:1990.
80 Lim intended to sell Sri Damansara to Kuala Lumpur Land, which was a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of Kamunting-controlled Malaysian Plantations. For details of Lim's plans see MB, 16:3:1990; 
AWSJ, 15:3:1990 and FEER, 14:6:1990.
81 See chapter 6.
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In the course of his bid for Magnum, Tan, besides increasing his stake in the 
company and amassing standby credit of $1 billion, was 'posturing'82 that he had more 
political support than Lim. So T K Lim needed a partner with as much perceived political 
clout as Tan but, with his heavy debt, Lim also desperately needed capital. Lim, who 
then controlled about 40 per cent of Magnum, Sri Damansara's parent company, 
approached Wan Azmi and a complementary deal beneficial to both was worked o u t83
In June 1990 Wan Azmi (General Lumber) paid Lim (Magnum) $200 million for Sri 
Damansara by issuing 80 million new shares at $2.50 each to Magnum.84 As a result 
General Lumber's paid-up capital doubled to $278.8 million.85 A key term of the 
agreement was a buy-back option which allowed Azmi to purchase from Magnum 
whatever it held in excess of 20 per cent of General Lumber's expanded share base.86 
The deal was regarded as generous to General Lumber and its chairman, Wan Azmi. At 
the same time, however, Wan Azmi bought the entire paid-up capital of Sri Trimal, a 
property company owned by Lim's family, a purchase which significantly helped to 
reduce the large debt Lim had acquired in the takeover of MPH.87 The arrangement also 
meant that T K Lim/Magnum became a substantial shareholder, almost 23 per cent, in an 
expanded General Lumber, one of Malaysia's premier Bumiputra property companies 
(MB, 16:10:1992). The ten-month takeover battle for Magnum concluded with something 
for all the major players: Vincent Tan sold his stake in Magnum to Lim's Dunlop Estates 
for a considerable profit;88 Wan Azmi sold a 25 per cent stake in Sri Damansara to Tan at
82 Wan Azmi's terminology. Author's interview with Wan Azmi, 13:1:1992
83 Interview with Wan Azmi, 13:1:1992.
8 4 The Star, 8:12:1990. Apparently the price represented a 34 per cent discount from General Lumber's 
last quoted price on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. See FEER, 14:6:1990 (Doug Tsuruoka, 
Magnum's odd man out').
85 See A WSJ, 8:12:1990 and FEER, 14:6:1990.
86 In effect this meant that Azmi could lift his stake in General Lumber to as much as 36 per cent, so 
his control of General Lumber remained secure.
87 See The Star, 19:6:1990 (In partnership - T K Lim and Wan Azmi) and The Star, 8:12:1990 ('$38 
Million gain for G Lumber') and AWSJ, 6:6:1990 (Stephen Duthie, 'Malaysia's Lim will sell 
Family-owned Land Firm').
88 Tan sold his 32.9 per cent stake in Magnum for $310.2 million thereby making a capital gain of 
$43.8 million (FEER, 20:12:1990). Tan denied accusations of corporate 'greenmail' in which a 
hostile investor takes a strategic stake in a company until bought out at a higher premium. Tan's 
marshalling of $1 billion in standby credit from the banks would seem to support his assertion that 
he was genuine in his attempt to gain control of Magnum. Raphael Pura of the AWSJ sighted Tan's 
cheque for the bid. Interview, Raphael Pura and Steve Duthie, 9:1:1992.
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a 20 per cent mark-up on what he had earlier paid Lim;89 and Lim reduced debt and 
successfully absorbed a leaner MPH and its more profitable assets, most notably 
Magnum and Dunlop Estates into his Kamunting group.90
Some commentators suggested that perhaps a quid pro quo for Lim's control over 
Magnum,91 the valuable gaming concern whose turnover in 1990 was over $1 billion 
with profits of $123 million,92 was the company's generous special Bumiputra share 
issue in 1991 that enabled Bumiputra investors to take a 30 per cent stake in the 
company. Bumiputra investors were allowed to purchase their shares at a sharply 
discounted price of $2 a share, permitting them to reap an extraordinary overall gain of 
$400 million (FEER, 14:5:1992). In April 1991 Lim restructured Magnum and its 
gaming business under a new subsidiary, Leisure Management Bhd. When Leisure 
Management was subsequently listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange on 15 
August 1991 the biggest beneficiaries were the fortunate recipients of the Special 
Bumiputra Share Issue who stood to make windfall gains of $74 million (MB, 1:4:1991). 
Such share issues made Lim even more popular with government officials and leading 
members of the Malay business community.93
In the late eighties and early nineties T K Lim quickly and skilfully built Kamunting 
into a large and profitable conglomerate.94 It is probably too early to assess whether Lim 
is a successful businessman or merely a ruthless corporate predator and clever deal 
maker. But the rise of T. K. Lim and Kamunting does highlight the symbiotic 
relationship between Chinese capital, the state and Malay capitalists, and how the 
intimacy and enmeshing of those elements is a key factor in the growth of the new 
Chinese business groups. In the case of Kamunting, state/political support was crucial to 
an assured flow of funds from a privatised toll-road contract, which in turn enabled 
Lim/Seri Angkasa to take the next step in its corporate development, the acquisition of a 
publicly-listed company, Kamunting Corporation Bhd. But, at each step along the way in
89 MB, 16:3:1991 (Azzah Mahidin, 'A Corporate Maestro Indeed') and Author's Interview with Wan 
Azmi 13:1:1992.
90 See FEER, 14:5:1992 and MB, 16:10:1992.
91 See MB, 16:10:1992, '(T K's Say, Interview with Malaysian Business') and FEER, 14:5:1992 
(Doug Tsuruoka,' Bloodied in Battle').
92 KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook Vol X V I1, Bk 1:227.
93 According to M Magasvaran, Capital Corp. Securities one of the principal Bumiputra beneficiaries 
was Rohas the family company of Wan Azmi and his wife. Interview, 8:9:1992.
94 In the fiscal year to end 31 March 1991 Kamunting's pre-tax profit rose 36 per cent from a year 
earlier to $21 million. Revenue increased 79 per cent to $61 million (FEER, 14:5:1992).
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Kamunting's growth, individual Bumiputras or Bumiputra investors also made 
handsome gains - viz Main Chance, Magnum and Leisure Management - all of which 
served to emphasize the complementary relationships between the state, Malay capital and 
the new Chinese groups like Kamunting.
Quek Leng Chan: Hong Leong (Malaysia) Bhd
There has been a greater convergence between the business interests of the Hong Leong 
group and those of UMNO than most other Chinese business groups - 'old' or 'new'. 
Although, as noted earlier, the Hong Leong Group (see Figure 9.3 below) was well 
established before 1970 and could be classified as 'old wealth', it shared much in 
common with the new money in the eighties in terms of the intimacy of its political links 
and the close integration of its capital with Malay capital. Hong Leong's rapid growth in 
the eighties shows how, through relinquishing some ownership in its key subsidiaries to 
UMNO-owned companies, it was able to achieve steady and larger earnings thereby 
enabling it to expand and become not only one of the most prosperous groups in 
Malaysia but also a major regional conglomerate through the Hong Kong-based Guoco 
Group.95
The rags-to-riches rise of Kwek Hong Png, the founder and patriarch of the Hong 
Leong group, was initially derived, like most of the 'old wealth' Chinese family firms, 
from trading in commodities. Expansion was funded by internal growth rather than 
external sources such as large borrowings from banks and the use of the stockmarket. 
Kwek Hong Png arrived in Singapore from Fuzou in China in 1929 as a virtually 
penniless immigrant; yet by 1941 he had reportedly accumulated $S7,000, sufficient 
capital to start Hong Leong as a trading company.96 In the early fifties, Hong Leong
95 Incorporated in Bermuda and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Gouco serves as the off­
shore holding company for Hong Leong's interests in Hong Kong that are centred on the Dao Heng 
Bank. In May 1992 Guoco had assets of US$3.1 billion (FEER, 28:5:1992). Dao Heng was 
incorporated in Hong Kong and jointly owned by Hong Leong and the Kuwait Investment Office 
(KIO) in 1985. Quek Leng Chan is the executive chairman of Guoco assisted by his brother Kwek 
Leng Hai. In addition to Hong Leong and the KIO, Quek has brought two other powerful 
shareholders into Guoco - Hong Kong property magnate, Li Ka Shing and Italy's Agnelli family. 
The diversity o f Guoco is apparent from the string of acquisitions made in the early nineties 
including a large stake in the international broker, Hoare Govett Asia, a joint venture in an 
airconditioner factory in Shenzen in southern China, a hotel in Fujian province and an industrial 
park in Guandong province. In Singapore, Guoco's locally-listed subsidiary, First Capital Corp. is 
the holding company for the group's varied property and manufacturing interests in the Republic. 
See FEER, 28:5:1992 (Jonathan Friedland, 'Quek off the mark, Malaysian tycoon exports his can- 
do style') and MB, 16:7:1991 (C S Tan, 'Hands across the waters').
96 Kwek’s three brothers, Kwek Hong Khai, Kwek Hong Lye and Kwek Hong Leong (the company 
being named after the latter), soon joined the firm as partners. See FEER, 2:11:1989 and Asiaweek, 
15:5:1992.
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made a fortune during the rubber boom sparked by the Korean war. As Singapore began 
its industrialisation drive in the 1960's, Hong Leong established jo in t ventures with 
Japanese companies in a range ol activities from manufacturing to property development, 
links which have continued to the present.97 The group flourished in both Singapore and 
Malaysia throughout the sixties and seventies as it expanded its interests in finance, 
property, manufacturing and construction.
Figure: 9.3: Hong Leong Group Malaysia
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97 Other prominent Chinese groups to establish links with Japanese companies during the sixties 
included Kuok Brother's Robert Kuok and UMW's Eric Chia.
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In 1963 Hong Leong set up a branch in Malaysia. When Singapore was ejected from 
the Malaysian Federation in 1965 the group was split in two. Kwek Hong Png retained 
control of the Singapore business and his younger brother, Kwek Hong Lye, took charge 
in Malaysia. Heng Lye's son, Quek Leng Chan, a law graduate from London, succeeded 
his father in 1973. Linkages have been maintained since then through common 
directorships,98 though Quek Leng Chan has been careful to keep Hong Leong Malaysia 
separate from the Singapore companies, even going so far as to emphasise in a company 
document that Hong Leong Malaysia, "is autonomous and operates independently of the 
Hong Leong companies in Singapore" (FEER, 9:6:1983).
It seems Quek's main concern in clearly asserting the independence of the two groups 
was to avoid the Malaysian operations being tainted by the group in Singapore, whose 
sharp and sometimes corrupt practices had brought Hong Leong Singapore into 
disrepute.99
Hong Leong Company (M'sia) Bhd is the holding company of most of the Hong 
Leong group in Malaysia. Principal companies in the group, all of which are publicly-
98 Kwek Hong Png was chairman of, and a shareholder in, Malaysian-incorporated Hong Leong 
Industries until 1991 when he was replaced by Quek Leng Chan. Kwek Hong Png's son, Kwek 
Leng Beng, who manages Hong Leong's Singapore operations, is a director and shareholder of Hong 
Leong Credit - the other principal Hong Leong company in Malaysia. Quek Leng Chan, on the 
other hand, is the only Malaysian director and shareholder of Singapore-incorporated Hong Leong 
Finance, one of the Kweks' principal listed companies in Singapore. The rest of the directors are 
Singapore citizens. See FEER, 9:6; 1983 (Anthony Rowley, 'A Singapore disconnection'); 
Cheong:1990: pp 61-68; KLSE Annual Companies Handbook: Vol XV: 192, 197, 675 and Vol 
XVI1 Book 1: 133, 572.
99 There has been speculation for many years that the Kwek family's difficulties with the Singapore 
authorities, and with Lee Kuan Yew in particular, go back to the fifties and sixties. In the last 
twenty years there are numerous and well documented instances where the Hong Leong group in 
Singapore has antagonised the authorities and prominent members of the Republic's business 
community. For instance in the early seventies the group was widely reported to have had a major 
falling out with the Singapore tax authorities; in 1983 Quek Leng Chye and Gan Kai Choon, who 
held management positions in Hong Leong, were convicted of misdemeanours under the Companies 
Act; and in April the same year, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS),then under Deputy 
Prime Minister, Goh Kheng Swee, refused Hong Leong a banking licence. The Business Times 
(S'pore) speculated that the reason was because of the company's "general standing and reputation" 
(FEER, 9:6:1983). Hong Leong's business tactics have often sailed close to the winds of illegality 
and alienated important business groups in Singapore. In the late seventies Hong Leong thwarted 
Wee Cho Yaw's United Overseas Bank (UOB) in a bitter battle to win control of Singapore Finance, 
prompting the assistant registrar of companies to step in at one stage and object to Hong Leong’s 
tactics. More recently, on 20 August 1990 Kwek Hong Png, the founder of the group, and his 
nephew Quek Leng Chye were found guilty in a Singapore court 'for failure to exercise due 
diligence’. Both were fined and barred from holding management positions in dozens of companies. 
The charge was reduced from the imprisonable charges of criminal breach of trust and having 
received stolen property. See FEER, 9:6:1983; FEER, 2:11:1989 (N Balakrishnan, 'Tycoon in 
Trouble') and FEER, 30:8:1990 (Briefing, 'Singapore court fines Hong Leong founder').
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listed companies, include Hong Leong Credit Bhd, Hong Leong Industries Bhd, Hume 
Industries (M'sia) Bhd and Malaysia Pacific Industries Bhd. Until the late eighties, Hong 
Leong kept a low corporate profile, helped in part by the fact that as a long-established 
group it had less need than others to rely on the mechanisms of the stockmarket to raise 
funds. Hong Leong's relationship with government appeared, publicly, at least, to be 
secured in much the same way as other established Chinese business groups, through the 
appointment of prominent members of the Malay elite as directors to companies in the 
group. In that regard, directors of Hong Leong Industries included Tan Sri Nasruddin 
Mohamed, former Secretary General of the Ministry of Finance, and Dr Agoes Salim, as 
well as Johari Tun Abdul Razak, the son of the former Prime Minister, Tun Razak and 
Tunku Dara Naquiah Jaafar, a member of the Negri Sembilan royal family and a director 
of a prominent Bumiputra business conglomerate, the Antah group of companies. The 
directors of Hume included Tan Sri Taib Hj Andek, a former chairman of Felda, Tan Sri 
Abdul Aziz Zain, a former Federal Court judge and chairman of the National Electricity 
Board, and Tan Sri Hj Ibrahim Ali, former Secretary General of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs.100
While these directors have remained with Hong Leong in the nineties, the company 
appeared to be adopting more direct and aggressive tactics in the late eighties where its 
relationship with the ruling party was concerned. The change in political tactics coincided 
with a string of acquisitions by Hong Leong and a decision, reportedly taken by Quek 
Leng Chan, to rapidly expand the group's activities in Malaysia.101 (In the wake of the 
1985-1987 recession, Hong Leong was one of the few groups with relatively little debt 
and so was ideally placed to take advantage of the recovery in Malaysia's economy and 
the boom after 1987.)
Linkages between Hong Leong and UMNO first came to public notice in April 1989 
when, as noted earlier, Hong Leong's Hume Industries made what the MCA considered 
was a hostile bid for the party's investment arm, Multi-Purpose Holdings (MPH). The 
simultaneous announcement of Hume's bid for MPH and the company's success in 
securing a $500 million contract UEM, the UMNO-owned company overseeing the
100 See chapter 4 where many of these individuals appear as 'figurehead capitalists.'
101 According to C S Tan in 1989 Quek Leng Chan set out his grand vision for the group in the 
nineties which was that by 1993 each Hong Leong division, that is Hong Leong Credit (HLC), 
Hong Leong Industries (HLI), Hume Industries and Malaysia Pacific Industries (MPI) would be as 
large as the entire group was in 1987. See MB, 16:6:1991 (C S Tan, Tlong Leong Group 'When 
Dragons Learn to Dance'). During 1990 and early 1991 the Hong Leong group purchased substantial 
stakes in six publicly-listed companies - OYL Industries, Nanyang Press, Bedford, Mycom, Zalik 
Securities and Malaysian Resources Corporation.
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North-South highway project, fuelled, it will be recalled, speculation within the MCA 
that Hume was acting as a proxy for UMNO interests. Rumours of an impending 
connection between Hume and UMNO-owned companies were confirmed in December 
1989 when, in an apparent quid pro quo for the lucrative North-South highway contract, 
Hong Leong renounced its rights entitlement in a new share issue (representing 26 per 
cent of Hume), in favour of Jaguh Mutiara Sdn Bhd, which then became a substantial 
shareholder in the company.
Jaguh Mutiara's major shareholder was Dr Ismail Abdul Rashid who was also a 
substantial owner of a company called Peninsular Springs. He was also formerly the 
managing director of United Engineers (M) Bhd in 1985.102 Jaguh Mutiara's connections 
with UMNO's Fleet Group were confirmed in April 1990 when Dr Ismail Abdul Rashid 
sold the company to the Fleet Group. In the same month, Hume effectively came under 
the umbrella of Renong Bhd when the Fleet Group was sold to Renong in its 
restructuring exercise (The Star, 6:4:1991).
The significance of the Hume-Jaguh Mutiara deal in terms of the growing integration 
between Chinese and Malay capital was that while Hume, as Malaysia's largest 
manufacturer of construction materials,103 seemed poised for further growth on its own, 
Quek’s willingness to sacrifice a share in the company in order to be part of the Renong 
group helped to secure a steady and larger earnings flow for the company.104 Benefits 
from being under the Renong umbrella also included synergies from being a member of 
Renong's 'construction supermarket' with the entry of property developers, the Faber 
Group, into the group as well as the strong political connections enjoyed by Renong 
which were likely to assist Hume's expansion plans (The Star, 8:4:1991).
Other links were established between Hume and Renong in April 1991, when 
Renong subsidiary, United Engineers, and Hume Industries entered into an a joint
102 See The Star, 1:3:1991 and FEER, 14:3:1991.
103 At least according to an analysis by the business section of The Star, 13:3:1991.
104 The Star, 6:4:1991. See also The Star, 8:4:1991 (Hume now a corporate giant with diverse 
interests'). Speaking about the convergence of interests between Hume and PLUS specifically with 
regard to the North-South highway project, Hume’s managing director, Dr Steve Yoong said in 
1989 that, 'the contract was symbiotic in nature'. He added that, 'PLUS needs us as much as we need 
them. From a practical viewpoint we need a firm committment to plough in investments to expand 
capacity. From their viewpoint, it is an effective means of costing' (NST, 17:4:1989). In retrospect 
there seems less justification for the size and duration of the contract between Hume and PLUS as a 
means to control costs given a revised estimate (as of January 1993) that the Norh-South highway 
would cost more than $6.2 billion, substantially more than the originally projected $3.4 billion. 
See AWSJ, 6:1:1993.
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venture agreement with Seino Transportation Company Ltd of Japan to establish and 
operate an integrated road system, freight forwarding and warehousing operation. In an 
announcement to the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange both Hume and UEM said 'that their 
joint venture with Seino was in their long term interests in view of the synergies in their 
respective businesses' (NST, 1:4:1991).
Hume's ties with Renong, UMNO's main investment arm, were further strengthened 
when Hume announced on 28 February 1991 that it had acquired for $113 million a 45 
per cent stake in Nanyang Press. Nanyang Press is the parent company of the largest 
Chinese-language daily newspaper in Malaysia, Nanyang Siang Pau. Hume, which 
already held almost 5 per cent of Nanyang through a subsidiary, had thus acquired a 
controlling 49.9 per cent in the publishing company (NST, 1:3:1991). The significance 
of the purchase was that Nanyang thereby came indirectly under the umbrella of the 
Renong group, by virtue of wholly-owned Jaguh Mutiara Sdn Bhd's 23.8 per cent 
interest in Hume (The Star, 1:3:1991). In other words via a significant stake in a Chinese 
owned company, Hume, UMNO's already extensive control of Malaysia's media was 
further strengthened.105
As noted earlier Quek's acquisition of Nanyang aroused suspicions that the deal was 
politically motivated, because the stake Hume purchased was largely from Wan Azmi, 
chairman of General Lumber Holdings and a protege of the then Finance Minister and 
UMNO treasurer, Daim Zainuddin. But, it will be recalled, the acquisition of Nanyang 
had embroiled Wan Azmi in some controversy and he was glad to sell it to Quek, at a 
profit of $12.75 million (FEER, 28:2:1991). However Quek's willingness to purchase 
Nanyang also suited UMNO. It allowed the party to downplay charges that it was taking 
over the country's independent Chinese businesses while at the same time ensuring that 
ownership of Nanyang passed to a friendly Chinese company, Hume, which had been 
brought indirectly within the ambit of the Renong group of companies anyway. Quek 
Leng Chan and Hume on the other hand gained control of a profitable and prestigious 
media company.106
The increasingly symbiotic relationship that Hong Leong has developed with 
Bumiputra capital in its quest for rapid expansion was most evident in the financial 
sector. Since the late eighties Hong Leong's principal flagship in the financial sector,
105 Renong already owned the New Straits Times Press, the publisher of Malaysia's largest English- 
language daily, several Malay language papers, the country's only commercial television station 
(TV 3) and a Chinese-daily, Shin Min Daily News.
106 See FEER, 14:3:1991 (Hong Leong's scoop).
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Hong Leong Credit, has sought to become a “financial supermarket” by adding 
stockbroking and banking to the services it already provided in the credit and insurance 
fields. In November 1986 Hong Leong Credit bought a controlling stake in a 
stockbroking firm, Zalik Securities (The Star, 24:11:1986). The robust growth of 
Malaysia's stock market during 1980-90, with market capitalisation rising to $131.7 
billion from $43 billion, made investment in stockbroking highly attractive.107 On 13 
March 1991 Hong Leong Credit announced that its 51 per cent-owned Zalik Securities 
was seeking a listing on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), and that concurrent 
with that listing Zalik would acquire a 20 per cent stake in a Penang-based bank, Ban Hin 
Lee Bank (BT, 14:3:1991). The day after Zalik's proposed listing was announced, on 14 
March 1991, and the day before his official retirement from cabinet, the Finance Minister, 
Daim Zainuddin, introduced a controversial rule limiting to 10 the number of listed 
brokers on the KLSE. Critics charged that the 10-broker rule was created to give 
politically-linked companies an inside track in the securities sector (FEER, 25;4:1991). In 
that regard it was revealed that Zalik was part of a consortium of four local groups that 
proposed to set up the Kuala Lumpur Options and Financial Futures Exchange, or 
KLOFFE. The other groups comprising the KLOFFE included UMNO's primary 
investment arm, Renong, The New Straits Times Press, then a subsidiary of Renong's 
Fleet Group and Rashid Hussain Bhd, a fast rising Bumiputra financial conglomerate.108
Coincidentally, in the midst of these manoeuvres, Quek Leng Chan and Wan Azmi 
were working together to overhaul a loss-making property company, Malaysian 
Resources Corporation Bhd. After restructuring in early 1992, the company had again 
become a profitable concern and by August the Hong Leong group had a majority stake 
in the company. In January 1993, in a seemingly separate development, it was 
announced that four senior executives of the New Straits Times Press Group (NSTP) 
were to acquire through a management buy-out controlling stakes in NSTP and Sistem 
Televisyen Malaysia (TV3), two of the most profitable media companies in the UMNO- 
controlled Renong group.109 The management buy-out, one of the largest in Malaysia's 
corporate history, cost the buyers 'a whopping $800 million' (MB, 16:1:1983). To effect
107 In the same period 1980 to 1990, the number of listed companies rose from 250 to 285 with the 
daily trading volume rising from $22.6 million (6 million units) to $141.3 million (65.4 million 
units) The Star, 13:1:1992.
108 For a comprehensive overview of UMNO's links and those of Hong Leong in the financial sector 
see articles by Gomez in Aliran, Vol 11(5):1991 and Vol 111 (3) 1993.
109 The four executives were Mohmed Noor Mutalib, New Straits Times senior group manager; Ahmad 
Nazri Abdullah, group editor of the newapaper company's Malay-language pubications; Abdul Kadir 
Jasin, editor o f the English-language publications; and Khalid Ahmad, managing director of the New 
Straits Times Press group. See AWSJ, 6:1:1993.
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the buy-out, the four executives formed a company called Realmild Sdn Bhd, a small 
concern with only $101,000 in paid-up capital (AWSJ, 6; 1; 1993). The mystery as to 
how such a company could fund the huge $800 million buy-out was solved when it was 
revealed that Malaysian Resources Corporation Bhd, which was controlled by the Hong 
Leong group until shortly before the NSTP/TV3 buy-out, announced that it was taking 
over 'the rights and obligations of Realmild' (MB, 16:1:1993). In short, the Hong Leong 
group of finance companies arranged the necessary finance to enable the four Malay 
media executives to make their massive $800 million purchase. Quek's apparent reward 
was permission from the Finance Ministry to acquire Khoo Kay Peng's MUI Bank 
(FEER, 11:3:1993). Ownership of the bank, Malaysia's 12th largest, on an assets basis, 
enabled Quek to fulfill his ambition of transforming Hong Leong into a financial 
supermarket.
Quek's financing of the management buy-out of NSTP and TV3 and his subsequent 
acquisition of one of Malaysia's most sought after banks also illustrates how a variety of 
powerful political and financial interests may reinforce those alliances forged by Chinese 
business groups in their quest for growth.
In financing the NST/TV3 buy-out, Hong Leong assisted UMNO's primary 
investment arm, Renong, to overcome what the research chief of Baring Securities gently 
referred to as 'significant short term cash problems'.110 The extent to which Hong Leong 
was prepared to assist in that regard cannot be determined with precision but the limited 
data available makes the point. Earlier it was noted how in April 1990 Renong had 
acquired three corporate groups - Fleet, United Engineers and Hatibudi (a group which 
included eight listed companies) - in a reverse takeover costing $1.23 billion* 111 Yet just 
two of those listed companies were sold barely two years later for $800 million, which 
reportedly gave Renong a handsome profit of $490.2 million (MB, 16:1:1993). Needless 
to say, there was no satisfactory explanation of how the two companies in question, NST 
and TV3, could so appreciate in value, but commenting on the extraordinary profit a 
senior Renong executive put it tersely, 'It's a damn good deal as far as we're concerned' 
(MB, 16:1:1993)
110 Asiaweek, 20:1:1993 (Conglomerates, ’The Party Lets Go'). At least in the short term analysts
point to two causes of Renong's cash flow problems, one arising from cost overruns on the North- 
South highway, estimated in January 1993 to have reached $1 billion and Renong's perceived need 
to contribute its equity share in the financing needs of its various subsidiaries and associates. See 
Asiaweek, 20:1:1993 and MB, 16:1:1993.
111 See chapter 5, Restructuring UMNO's Corporate Assets:The Renong Takeover.
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Besides raising badly needed cash for Renong, Quek, through Malaysian Resources' 
funding of the management buy-out of NSTP and TV3, also served (albeit indirectly), 
powerful political interests within UMNO. Since the restructuring of UMNO's assets 
under Renong's umbrella, groups sympathetic to former Finance Minister, Daim 
Zainuddin, and his successor, Anwar Ibrahim, had vied for control of UMNO's lucrative 
and influential media empire. Matters came to a head when Daim protege and Renong 
chief, Halim Saad, sacked the NST group's acting managing director, Datuk Nik Ibrahim 
Kamil, a protege of Anwar, in a boardroom tussle in January 1991 (FEER, 4:2:1993). 
While a rapprochement was reached between Daim and Anwar, the removal of the 
NST/TV3 media concerns from Renong's control to a new management group believed 
to favour Anwar was seen as a victory for the Finance Minister.112 In his increasingly 
bitter battle with the Deputy Prime Minister, Ghaffar Baba, for the status of heir apparent 
to Prime Minister Mahathir, control over the NST/TV3 media operations was seen as 
important for Anwar in the run-up to what was expected to be a hard-fought contest in 
party elections due in November 1993.113
In the late eighties a particular feature of Hong Leong's growth was the extent to 
which that growth was facilitated through a close integration with Bumiputra, frequently 
UMNO-owned, capital (the Hume/Jaguh Mutiara/Renong link), whether in the 
construction (North-South Highway), transportation (joint venture between 
UEM/Hume/Seino) or financial sectors of the economy. Hong Leong's membership of 
the small consortium to set up the Kuala Lumpur Options and Futures Exchange, or 
KLOFF, with Renong, The New Straits Times Press and a fast rising Bumiputra 
financial conglomerate, Rashid Hussain Bhd) The other important feature that Hong 
Leong shared in common with other 'new' Chinese business groups, such as Berjaya 
and Kamunting, was that its access to lucrative contracts (North-South highway) and 
licenses (MUI Bank) could only be fully understood in the context of its complementary 
relationship with party and privately-owned Bumiputra capital. As we have seen, there 
was often both a financial and a political dimension to that relationship. Hume's 
acquisition of Nanyang Press brought Nanyang within the ambit of the Renong group 
and relieved a prominent Bumiputra capitalist, Wan Azmi, of a burdensome investment, 
while Quek's/Malaysian Resources financing of the management buy-out of NST/TV3 
not only raised badly needed cash for Renong at one point but also facilitated a change in 
management favourable to one of the new power-holders within UMNO.
112 See FEER, 4:2:1993 and Asiaweek, 20:1:1993.
113 See Aliran, Vol 111 (3) 1993:3 (Gomez, 'Anwar's men gain media control'); and FEER, 4:2:1993 
(Doug Tsuruoka, 'Peace Offering, Malaysian media deal seals political truce').
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Conclusion
The nexus between the state and business has been critical to the growth and character of 
the 'new' Chinese groups that have arisen after 1970, that is within the constraints of the 
NEP. In that regard a number of important features emerge from our study of some of the 
most prominent representatives of new wealth. First the rapid growth of the new Chinese 
groups - viz Berjaya, Kamunting, MUI and Hong Leong - was facilitated by the close 
integration of their capital, including at some points ownership, with Malay capital, the 
latter almost invariably a mix of state, party (UMNO) and private (the new Bumiputra 
business groups). At the same time in the course of their growth all these groups received 
the backing of the state's regulatory authorities and the support of state-owned banks and 
financial institutions. But, even more importantly, generous patronage in the form of 
lucrative privatisation projects was also critical to the capacity of some (Berjaya and 
Kamunting) to make the jump to successful conglomeratisation.
Another important feature of the new Chinese groups was how their growth was 
complementary to, rather than competitive with, Bumiputra interests, again be they state, 
party or private. Thus the integration of Chinese capital with that amalgam of Malay 
capital assisted the rise of the new Bumiputra groups, benefitted Bumiputra investors 
more generally, or facilitated UMNO interests both political and financial (Nanyang Press 
and the management buy-out of NSTP/TV3).
The political/personal dimension of that economic relationship was equally complex. 
In the early stages of their growth some of these groups, and the tycoons who led them, 
certainly fitted Rigg's description of 'pariah entrepreneurs' and their relations with the 
state and the UMNO leadership could be characterised in 'patron-client' terms. Yet ,as 
those conglomerates grew, and a more complex interweaving of interests - political, 
personal and corporate - emerged, notions of patron or client, pariah or paragon, also 
became less applicable and often meaningless as all parties prospered or benefitted from a 
constantly changing mix of arrangements. (This was well illustrated by the variety of 
interests served in the bewildering movement of shares in Vincent Tan's network of 
companies.) Yet as the example of MUI showed, the new Chinese groups can also be 
vulnerable to the changing vicissitudes of UMNO politics so necessitating a deeper and 
broader set of relationships with the Malay political and business elites if they are to avoid 
isolation or the stymieing of their corporate ambitions.
Finally it was apparent that as the origins of the new Chinese groups, their methods 
of capital accumulation, and their relations with the state bore many similarities with the 
new Bumiputra business groups, so these Chinese capitalists also occupied various
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points along the spectrum from rentiers to entrepreneurs in the course of their growth and 
development. Thus while Quek is clearly an entrepreneur and Khoo (MUI) appears to 
have moved well beyond his 'ersatz' origins, erasatz characteristics remain more 
prominent in the Berjaya and Kamunting groups. But the variety and change found 
amongst 'new' Chinese capital can also be found amongst the 'old' and so it is to a 
survey of those groups that we now turn.
Chapter 10
CHINESE BUSINESS GROUPS: OLD WEALTH
GROWTH AND RELATIONS WITH THE STATE AND BUMIPUTRA
BUSINESS GROUPS
This chapter argues that just as the nexus between the state and business after 1970 was 
critical to the growth and character of the new Chinese business groups similarly, it has 
also defined the more adaptable in comparison with less adaptable old groups. That is 
those who have intensified or established new links with the state and the UMNO 
leadership and those who have not. Before exploring this distinction and some of the 
economic implications of it further, some of the more important features associated with 
the rise of 'old wealth'1 should be noted. These features include:
• Identification with a particular industry (often commodities or construction) as a 
principal or core activity, hence the popular tagging of leading business 
personalities as "sugar king" or "rice king". As Sieh (1992:105) has pointed, 
out 'business expansion was usually within related industries, through 
backward or forward linkages with the principal firm and while investment 
across sectors occurred, it was not common or sizeable'. (A situation that 
contrasted with that of the new groups whose investments were in diverse 
sectors of the economy from the start.)
• Compared to the new groups that grew rapidly through external financing (the 
stockmarket and bank borrowings), and incurred large debts in the process, the 
growth of the old groups was less rapid; a 'step- by-step' process, constrained 
as it was by internally generated sources of finance. At the same time, however, 
the old groups incurred relatively little debt, generally paying off borrowings at 
each stage of their growth.
l 'Old wealth', it will be recalled, was defined as including those Chinese business groups that had 
accumulated significant capital, or were already well established business entities, before the 
implementation of the NEP.
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• Although the MCA had exerted considerably more influence in the Alliance 
Government of the fifties and sixties, major Chinese business leaders relied, 
even then, on a web of personal connections with prominent members of the 
Malay political and bureaucratic elites, rather than seeking to protect or promote 
their interests solely through the MCA. In the pre-NEP period, political 
connections and 'clout' for Chinese business came after the accumulation of 
wealth and was not, as during the NEP, a corollary to the process itself. As a 
consequence, while the leading figures of the old groups often had strong and 
longstanding relationships with members of the Malay elite, those relationships 
were generally less intimate and more diverse than those forged by the new 
tycoons.
• Before 1970 'old wealth' was relatively homogeneous both in the manner by 
which it grew and in the nature of its relations with the state. On the basis of 
those criteria, however, 'old wealth' appeared to be increasingly divided into 
two broad categories by the 1980's, that is between a more adaptable and a less 
adaptable group. As noted above, the more adaptable groups have adjusted to 
the environment of the NEP by cementing or intensifying their relationship 
with the state, a process which has in turn provided new opportunities for them 
with the rapid expansion of the state's role in the economy after 1970 and as 
new areas of investment have opened up in Malaysia's increasingly diversified 
economy. (As elsewhere in this study there is in reality some overlap and 
arbitrariness involved in such a distinction, nevertheless it is a useful one for 
the purposes of analysis.)
ADAPTABLE OLD CHINESE GROUPS
Representatives of this more adaptable element of 'old wealth' include such business 
leaders as Robert Kuok (Perlis Plantations), Lim Goh Tong (Genting Bhd), Lim Thiam 
Leong (Bolton Properities Bhd), William Cheng (Amalgamated Steel Mills Bhd) T. K. 
Wen (Selangor Properties) and, if we are not to adopt too rigid a notion concerning 
categories, Quek Leng Chan (Hong Leong) and Loy Hean Heong (MBf Holdings Bhd), 
who could also be placed in this broad classification.
We shall first examine the cases of two prominent members of this more adaptable 
group, Robert Kuok (Perlis Plantations), and Lim Goh Tong (Genting Bhd), before 
turning our attention to the more variegated 'less adaptable' group. Throughout we shall
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be concerned to focus on the changing relationships of these groups with the state and the 
UMNO leadership and the implications of those relationships for their growth and 
development
Robert Kuok : Perlis Plantations
Robert Kuok Hock Nien, the ‘sugar king’, is reputed to be Malaysia's richest 
businessman. In 1990 it was estimated that his assets in various parts of the world were 
worth $4.05 billion (US$1.5 billion)2 and that the profits from his various private and 
public group companies amounted to US$ 175-200 million (FEER, 7:2:1991). Two 
important features of the rise and transformation of Kuok's considerable business 
interests are often overlooked and both are connected. First, Kuok had forged important 
links with Malay partners and incorporated significant Malay interests into his businesses 
well before the NEP. Secondly, Kuok was also emerging as a major regional 
businessman even before 1970. Kuok's continued expansion off-shore in the 1970's and 
1980's was therefore not motivated primarily by perceived constraints of the NEP or his 
exercise of the 'exit option;' rather it was the continuation of a trend already apparent in 
the Kuok group for some time, towards exploiting the advantages the group perceived in 
linking into the international network of capitalist enterprise. Meanwhile in Malaysia, 
Kuok, who had always been a highly political operator, extended his already 
considerable links to the key group of Bumiputra businessmen who had emerged around 
Daim Zainuddin in the early eighties.
Robert Kuok’s business activities go back to 1949, when he and his brother, Philip, 
set up Kuok Bros Sdn Bhd, a company that principally dealt in commodities such as rice, 
sugar, salt and flour.3 They quickly expanded the scale of their distribution business 
within Malaysia and integrated it with importing and processing operations. In 1959 
Kuok founded Malaya Sugar Manufacturing Co (MSM) in conjunction with Malaysia's 
government-owned Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), so that almost from 
the inception of his business, he had brought in Malay/Govemment shareholders. By the 
1960's Kuok had become not only a major force in distribution but also Malaysia's 
leading refiner of sugar (FEER, 30:10:1986). It was Kuok's sugar monopoly which
2 NST, 30:1:1990 (The NST's source is the Indonesian bi-weekly magazine, Warta Ekonomi (no date 
cited). Forbes Magazine , 23:7:1990 made a similar estimate of Kuok's wealth in its annual list of 
the world's richest businessmen.
3 Robert Kuok already understood the rice distribution business well having worked during the Japanese 
occupation in the Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha’s rice department in Johore Bahru (MB, 16:2:1993).
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provided the foundation for future growth.4 In the 1960's and 1970's, he expanded and 
diversified his activities - ship chartering led to ship-owning (Kerry Shipping); trade 
finance to banking and insurance (Malaysia-French Bank); land holding and property to 
hotel development (the Shangri-La chain); and plantations to manufacturing. This 
expansion was undoubtedly assisted by the links with Malaysia's elite he had forged as 
the son of a middle class merchant in the forties at the Johore Bahru English College, one 
of Malaya's finest schools, and at Raffles College in Singapore. Kuok's contemporaries 
at one or both of those institutions included the late Tun Razak and Tun Hussein Onn, 
Muhammed Ghazali bin Tunku Sulaiman (chairman of Pemas) and Geh Ik Cheong, now 
chairman of Kuok's publicly-listed flagship in Malaysia, Perlis Plantations.5
Even in the sixties, Kuok's already considerable influence sprang not only from his 
alumni connections and financial contributions to the Alliance Party6 but also from his 
stature as a valued partner of the Malaysian Government in its efforts to promote a 
number of key economic projects. He was a founder-director of Bank Bumiputra, one of 
the first pre-NEP institutions set up to assist Malays to enter business; he marshalled the 
funds and implemented the establishment of a national shipping line, Malaysian 
International Shipping Corporation (MISC), a plan conceived by Malaysia's then Finance 
Minister, Tun Tan Siew Sin, as a means to break the stranglehold Far East Freight 
Conference lines had on Malaysia's commodity exports; and it was Kuok to whom Tun 
Razak, an old college friend, turned to assist in the process of creating heavy industry in 
Malaysia in the form of Malaysia Shipyard and Engineering Sdn Bhd at Pasir Gudang in 
Johore.7
Kuok's partnership with Government in such key projects was complemented after 
the introduction of the NEP by his attractiveness to state institutions as an investment 
partner. At the same time, state institutions have remained the preferred means adopted by 
the older established groups like the Kuoks, who were mainly concerned with 
consolidation and (sometimes) diversification, to satisfy NEP requirements for Malay 
equity. Malay equity in the form of institutional investment is less instrusive in the day- 
to-day management of enterprises (its prime concern being a 'good return' from proven
4 Regarding the highly political nature of Kuok's sugar business see fn 11 following.
5 See Insight: August 1978 (Ian Verchere, The Changing World of Robert Kuok') and FEER, 
30:10:1986 (Robert Cottrell,' The silent empire of the Kuok family').
6 Insight, August 1978.
7 Insight, August 1978.
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companies) than Malay equity which involves the incorporation of the new Bumiputra 
business groups. This situation contrasts with the requirements of the new Chinese 
wealth which in order to grow must seek linkages with leading members of the 
Bumiputra business elite who can more readily facilitate their access to business 
opportunities.
The Kuok's enterprises exemplify, on a grander scale than most, the considerable 
advantage old money has had in being able to establish a mix of linkages with the state 
enterprises most conducive to the protection and expansion of the various elements that 
make up their business (Heng, 1992:133). The Kuoks' interests in tin and rubber 
(Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd), for instance, and their property and housing interests in 
Johore (Pelangi Bhd), are secured through substantial shareholdings by the Johore state 
government. State-supported savings and investment bodies with significant share­
holding stakes in some of the Kuok-controlled companies include Lembaga Urusan 
Tabung Haji - (LUTH), the Pilgrims Management and Fund Board and Lembaga Tabung 
Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), the Armed Forces Fund Board and Pemegang Amanah Raya 
Malaysia (Sekim ASN), the unit trust scheme of the national equity corporation, PNB 
(Heng, 1992:133).
In addition, the Kuok group, like most other representatives of old wealth - has 
prominent members of the Malay elite represented on the boards of its publicly-listed 
companies. In the Kuok group those individuals include representatives of Malay royalty, 
YTM Tunku Sulaiman (Perlis Plantations Bhd) and Tunku Osman Ahmad (Pelangi Bhd); 
former senior civil servants, Tan Sri Taib Hj Andak and Tan Sri Nasruddin, former 
secretary-general of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Federal Flour Mills Bhd); and 
General Tan Sri Ibrahim Ismail (chairman, Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd).8 The 
significance of such individuals as directors however is that, with the possible exception 
of Nasruddin, their roles all correspond to that of 'figurehead capitalists' described 
earlier, that is they have no control over or actual interest in the company but mainly 
perform representational or symbolic functions for the company in its relations with state 
institutions. (This situation contrasts most of the old Chinese groups with the new where 
often Malay owner-directors are present in the company and whose presence, as we saw 
earlier, involves the active integration of Bumiputra capital with the company concerned.)
8 See Cheong, 1989:121-132.
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While in the sixties and seventies many other large commodity producers in Southeast 
Asia became marginalised either through political disfavour or deregulation, Kuok 
showed he could adjust to changing political and economic circumstances. On the 
economic front he adapted to a more open trade regime through huge investments in 
plantations and refining while at the same time expanding into other areas such as hotel 
and property development and bulk shipping. At the same time the regional trading and 
commodity-producing alliances Kuok had forged in the late 1950's and early 1%0's with 
other Southeast Asian producers and refiners became in the 1970's and 1980's global in 
scale. A further extension of that strategy was Sucden Kerry International (SKI), Kuok's 
30 per cent owned venture with Paris-based commodities giant Cie Commercial Sucres et 
Denvees, the worlds largest sugar trader (FEER, 7 ;2:1991). The regionalisation and 
intemationalistion of capital is thus well reflected in the expansion and diversification of 
the Kuok group, a characteristic, as noted earlier, that also made it less vulnerable than 
other Chinese groups to possible constraints under the NEP. In other words, Kuok's 
moves in the 1970's first back to Singapore and then to Hong Kong and China, reflect as 
much the pressures and opportunities for a maturing conglomerate operating on a regional 
basis, where he was already well integrated into the substantial, largely Chinese, 
capitalist networks, than any concern Kuok may have had that the group would not be 
able to reconcile its interests with those of the Malaysian Government
Kuok's adaptability on the political front was reflected also in the continued 
employment of his private resources, both management and financial, to assist state 
policy objectives and in his capacity to forge new alliances with those who were to 
become leading Bumiputra businessmen. In the early eighties Kuok had a substantial 
stake in Malaysia-French Bank with Daim Zainuddin (FEER, 7:2:1991). At about the 
same time he also established close ties with that group of Bumiputra businessmen whom 
Daim was nurturing at Peremba, later to become a critical element of the emerging 
Bumiputra business elite. (In that regard Kuok, besides fulfilling a government wish that 
a first class hotel, office and convention complex be developed in Kuala Lumpur (UBN 
Plaza), also acceded to Daim’s wish that Wan Azmi and his team at Peremba gain 
experience by assuming responsiblity for the management and construction of the 
project).9 In addition, as we saw earlier, Kuok's stature and management skills were also 
called upon to set the MCA's highly policiticised and debt-burdened investment arm,
9 Authors interview with Wan Azmi, 13:1:1992. Apparently Kuok was prepared to assist in the 
training o f the young Malay managers at Peremba in this way rather than employing an already 
experienced management and construction team which he had assembled in the course of other 
projects.
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MPH, back on a proper business footing. Kuok also performed something of a national 
service by raising the considerable bail money for the embattled MCA leader Tan Koon 
Swan when he was imprisoned in Singapore on criminal charges.10
No other Malaysian Chinese tycoon can rival the breadth of Kuok's connections and 
considerable influence in Malaysia* 11 or the diversity and geographical spread of his 
group . 12 The strength and resilience those characteristics offer his businesses in 
negotiations with the state are reinforced by cautious financial management. In that 
respect the Kuok group, in common with many other established groups or 'old money', 
expect each company comprising the group to operate as a separate profit centre. In other 
words they do not cross subsidise business among their companies, as many of the new 
groups do, a practice that makes the latter at some points highly vulnerable to changes in 
the political or economic climate. 13 Finally the Kuok group, like other elements of 
'adaptable old wealth' appear to have successfully resolved the problem of adjusting the 
group's structure and control to contemporay business demands by melding a close-knit 
family group with a core of competent professional executives. 14
10 See FEER, 7:2:1991.
11 Testament to Kuok's influence is the insulation still afforded to the group's highly lucrative flour and 
sugar business from word market fluctuations. Retail flour and sugar prices remain controlled by the 
government; as one Malaysian broker commented the price only goes up, never down .. it is very 
political and very profitable'. FEER, 7:2:1991 (Jonathan Friedland, 'Sugar tastes sour’). Friedland 
points out that, 'the Kuok group's Malaysian sugar business is largely insulated from world market 
cost fluctuations because of the Malaysian Government's contract with Australian producer (CSR) to 
purchase raw sugar at a rate that is fixed every three years. The rate is geared to Perlis' relatively 
inefficient cost of production. A similar scheme exists for wheat imports feeding Federal Flour Mills, 
which is 50.81 per cent-owned by Kuok's Perlis group'.
12 The diversity and strength of Kuok's links read like an International Who's Who. His partners include 
Thailand's Sophonpanich family, owners of Bangkok Bank; Indonesian magnate Liem Sioe Liong; 
and Filipino property and oil tycoon Alfredo Ramos. Government companies outside Malaysia in 
league with Kuok include: China Resources, China's overseas trading arm based in Hong Kong, and 
the former Soviet trading agency Prodintorg. Kuok's personal relationships extend to such 
personalities as Cuban President Fidel Castro, Chinese Premier Li Peng, Indonesian President 
Suharto and not surprisingly, Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir. As K S Jomo, a social 
science professor at the University of Malaya observed, 'Kuok is the type of guy who insures himself 
extensively' FEER, 7:2:1991 (Jonathan Friedland, 'Kuok the kingpin').
13 See FEER, 7:2:1991
14 Chief amongst the core of professional executives who have been working for Kuok's Malaysian 
concerns, many for over 25 years are Tan Sri Geh Ik Cheong, the chairman of Perlis Plantations and 
Khor Chin Poey, the company's managing director. Geh has characterised his relationship with Kuok 
as a complementary one, 'Kuok being the entrepreneur and trader and Geh the systems man who 
consolidated and tidied things up.' One of Kuok's sons and deputy chairman of Perlis, Kuok Khoon 
Ean (known as Ian Kuok) is expected to succeed Geh as chairman and probably oversee the group’s 
Malaysian interests. See MB, 16:2:1993 (Rajen Devadason, The Taipan of Perlis').
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Tan Sri Lim Goh Tong: Genting Bhd
While the size and diversity of the Kuok group and the breadth of its political connections 
sets it apart, even amongst the 'dynamic' element of old wealth, Lim Goh Tong's 
Genting group, is also a good example of old wealth that has successfully cemented and 
intensified its relationship with the state while at the same time expanding and 
diversifying its activities in Malaysia and abroad. By 1990 Genting was one of 
Malaysia's five largest corporations; its assets totalled $2.4 billion and the group 
employed 13,000 people nationally and internationally.15 Lim's personal wealth alone 
was conservatively estimated to amount to $500 million (MB, 1:12:1987).
Lim Goh Tong is a typical 'rags-to-riches' story. Starting out as a penniless 
immigrant from China in 1937, he initially worked as a carpenter and hawker in Kuala 
Lumpur. While working for his uncle, a contractor, he was introduced to the construction 
industry, and then took on small contracts as he gained experience. With the money he 
saved, he established his own firm, Kien Huat Construction (NST, 17:11:1985). The 
company was appointed a Government contractor in 1955 and, as the economy of the 
newly independent Malaya boomed, so Lim's company expanded to become one of the 
largest construction firms in the country.
In the early 1950's Lim diversified into mining tin and iron ore, activities that by the 
mid-1960's also brought him multi-million dollar profits. In the late fifties he also 
diversified into rubber and oil-palm plantations. While in the process of applying for an 
iron ore mining licence in Johore in 1950, Lim struck up a friendship with a member of 
the Johore State Executive Council, Tan Sri Hj Mohd. Noah Omar, later father-in-law to 
two Malaysian Prime Ministers, Tun Razak and Tun Hussein Onn. The friendship 
proved invaluable when Lim sought permission to develop a tourist resort on a mountain 
near Kuala Lumpur, Genting Sempah. In November 1965, a company called Genting 
Highlands Bhd was formed with Mohd Noah Omar as chairman. At the time Tunku 
Abdul Rahman's Alliance Government was also keen to develop the area, but lacking 
funds, decided that the scheme was best passed to the private sector (MB, March 1981). 
To speed up the development of the Genting area into a comprehensive tourist complex,
15 See KLSE Annual Companies Handbook Vol X V 11 Bk 2:70 and The Star, 13:8:1990.
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the then Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman announced he was prepared to grant a 
casino licence to Genting Highlands Bhd.16
Lim shrewdly combined the advantage of a casino licence, state support and the 
opportunities offered by the growth of Malaysia's stock exchange to adapt his business 
operations to the changing economic and political environment of the seventies. In the 
process he vastly increased his already considerable wealth. In the aftermath of the 13 
May 1969 racial disturbances, banks were loathe to fund Lim's project so, apparently on 
the advice of one of his managers, none other than Tan Koon Swan, Lim approached the 
government agency, Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Bhd (MIDF), and 
obtained the tax advantages of pioneer status and simultaneously floated his company, 
Genting Bhd (Gill, 1985:142). Genting Bhd soon became one of Malaysia's most 
profitable companies, a 'blue chip' counter on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and a 
leading contributor to Government revenues.17 At the same time the Genting group, 
sensitive to possible criticism in a Muslim-dominated country where gambling is 
officially frowned upon, extensively diversified its activities first in Malaysia and then 
abroad.18
In 1980 Lim bought Asiatic Development, a shell company, and used it to buy three 
Hong Kong-based Malaysian plantation companies. Asiatic Development became a listed 
subsidiary of Genting with former Attorney General, Tan Sri Kadir Yusof, as chairman. 
In line with NEP requirements, Asiatic Development issued a 30 per cent stake in the 
company to the Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), the armed forces fund 
board. Asiatic Development grew rapidly so that by December 1990 its holdings in 
rubber, palm oil and cocoa plantations placed it (in terms of hectarage) amongst 
Malaysia'a top five companies in the plantation sector (MB, 16:3:1992). Rated by 
Morgan Grenfell Asia as one of Malaysia's most promising companies,19 Asiatic also 
diversified downstream into processing and refining and through joint ventures into
16 The Tunku has been quoted as saying that, ’it was (then Finance Minister) Tan Siew Sin who 
suggested that somebody build a resort (at Genting) at no cost to the government provided the 
government gives him a casino licence' (MB, 1:12:1987).
17 In 1989 Genting was the third largest corporate taxpayer in Malaysia after Shell and Esso. See MB, 
16:3:1992.
18 In the early 1980's increasing government sensitivity to Islamic values was reflected in the formal 
banning of all Muslims from the casino section of the Genting tourist resort. See SMH, 9:5:1987. 
The casino licence is renewable every three months and, while a valuable contributor to government 
coffers, remains vulnerable to Malaysia's shifting political tides. See FEER, 5:1:1989.
See FEER, 5:1:1989.19
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manufacturing, particularly of rubber products. At the same time other parts of the 
Genting group moved into paper manufacture and property development.20
Overseas, through Genting International Ltd (GIL), the Genting Group's strategy 
was to establish world-wide links in its particular field of expertise, resort development. 
During 1985-86 Genting acquired interests in Australia that included a 42 per cent stake 
in the $300 million Burs wood Island resort/casino in Perth and the management contract 
for another casino in Adelaide.21 The extraordinary range of Genting's overseas 
partnerships was further illustrated in the United States where, in co-operation with an 
American Indian tribe, Genting undertook to build and manage a $US300 million resort 
in Connecticut (AWSJ, 17:3:1992). The group further raised its overseas profile when, 
in May 1990, Genting International obtained a listing on the Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange (FEER, 23:8:1990). Simultaneously, like other successful examples of old 
wealth, Lim built up a core of trustworthy managers to help him run his multi-million 
dollar multi-national group. Closely integrated with that core of managers were two of his 
daughters and three sons, one of whom, Lim Chee Wah an economics graduate from 
London University, was groomed to eventually succeed his father.22
Lim's ability to expand on the economic front was complemented by the new 
alliances he forged in keeping with Malaysia’s shifting political tides and, like Kuok, his 
willingness to assist state objectives. The links Lim established in the sixties with such 
key political players as the Tunku, Tan Siew Sin and Mohd. Noah were extended to their 
equivalents of the eighties. In addition to contributions to a wide range of political parties,
20 Paper manufacture was carried out by Genting International Ltd which commenced manufacturing in 
Malaysia and Singapore See MB, 16:3:1992. Genting's principal property projects included Ria 
Apartments and the Awana Country Club, the latter being graced by the presence of a French 
provincial mansion owned by former Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin. See FEER, 5:1:1989.
21 In 1988 Genting sold its equity in Burswood to a Japanese consortium for A$110 million but GIL 
retained the management contract for Burswood. Genting also applied, unsuccessfully, for two 
separate contracts to build and operate casino/resorts in Queensland and one in Sydney, New South 
Wales. See FEER, 25:1:1989. Revenue from the Burswood casino in its second year of operation 
was more than A$70 million. Genting's partner in Burswood, the flamboyant Australian 
businessman, Dallas Dempster, was a close friend of the then state premier Brian Bourke who has 
since been convicted of various charges relating to his period in office and imprisoned. See SMH, 
9:5:1987.
22 Except for a brief family spat in 1990 when Lim Chee Wah left the company temporarily apparently 
over a 'matter of the heart'- the Genting group appears to have avoided the succession problems that 
have beset many of the other companies representing 'old wealth. See FEER, 23:8:1990 (Doug 
Tsuruoka, 'Genting's family affair') and MB, 1:12:1987 (S. Jayasankaran, Manager of the year') One 
daughter, Lim Siew Kim, is the executve deputy chairman of Metroplex Bhd, a large listed property 
development company, of which her husband, Dick Chan Teik Huat, is the managing director.
287
though particularly those of the governing Barisan,23 Lim also made judicious 
contributions to the rising generation of new power brokers in UMNO. He made for 
instance a $250,000 'personal' donation to a foundation, Gerak Bakti, headed by then 
Education Minister, Anwar Ibrahim.24 (Given the vulnerability of the casino side of 
Genting's operations to Islamic sentiment in the country, a cynic might suggest that 
Lim's cultivation of Anwar, a former Islamic youth leader and later Minister of Finance, 
was good insurance.) In addition, when Genting undertook a reconstruction scheme in 
1989 transferring its gaming, hotel and resort activities to another publicly-listed 
company, Resorts World, it was rumoured that it had enamoured itself to UMNO by 
placing $570 million of Resorts World shares in the hands of politically-connected 
individuals. The shares were believed to have been pledged to local banks as collateral 
against new loans (FEER, 23:8:1990).
At the same time Lim's extensive philanthropic activity and support for state 
objectives such as Malaysia's first fully-owned bank abroad, the Southeast Asia Bank 
Limited in Mauritius, also earned him the plaudits of the political leadership. Lim was a 
key figure in the overseas bank initiative which also included such luminaries of the new 
Bumiputra business elite as Tun Daim Zainuddin, Tan Sri Basir Ismail and Wan Azmi. 
Southeast Asia Bank was launched by Prime Minister Mahathir in August 1988 and was 
expected to facilitate Malaysia's utilisation of Mauritius' export processing zone (EPZ) to 
gain barrier-free access to the EEC.25 A testament to Lim's ability to both prosper and 
adapt his companies operations to the economic and political environment of the NEP 
was provided by the Prime Minister Dr Mahathir who, praising Lim's achievements at the 
25th anniversary of the company, noted that, 'he has been willing to comply with our 
rules and regulations including the restructuring needs of the country but (he) has become 
very, very successful'.26
2 3 See MB, 1:12:1987 (S. Jayasankaran, 'Manager of the year') Jayasankaran quotes a friend of Lim's as 
saying ..'he's even donated to some opposition parties on the principle they need money too. Of 
course, he doesn’t give them as much as he gives Barisan parties'.
24 UMNO Youth leader, Najib Razak, revealed the donation in the course of refuting an allegation by 
the Malay newspaper, Watan, that claimed Anwar received $500,000 of "gambling money" for the 
Gerak Bakti Foundation of which he was head, from Genting Bhd. Najib said, 'Anwar received only 
$250,000 ..and this was a personal donation from Tan Sri Lim and not gambling returns as alleged’ 
(NST, 1:9:1990).
25 See The Star, 18:8:1988. Mauritius, being a signatory to the Lome Convention between the 
European Economic Community and developing African, Caribbean and Africn nations, enjoys 
barrier-free access to the European market.
26 The Star, 13:8:1990 (Excerpt from speech given by the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir on the occasion 
of Genting's 25th Anniversary).
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LESS ADAPTABLE/STATIC OLD CHINESE GROUPS
The second element of 'old' Chinese wealth consists of those groups we have broadly 
labelled 'less adaptable' because their links with the state and the UMNO leadership are 
more distant or 'formal' compared with the more adaptable' groups examined earlier. 
Amongst the less adaptable element of old wealth there is considerable variation. There 
are groups such as See Hoy Chan, Lee Loy Seng, Public Bank, IGB27 and Khong Guan 
Holdings which continue to enjoy considerable success and prosperity, others, such as 
Oriental Holdings and the Low Yat Group whose fortunes were more mixed in the 
eighties, and some who have lost their companies (Chong Kok Lim/Landmarks) or 
whose fortunes were greatly diminished (Wong Kee Tat's/Kuala Lumpur Industries). In 
accounting for the variation between these groups we shall focus on two main factors.
First, the interests of most of the above groups are concentrated in established sectors 
of the economy such as plantations, property and distributorships. Expansion or 
diversification, particularly into new and unproven businesses has been shunned. Sectors 
of activity have implications as to the type of Bumiputra partner (or equity) required and 
the intimacy of that relationship. Expansion or diversification into new and frequently 
unrelated fields of activity is more likely to require close linkages with a Bumiputra 
individual or business group for 'up-front' negotiations for contracts, licenses or 
franchises. However groups which seek primarily only to secure investments in 
established sectors of the economy can do so through partnership with institutional 
Bumiputra investors, such as state enterprises and pension funds. (Moreover, as noted 
earlier, such associations are complementary as institutional investors, often flush with 
funds, seek to invest their capital in proven enterprises while for the Chinese business the 
advantage of such Bumiputra investment is that it is generally passive.)
Second, problems of succession and splits within a number of the above groups have 
meant that one tycoon or 'kingmaker' can no longer deal directly with the state or key 
individuals in the political leadership on behalf of the company concerned. In other 
words, even if they so wished, the diffusion of authority within some of these groups 
precludes them from having a more direct or intimate relationship with the state.
27 IGB is the acronym for Ipoh Gardens Bhd.
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Surviving Groups
As indicated earlier such groups as Kuala Lumpur Kepong, Paramount Corporation and 
Public Bank remain the more successful and prosperous elements of old wealth. But the 
restraining influences on their future expansion, noted above, will be become apparent in 
the profiles that follow.
Tan Sri Lee Loy Seng
Tan Sri Lee Loy Seng was popularly known as Malaysia's rubber baron. In the late 
eighties his plantations ranked only behind PNB and Sime Darby in acreage and, as a 
family group, it was the largest plantation owning family in the country (Cheong, 
1990:72). Lee was the son of wealthy third-generation tin-mining family from Ipoh. 
When his family made a mistake by buying some rubber land which turned out not to 
have tin, Lee was forced to learn about the rubber industry (MB, May: 1973). He soon 
discovered that many locally incorporated rubber companies were grossly undervalued, 
though cash-rich, and so engaged in a domino-type strategy where he bought up one 
company and then used its resources to buy into another and so on (Jesudason, 
1990:36). By that method he was one of the few Malaysian Chinese to make much 
headway in acquiring large foreign-owned plantation companies (Tan, 1982:150). With 
low levels of debt and well-managed plantations, Lee's companies became a 'blue-chip' 
counter on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and a favourite of Malay state institutional 
investors. Substantial shareholders in Lee companies such as Batu Kawan and Kuala 
Lumpur Kepong Bhd include PNB, ASN, the Employees Provident Fund and the 
Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA).28
Lee's three sons, all well educated, are on the boards of his principal companies and 
analysts do not foresee succession problems for the Loy Seng group. The most notable 
Malay director common to all the boards of Lee's principal companies - Glenealy, Batu 
Kawan and Kuala Lumpur Kepong is Tengku Robert Hamzah, who replaced his brother, 
Tengku Razaleigh, following the latter's appointment as a senior government minister in 
the mid-1970s. During the 1970's and early 1980's Razaleigh was one of the UMNO 
leaders with whom Lee was most closely identified. Nevertheless Lee apparently chose 
not to exploit his political connections to branch out into other kinds of business but 
remained strong in his own field. A result of Razaleigh's fall in UMNO was, according
28 See KLSE, Annual Companies Handbook, Vol XV: 997 & 1050.
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to observers, a 'cooling' and 'formalisation' of relations between the government29 and 
the Lee group. However with the death of Lee Loy Seng in November 1993 the liability 
of the Razaleigh association may pass.
The See Hoy Chan Group
The founder of the See Hoy Chan group, the late Teo Hang Sam, provided another 'rags- 
to-riches' story. Early in the century, Teo started his career in Singapore as a general 
merchant trading in rice and sugar. By cultivating strong clan ties within the Teochew 
community of rice dealers he became so dominant in rice trading that he earned the 
sobriquet, 'Rice King of Malaya' (Jesudason, 1990:34). In the fifties See Hoy Chan 
diversified into plantations, insurance and property development. The Teo's first housing 
estate development, called Paramount Gardens (which became the name of the Teo's 
publicly-listed company), made windfall profits for the group that appear likely to be 
repeated in another project well under way by the early nineties, the $2 billion Bandar 
Utama housing project (BT, 19:10:1991). In the early nineties See Hoy Chan remained 
amongst Malaysia's most profitable groups with assets estimated to be at least $1.5 
billion, little debt and a liquidity that enabled the group access to a staggering $300 
million cash.30
With such huge assets in property and cash, and little interest in diversification, the 
See Hoy Chan group has little need to develop a closer relationship with senior figures in 
UMNO or the state. Rather it maintains a 'proper' relationship with government 
projecting wherever possible the corporate image of a modem Malaysian company 
responsive to community causes. This somewhat distant and correct relationship with the 
state has much to do with changes that occured in the internal structure of the group 
during the eighties.
Sibling rivalries and generational differences within the Teo family and a reluctance to 
incorporate outside professional management expertise, problems common to 
traditionally-run Chinese businesses, have been important restraining factors in this 
otherwise solidly grounded and prosperous company. The years from 1984 to 1988 were
29 This view was derived from author’s interviews with Chinese businessmen and editors of Chinese 
newspapers in January 1992.
30 Author's interview with Teo Chiang Kok, director See Hoy Chan Holdings, 21:1:1992. According to 
Teo, group assets of $1.4 billion and debt of only approximately $30 million were estimates made in 
the mid-eighties, but presently, circa 1992, the liquidity of the group was such that it could call on as 
much as $300 million cash. Teo was contrasting the low leverage and high cash flow of a number of 
the 'old' Chinese business groups compared with the highly leveraged, 'new' groups.
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crucial for the future structure and operation of the See Hoy Chan group. During that 
period the 'hands-on' autocratic style of the older generation, headed by Teo Soo Chiang, 
was too slow to accommodate the third-generation Teos, many of whom were returning 
from overseas with professional business qualifications and who objected to the 
paternalistic style of their elders. In 1988, frustrated at being mere cogs in the group, the 
third generation out-voted the second generation and split the See Hoy Chan group eleven 
ways among the children of the three founding Teo brothers.31 The division of the See 
Hoy Chan group in the eighties typifies the challenge faced by most of the 'old groups' 
as they seek to adapt the structures of a traditionally-run Chinese business to 
contemporary demands, both corporate and generational, to avoid the splintering of their 
resources. An important consequence of the diffusion of authority within See Hoy Chan 
was that it precluded any one person embodying the group and thus being able to 
represent its interests directly and more intimately to the Malay political or state elites.32
Tan Sri Teh Hong Piow: Public Bank
Tan Sri Teh Hong Piow is the founder and president of Public Bank Bhd. Of Malaysia's 
top twelve banks in 1990 only two remained Chinese-owned, Public Bank, which ranked 
fourth in terms of assets, and Khoo Kay Peng's MUI Bank which ranked eleventh.33 In 
1991 Teh's net worth was estimated at $44 million, a figure which predominantly 
reflected the value of his 40 per cent stake in Public Bank (FEER, 3:10:1991). Teh Hong 
Piow was born in Singapore in 1930. He joined the Overseas Chinese Banking 
Corporation (OCBC) in 1950 but resigned after ten years and moved to the fledging 
Malayan Banking that had just been established by Khoo Teck Puat in Kuala Lumpur. At 
Malayan Banking Teh quickly rose to the position of general manager. But during the 
1960's the laissez faire policies of the Alliance Government and Malaysia's growing 
economy offered business opportunities outside the banking sector and Teh became 
active in property development around Kuala Lumpur. With windfall profits from his 
property investments, Teh left Malayan Banking and in 1966 applied for a licence to set 
up Public Bank. He was later to concede that 'getting a banking licence in those days 
wasn't easy, but with help of friends and connections we managed to secure one' (MB,
31 Information concerning the changes within the See Hoy Chan group was obtained from authors 
interview with Teo Chiang Kok, 21:1:1992.
3 2 Developments in the See Hoy Chan group also highlight the transformation of old money from the 
first-generation patriarch, entrepreneurial and risk-taking, to members of the third generation, 
generally highly qualified but more inclined to caution and the careful management of their 
investments.
3 3 See chapter 3 The Banking and Financial Sector.
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1:8:1987). Teh has been coy about the connections that facilitated the banking licence but 
the consortium he assembled included prominent Chinese businessmen, a number of 
whom had considerable influence in the MCA, and in particular with the then President of 
the party and Finance Minister, Tun Tan Siew Sin.34 A key figure in that regard was 
apparently Tan Cheng Swee, MCA treasurer in Malacca, Tan Sew Sin's home town.
Teh's nimbleness at developing key links within the Alliance in the sixties continued 
after 1970 when he forged similar ties with UMNO, mainly by adapting the bank's 
persona and policies to the demands of the NEP. At one level the bank avowedly 
eschewed any 'Chinese' image, stressing instead its 'Malaysian' identity and its active 
role as a responsible corporate citizen ever ready to lend its support to the arts, education, 
and sport.35 At a more substantive level, however, Public Bank has responded quickly to 
UMNO policies. It has, for instance, offered low-cost home owner loans, introduced an 
innovative Special Loan Scheme for petty traders (in response to the government's call to 
assist small traders to start business), and energetically implemented a hiring program for 
Bumiputras.36 At the same time, while the group has grown from a one-branch operation 
to a financial-services empire with more than 155 bank and finance-company branches in 
Malaysia, it has also vigorously expanded its operations overseas, particularly in third 
world countries, like Sri Lanka and Vietnam.37 The latter, while consistent with the 
bank's strategy of identifying opportunities in high-risk markets amongst small to 
medium sized business, was also a savvy political response to Prime Minister Mahathir's 
goal of seeking to expand Malaysia's South-South economic and political ties.38
In terms of his relationship with the state and the political leadership, Teh is fairly 
typical of old style entrepreneurs. In the process of accumultating his wealth in the sixties 
he established close ties with MCA leaders, ties which were apparently important in his
34 Source: A senior figure in Public Bank who indicated that the other members of the consortium who 
applied with Teh for the licence (pooling $1.5 million to do so), included Yeap Hock Hoe of Ban Hin 
Lee Bank, Tan Cheng Swee, Treasurer Malacca MCA, Ng Eng Hian and Singapore businessmen Seet 
Hong Kiat and Tay Beng Swee.
35 See for instance MB, 1:8:1987 (Public Bank, ’Doing its bit for society').
3 6 The Special Loan Scheme dispenses with the usual security requirement, giving loans of between 
$1,000 and $2,000 with a preferential interest rate of 10 per cent, on a monthly reducing basis. See 
MB, 1:8:1987.
37 See FEER, 3:10:1991 (Ed Paisley, 'Malaysian lender combines prudence with vision’).
38 See FEER, 3:10:1991. Public Bank was the first Malaysian Bank to heed Prime Minister Mahathir's 
calls in that regard - yet another example, according to Ed Paisley of the Far Eastern Economic 
Review, of Public Bank's keen political acumen'.
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obtaining a bank licence. Already wealthy before the NEP, and having secured a base, 
Public Bank, to further his corporate ambitions Teh has little need for patronage and his 
earlier political ties appear to have faded.
Declining Groups
Economic and social factors (a heavy reliance on property and succession problems), 
rather than political factors have further thinned the ranks, or diminished the former 
prominence, of other 'old' Chinese groups. Notable examples that illustrate this point 
include Low Boon Siew's Oriental Holdings Bhd and Chong Kok Lim's, formerly of 
Landmarks Bhd.
Datuk Loh Boon Siew: Oriental Holdings Bhd
Datuk Loh Boon Siew came to Malaya as a penniless migrant when he was 12 years old. 
After working for several years as an apprentice motor mechanic, he opened his own 
repair shop when he was eighteen and a year later acquired a fleet of eleven buses with 
which he started the Penang Yellow Bus Company (MB, January 1974). During the 
fifties Loh invested in housing and property, but his big break came when, after a visit to 
Japan, he acquired the local franchise to assemble and distribute Honda motorcycles in 
Malaysia. (In the 1970's Honda cycles supplied 70 per cent of the Malaysian market. 
Later Loh acquired the franchise for Honda cars as well.) Like many old tycoons, Loh 
was apparently reluctant to go 'public' but the sheer volume of his business and the need 
to separate some of his holdings prompted the decision in 1963 to establish a publicly- 
listed company, Oriental Holdings Bhd (Gill, 1985:178). During the 1970's Oriental 
diversified further from property, finance, motor-vehicle assembly and distribution to 
rubber and palm-oil plantations when it acquired estates formerly owned by Jardine 
Matheson. In the early eighties the group, in co-operation with Honda Motor Company 
Ltd of Japan, invested heavily to manufacture an increasing range of car components for 
export markets in Thailand and Indonesia so as to expand its market base and defray 
rising production costs in Malaysia (MB, 16:6:1988). Since its inception in the 1960's 
Loh's Oriental Holdings has been one of Malaysia's most profitable public companies, a 
record it maintained during the severe recession of the mid-eighties when other notable 
companies in the motor transport industry such as UMW/Toyota, Tan Chong Motors and 
Cycle and Carriage Bintang incurred heavy losses. In common with many of the old 
Chinese groups, Oriental has grown organically, that is from its own capacity to generate 
capital and has not in its 30-year existence made a single rights issue to raise funds (MB, 
16:6:1988).
294
Its solidity and profitability notwithstanding, the structure and ownership of Oriental 
Holdings makes its long-term durability uncertain. The group is tightly controlled by Loh 
and his family who own just over 50 per cent of the company's shares. (The largest 
Bumiputra shareholders are two government institutional investors, ASN with 6 per cent 
and LTAT with 2 per cent).39 The combination of both factors emphasise the absence of 
a major Bumiputra link where Oriental Holdings is concerned. By the early nineties the 
concentration of control by Loh and his family's apparent unwillingness to integrate a 
core of professional managers into the group appeared likely to become the Achilles' heel 
of this otherwise sound group. The catalyst in that regard was the murder of Loh's son, 
Loh Kah Kheng, in tragic and bizarre circumstances and a bitter split and feud in the 
family over his inheritance.40
Tan Sri Chong Kok Lim: Formerly Landmarks Bhd
The corporate fall of Chong Kok Lim and his loss of Landmarks Bhd was a story 
repeated by a number of 'old groups' who, tempted by the new sources of wealth 
provided by the property and stockmarket boom of the early eighties, risked what were 
often large and previously well-diversified companies built over a generation or two, to 
the vagaries of the stockmarket.
Chong Kok Lim migrated from China to Malaya in the 1920's. Initially he worked on 
rubber plantations and with his savings set up a provision store in Sungei Siput, Perak. 
He then went to Singapore where during the war he made considerable profits from 
shipping and trading (mainly with Java). In 1946, with the capital he had accumulated as 
a trader, he returned to Perak and invested his money in tin mining (Yoshihara, 
1988:202). In the early fifties Chong was fortunate enough to hit a motherlode and made 
a fortune in tin mining. In the 1970's he invested heavily in property development and 
hotels; (his most notable properties included the Sungei Wang Plaza and the Regent 
Hotel). In 1982 Chong acquired a publicly-listed company, plantation-based Premium
3 9 Loh’s family company, Boon Siew Sdn Bhd held a 43 per cent share of Oriental while other Loh 
companies, notably Penang Yellow Bus Company, held 5 per cent and the Bayview Hotel Sdn Bhd 
held 3.5 per cent. See KLSE Annual Companies Handbook, Vol X V I 1, Bk 2:342 & MB, 
16:6:1988.
40 On 25 February 1987 Loh Kah Kheng was strangled in his own home. A coroner's court concluded 
after extensive deliberations that the murder was planned and committed by a person/s 'very familiar' 
with Loh's house. Kah Kheng's widow and Loh Boon Siew and their respective supporters in the 
family have since contested Kah Kheng's will. Boon Siew has offered a $500,000 reward for 
information leading to the arrest and conviction of those responsible for his son's death. See, The 
Star, 19:6:1990 & 9:4:1991 and NST, 29:3:1990 & 17:4:1990.
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Holdings Bhd, which he renamed Landmarks Holdings Bhd (Yoshihara, 1988:202). 
Chong held over 50 per cent of Landmarks shares while about a third was owned by 
Bumiputra institutional investors, the largest of which was Peremba, the government- 
owned property corporation with almost 25 per cent of the company (Asiaweek, 
21:6:1987). After Chong took over Landmarks he sold the company's plantations and 
injected most of his property assets into the company. This was done in late 1983 when 
property values, including Chong's prized assets such as the Regent Hotel and Sungei 
Wang Plaza, were at a peak. So a painstakingly built well-diversified conglomerate 
became dangerously property-oriented and when property prices plunged in the recession 
of the mid-eighties, Chong lost control of Landmarks Bhd. In June 1987 ownership of 
Landmarks passed to state-owned Peremba, with former Foreign Minister, Tan Sri 
Ghazali Shafie, as chairman (The Star, 9:6:1987).
The Chong Kok Lim group’s considerable liabilities, estimated by Authur Young in 
1987 to total $922 million (The Star, 9:6:1987), were compounded by his association 
with two other property tycoons, Syed Kechik and Wong Kee Tat. The three 
businessmen had invested in a publicly-listed textile firm, Sri Hartamas Corporation, 
which they turned into a property company and, at about the same time, mid-1984, 
acquired a large parcel of land on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur valued at $300 million 
(Asiaweek, 21:6:1987). (Each of the partners had pledged his shares in the company as 
collateral to buy more property also pledged.). The value of the land was expected to 
increase dramatically after government offices were built on the site but the deal failed to 
gain official approval and all three parties incurred heavy losses. Apparently it was hoped 
that the presence of a Bumiputra business partner, Syed Kechik, as a principal owner- 
director of Sri Hartamas, would facilitate government approvals. But by the mid-eighties 
Syed Kechik had been bypassed by a new generation of Bumiputra entrepreneurs, better 
qualified and more closely connected to key UMNO leaders such as Finance Minister, 
Daim Zainuddin. Sri Hartamas' dire financial problems41 were exacerbated by Syed 
Kechik and other directors who used the company to obtain loans from Bumiputra 
Malaysia Finance BMF for the purchase of land in California, a scheme that contributed 
the massive losses suffered by BMF in what became Malaysia's greatest financial 
scandal)42 In January 1992 Chong Kok Lim was declared bankrupt (The Star, 9:1:1992)
41 See BT, 6:6:1987.
42 Syed Kechik, and other directors of Sri Hartamas borrowed US$40 million from BMF, a subsidiary 
of Bank Bumiputra, to buy land in California. Both Sri Hartamas and BMF were also incorporated in 
Hong Kong where the loan was obtained. Syed Kechik and the other directors of Sri Hartamas
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and another group representing 'old Chinese wealth' passed from Malaysia's corporate 
scene.
Conclusion
This chapter on 'old Chinese wealth' has shown how the nexus between the state and 
business has also been a key factor in the increasing variation found amongst old Chinese 
capital since NEP. The more adaptable groups have adjusted to the NEP environment by 
intensifying and broadening their relationship with the state, a process which has in turn 
facilitated access to new opportunities with the rapid expansion of the state's role in the 
economy after 1970 and as Malaysia's economy became more diversified. In the cases of 
the groups studied, the complementary character of their relationship with the state was 
illustrated by the role Kuok played as a founder-director of Bank Bumiputra, and in the 
establishment of MISC, while Lim Goh Tong was prominent in the establishment of the 
South East Asia Bank. At the same time a number of these groups have become more 
integrated into the regional and international networks of capitalist enterprise. Thus their 
very strength and diversity, partly a product of their close relationship with the state, has 
also made them less vulnerable to Malaysia's political and economic circumstances.
A feature common to all old groups however is their structure of ownership and 
control. In that regard the publicly-listed companies of old wealth such as Genting Bhd, 
Perlis Plantations Bhd and Oriental Holdings Bhd are tightly held by family-owned 
com panies.43 Bumiputra equity invariably involves state institutions such as PNB, 
FELDA or pension and savings funds such as EPF, LTAT and LUTH. Thus old wealth 
is less integrated with the new Bumiputra business groups, both in terms of capital and 
ownership, than the new groups such as Berjaya and Kamunting - whose rise after 1970 
necessitated extremely close ties with Malay capital - state, party and private.
The second element of old Chinese wealth in our survey consisted of those groups 
called 'less adaptable' - a description that derived mainly from their more formal 
relationship with the state compared to that of the adaptable groups. Considerable 
variation was found amongst the so-called less adaptable element ranging from the more
involved in the deal all defaulted on the loan which they were later ordered by Malaysia's High Court 
to repay to BMF. See ST(S), 14:8:1988.
43 Genting Bhd's principal shareholder is Lim Goh Tong's family owned company Kien Huat Realty 
which has a 30 per cent stake: Perlis Plantations principal shareholders are Kuok Brothers (29 per 
cent) while Boon Siew Sdn Bhd has a 41 per cent stake in Oriental Holdings. See KLSE, Annual 
Companies Handbook Vol XV: 154,427,457.
297
successful (See Hoy Chan, Lee Loy Seng groups and Public Bank), to those whose 
fortunes have been more mixed (Wong Kee Tat/Kuala Lumpur Industries, Loh Boon 
Siew/Oriental Holdings) or declined altogether (Chong Kok Lim/Landmarks).
The more formal relationship between the so called 'less adaptable' element of old 
wealth and the state was, as various corporate profiles indicated, also related (at least 
partly), to their structures and areas of economic activity. Many of those groups remained 
in established sectors of the economy - plantations, property, and distributorships and 
few have diversified or deepened their activities by vertical linkages - at least not on 
anything like the scale of the more adaptable groups. While such old groups are primarily 
concerned to protect and build on their often already considerable wealth, internal 
problems also contributed to their more distant relationship with the state. Increasing 
diffusion of power and, in some cases, the splitting of assets within old groups (such as 
Oriental Holdings and See Hoy Chan), precluded a more concerted or robust relationship 
with the state.
Finally, just as amongst the new Chinese groups there is a spectrum from rentiers to 
entrepreneurs, so there is amongst old wealth. Some of the 'paragons' of the 1990's, 
even including Robert Kuok exhibited, it should be recalled, some pariah-like 
characteristics thirty years ago (that is the sugar monopoly) which provided the 
foundation for later growth. At the same time other elements of old wealth who built 
solid, and in some cases diversified groups in the 1960's and 1970's became more 
'ersatz' in the 1980's as their interests increasingly focussed on property and the 
stockmarket. For some this change spelt their demise.
Chapter 11
CONCLUSION
This thesis has been concerned with change and the transformation of Malaysian 
capitalism. It has argued that 'the nexus of business, politics and the state which has been 
central to the capitalist upsurge in Southeast Asia' (McVey, 1992:9) has also been central 
to the rise of Malay capitalism and the transformation of Chinese business in Malaysia. A 
concern throughout has been to provide a sense of the dynamics between these elements 
in the development of Malaysian business groups. In that regard the study has shown 
how just as the boundaries between business, politics and the state became increasingly 
blurred in the process of creating Malay entrepreneurs, so in the Malaysian context, as 
indeed elsewhere in Southeast Asia, it is not always easy to distinguish between 'real' 
capitalists or entrepreneurs on the one hand from rent-seekers, pariah entrepreneurs, 
client capitalists and speculators, on the other. But, from this amalgam, what sort of 
capitalism and capitalists have emerged in Malaysia since the NEP? To answer that 
broader question the thesis raised and sought to answer two questions that go to the heart 
of the debate concerning the character and strength of Malaysian capitalism. We shall 
summarize our findings to each in turn, first:
Has Government manipulation created new sources of entrepreneurship or 
only fostered rentiers?
A prime goal of the NEP was the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial 
community, or Malay capitalists. However considerable controversy and debate has 
surrounded the efficacy of the means used towards that goal. As we saw at the outset, in 
varying degrees and from various standpoints scholars have expressed scepticism as to 
whether government action in Malaysia could create new sources of entrepreneurship. 
Rather, the common view is that state support has fostered rentier activity and clients 
rather than entrepreneurs. Yet the rather static and deterministic quality of such a view 
stands in marked contrast to analyses of capitalism elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region. 
In that regard a number of scholars have warned against creating sharp dichotomies 
between rent-seeking and 'true productive capitalism' or becoming too attached to such
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discrete categories as state and capital if we are not to miss the distinctive and 
evolutionary character of Southeast Asian capitalism.
In the rise of Malay capitalism it has been the very blurring of such categories as the 
state, the party and the private sector that have determined the character of Malay capital 
and provided the combustion for its growth. While recognising the considerable blurring 
and overlap between these categories in the context of the NEP, their employment in the 
study nevertheless served a useful heuristic purpose in illuminating the relationship 
between them in the development of Malaysian capitalism. Let us first consider the state's 
role.
The pattern of ethnic ownership of the economy before 1970 meant that it fell to the 
state to play a key role in extending Malay ownership over the commanding heights of the 
economy and initially to play the role of corporate nursery or 'incubator' in the 
development of Malay capitalists. Clearly the state - as the representative or 'trustee' of 
Malay capital - achieved a large measure of success in the extension of Malay ownership 
in the corporate sector. Thus, the government through Petronas indigenized control over 
Malaysia's oil and gas reserves and through MMC achieved a large measure of control 
over the tin industry, while significant shifts toward greater Malay ownership through 
government agencies also took place in modem agriculture, manufacturing and the 
banking and financial sector. But to what extent was the expansion of Malay ownership 
matched by its intended corollory, the creation of Malay capitalists? Was the new Malay 
state a catalyst for capitalism or cronyism?
In that respect the record of the state was more mixed. A variety of avenues were 
identified by which bureaucrats and state managers made a transition to the corporate 
sector. In some cases the manner of that transition had implications for the sort of 
capitalists that emerged. At one end of the spectrum were the cronies and figurehead 
capitalists. Although figurehead capitalists remained a feature of Malaysian business in 
the 1990's, their significance in terms of the symbolic functions they perform is 
diminishing. Weakness as regards 'capitalist credentials' was also apparent amongst 
those who made the transition to business as state managers-tumed-owners through 
privatisation by management buy-out (MBO) of government enterprises. So far the 
evidence suggests that MBO’s have been used as a source of patronage for well- 
connected businessmen rather than a means to promote self-reliant Bumiputra 
entrepreneurs. But the state also fostered a rapid increase in the number of Malay 
executive directors since the mid-70's to oversee and manage the huge investments made 
by trust agencies to extend Malay ownership of the economy. By the mid-1980's the
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emergence of an expanding core of Malay executive directors - whether of the 
'professional' or 'trustee' type - was identified as a necessary and important feature 
adding 'ballast' to the development of Malay capitalism. As the boundary between the 
state and business increasingly blurred with the progress of the NEP, so some state 
managers and bureaucrats made the transition to the private sector for the advisory and 
brokerage roles they could perform as functional directors. However while some 
functional directors emerged as owner-directors of companies, the role of others appeared 
more passive. Such differences could also be discerned amongst some bureaucrats- 
tumed-businessmen, that is between those who remained little more than rent-seekers on 
the one hand and others who combined technical or professional skills with state support 
to move beyond rentier origins to become entrepreneurs. But the mixed record of the state 
as catalyst for capitalism or cronyism was also mirrored by the party, which itself became 
a promoter of Malay capitalists.
The extraordinary growth of UMNO's corporate investments in the eighties first 
through the Fleet Group, then Hatibudi and finally Renong, meant that the party itself 
also played an important role in the expansion of Malay ownership and the promotion of 
Bumiputra capitalists. The shift from the state to the party in that regard arose from 
changes that were structural, political and personal. In the wake of the recesssion of the 
mid-eighties economic pressures for a check on the expansion of the state sector 
coincided with changing attitudes in UMNO as to the role of the state in the expansion of 
Malay ownership of the economy. This change was symbolised by the transfer of power 
to Dr Mahathir as Prime Minister and the growing influence of the Malay business elite 
within UMNO where its members began exerting pressure on the government for greater 
business opportunities by curtailing public sector expansion and effecting a more rapid 
transfer of assets to the private sector.
The growing influence of the emerging Bumiputra business elite within UMNO was 
epitomised by the appointment of Daim Zainuddin as Finance Minster in July 1984. The 
significance of Daim's appointment was that he brought to government a view that no 
longer saw the spheres of state, party or private interests as distinct entities, whether in 
the expansion of UMNO's corporate interests or in the promotion of Bumiputra 
capitalists. But what were the implications of the blurring of those categories for the 
development of political capitalists and what sort of capitalists were they?
Political capitalists were divided into two broad groups, politicians who became 
businessmen and UMNO's proxy capitalists who also became businessmen. Not only 
were the origins of the two groups different but so was their capacity to move beyond the
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networks of patronage that initially sponsored them. A characteristic of politicians-turned- 
businessmen was their static nature as their very dependency on patronage further 
encouraged a form of capital accumulation that was narrowly-based and geared to short 
time horizons. The 'catch 22' situation of politicians-turned-businessmen, mostly 
rentiers, was in contrast to the greater diversity found amongst UMNO's proxy capitalists 
whose corporate experience and connections - gained in the course of managing 
UMNO's investments and/or at some points through enmeshing their own private 
corporate interests with those of the party - was the key to their capacity to become 
capitalists.
But UMNO's record as a corporate nursery or ‘incubator’ for this group of capitalists 
was also mixed. There were some who remained proxies, although as owner-directors 
and executive-professional directors of some of Malaysia's largest companies they 
nevertheless wielded considerable influence in corporate circles. Another group of 
UMNO proxy capitalists-cum-businessmen included those whose corporate fortunes 
were also closely linked with those of the party and whose rise in business owed much to 
the fusion of party and private roles. Generally speaking, however, while members of 
this group had made some advances as capitalists, their capacity to develop beyond 
UMNO's patronage networks as free-standing entities appeared limited. In short, while 
the merging of political and private roles was responsible for their rise, beyond a certain 
point that relationship also appeared to be a restraining factor in their further development 
as more independent and robust capitalists. But, at the same time, from the networks of 
party patronage there also emerged that important group of young Malay professionals, 
the 'Peremba graduates' who clearly demonstrated a capacity to build on rather than 
remain dependent on networks of party and state patronage. As members of this group 
rose and their capital, became more closely integrated with Chinese and/or foreign capital, 
their relationship with those elements, and the state, took on a more complementary rather 
than clientelistic character.
The spectrum of capitalistic development found amongst 'political capitalists' was 
also apparent amongst those Bumiputra businessmen whose origins and growth was 
largely based in the private sector. The status of individuals as rentier, transitional or 
entrepreneur also involved the evolution of their relationships with networks of state and 
party patronage on the one hand and generally, though not always, with Chinese or 
foreign capital on the other. Again a striking contrast between the two extremes, rentiers 
and entrepreneurs, lay in how the very intimacy of state/party links distorted and 
ultim ately constrained the development of the former whereas the latter, the 
entrepreneurs, combined the initial advantages of state support with skills as bankers or
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technocrats to consolidate early gains (from the stockmarket or government contracts) to 
develop strong groups in banking and manufacturing.
So, has government manipulation created new sources of entrepreneurship or only 
fostered rentiers? This study has shown that just as there has been a blurring of the 
categories of state, party and private in the development of Malay capitalism so from that 
amalgam has emerged both rent-seekers and entrepreneurs and many groups between the 
two. But just as in the case of Indonesia where Robison (1990:36) has identified a core 
of productive investment emerging within the cocoon of primitive accumulation and rent- 
seeking, this study has also identified such a core within Malay capitalism. In our 
analysis of Malay business groups, whether from a ’state', 'party' or 'private' 
perspective entrepreneurs who had emerged from commercial capitalists, speculators and 
rent-seekers were identified. The most prominent included Shahrani Hj Abdullah 
(Shapadu), Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah (Land and General), Samsuddin Abu Hassan 
(Landmarks), Tajuddin Ramli (Technology Resources), Ishak Ismail (Grand Care), 
Rashid Hussain (Rashid Hussain Bhd), Azman Hashim (Arab-Malaysia) and Samsuddin 
Abdul Kadir (Sapura). The existence and development of such groups would suggest 
some revision of the view that since the origins of Malay capital were often based, at least 
initially, on the twin props of strong links to political power and Malaysia's moderately 
high growth rates, such origins would necessarily lead to a form of capitalism that was 
parisitic and dependent rather than robust and resilient. In that respect this study has 
identified the complex interaction between the state, party and business as the source of 
dynamism or defeat in the development of Malay capitalists. Clearly, however, 
significant changes are taking place in those relationships, while at the same time more 
Bumiputra groups are developing a greater independence of patronage. These changes 
suggest that it is imperative that we keep our view of the nature of Malay capitalism open 
to revision.
Just as this study has sought to indicate that the growth of Malay capitalism is more 
variegated than generally supposed, so our survey of Malaysian capitalism has also 
sought to illuminate the change and transformation occurring among Chinese business 
groups. Linking those chapters of the thesis was the question -
Have Malaysia's political circumstances trapped Chinese businessmen 
into dependency relationships similar in kind if not degree to Riggs' 
pariah entrepreneurs?
To answer that question the focus throughout our survey of Chinese business groups 
was on the nexus of the state and business because it was argued that that nexus has been
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central not only to the growth and character of Malay capitalism but, since the 
introduction of the NEP, to the growth of Chinese capitalism as well. After contrasting 
the close relationship of the government and UMNO in the expansion of Malay 
ownership with the suspicion and obstruction that MPH's 'group' or 'institutional' 
approach aroused in UMNO when it attempted to mobilise resources on behalf of the 
Chinese community, our survey turned to the response of the large Chinese business 
firms who have eschewed such a group or communal response to the NEP. In our 
analysis of Chinese business groups significant differences were found between 'old' 
groups and 'new' groups, both in terms of their relations with the state and with the new 
Bumiputra business groups.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the new Chinese business groups were the points 
of similarity between them and the rising Bumiputra business groups, both in their 
origins and their movement across a spectrum from rentiers to entrepreneurs. In the 
evolution of these groups there was both an economic and political dimension to their 
relationships with the state and Bumiputra capital. On the 'economic' side the rapid 
growth of the new Chinese groups was facilitated by the backing of the state's regulatory 
authorities, as well as often-generous patronage from the government's privatisation 
program which enabled a small number to make the quantum jump to conglomerate 
status. Another important aspect concerning the development of 'new groups' was the 
extent to which their capital, and at some points ownership, became closely intertwined 
with Bumiputra capital - state, party (UMNO) and private. (This was a principal point of 
difference between the new and old Chinese groups since the latter achieved Bumiputra 
equity and participation mainly through state institutions or pension funds.) A 'political' 
dimension was equally important to the rise of the new groups. In that respect it was 
notable how in the course of their growth an often complex mix of interests - political, 
corporate and personal - were served. Yet as these groups evolved, their inter-dependent 
relationships with the state and Malay capital increasingly defied easy categorisation and 
terms such as patrons or clients, pariahs or patrons no longer accurately portrayed the 
multiplicity of roles their leaders performed.
The nexus between the state and business was also identified as a key factor in the 
variation found amongst old Chinese capital - that is between the 'surviving,' and the 
'declining' old groups. The more adaptable groups who had adjusted to the changed 
circumstances of the NEP by seeking a more engaged relationship with the state had also 
benefitted in terms of business opportunities. The complementary character of their 
relationship with the state and the UMNO leadership was in stark contrast to that of the 
declining groups, an increasingly small proportion of the Chinese business elite whose
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principal sphere of political activity was, or remained, confined to the Chinese Chambers 
of Commerce. The political and economic marginalization of these groups was also 
exacerbated by other factors, notably the increasing diffusion of power and wealth within 
them.
Stepping back from the often considerable detail provided in our case studies of 
Chinese groups, new and old, what are the points of difference in this study with some 
of the scholarly writings on the subject referred to earlier? Perhaps particularly pertinent 
in that regard was Heng Peck Koon's (1992) rather pessimistic assessment in the mid­
eighties of the relationship between the state and Chinese business. Heng, it will be 
recalled, was inclined to the view that Malaysia's political circumstances were likely to 
trap Chinese business in dependency relationships of the pariah sort. She concluded 
(Heng, 1992:127-28) that even the "success stories" that is those groups who have 
formed close and profitable alliances with Malay patrons, may 'merely reflect a 
transitional phase, or (from the perspective of the Malay power structure) a temporary 
"alliance of convenience" which serves as a necessary half-way station en route to 
complete Malay and foreign dominance of the major economic institutions of the 
country.' Jesudason's observation (1990:160) that 'the critical point is that the Malay 
state elite and Chinese business have viewed each other in zero-sum terms and have gone 
on divergent paths in their economic activites' implied a no less pessimistic conclusion.
But does this seem the case in the 1990's? Rather the contrary. Indeed the most 
striking feature of the new Chinese groups was the extent to which their capital was 
integrated with Bumiputra capital and the interdependence of that relationship. Similarly, 
amongst the old Chinese groups relations with the state have taken on an increasingly 
complementary rather than competitive character. Further, from the perspective of the 
mid-nineties it appears that the degree of integration and mutual interdependence of 
Chinese and Malay business groups (at least those studied) is likely to add new ballast in 
the amelioration of ethnic differences. Finally, at a general level, our survey of Chinese 
business, particularly the new groups, challenges a common view that Chinese capital is 
completely different to Malay capital. There are clear differences but, as noted earlier, 
increasingly there are important points of similarity - in the manner of their growth, their 
relations with the state and the UMNO leadership, and their credentials as capitalists.
In conclusion three general points emerge from our study of Malaysian capitalism. 
First, analyses in the 1980s which have described the relationship between the state and 
Chinese (as well as foreign) capital in Malaysia as discrete entities, and in antipathetical 
terms, no longer seem appropriate to the more complex and complementary character of
305
those categories in the 1990s. Secondly, in our examination of Malaysian business 
groups, an erosion of ethnic exclusivity and identity was apparent as both economic 
interests and cultural forces brought together Chinese and Bumiputra elites in pursuit of 
common goals. In other words, in many of the groups studied, capital - whether the 
state, Chinese or Bumiputra - not only lost its face but also its colour. Finally, this study 
has argued against drawing sharp contrasts between dependency and self-reliance, 
between state and capital, and between rent-seekers and true productive capitalists. For it 
was from that amalgam of categories and groups that this study has shown a form of 
capitalism emerging in Malaysia which nonetheless appears remarkably dynamic, vibrant 
and resilient despite its unorthodox origins.
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Appendix 2.1:
Peninsular Malaysia: Ethnie Structure of Population, 1911-1957 
(Percentage of Populations)
Census Year
Race 1911 1921 1931 1947 1957 1970 1980
Bumiputras 59 54 49 50 50 53 55
Chinese 30 29 34 38 37 36 34
Indians 10 15 15 11 11 11 10
Sources: Lim, C.Y., (1967, Table 7:5);
Appendix 2.2:
Foreign Ownership in the Malaysian Economy, 1970
Share Capital
MS'OOO Foreign %
Agriculture (1,432,400) (75.4)
Rubber 1,134,163 77.7
Oil Palm)
Coconut) 298,237 66.8
Tea )
Mining (543,497) (72.5)
Tin 434,477 71.5
Other 109,020 76.4
M anufacturing 1,348,245 59.6
Construction 58,419 34.1
Transport 81,887 12.0
Trade (605,164) (63.6)
Wholesale 450,593 70.1
Retail 154,571 44.5
Financial Sector (636,850) (52.3)
Banks 93,549 35.2
Insurance 7,670 55.3
Other 535,631 55.2
Other Industries 582,516 31.4
Total 5,288,978 60.7
Source: Adapted from Lutz and Tan, 1980:215.
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